Deepwater Horizon - Transocean Oil Rig Fire

Offshore
4141

First, I have no source of inside information about the relief well and am relying solely on published data from any source I can find. There is actually a lot of data on BP’s web site if you are willing to dig around for it.

Second, I am a geologist and not a driller. Everything I know about drilling I have learned from reading, not doing.

With that said, here’s what I’ve seen and what I would predict:BP’s published plan calls for an intercept at around 18,000 feet, well above the porous zones. They reported they were at around 16,000 feet a week ago and drilling ahead. Looking at the drilling rates they’ve achieved puts the first try at an intercept right around now. Once they know they are close, and use the magnetometer results to pick a kickoff point, they will probably take a couple of days to set more casing to
<add’l content snipped for brevity - see Geodudes OP>

The thanks, button seems to be inop - but…Thanks!

4142

[QUOTE=geodude;38208]First, I have no source of inside information about the relief well and am relying solely on published data from any source I can find. There is actually a lot of data on BP’s web site if you are willing to dig around for it.

Second, I am a geologist and not a driller. Everything I know about drilling I have learned from reading, not doing.

With that said, here’s what I’ve seen and what I would predict:

BP’s published plan calls for an intercept at around 18,000 feet, well above the porous zones. They reported they were at around 16,000 feet a week ago and drilling ahead. Looking at the drilling rates they’ve achieved puts the first try at an intercept right around now. Once they know they are close, and use the magnetometer results to pick a kickoff point, they will probably take a couple of days to set more casing to the kickoff point to give themselves maximum flexibility in mud weights for the kill attempts.

I have not seen any published pressure data from the relief well, but based on their approach during the topkill attempt I suspect this kill operation will start with mud weights appropriate for a soft kill (minimal chance of doing more damage to the original wellbore). They know the formation pressures from the first well, and can correct the needed density for the loss of riser height. I suspect they learned enough from the top kill attempt to know what kinds of pressures it took to keep the oil in the formation. I would imagine they will use a similar pressure, corrected for the extra distance downhole, and start there. They will probably let the well spout mud for a while to be sure they’ve fully evacuated the lighter fluids and are not seeing any oil flow. Once they are comfortable they have the well completely filled with mud they will try to slow down and then stop the pumping to see if they have succeeded in creating a static condition. Only then can they cap the original hole and inject cement through the relief well.

If the well does not go static and resumes flowing after the first try then they will keep trying with denser and denser mud until it stops. If the porous zones downhole suck up a lot of mud so that they are actually taking losses when the pumps stop - the original hole starts sucking down fluids - then they will treat it like any other lost circulation problem during drilling and mud down until it stops the losses and goes static.

The whole operation should take a few days, but very little oil should be flowing from the formation once they start pumping.

Also, I have yet to see any evidence that the BOP is listing any more than when the riser torqued it during the initial rig sinking. As such, I see no reason to be concerned about this in the next few weeks. All the measurements they were taking appear to me to have been aimed at perfecting the design of the LMRP cap seal. I’m sure they would be anchoring the BOP with massive tethers of they were worried about it falling over.

As for the flow rate, I think everyone would agree that it is dramatically less when they are sucking out 28K barrels a day than when the cap was off, making me suspect the flow is somewhere near 35K barrels a day. When the cap is off it is gushing like a jet engine exhaust. When the cap was first placed on the flex joint, the downward jets went way down into the valve assembly before turning up (just look at the distance the stains go down the pipes) and the cap was bouncing like a rodeo bull. When they are pumping at full capacity, the cap is rock steady and there isn’t even any outflow on the downhill side. The flow out the uphill side is just barely coming around the lip before floating upwards. I suspect they are at the technical limit of their ability to suck up oil without drawing seawater into the cap, which would risk hydrate ice formation in the system.

As for my comments about the government stepping up to its responsibility in this whole affair, I do not think there is anything they can do but let BP handle the kill operations with oversight. The government has no expertise to match that in the industry and no other company is going to touch this thing with the proverbial 10 foot pole. Exxon’s CEO has admitted that they can think of nothing they would have done very differently than BP did to try to stop the deepwater blowout. The other companies have not said they could stop the leak, they have only said that their policies would never have let this happen in the first place (but I’m sure even BP can claim that).

What I meant was taking over the cleanup effort. BP is in a challenging spot. They are not Americans and are struggling to deal with our bureaucracy. They certainly don’t want to proactively cause any more harm or their liability just goes up. So they tiptoe around placing booms and raking beaches. What’s needed is for the US government to step in and wage a war on the spilled oil. All hands on deck. All available people and all available resources brought to bear as quickly as possible. A lot of that can be done without oil company help.

I just find it pitifully sad that our political system makes it easier for them to simply point fingers at BP for its failings in the cleanup rather than actually stepping in and doing the right thing for the people of the Gulf. I fear that their election year calculus is that it will be easier to take a hands-off approach and blame BP than it would be to take the more appropriate hands-on approach and risk getting a few things wrong and getting some local people pissed at them. They want this to stay BP’s problem for political reasons and fear that action on their part would morph it into their problem. Yes, stick BP with the bill, but get after it for God’s sake! I’m already pissed at them for not waging this war to save our own shores when they are clearly so interested in fighting big wars “over there”. This smacks of raw politics by a ruling party that knows they are not winning any of the Gulf states this fall and are only willing to do the minimal photo ops for the base back home.

Sorry, I’m starting to sound like some of the rants that have almost turned me away from this site. Forgive my lapse into venting.[/QUOTE]
I hope your right on the well kill. I absolutely agree on the political footbal being played at the expense of the gulf coast & Obama will pay for that.
I can’t agree on the condition of the stack. It certainly appears to be leaning some 15 degrees to me. I didn’t even pay attention to it at first because it appeared straight, but now, it looks bad to me. Waiting & hoping, but certainly not over expecting on this one right now.

4143

[QUOTE=alcor;38211]Are you asking what action should have been taken following the failed Testing and volume inconsistencies? Is that your question?[/QUOTE]

My question is do you have proof that BP consulted Anadarko on their negligent activities?
My explanation is BP’s negligence caused this disaster.

4144

[QUOTE=alcor;38209]I worked in the Us for 12 months. Loved it. Love the country, love the low taxes. Hated the food. All the cereal has added sugar.[/QUOTE]
Where was it?

4145

[QUOTE=geodude;38208]First, I have no source of inside information about the relief well and am relying solely on published data from any source I can find. There is actually a lot of data on BP’s web site if you are willing to dig around for it.

Second, I am a geologist and not a driller. Everything I know about drilling I have learned from reading, not doing.

With that said, here’s what I’ve seen and what I would predict:

BP’s published plan calls for an intercept at around 18,000 feet, well above the porous zones. They reported they were at around 16,000 feet a week ago and drilling ahead. Looking at the drilling rates they’ve achieved puts the first try at an intercept right around now. Once they know they are close, and use the magnetometer results to pick a kickoff point, they will probably take a couple of days to set more casing to the kickoff point to give themselves maximum flexibility in mud weights for the kill attempts.

I have not seen any published pressure data from the relief well, but based on their approach during the topkill attempt I suspect this kill operation will start with mud weights appropriate for a soft kill (minimal chance of doing more damage to the original wellbore). They know the formation pressures from the first well, and can correct the needed density for the loss of riser height. I suspect they learned enough from the top kill attempt to know what kinds of pressures it took to keep the oil in the formation. I would imagine they will use a similar pressure, corrected for the extra distance downhole, and start there. They will probably let the well spout mud for a while to be sure they’ve fully evacuated the lighter fluids and are not seeing any oil flow. Once they are comfortable they have the well completely filled with mud they will try to slow down and then stop the pumping to see if they have succeeded in creating a static condition. Only then can they cap the original hole and inject cement through the relief well.

If the well does not go static and resumes flowing after the first try then they will keep trying with denser and denser mud until it stops. If the porous zones downhole suck up a lot of mud so that they are actually taking losses when the pumps stop - the original hole starts sucking down fluids - then they will treat it like any other lost circulation problem during drilling and mud down until it stops the losses and goes static.

The whole operation should take a few days, but very little oil should be flowing from the formation once they start pumping.

Also, I have yet to see any evidence that the BOP is listing any more than when the riser torqued it during the initial rig sinking. As such, I see no reason to be concerned about this in the next few weeks. All the measurements they were taking appear to me to have been aimed at perfecting the design of the LMRP cap seal. I’m sure they would be anchoring the BOP with massive tethers of they were worried about it falling over.

As for the flow rate, I think everyone would agree that it is dramatically less when they are sucking out 28K barrels a day than when the cap was off, making me suspect the flow is somewhere near 35K barrels a day. When the cap is off it is gushing like a jet engine exhaust. When the cap was first placed on the flex joint, the downward jets went way down into the valve assembly before turning up (just look at the distance the stains go down the pipes) and the cap was bouncing like a rodeo bull. When they are pumping at full capacity, the cap is rock steady and there isn’t even any outflow on the downhill side. The flow out the uphill side is just barely coming around the lip before floating upwards. I suspect they are at the technical limit of their ability to suck up oil without drawing seawater into the cap, which would risk hydrate ice formation in the system.

As for my comments about the government stepping up to its responsibility in this whole affair, I do not think there is anything they can do but let BP handle the kill operations with oversight. The government has no expertise to match that in the industry and no other company is going to touch this thing with the proverbial 10 foot pole. Exxon’s CEO has admitted that they can think of nothing they would have done very differently than BP did to try to stop the deepwater blowout. The other companies have not said they could stop the leak, they have only said that their policies would never have let this happen in the first place (but I’m sure even BP can claim that).

What I meant was taking over the cleanup effort. BP is in a challenging spot. They are not Americans and are struggling to deal with our bureaucracy. They certainly don’t want to proactively cause any more harm or their liability just goes up. So they tiptoe around placing booms and raking beaches. What’s needed is for the US government to step in and wage a war on the spilled oil. All hands on deck. All available people and all available resources brought to bear as quickly as possible. A lot of that can be done without oil company help.

I just find it pitifully sad that our political system makes it easier for them to simply point fingers at BP for its failings in the cleanup rather than actually stepping in and doing the right thing for the people of the Gulf. I fear that their election year calculus is that it will be easier to take a hands-off approach and blame BP than it would be to take the more appropriate hands-on approach and risk getting a few things wrong and getting some local people pissed at them. They want this to stay BP’s problem for political reasons and fear that action on their part would morph it into their problem. Yes, stick BP with the bill, but get after it for God’s sake! I’m already pissed at them for not waging this war to save our own shores when they are clearly so interested in fighting big wars “over there”. This smacks of raw politics by a ruling party that knows they are not winning any of the Gulf states this fall and are only willing to do the minimal photo ops for the base back home.

Sorry, I’m starting to sound like some of the rants that have almost turned me away from this site. Forgive my lapse into venting.[/QUOTE]

Thank you for your perspective. It is brilliant. It is fair and neutral. Above all, it is common sense analysis and highly illuminating. Thank you.

4146

Here’s a good article, cm1 on the "leaning tower of pisa’’ http://georgewashington2.blogspot.com/2010/06/bps-blowout-preventer-is-leaning-and.html

4147

[QUOTE=company man 1;38192]We still haven’t heard what the company men have to say. I would think considering Alcor’s attitude, that BP is planning to shove it all off on the comapany man/men. Getting him/them to talk with a plea bargain should be pretty easy right about now. Once the dominoes start to fall it won’t take long before there’s a parade going into the U.S. attorney’s office. That is IF the U. S. attorney hasn’t been bought off by now.[/QUOTE]

Let’s see…they can cooperate with Justice and live on Social Security, or continue pleading the 5th and retire with a full pension plu in Switzerland. Which choice do you think they will take? (I guarantee you Vidrine will “relocate” out of Lafayette.)

4148

[QUOTE=company man 1;38214]My question is do you have proof that BP consulted Anadarko on their negligent activities?
My explanation is BP’s negligence caused this disaster.[/QUOTE]

Anardarko, have had more than 60 days to present their case. They’re running scared. They invested in the plans to develop an exploration well. If they wanted to take all the risk they’d have invested solely. They’re protecting their interests as best they see fit. BP, were nominated to run this well.
It’s quite impossible to perform an operation where all parties are consulted on an hourly basis. The rigs would be sitting idle. You surprise me, you ought to know that much as an apparent Co Man. All parties were aware of the change of well category, from exploration to production. They’d have been delighted at that point. As to the completion string, it’s a common GOM routine. But that wasn’t the failure. The failure was the control of well fluid volumes and pressure.

4149

[QUOTE=OldHondoHand;38219]Let’s see…they can cooperate with Justice and live on Social Security, or continue pleading the 5th and retire with a full pension plu in Switzerland. Which choice do you think they will take? (I guarantee you Vidrine will “relocate” out of Lafayette.)[/QUOTE]

Absolutely correct. 5th is admission of guilt in my book and shows no consideration for the 11 victims.

4150

[QUOTE=rlanasa;38147]We must also consider today and at least for the next decade there are more blocks ready to drill offshore than there are deep sea rigs to drill them. The rigs are put in service over the reservoir where the investors thinks they can earn the greatest return at the lowest risk. If we raise the safety bar too high or make the penalties for violations too great the rigs will go elsewhere. How would you life or neighborer change without GOM drilling? Once those rigs leave they will never come back. Building new rigs will take a decade or more if you can find anyone willing to make the investment for the new US safety requirements.

How many US flagged super takers are there in operation today?[/QUOTE]

Economics are always a consideration; in this Macondo well, if they indeed had a deeper prospect they could have drilled deeper with a 6” or 6 1/8" bit on the 3-1/2” D.P., but the thought of a 5” F.J. liner maybe wasn’t too appealing, and they decided to stop spending money, even though now if they ever want to go deeper after this zone is depleted there will be additional problematic geomechanics to deal with when drilling through the depleted zone at greater expense because they didn’t incur the expense NOW.

I can’t conceive that a nickel a barrel add’l finding cost is burdening a 100 million barrel reservoir. But new rigs are being built right now with some of these features that will move to the GoM, lots of rigs in Brazil already have SBOPs. New wellheads on new drills would be a problem? New risers? What?

You’re right, drilling will continue in the GoM even before a lot of new hardware is retrofitted on older rigs, what is probably happening now is just positioning to see who is distanced in the event lightening strikes twice before safety from lessons learned is implemented. It could be 10 days, it could be 10 years.

The Mechanics of Blowouts and How to Control Them
T. B. O’BRIEN Gulf Oil Corp… Houston, Texas.
AND W. C. GOINs, JR. Gulf Research and Development Co., Hamarville, Pa.
Presented by T. B. O’Brien at the spring meeting of the Southern District, Division of Production, San Antonio, Texas, March 1960. References are at the end of the paper.

ABSTRACT
Much has been written previously about blowouts, their causes, the equipment used, how to put out fires, and other points concerned with the hazards involved; but each writer, after a good start, has said, “put the well on choke and raise the mud weight.” The subject work not only gives a method for determining the choke size and mud weight required, but tells how to handle drilling breaks and what action to take when a blowout threatens during a trip.

Calculations are made to show initial flow rates caused by kicks of varying intensity. Several interesting conclusions are drawn from the results of these calculations. The possibility of reverse circulation for killing blowouts is discussed.

A method for killing threatened blowouts is given. This is a step-by-step procedure which, if followed, gives the simplest positive control of the well at all times. Minimum pressures are maintained and a mini mum time is required to kill the well. The method has been field-tested by the authors and others, and has been found practical.

INTRODUCTION
Much has been written on blowouts — their causes, equipment types, and arrangements for handling, how to put out fires, and other points concerned with the hazards involved; but each one has said, after a good start, “put the well on a choke and raise the mud weight.” No one has said how much to raise the mud weight or what size choke to use.

In the field there is a considerable lack of understanding about the mechanics of a threatened blowout, and practically no knowledge of how to kill one. This is clearly illustrated by the usual statement that “nothing happened except that all of a sudden, the well was blowing gas.” Of course, the word “blowout” strikes fear in the mind of everyone in an oil company from roughneck to chairman of the board. The roughneck fears for his life, the board chairman for his company’s bank account. As a result, very few blowouts are approached rationally; and there is a strong tendency among rig personnel to leave the rig rather than to analyze the situation and correct it. It is believed that this fear stems from the lack of knowledge on the part of those concerned with drilling wells.

A study has been made of a number of conditions which lead to blowouts and a method for the correction of each is proposed, leaving little to guesswork. Calculations are made which show the rate of gain of mud (inflow of foreign fluid) resulting from kicks of varying intensity and the significance of each rate is discussed. The work of a number of writers is drawn from, but particularly that of Bell inasmuch as his is the most comprehensive published to date.

GENERAL
Blowout prevention is not a matter of the number of valves in the preventer system, their arrangement, or the ability of people to operate them. Although these things — along with a number of techniques — are important, they are not the prime essential. Blowout prevention is a frame of mind existing throughout the drilling crew and supervisory staff. A determination on the part of the operator’s management to eliminate blowouts is far more valuable than the addition of several pieces of equipment to control blowouts.

Equipment is much like insurance in the prevention of blowouts. The greater the risk to life and property, the greater the expense required to offset the risk. Little consideration is given here to equipment, except to say that if an item is installed it should be suitable for the job it is to perform and it should be in good working order. That is, blowout preventers should have pressure ratings equal to or greater than any pressure expected in the well being drilled, but they need not be stronger than the casing on which they are installed. Further, at sufficiently frequent intervals, all equipment should be operated and tested. Tests are particularly important after breaking any joint subject to pressure.

The particular items assembled as blowout preventers or the manner in which they are arranged is not so important. Each person has his own idea as to what should be used ant how it should be used. Within reasonable limits this is not a bad situation, except for the extra cost to the operator because of the contractor having to maintain extra material. New arrangements are often developed in this fashion.

Farmer and Jones state that more lives and money can be saved by practical training of crews than in any other manner. As far as rig operation is concerned this is quite true, but training must go beyond the rig; it must go on into company policy. It is true that such policy in general gives lip service to the practice of blowout prevention, but in many cases the policy is devoid of “teeth.” There are two periods in which time is most critical from management’s point of view. First, when a contract is being negotiated there is a tendency to belittle the possibility of blowouts in an effort to get a lower price. Second, when drilling slows down, time lost in operation and testing of blowout preventers becomes more important than does the possibility of a blowout.

In either case we are looking at dollars, as we ale when there is a suggestion that time be set aside for training personnel. Company policy about the problem is always reflected on the rig. It is believed necessary that management be certain the supervisory and operating personnel understand and know how to control threatened blowouts. Further, it would he desirable to have it well understood that no unnecessary chances are to be taken either with the condition of equipment or with operation of the well.

This is not meant as a recommendation that preparations for drilling each well be elaborate to the point of excess. But, by having a general knowledge of conditions to be expected in a well, the individual making the plans can select a satisfactory rig having a crew that is competent to handle the problems that will arise. In selecting the rig he should make it a point to see the rig in operation if possible. This would give him a chance to observe both the equipment and crew in operation. A simulated kick might be arranged to see how it is handled by the crew…. (Continues)….
4151

[QUOTE=company man 1;38213]I hope your right on the well kill. I absolutely agree on the political footbal being played at the expense of the gulf coast & Obama will pay for that.
I can’t agree on the condition of the stack. It certainly appears to be leaning some 15 degrees to me. I didn’t even pay attention to it at first because it appeared straight, but now, it looks bad to me. Waiting & hoping, but certainly not over expecting on this one right now.[/QUOTE]

How would you know if the stack is leaning 15 degrees? It would have toppled over by now. This is misinformation.

4152

geodude, thanks for your input. I would like to share this: I got very ticked off when I saw pictures, of clean up workers, using what they called " absororbant pads’ to soak up an ocean full of oil sludge. How insulting to our intelligence!!! Those pads are good for soaking up a max of 800cc, that’s approx a little less than a quart of fluid. And, on top of that the clean up workers are not wearing “respirators” to protect their lungs from the toxic fumes, of the corexic dispersant. And, the poor suckers, hired, are F;;;g so desperate to support their families, they 'll do anything the “BOss” says…Yes Master, what ever you say, master. Can I wipe your ass master, with my absorbant pad. ??? How disrespectful to our citizens.

4153

[I]But, one thing can be said in their favour. They have put every resource possible into combatting the shoreline invasion of oil.

[/I]NO, Alcor, they have not! I have seen numerous shows on TV where various companies have demonstrated oil absorbing products THAT WORK. There are warehouses full of these products, a couple are on the Gulf shores, several in the NE and a couple out West. These products have been approved by the EPA so they could be used IMMEDIATELY. The company owners/reps have contacted BP and, guess what, NO FRICKIN’ RESPONSE! Now, they are putting every resource possible in recovering the oil shooting out of the ocean floor, but the are damn sure NOT doing everything possible to protect the shoreline.

I am SO SICK of reading post after post after post from you defending these criminal sacks of shit with arms, I could just puke.

If we had someone in the WH with some balls instead of that incompetent, clueless, moron - who took a boatload of $$$$ from BP - then I would be willing to bet he/she would light a fire under BP’s ass and they actually would be doing everything possible. Hell, I could do a better job of cleaning up the shoreline than Obama and BP.

BP better grab all that oil they can because I can guarantee you, they’re gonna need every penny they can get their hands on and then some.` They can sell every freaking asset they have, down to the last bar of soap and roll of toilet paper, and they will NEVER have enough to pay for the lives - human and animal - they have destroyed.

I am sorry for the people that work for BP (except those involved in this train wreck - they belong in jail). The BP employees aren’t to blame and they also will suffer for the foolishness of those that were in such a hurry they couldn’t do things RIGHT! And, also the shareholders - certainly not their fault and they will also suffer. Just hope the lady that works with my sister and had BP in her retirement portfolio sold that crap like I suggested a couple of days after the blowout. Nobody in their right mind would buy it now, except fools like you that think this company has to or will survive. I don’t think they will survive this, nor do I think they should!

End of rant - til I read another dozen posts of yours defending these jerks, then I’m liable to go off again!

4154

[QUOTE=alcor;38220]Anardarko, have had more than 60 days to present their case. They’re running scared. They invested in the plans to develop an exploration well. If they wanted to take all the risk they’d have invested solely. They’re protecting their interests as best they see fit. BP, were nominated to run this well.
It’s quite impossible to perform an operation where all parties are consulted on an hourly basis. The rigs would be sitting idle. You surprise me, you ought to know that much as an apparent Co Man. All parties were aware of the change of well category, from exploration to production. They’d have been delighted at that point. As to the completion string, it’s a common GOM routine. But that wasn’t the failure. The failure was the control of well fluid volumes and pressure.[/QUOTE]
Them changing the well category from exploration to production doesn’t have a fu…ing thing to do with the shitty way they did the final casing design. It also doesn’t have anything to do with the way they ignored Halliburton & your stupid arrogant ass knows that. They waited until they had enough knowledge of what was going on to make their statement. As to the tapered string you fucking murdering bastard you goddamn well it was the cause of this disaster & it sure as hell isn’t commonly run the way they ranit you fucking piece of shit murderer. I hope God strikes your fucking ass dead tonight you lowlife mother fuckef. Your a lying bastard. You, Tony, & Lord Brown go suck each others cock’s til you all catch AIDS & die you queer murdering fucking pigs. Fuck you. I’d stomp your goddamn ass in the ground if you were here you piece of shit. They’re gonna run me for this, but I don’t care because you are a piece of shit & your fucking company is going to hang for the murder of eleven in the gulf & 16 more in Texas you lowlife piece of shit.

4155

[QUOTE=rlanasa;38147]We must also consider today and at least for the next decade there are more blocks ready to drill offshore than there are deep sea rigs to drill them. The rigs are put in service over the reservoir where the investors thinks they can earn the greatest return at the lowest risk. If we raise the safety bar too high or make the penalties for violations too great the rigs will go elsewhere. How would you life or neighborer change without GOM drilling? Once those rigs leave they will never come back. Building new rigs will take a decade or more if you can find anyone willing to make the investment for the new US safety requirements.

How many US flagged super takers are there in operation today?[/QUOTE]

Correction: Once these rigs leave (which they, hate to say it, probably will), they will come back when the economic case justifies it. Come on, rlanasa, you [I]know[/I] that!

4156

[QUOTE=company man 1;38228]Them changing the well category from exploration to production doesn’t have a fu…ing thing to do with the shitty way they did the final casing design. It also doesn’t have anything to do with the way they ignored Halliburton & your stupid arrogant ass knows that. They waited until they had enough knowledge of what was going on to make their statement. As to the tapered string you fucking murdering bastard you goddamn well it was the cause of this disaster & it sure as hell isn’t commonly run the way they ranit you fucking piece of shit murderer. I hope God strikes your fucking ass dead tonight you lowlife mother fuckef. Your a lying bastard. You, Tony, & Lord Brown go suck each others cock’s til you all catch AIDS & die you queer murdering fucking pigs. Fuck you. I’d stomp your goddamn ass in the ground if you were here you piece of shit. They’re gonna run me for this, but I don’t care because you are a piece of shit & your fucking company is going to hang for the murder of eleven in the gulf & 16 more in Texas you lowlife piece of shit.[/QUOTE]

I’d imagine you’ll be run off for entirely different reasons. And, it’s not my company. I have nothing to do with them. My interests lie in the fact that I’m not prepared to watch you spread misinformation.

4157

[QUOTE=alcor;38206]I can assure you that all of your fellow conspirators on this thread have been questioning your information and early judgement. You may not hear it yet, but it’s coming. I imagine they are wise enough to reflect on the content of my postings. At least, they challenge your assertions. The interesting part is that I don’t have an army of consultants and advisers around me. I have my knowledge and expertise of the industry.[/QUOTE]

As someone who found this thread at a point when my knowledge of the deepwater drilling industry was [U]completely[/U] non-existent, I can say that one person, cm1, has adjusted his thinking as new evidence, information, scenarios have come in. Another person chooses to rant about monitoring pressures when some of the scenarios that he himself has posted acknowledged that, with the likely nature of the failure, that wouldn’t have, really, in the final analysis, helped. Also, another person refuses to acknowledge pertinent questions that would undermine his single-minded presentation, and keeps beating the same drum regardless. With [I][U]that[/U][/I] said, I’m going to follow my own advice from last night.

4158

[QUOTE=use2be;38227][I]But, one thing can be said in their favour. They have put every resource possible into combatting the shoreline invasion of oil.

[/I]NO, Alcor, they have not! I have seen numerous shows on TV where various companies have demonstrated oil absorbing products THAT WORK. There are warehouses full of these products, a couple are on the Gulf shores, several in the NE and a couple out West. These products have been approved by the EPA so they could be used IMMEDIATELY. The company owners/reps have contacted BP and, guess what, NO FRICKIN’ RESPONSE! Now, they are putting every resource possible in recovering the oil shooting out of the ocean floor, but the are damn sure NOT doing everything possible to protect the shoreline.

I am SO SICK of reading post after post after post from you defending these criminal sacks of shit with arms, I could just puke.

If we had someone in the WH with some balls instead of that incompetent, clueless, moron - who took a boatload of $$$$ from BP - then I would be willing to bet he/she would light a fire under BP’s ass and they actually would be doing everything possible. Hell, I could do a better job of cleaning up the shoreline than Obama and BP.

BP better grab all that oil they can because I can guarantee you, they’re gonna need every penny they can get their hands on and then some.` They can sell every freaking asset they have, down to the last bar of soap and roll of toilet paper, and they will NEVER have enough to pay for the lives - human and animal - they have destroyed.

I am sorry for the people that work for BP (except those involved in this train wreck - they belong in jail). The BP employees aren’t to blame and they also will suffer for the foolishness of those that were in such a hurry they couldn’t do things RIGHT! And, also the shareholders - certainly not their fault and they will also suffer. Just hope the lady that works with my sister and had BP in her retirement portfolio sold that crap like I suggested a couple of days after the blowout. Nobody in their right mind would buy it now, except fools like you that think this company has to or will survive. I don’t think they will survive this, nor do I think they should!

End of rant - til I read another dozen posts of yours defending these jerks, then I’m liable to go off again![/QUOTE]

I’m not defending anyone. I’m telling you how the well could have been saved. No GOM environmental disaster. If this is not explored then no-one learns anything.

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Sort of… The cost in time, day rate and transit is enormousness. Once they arrive on their new station they will stay there until the work drys up or the risk to stay their is too great. Once one of these rigs is off Brazil, Africa, ect they change of them leaving is very very small. That is why the thoughtful leaders say “once they leaver they are never coming back” Remember these rigs have days rates of +/-$500K and moving them takes months.

[QUOTE=dell;38229]Correction: Once these rigs leave (which they, hate to say it, probably will), they will come back when the economic case justifies it. Come on, rlanasa, you [I]know[/I] that![/QUOTE]

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[QUOTE=dell;38100]alf,

I think quite a few of us have put, perhaps, too much focus on criminal action (I understand why you do, not criticizing, but it results in taking your eye off the ball that [I][U]is[/U][/I] motivating all corporate parties at this point). The legal and crisis management teams are focused on ‘managing’ joint and several liability. See: http://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/joint+and+several+liability

So, as soon as one company admits to any blame, then that company may as well go straight into Chapter 7 liquidation under the Bankruptcy Code. [I][U]That’s[/U][/I] why–not any confidentiality agreements, which circumstances have overridden (or you would treat them that way if it was in your company’s interest)–everyone but BP has, nearly entirely, been maintaining radio silence.[/QUOTE]

I don’t think my eye has strayed too far, yet. Thanks Dell for your far better explanation of this compared to my oversimplified “go straight to jail” analogy.