Martin, who license-built the Canberra in the US were one of the contestants in the design competition with a variation on it. But Lockheed designed the U2 based on an earlier Lockheed design.
Officials at Lockheed Aircraft Corporation heard about the project and decided to submit an unsolicited proposal. To save weight and increase altitude, Lockheed executive John Carter suggested that the design eliminate landing gear and not attempt to meet combat load factors for the airframe. The company asked Clarence “Kelly” Johnson to come up with such a design. Johnson was Lockheed’s best aeronautical engineer,[12] responsible for the P-38 and the P-80. He was also known for completing projects ahead of schedule, working in a separate division of the company, informally called the “Skunk Works”.[13]
Original U-2A at USAF Museum
Johnson’s design, named CL-282, was based on the Lockheed XF-104 with long, slender wings and a shortened fuselage. The design was powered by the General Electric J73 engine and took off from a special cart and landed on its belly. It could reach an altitude of 73,000 feet (22,300 m) and had a 1,600 mi (1,400 nmi; 2,600 km) radius.[14] The reconnaissance aircraft was essentially a jet-powered glider. In June 1954, the USAF rejected the design in favor of the Bell X-16 and the modified B-57. Reasons included the lack of landing gear, use of the J73 engine instead of the more proven Pratt & Whitney J57 used by the competing designs, and not using multiple engines, which the USAF believed to be more reliable. General Curtis LeMay of Strategic Air Command (SAC) walked out during a CL-282 presentation, saying that he was not interested in an airplane without wheels or guns.[15]
Approval[edit]
Civilian officials including Trevor Gardner, an aide to Secretary of the Air Force Harold E. Talbott, were more positive about the CL-282 because of its higher potential altitude and smaller radar cross-section, and recommended the design to the Central Intelligence Agency’s Office of Scientific Intelligence. At that time, the CIA depended on the military for overflights, and Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles favored human over technical intelligence-gathering methods. However, the Intelligence Systems Panel, a civilian group advising the USAF and CIA on aerial reconnaissance, had recognized by 1954 that the RB-57D would not meet the 70,000 feet (21,300 m) requirement that panel member Allen F. Donovan of Cornell Aeronautical Laboratory believed was necessary for safety. The CIA told the panel about the CL-282. The design elements that the USAF considered to be flaws (the single-engine and light load factor) appealed to Donovan. He was a sailplane enthusiast who believed that a sailplane was the type of high-altitude aircraft the panel was seeking.[16]
