BP had admitted along with Thad Allen that the BOP is leaning, They hope the lean is from torque when the riser came down, Remember the BOP is connected to thousands of feet of casing that is at least partially cemented in. What I have not scene is any evidence that the heal has increased since day one? Anybody?
[QUOTE=alcor;38223]How would you know if the stack is leaning 15 degrees? It would have toppled over by now. This is misinformation.[/QUOTE]
“[I]Q: Do you have any signs that the—there’s erosion? In other words, that the existing containment gear, the blowout preventer, et cetera, are failing in any way that could lead to a larger and larger flow? In other words, that you could be chasing a moving target in terms of flow?
ADMIRAL ALLEN: Nothing that we’re familiar with at this point. The entire arrangement is kind of listed a little bit. I think it’s 10 or 12 degrees off perpendicular so it’s not quite straight up. And that causes a little bit of a challenge in sealing this containment cap in the rubber seals around it.
But none that I’m aware of, but we will double check that. If there’s any change to that, we’ll make an announcement by tomorrow. But I think—I don’t think we have any indication that’s going on.[/I]”
[QUOTE=rlanasa;38155]What would you have the junior engineers plead guilty to as part of a plea bargain?[/QUOTE]
Well, duh, yeah they would plead–to at least some part of whatever the prosecutors charged them with. That you even ask suggest that you aren’t very familiar with the way federal prosecutors and federal prosecutions work these days. They have a whole panoply of magnificently broad crimes with which to charge and, in the actual practice, there is a [I][U]considerable[/U][/I] element of extortion.
I’m sorry, but the statement that the entire company isn’t responsible is a problem. I don’t have the data in front of me, but a comparison of the number of fines for failure to follow necessary safety procedures, including repairing equipment that had failed or was about to fail indicates that the entire company has been infected for some time with a kind of negligent homicide virus. First, there is the attitude at the top that encourages risky negligent behavior and then there are the actors lower down who demand it, and finally the poor stiff at the bottom who do the bidding of those above. Some of these behaviors are only under the control of those above, some aren’t. When one starts talking about a company that is so totally infected with a set of attitudes that values profit over elementary safety, we are talking about a corporate citizen that cannot be trusted to continue to be involved in work where there are many risks. Is there anyone who realistically believes that BP should continue to drill in GOM? If you do, go find the reports on the BP pipeline in Alaska where they have been repeatedly fined for failing to maintain the most basic maintenance and this failure resulted in oils leaks. And when you finishe reading those reports, look at the other reports that compare BP’s operation with other major oil companies - you will find that they have been fined at rates approaching 100 time the rates of other companies (Exon/Mobile for instance).
Yes, it will be a sad day for many when BP is shut down. But most of the people who are employed worldwide will continue to work - the assets of the company will not disappear. The reality is that this corporation needs to have its head cut off, that’s the only way that the lower units can continue to function. The attitudes of the company hierachery have been detailed in many articles and demonstrated by the data of their actual practices (anyone can publish excellent “best practices” just as they have, but who cares if they don’t dollow them from the top down?). Ahh well, enough I’m learning about oil well drilling. What I know about already is human behavior and I would say that BP must not survive
[QUOTE=rlanasa;38236]BP had admitted along with Thad Allen that the BOP is leaning, They hope the lean is from torque when the riser came down, Remember the BOP is connected to thousands of feet of casing that is at least partially cemented in. What I have not scene is any evidence that the heal has increased since day one? Anybody?[/QUOTE]
Agreed, but 15 degrees??? That’s a judgement made from a sofa!!!
[QUOTE=alcor;38164]Not true. This is misguided nonsense. When partners get together it is agreed which one shall perform the operation, all planning and execution. Naturally, the partners would have had an interest in the development of the well. Purely financial. BP was responsible for the execution of the well. This is quite normal throughout the world. The well design was changed and met with MMS approval. The partners had no reason to be alarmed.
Decisions on the rig changed this outlook completely. And, anyone informed in town. When you invest, you take risks. If that involves risk with the drilling contractor, all partners assume the same risk for profit or loss.[/QUOTE]
Sorry, Alcor, minority or junior partners neither usually assume, nor are required to assume that the majority, senior partner will act recklessly, contrary to all standards and norms. Want me to research the cases establishing that point–and in what jurisdiction?
Also, we note that fast shuffle between Anadarko’s knowledge and approval and MMS’s. Nice try–no cigar.
[QUOTE=company man 1;38159]With all due respect pumping jack I disagree with some of your statements. If all the other operators wer going at it as carelessly as BP has, don’t you think more would have emerged by now. Sure they all had the same response plan, but the similarities pretty much end right there. Do you have a lick of evidence to back up the claims that the other big companies are corner cutting & buying back stock instead of paying dividends? I guess 80% of the people I know are in the oil/ petrochemical industry & without a doubt BP’s name gets mentioned as much as all the other guys combined by people when safety & environmental issues come up. Are there industry & governmental improvements that should be addressed from this disaster? No doubt there are, but to say there is an industry wide practice of corner cutting to this degree is absolutely false. I have been working almost exclusively in the GOM all my adult life & if I thought for one second the other operators were anywhere near this wreckless & arrogant, I would be looking for other work right now while screaming to the top of my lungs that deep water drilling should never be allowed again. I have good friends who work for Anadarko & they were not allowed to have any say in this project. I can tell you for a first hand fact that they don’t operate this way. Now they stand a chance of going under over this mess, because a well design they approved of as a partner was changed at the eleventh hour & they weren’t even consulted about it.[/QUOTE]
Boss Man, I’m not sure I exactly said everything that you disagree with what I said, did I? But…. I do understand the context you put everything in…. I repeat that no GoM operator has a worst case scenario response plan, and if we looked at their memos and emails we would probably see they have all cut corners, and I offered up an example to refute. And I put BP corporate psyche on the couch to explain why this happened to them.
I am assuming that Anadarko is what they call a sophisticated investor and had access to all the info you do about BP and so must have known everything that you do when they decided to take their 25% interest.
I received the info about ExxonMobil from my CFA (Chartered Financial Analyst), here’s what was said
“Here is a report from Bloomberg on the current debt raising rumors.
They note “The total average yield on its debt rose to an average 7
percent last week, from 2.34 percent on April 19, Bank of America
Merrill Lynch indexes show” so a jumbo bond would surely need to be
issued above 7%. I also attached a summary of BP vs peers on a variety
of metrics, sorted by operating margin (OPM:Y). Using last years
results BP’s margins are below mega-cap peers Total, Exxon and Chevron
but above Connoco and Royal Dutch. I also included their div payout
ratio which is the second highest vs peers, and higher than XOM who as I
mentioned yesterday favors buying back shares over dividends. Also have
the most recent short interest chart. Looks like shorts have been
closing on the name as the stock falls.“
[QUOTE=Docbradd;38238]I’m sorry, but the statement that the entire company isn’t responsible is a problem. I don’t have the data in front of me, but a comparison of the number of fines for failure to follow necessary safety procedures, including repairing equipment that had failed or was about to fail indicates that the entire company has been infected for some time with a kind of negligent homicide virus. First, there is the attitude at the top that encourages risky negligent behavior and then there are the actors lower down who demand it, and finally the poor stiff at the bottom who do the bidding of those above. Some of these behaviors are only under the control of those above, some aren’t. When one starts talking about a company that is so totally infected with a set of attitudes that values profit over elementary safety, we are talking about a corporate citizen that cannot be trusted to continue to be involved in work where there are many risks. Is there anyone who realistically believes that BP should continue to drill in GOM? If you do, go find the reports on the BP pipeline in Alaska where they have been repeatedly fined for failing to maintain the most basic maintenance and this failure resulted in oils leaks. And when you finishe reading those reports, look at the other reports that compare BP’s operation with other major oil companies - you will find that they have been fined at rates approaching 100 time the rates of other companies (Exon/Mobile for instance).
Yes, it will be a sad day for many when BP is shut down. But most of the people who are employed worldwide will continue to work - the assets of the company will not disappear. The reality is that this corporation needs to have its head cut off, that’s the only way that the lower units can continue to function. The attitudes of the company hierachery have been detailed in many articles and demonstrated by the data of their actual practices (anyone can publish excellent “best practices” just as they have, but who cares if they don’t dollow them from the top down?). Ahh well, enough I’m learning about oil well drilling. What I know about already is human behavior and I would say that BP must not survive[/QUOTE]
What you must recognise is that certain individuals within the company steered the ship off course in the case of this one well. Eventually, you’ll find that a company man offshore made inadequate decisions or related inadequate data to town. How we go about changing this is another matter altogether. But, what we can say, without the mumbo jumbo and cut to the tail, is that there are failures in the system that Gov’t bodies have allowed to exist. If a Gov’t body approves a lease to develop a well they better have more interest than the background dollar income. They need to understand that a loose cannon may be making decisions against Operator’s standards. How do we proceed from here?
[QUOTE=alcor;38250]Agreed, but 15 degrees??? That’s a judgement made from a sofa!!![/QUOTE]
Here is what Thad said:
[I]Q: Do you have any signs that the—there’s erosion? In other words, that the existing containment gear, the blowout preventer, et cetera, are failing in any way that could lead to a larger and larger flow? In other words, that you could be chasing a moving target in terms of flow?
ADMIRAL ALLEN: Nothing that we’re familiar with at this point. The entire arrangement is kind of listed a little bit. I think it’s 10 or 12 degrees off perpendicular so it’s not quite straight up. And that causes a little bit of a challenge in sealing this containment cap in the rubber seals around it.
But none that I’m aware of, but we will double check that. If there’s any change to that, we’ll make an announcement by tomorrow. But I think—I don’t think we have any indication that’s going on.[/I]
There are 2x photos taken 10th June. There is also an explanation of those 2x photos quote “
I can confirm that the parts in question look like ours and would be manufactured at our plant here in Scotland. The top picture is of a 0-2 degree slope indicator with 0.5 degree increments and the bottom one is a 0-5 degree with 1 degree increments. Going by the picture I would say the overall diameter of the slope indicator would be 350mm diameter.”
The above pics etc were more than 2 weeks ago. Since then we have been told (USCG) the BOP is now leaning 10-12 degrees!
So the BOP looks like it has moved from approx 3 degrees to 12 degrees in 2 weeks.
The question that really needs clarifying is are they talking about the BOP or the Flex joint angle? (Remember that the Flex joint is designed to move like a ball joint)
[QUOTE=dell;38252]Sorry, Alcor, minority or junior partners neither usually assume, nor are required to assume that the majority, senior partner will act recklessly, contrary to all standards and norms. Want me to research the cases establishing that point–and in what jurisdiction?
Also, we note that fast shuffle between Anadarko’s knowledge and approval and MMS’s. Nice try–no cigar.[/QUOTE]
The point is that nothing was wreckless. The casing was set. Whether the cement failed is immaterial. Cement fails in wells all over the world. The point is this: Did the Seal Assy fail testing? Yes, it did. And, the OIM on the rig knew this. He raised his ‘Concerns’ vehemently. This was not accepted by the all powerful Co Man. But, all is not lost, there are more signs from the well that something is amiss. And still, the well was not closed in.
You need to understand that the silence of TO doesn’t mean that they aren’t culpable. I would imagine BP don’t want to undermine the dilemma facing the company because of the current requirement to kill the well through relief efforts.
[QUOTE=alcor;38197]They won’t plea bargain. They’ll pay for the spill. But TO will be responsible for the rest.[/QUOTE]
TO’s responses were subsequent to the cause ie: THE ROOT CAUSE - BP. The following has been borrowed from a co -contributor from an earlier post - my apologies I can’t remember who it was that made this post, but it was such music to my ears that I decided to make a copy of it. BP will be held accountable for :-
The change of casing design from a two cased system with 4 barriers between the zone of interest to prevent an uncontrolled release of hydrocarbons into the GOM.Responsible parties- BP did not donsider the likelihood that this would not give proper safety & control over Macondo#1 by reason of isolation. BP for reasoning that it was more important to save time & money than it was to assure these barriers were in place. BP for not understanding that their own previously run safety features such as rupture discs placed in the intermediate casing could be turned into flow paths to allow for unconrolled flow outside of any predetermined barriers, thereby making it much more unlikely that a relief well would be able to kill the well in the event of a worst case scenario. MMS for rubber stamping permission to run this redesign as well as taking many other shortcuts without proper review of design changes & the possible effects of this redesign & other changes in a worst case scenario.
The lack of proper centralization between the production casing & the wall of the well bore to ensure proper offset by the casing to allow for the proper amount of cement placement to ensure proper bonding & prevent channeling of hydrocarbons from the zone of interest up the casing annuli in an uncontroled manner. BP for totally disregarding the implied strong recommendations of its cementing vendor that the well would be subject to sever gas flow problems. BP for deciding that it was more financially feasible to not run available centrailzers due to the time & excess money it would cost to install recommended centralizers.
The possible contamination of cement designed to bond casing to the well bore wall & contain hydrocarbons in place as the primary source of well control BP for disregarding its own procedures by reason of not explicitly following instructions written on its cementing procedure. BP for not circulating a complete hole volume before pumping cement as instructed in writing by procedure based on the fact the string took extra slack off weight to get the casing string to bottom.
The very highly likely loss of cement bond strength to the casing & well bore wall due to premature pressuring up of casing, causing casing to swell by reason of hydrostatic pressure imposed by extra volume placed into casing by premature pressure tests. BP ignored the recommendations of its cement vendor when the vendor had run laboratory simulations of the effects of temperature & hydrostatic conditions on the cement placed on it by hole conditions. BP ignored these recommendations which were to allow the cement time to gain sufficient compressibility strength of 1500 PSI over 48 hours to ensure pressure testing would not crack the cement by virtue of swelling the casing due to said pressure testing procedures. Instead initial tests were done 10.5 hours after cementing was completed to save 38 hours of rig time.
There was no casing cement bond log run to prove the bonding strength to the casing & well bore walls. This was in direct violation of BP’s own instructions which approved by MMS as well as recommendations of its cement vendor in writing days before the actual cement job occured. BP for not following its own recommendations, the recommendations of the MMS, & the recommendations of its cement vendor.
The premature displacement of kill weight mud from some 3300’ below the BOPs to the BOPs before testing the casing seal assembly for integrity. BP representatives on the rig recieved instructions from the Houston office to prematurely displace 3300’ of kill weight mud prior to testing well head caing seal as well as annular seal of zone of interest. This assumed that tests would pass even before they were conducted.
The possible failure of positive & negative testing on the well head casing seal & the annulus of the isolation barrier of cement. BP’s representatives possibly proceeded to instruct its vendor TO to displace well based upon results of failed tests on such barriers. TO for allowing BP to place its rig & personnel in danger by virtue of allowing the continuation of such activities to continue after the results of such possibilities existed.
The insufficient testing of critical barriers designed to isolate the well & maintain well control. BP for not using standardized recommendations of its vendors, the API, & its own standard practices as set forth in its own safety manuals. TO for allowing BP to depart from API standards in its tesing procedures thereby endangering its rig & its employees from the possible uncontrolled release of hydrocarbons on its location.
The premature removal of most or all of the location’s kill weight mud in the event of the release of hydrocarbons. BP for departing from API standard practices a guide lines as enforced by MMS edict. TO for following BP instructions to remove a critical well control device while not having absolute proof of passed tests combined with a final cement barrier in the well.
There was no lock down ring installed on top of the well head production casing hanger. BP for prematurely displacing the well to an underbalance condition without having a critical component in place to assist in holding down the production casing & thereby holding a seal in the annulus. TO for allowing BP to instruct them to displace the well prematurely without having all possible pressure control devises in place for proper well control thereby exposing its rig & personnel in danger due to an uncontrolled release of hydrocarbons on their rig.
I can not comment on BOP status due to the lack of properly disclosed information by BP & TO. There are too many possibilities for the cause of failure of this system to make an educated response at this time. One has to trust that with co-culprits on location together, they will balance each other out in finding out the root cause of the failure of this system.
Failure to disclose proper & pertinent information to allow for proper response planning & action to take place since this occurrence.
[QUOTE=Cynthia;38184]Cool. No need to make busy work, nor to issue requierments that no one can meet. I just got the feeling you were waving off any adjustments to regs. One problem with this blowout, maybe, is that regs were hedged, so that needs to be addressed too. Exactly what the regs should be a [B][I]huge[/I][/B] conversation, and that is what lobbyists are for.[/QUOTE]
Cynthia,
Usually I’m with you, but yikes is your apolitical stance showing on this one. The conversation about what the regs should be should happen right [B][I]here[/I][/B]; later, the lawyers can go in and write them up. NOT ON K STREET!! Guess what BP’s lobbyist wants the regs to be? Come on! Re-read this: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/06/20/AR2010062003168_pf.html Would you rather the future of the regs be in the hands of the people on this board or [I]THEM[/I]?!? Who would do a better job–your or http://www.whorunsgov.com/Profiles/Tony_Podesta?
[I]I cannot imagine a jury deciding anyone on DWH or its chain of command was expecting to or trying to hurt someone.
[/I]Oh really? If I was on the jury and Jason Anderson’s wife was on the witness stand describing how he wrote a will, taught her how to do the things she needed to do and got his affairs in order, I would think he had a reasonable expectation that he might be killed and wouldn’t have a bit of problem voting guilty/
[QUOTE=BLISTERS;38258]TO’s responses were subsequent to the cause ie: THE ROOT CAUSE - BP. The following has been borrowed from a co -contributor from an earlier post - my apologies I can’t remember who it was that made this post, but it was such music to my ears that I decided to make a copy of it. BP will be held accountable for :-
The change of casing design from a two cased system with 4 barriers between the zone of interest to prevent an uncontrolled release of hydrocarbons into the GOM.Responsible parties- BP did not donsider the likelihood that this would not give proper safety & control over Macondo#1 by reason of isolation. BP for reasoning that it was more important to save time & money than it was to assure these barriers were in place. BP for not understanding that their own previously run safety features such as rupture discs placed in the intermediate casing could be turned into flow paths to allow for unconrolled flow outside of any predetermined barriers, thereby making it much more unlikely that a relief well would be able to kill the well in the event of a worst case scenario. MMS for rubber stamping permission to run this redesign as well as taking many other shortcuts without proper review of design changes & the possible effects of this redesign & other changes in a worst case scenario.
The lack of proper centralization between the production casing & the wall of the well bore to ensure proper offset by the casing to allow for the proper amount of cement placement to ensure proper bonding & prevent channeling of hydrocarbons from the zone of interest up the casing annuli in an uncontroled manner. BP for totally disregarding the implied strong recommendations of its cementing vendor that the well would be subject to sever gas flow problems. BP for deciding that it was more financially feasible to not run available centrailzers due to the time & excess money it would cost to install recommended centralizers.
The possible contamination of cement designed to bond casing to the well bore wall & contain hydrocarbons in place as the primary source of well control BP for disregarding its own procedures by reason of not explicitly following instructions written on its cementing procedure. BP for not circulating a complete hole volume before pumping cement as instructed in writing by procedure based on the fact the string took extra slack off weight to get the casing string to bottom.
The very highly likely loss of cement bond strength to the casing & well bore wall due to premature pressuring up of casing, causing casing to swell by reason of hydrostatic pressure imposed by extra volume placed into casing by premature pressure tests. BP ignored the recommendations of its cement vendor when the vendor had run laboratory simulations of the effects of temperature & hydrostatic conditions on the cement placed on it by hole conditions. BP ignored these recommendations which were to allow the cement time to gain sufficient compressibility strength of 1500 PSI over 48 hours to ensure pressure testing would not crack the cement by virtue of swelling the casing due to said pressure testing procedures. Instead initial tests were done 10.5 hours after cementing was completed to save 38 hours of rig time.
There was no casing cement bond log run to prove the bonding strength to the casing & well bore walls. This was in direct violation of BP’s own instructions which approved by MMS as well as recommendations of its cement vendor in writing days before the actual cement job occured. BP for not following its own recommendations, the recommendations of the MMS, & the recommendations of its cement vendor.
The premature displacement of kill weight mud from some 3300’ below the BOPs to the BOPs before testing the casing seal assembly for integrity. BP representatives on the rig recieved instructions from the Houston office to prematurely displace 3300’ of kill weight mud prior to testing well head caing seal as well as annular seal of zone of interest. This assumed that tests would pass even before they were conducted.
The possible failure of positive & negative testing on the well head casing seal & the annulus of the isolation barrier of cement. BP’s representatives possibly proceeded to instruct its vendor TO to displace well based upon results of failed tests on such barriers. TO for allowing BP to place its rig & personnel in danger by virtue of allowing the continuation of such activities to continue after the results of such possibilities existed.
The insufficient testing of critical barriers designed to isolate the well & maintain well control. BP for not using standardized recommendations of its vendors, the API, & its own standard practices as set forth in its own safety manuals. TO for allowing BP to depart from API standards in its tesing procedures thereby endangering its rig & its employees from the possible uncontrolled release of hydrocarbons on its location.
The premature removal of most or all of the location’s kill weight mud in the event of the release of hydrocarbons. BP for departing from API standard practices a guide lines as enforced by MMS edict. TO for following BP instructions to remove a critical well control device while not having absolute proof of passed tests combined with a final cement barrier in the well.
There was no lock down ring installed on top of the well head production casing hanger. BP for prematurely displacing the well to an underbalance condition without having a critical component in place to assist in holding down the production casing & thereby holding a seal in the annulus. TO for allowing BP to instruct them to displace the well prematurely without having all possible pressure control devises in place for proper well control thereby exposing its rig & personnel in danger due to an uncontrolled release of hydrocarbons on their rig.
I can not comment on BOP status due to the lack of properly disclosed information by BP & TO. There are too many possibilities for the cause of failure of this system to make an educated response at this time. One has to trust that with co-culprits on location together, they will balance each other out in finding out the root cause of the failure of this system.
Failure to disclose proper & pertinent information to allow for proper response planning & action to take place since this occurrence.[/QUOTE]
Rubbish! TO have a responsibility to interpret volume and pressure changes and react accrodingly. Shut the BOP if any anomalies occur. Quite elementary. That is their fundamental requirement.
Don’t know if you have the power, but weak you sure are. Too weak to face the truth starring in your face. In constant denial and suffering from attention deficit which explains how come you are compelled to dedicate so much of time at harping over and over like a fundamentalist. Caution: the anger and frustration you harbor might burn a hole in you. Now go and get some sleep child, least you chuck another tantrum here for the rest of the world to see.
[QUOTE=alcor;38202]I realise you’ve spent a lot of time planning the demise of BP. Problem is this: I won’t let you run your mouth off to people who don’t know the industry. This is misinformation to suit your needs. And, I will piss anybody off who advances invalid information. This is my power. I have expertise.[/QUOTE]
Don’t know if you have the power, but weak you sure are. Too weak to face the truth starring in your face. In constant denial and suffering from attention deficit which explains how come you are compelled to dedicate so much of time at harping over and over like a fundamentalist. Caution: the anger and frustration you harbor might burn a hole in you. Now go and get some sleep least you chuck another tantrum here for the rest of the world to see.
Umm, before my head explodes, could, like, everyone stop opining, let alone hyperventilating, about applicable (?) federal criminal law? If y’all don’t, I commit that I will retaliate as follows: I will post my opinions on annulars and casing and well design principles and cementing and pressures. I have learned just enough to very dangerous, and I promise, your heads would then all explode TOO.
Federal criminal law is a quite abstruse area, one with which I’m only very slightly familiar. I would expect, when we look back on this tragic, sorry episode a decade from now, most of the people will have gone to jail for rather mundane things like filing false statements with the MMS.
[QUOTE=BLISTERS;38262]Don’t know if you have the power, but weak you sure are. Too weak to face the truth starring in your face. In constant denial and suffering from attention deficit which explains how come you are compelled to dedicate so much of time at harping over and over like a fundamentalist. Caution: the anger and frustration you harbor might burn a hole in you. Now go and get some sleep child, least you chuck another tantrum here for the rest of the world to see.[/QUOTE]
Ok, I’ll sleep. But, I won’t let your efforts to relieve those of their part in this outcome be addressed. Try and explore the TO role in all of this.
[QUOTE=dell;38264]Umm, before my head explodes, could, like, everyone stop opining, let alone hyperventilating, about applicable (?) federal criminal law? If y’all don’t, I commit that I will retaliate as follows: I will post my opinions on annulars and casing and well design principles and cementing and pressures. I have learned just enough to very dangerous, and I promise, your heads would then all explode TOO.
Federal criminal law is a quite abstruse area, one with which I’m only very slightly familiar. I would expect, when we look back on this tragic, sorry episode a decade from now, most of the people will have gone to jail for rather mundane things like filing false statements with the MMS.[/QUOTE]
So, where would you direct us in order to get your pound of flesh?