[QUOTE=captobie;109450]Having sailed on both sides, another big problem I saw was the tendency of navy OOD’s to always act as though they are the give way vessel. It’s weird, because the stereotype we frequently have of the navy is that they never answer the radio and they never get out of the way, but most of the OOD’s I served with felt the same way of the big ships they encountered. So rather than letting the rules do their job, they felt they needed to proactively take action in every circumstance.
The thing I kept asking myself when listening to the audio was “why are they turning left?” Without knowing more details of the situation, my first reaction was that if they needed to turn left to avoid the traffic then they were likely the stand-on vessel. I wish the audio was longer so we could have heard more about how the situation developed.[/QUOTE]
I agree. wish there was more info available,because I was asking the same question. I certainly hope there was a very good reason which precluded a turn to starboard. It was also just barely over 60 seconds from the time the first 5 short were sounded until the collision. Probably way to late for it to help anything.
[QUOTE=valvanuz;109435]Obviously, there is confusion on who is really in charge either the CO or the OOD.
French grey Navy rules are clear: on the bridge, the OOD is in charge, even if the CO is present. If the CO is on the bridge, he can provide advice and the OOD may request advice but the OOD remains fully in charge.
If a situation becomes difficult, two things may happen:
• The CO can take over navigation at any moment. It is a formal statement: [I]“Le Commandant prend la manoeuvre”[/I] “This is the CO, I take over the nav”. This is written in the Log book. The OOD remains in charge of the watch.
• The OOD may request the CO to take over navigation. This is also a formal statement that must be acknowledged by the CO: [I]“Commandant, je vous demande de prendre la manoeuvre”[/I] “This is the OOD, CO, I ask you to take over the nav” “This is the CO, I take over the nav”. This is written in the Log Book. The OOD remains in charge of the watch.
When situation returns to normal, the nav is given back formally to the OOD.[/QUOTE]
The MINUTE the CO gave a command - the bridge was HIS. Period. End of sentence. “CAPTAIN HAS THE CONN” should have been heard LOUD AND CLEAR and all would have acknowledged. When satisfied he should have passed the CONN back to whoever’s job it was and carried on. I’m not defending ANYBODY but I have yet to be aboard a Navy ship (and I’ve been aboard MORE than anyone here) where that wasn’t the case. And THAT transition should have been more black and white than it was here. OOD/NAV tried to interject early on and and CO bullied him quiet. Other mistakes not withstanding if they’d kept their speed on they JUST might squeaked by - slowing to 5 was the nail in the coffin for me BUT I am completely unfamiliar with the lay out over there and haven’t looked at any nav tracks - not sure if there was any room on the other side of the guy they hit.
Don’t want to hijack the thread, but what kind of training do the guys on conn have as a swo in way of ship handling, nav rules, prudent seamanship, etc? What minimum qualifications do they have before driving a speedy naval vessel? It is weird seeing these naval cadets going to school with the license option cadets. The license folks spend all four years learning about this stuff, yet the navy cadets spend all four years learning about marine fisheries or business, never marine transportation. They then go on to commission, and become a swo? Doesn’t make since to me.
[QUOTE=“Fraqrat;109476”]Ok well if he was on the bridge why are there so many people talking and shouting? I have never been on the bridge of a naval or CG vessel underway. What is the reasoning behind so many personnel being present. I’ve seen thousand foot ships docked with 4-5 people on the bridge and the master or pilot are the only ones who say a word. It seems like the dozen or more people on a bridge is overkill. I understand the whole attrition factor if they took a hit but seems like to much noise and distraction on a good day.[/QUOTE]
I was active duty for 5 years on two surface warfare ships. A CG and a DDG. You could hear a pin drop on the bridge whenever I was up there steering. Maybe the CO of both my ships kept it tight…There was an OOD AND a Conning Officer back in 97’. I am unaware of how they do it now on Navy vesels.
Yes, the CO should have taken the CONN and LEAD! Instead, he just made useless comments and then tried to solve the situation with full speed. ( sure that may work and is a last resort, but your have to ask what the hell were they doing before hand that made a flank bell warranted). The SOH is not all that big an issue, been through there plenty of times without the slightest problem. That is with commercial traffic, the game changes when the USN arrives. They seem to go from one near miss to another. I don’t miss working with the unfoundedly arrogant amateurs in the least. This is a classic example. Makes me wonder how they would ever win a real sea battle Sink the enemy with collisions?
In the late 80’s USS Eisenhower hit a ship in the anchorage. Just prior to collision the Captain was being awarded for having a perfect cruise with zero accidents, oops. They were early and basically drifting looking ahead not looking in direction of movements, ie sideways with wind and current on the beam. Navy did try to blame the anchored ship.
Yea, I could see that. Generally it’s the anchored ship that’s at fault. Must have been that the anchored ship was having problems maneuvering.
I arrived in Singapore with the USS REAGAN on her first deployment. As they entered the straits west bound (from the south across traffic no less) they were heard on the VHF screaming for a 3 mile CPA - declaring all the while they were a " US war ship". You could hear all the bridge chatter in the background on the VHF. No one paid any attention… 3 mile CPA? Really, in the Singapore straits? We just followed behind and listened to the entertainment as we maneuvered into the straits without issue.
I can only imagine what the MOW or captain on the other ship must have been saying to himself watching the Porter slow down, turn left, then go to flank to cross his bow (and not even close to making it). Worst traffic situation I’ve experienced was coming into Tokyo bay on a T-AGOS making 11 kts.
This statement “Sir, I would like to turn to starboard and pass down his starboard side” is the reason they didn’t turn to starboard. It came from somebody other that the captain, and the captain has either an ego, something against the person making the suggestion, or an inferiority complex. He immediately countered the request with “Why don’t we just do this”. It had nothing to do with the situation. He didn’t even have a reason. He simply could not allow someone inferior make that call so he had to do something different.
When on the bridge and I have the conn, I’ve always followed advice that a long time captain gave me…“if grey,steer away”. Listening to this clusterf^^k clearly proves it’s a prudent method of navigating a vessel.
The comment from what I assume is the OOD regarding a turn to starboard makes no sense. I agree on the right turn, but he says he sees a port running light, a turn to starboard to pass down “his” starboard side means to me he would have to cross the other ship’s bow. A traditional right turn would place the navy ship’s port side to the port side of the merchant he was worried about so he could go under his stern. Another odd comment is prior to that the CO ask the OOD what he s doing, the OOD makes some lame comment along the lines of kicking his stern out in case the other ship’s bow was getting too close - or some such comment. ( if the other contact is so close you are kicking the stern away you are already in trouble). From the recording it really sounds like a comedy of errors swinish people conning that know nothing about what they are doing.
Was he referring to pass down the starboard side of the first ship that he crossed? I’m trying to picture the scenario, so they were crossing the bow of ship #1 only to realize after crossing there was ship #2 off the starboard quarter of #1 with the same heading. Instead of going between them (starboard turn) they tried to scoot across the bow of #2. Maybe it was too close for comfort to go between but I still feel that the CO only came up with an alternative because it was an alternative. There just seems to be something they way that part went down.
And I agree the part about kicking his stern was odd. I thought I was not hearing that correctly and ignored it. Your ass is already in a bind when you have to kick your stern out when crossing a ship, or like the Costa Concordia sliding into a rock.
So what would have been the proper crossing scenario? I’m thinking Porter should have slowed to to 5 knts and allowed Ship 1 Right of Way. As ship 1 passed, Porter could pass astern. As this was played out, Ship 2 would have come into view . Porter further yields to Ship 2 and all is good.
Sounds fine to this keyboard captain but we don’t know the traffic beyond Ship 2. My father used to say 'If in doubt, cut his ass off". That’s how I would have played it.
True, we don’t know the exact situation. If you are correctly running a radar plot you don’t " wait for a ship to come into view". Using radar is a real time view and is one reason we use it and hold radar observers certificates. In doing so we are able to plan ahead and not take other contacts as we see them… I’ve often times cut ahead of contacts but made darn sure I had the room and done a trail maneuver solution. ( and when done made sure I had plenty of room to do so, if in doubt turn out as they say). From this recording is seems there was not definitive decision making going on… Just shooting from the hip and hoping it all turned out right… Well, seems it didn’t.
Actually, rule 8 gives equal credence to speed and or course changes as long as either are done early enough and be readily apparent to the other vessel. Right you are that generally speaking a course change at sea is the better option as the result can be seen sooner by either vessel. It sounded like the OOD wanted to slow more due to him being in over his head than a viable option for colregs. The USN often thinks brute horsepower can get them in and out of trouble. Slowing to them is not as big a deal as we in larger ships. The USN can gain back the seed loss far faster then we can, and is perhaps why we are more reluctant to give up our speed. ( ie: speed = maneuverability ).
That collision is really not funny but at the same time how can you not laugh? This is the same Navy that managed to somehow ran into a stationary platform off Virginia (a while ago). Thankfully no one was hurt.
I was standing a 2000-2400 watch as DWO on a USCG medium endurance cutter operating just south of Cuba. We were on a westerly course with a USN ship off to port headed north to GITMO. No traffic or approach lanes, etc. Just routine steaming. I made radio contact and politely identified the ship as “US Naval vessel”; the Navy hates using ship names for some reason. Anyway, provided our position and course and asked their intentions fully expecting them to reply along the lines of altering course to starboard to pass astern. Nope. I gave the ship/DWO a few chances to see the situation and realize what was happening. Still insisted they were going to maintain their course and speed. By that time, the CO was on the bridge. I asked our combat center to ID the ship for me. I thought maybe I could embarrass them into following the nav rules. In the clear, I used the ship’s name, essentially detailed the situation, and asked if their intentions were to deviate from the nav rules and create an unsafe crossing by maintaining their course and speed. After a slight pause came their reply…‘Affirmative.’ The CO was laughing as he left the bridge…after telling me to head in the opposite direction.
You can’t make this stuff up. How the Navy is not involved in more collisions is a great mystery.
As a journeyman shipfitter I get to see the results of our navy personnel action. A while ago, I was on a Navy tug used to dock subs in Hood Canal. In front of the wheel there were two large engraved panels marked “Left” and Right". This might explain some of the maneuvers made by them. OLY