Only if the helmsman was using a non followup control. With followup steering if you put the lever/wheel in neutral position the rudder goes to amidship. Not perfect because without the rudder indicator there is no position confirmation. There is a simple selector switch on the console to shift from FU to NFU.
The wheel on a sailboat with a turk’s head straight up is a followup system without a rudder angle indicator. Good enough for Cook, Drake and Nelson.
Not in a restricted channel where bank effect is a factor. In Houston I could use the autopilot on tugs towing, but not pushing and it worked on small ships - say less than 100m. Even then, if the small ship was loaded to her marks it was dubious.
I remember some years ago reading or hearing about a ship with shaft generator that suffered a breakdown of their main engine.
They managed to limp to a safe port/anchorage by using the shaft generator as a motor, with power supplied by the generators.
In this case they had to disconnect the shaft from the M/Eng, but I believe it is now a more common thing to use the shaft generator as booster motor these days.
Thanks Mr. 244. You certainly do and definitely very observant! In researching these large Korean built container vessels, I am reasonably certain that it is high voltage. Most likely 6.6 kV. With the approx. 16 MW of power generation I think the vessel may be fitted with about a 1000 reefer outlets (7-8 kW each). So, many transformers required for reefers and a couple (100% redundant) for the essential loads. Essential loads for operating the main engine and all other consumers including the Bridge, accommodation, galley, etc will be around 1.5 MW only. Bow thruster (3000 kW) most likely is same voltage and directly fed from the high voltage board.
Just thinking out load here. I think they had a case of double jeopardy (concurrent equipment failure) or a consequential effect that knocked out critical equipment. Blackout due to a fault (most likely electrical) and in turn this blackout resulted in the steering gear damage. The quick recovery from the blackout corroborates the electrical fault theory. And the ME electronic engine where there is no lost time in camshaft/reversing links/starting air distributor to re-position, reversing is almost instantaneous. Braking air and as soon as the prop turns astern about 15 rpm air off and fuel on. Excessive black smoke is due to turbos not yet upto speed to provide sufficient air for the demand rpm. You see the timing of the first blackout also seems reasonable when the Bridge would announce they are done with the Thruster. And when they get the ME started and realize no steering they ask for the BT again as a last ditch effort. And the second blackout when they energize the BT breaker in the engine room.
Generally in the marine industry no failure modes analysis or workshops are conducted and for sure double jeopardy or freak incidents will not be considered. Got to be patient for the NTSB report!
BTW, I also saw a news item about Hyundai shipyard with an approval in principle from DnV GL class for a new electrical generation and distribution design. Most likely they may revert to 440V rather than the high voltage.
Mr. Ombugge
Indeed correct on the shaft generator that can be a motor to provide some additional power to the shaft such that the main engine can operate at the rated rpm without overloading. Used frequently to maintain schedule on container ships. Big pain for the engineers as they need to operate all the diesel generators.
Hello 244
I saw your query regarding potential failure of the steering gear. As a new user looks like I am limited to 3 replies only and as such could not respond to your post directly. Please see my post 301 for some explanation. Although the reasoning for the failure is valid, now that we know the size/capacity of the generators, and the likelihood that they are high voltage, I do not think the SG pump could have caused the blackout, but rather a fault on a breaker on the high voltage board. As I mentioned earlier, could be an issue with the BT breaker.
Can someone point out how a VTS would have prevented the situation in Baltimore? Or what VTS could have done that the pilots didn’t do? It wasn’t traffic that caused the allision.
This isn’t meant to be a snarky dig at our fearless leader, I just genuinely don’t understand what VTS would have done differently.
A VTS in itself could not have prevented the Dali allision from happening, but they can significantly lighten the task loading that the pilot had - calling for tugs, calling to shut down bridge traffic, etc. Reportedly, there were two pilots in this case (though I’ve heard one was actually an apprentice) so those tasks could have been delegated to the non-conning pilot.
But assume for a minute that there is only one pilot - A well-run VTS with solid SOP’s and operators can take care of these things, thus allowing the pilot to focus on the situation in front of him and handle the ship.
However, the major difference in this case vs the NY one is simply that the tugs are kept through the KVK and were at the ready to assist. A VTS (NY or otherwise) has nothing to do with that.
The only way a Baltimore VTS might have made a difference is they if they:
(1) had routine drills for potential bridge strikes, and
(2) had a button in VTS that they could push that would immediately sound a bridge alarm and close entrance gates on the bridge.
There is a reason why there is no VTS in Chesapeake Bay: the needs did not justify the cost.
Now, maybe they need to reconsider whether the cost of VTS might be justified.
San Francisco Bay has VTS, but that didn’t prevent the Cosco Busan with a pilot aboard from side swiping the Bay Bridge span support.
VTS may have been helpful in The Qingdoa incident in NY, mainly by directing other traffic to stand clear.
Powerful escort tugs saved the day. Escort tugs are the first thing to spend money on to protect bridges and other infrastructure. (It won’t add more than a nickel per container to shipping costs).