They need to implement a risk assessment system for the use of these counter devices and keep a counter-error log.
They need a pre field arrival pax loading checklist. They should reboot the counters prior to entering the 500m dock zone. Then with an email from the office verifying receipt of the clicker checklist they can move onto doing the JSA for loading the pax. What I wanna know is who was in charge of clicker maintenance? When was the last time these things were calibrated? Did the guy at the clicker lab take shorts cuts? Did a third party verify the labs results? This thing is about to bust wide open. We need congressional hearings on this. Why wasn’t the moratorium given the green light? They won’t be satisfied until one of these things flip over. What if the captain had wanted to buzz the beach close to where he lives? This thing could have turned out way worse.
the real issue here is Jody banging the counter’s wife has him distracted. No more Jody, the coast guard and BAYOO mafia need to implement a system to eliminate this problem. A secure ID card and readers are necessary.
Clicker maintenance? Why do I suddenly believe. that the WSF management. is going to create a nrw full time port engineer’s position just for that?
[QUOTE=c.captain;144805]Clicker maintenance? Why do I suddenly believe. that the WSF management. is going to create a nrw full time port engineer’s position just for that?[/QUOTE]
Because you’re delusional.
More tasty tidbits about the aftermath of the Tacoma going NUC in the Seattle Times this morning. Mostly about how the WSF shore-side folks couldn’t communicate with the skipper about passenger capacity waivers.
I also don’t think anybody has mentioned that the new ferries director is Lynne Griffith who just retired as CEO of Pierce Transit and has no maritime industry experience.
when I wrote news of the ridiculous, I should have written news of the EFFING UNBELIEVABLY RIDICULOUS!
A little bit of obfuscation cloaked newsburied in the Seattle Times today.
The damaged state ferry Tacoma, which stalled July 29 off Bainbridge Island due to an electrical failure, will cost at least $1.8 million to fix and will likely not return to service until summer 2015, officials said Wednesday.
In August, officials said the vessel would be out of service until at least December 2014.
The timeline has been pushed back because it has taken engineers longer than expected to pinpoint the cause of the failure and replacement parts for the 17-year-old ferry are not available, officials said.
New versions of the now-obsolete parts must be manufactured in Germany, according to officials.
The $1.8 million needed for repairs will come out of an emergency fund, said the ferry system’s new director, Lynne Griffith, who took over in September after a series of foul-ups that included the July 29 breakdown…
[QUOTE=renoun;147842]A little bit of obfuscation cloaked news buried in the Seattle Times today.[/QUOTE]
and yet they still refuse to divulge WHAT THE FUCK HAPPENED and WHO THE FUCK IS RESPONSIBLE!
GOD how I hate the WSF!
And luckily it’s on the cover of workboat magazine!
[QUOTE=c.captain;147843]and yet they still refuse to divulge WHAT THE FUCK HAPPENED and WHO THE FUCK IS RESPONSIBLE!
GOD how I hate the WSF![/QUOTE]
Well, you can blame the ST for not linking to it. The WSF causality report is openly shown on their website and linked here:
It is 59 pages long and quite technical. About the only thing you can put on the crew is that the original over-voltage alarm which activated as Gen 4 was taken offline at the previous Seattle landing should have been investigated; and if no obvious cause was found, that gen should not have been used until the problem was found/diagnosed. I was always under the impression anyways that on the Mark II’s they rotated between the generators for each landing to avoid short cycles on one particular unit during each service day. I guess not.
No - I nor anyone else I know personally work at WSF.
[QUOTE=c.captain;147843]and yet they still refuse to divulge WHAT THE FUCK HAPPENED and WHO THE FUCK IS RESPONSIBLE![/QUOTE]
Well, we do have a fairly robust Public Records Act in Washington. The Attorney General’s web site has a good compilation of exceptions to the act in Chapter 2 of the Open Government Internet Manual. There are even sample requests available online. Perhaps we should file some records requests for our own amusement and education.
[QUOTE=NWWaterman;147854]Well, you can blame the ST for not linking to it. The WSF causality report is openly shown on their website and linked here:
It is 59 pages long and quite technical. About the only thing you can put on the crew is that the original over-voltage alarm which activated as Gen 4 was taken offline at the previous Seattle landing should have been investigated; and if no obvious cause was found, that gen should not have been used until the problem was found/diagnosed. I was always under the impression anyways that on the Mark II’s they rotated between the generators for each landing to avoid short cycles on one particular unit during each service day. I guess not.[/QUOTE]
this report is BULLSHIT and does not follow the sequence of events at all. The TACOMA did not go black when approaching or anywhere near the dock at Winslow but some time after getting underway from it. This supposed flashover occurred many minutes later long after the vessel departed…WHAT THE FUCK HAPPENED DURING ALL THAT TIME? WHO RECLOSED THE BREAKERS AFTER THEY TRIPPED AT 12:31?
here is the smoking gun in the whole sorry assed sequence of events
first it is safe to say from the report that something happened to the #4 generator switchgear in Seattle which NOBODY was FUCKING aware of because they used #4 generator again in Winslow 40 minutes later even though they had alarms telling them there was a problem with it. Next, assuming that 12:31:01 is at the dock in Winslow, that breakers were reset manually without anyone attempting to see what caused them to trip? The whole MASSIVE TICKING TIME BOMB was then allowed to stay running and connected until after they leave the dock until the moment when everything goes poof in the board after clearing Eagle Harbor. SOMEONE ALLOWED THIS CONDITION TO OCCUR AND TO CONTINUE TO EXIST AND DIDN’T KNOW WTF THEY WERE CAUSING! THEY HAD PLENTY OF WARNINGS BUT BLINDLY IGNORED THEM! FUCKING MISERABLE SLUGS!
the effing breakers tripped!..how on earth did this flashover occur? did someone reset them?
THIS STINKS TO HIGH HEAVEN!
so the breakers to #3 & #4 generators tripped virtually simultaneously at 12:31 but the flashover happens at some indeterminate time afterward? If a breaker is open, a generator is not producing current…correct? How does a flashover occur then breakers are not closed? Did someone reclose a breaker after if opened when they did not know what they were doing or what the consequences would be? That does not appear to be mentioned anywhere? What human actions played a part in this whole sorry series of events?
When #4 generator was taken off-line there was a failure of some sort which caused a high voltage surge which damaged control equipment, the only indication was a high voltage alarm. When # 4 generator was put back on line a PLC allowed a breaker to close that should have stayed open given the damage to the system. The PLC failed due to (long complicated explanation involving system logic, unanticipated failures and tired equipment).
I’ve read through the reports now. If you are short on time look at the photos and skip ahead to the DEI Electrical Consultants report on pages 44-45.
Design/Construction Faults:
[ol]
[li]Phase loss relays capable of tripping the bus tie breakers for each generator were sensing in phase to ground mode in a un-grounded/floating system when phase to phase mode would be more appropriate. [/li][li]The installation of the phase loss relay would trip the breaker if a fuse to one phase or fuses to all phases blew but not if two fuses blew. In the initial fault in Seattle two fuse blew. pp 14-15[/li][li]The cabinets containing the breakers were not sealed where the cables entered them and thus could not contain the arc flash resulting in more widespread damage.[/li][li]Surge limiters were sized for phase to ground voltages rather than phase to phase voltages, were routinely subjected to voltages in excess of their contentious voltage rating when generators were tied to the bus, and failed (in a spectacular manner) before the end of the planned life of the generator. If correctly specified they should have lasted as long as the generator. [/li][li]The cabinets containing the breakers were not sealed where the cables entered them and thus could not contain the arc flash resulting in more widespread damage.[/li][li][B]Speculation[/B] [I] Ferry operational patterns resulted in generators being brought online/offline many times a day, a pattern that may not have been anticipated in standard design/engineering guidance assuming less frequent generator swaps (See Aloha Air Flight #243).[/I] This contributed to a greatly reduced life for the poorly specified surge limiters.[/li][/ol]
Ferry Operations:
[ol]
[li]Per. page 47 the breakers for Gen. #1 and Gen. #2 were opened roughly twice as often as the breakers for Gen. #3 and Gen. #4. Why were the generators not being used in a more uniform manner?[/li][li]The initial alarm for the over-voltage event in Seattle wasn’t acknowledged for 2:13. Was the alarm panel being monitored closely enough or were the crew excessively occupied by the docking?[/li][li] Was the crew diligent in investigating the alarm?[/li][li]Why was there nobody in the generator compartment between 11:53 and 12:30 to notice smells of the surge limiters getting smoked. Are rounds made in unattended spaces at an appropriate frequency?[/li][/ol]
This system sounds so space age and complicated. I’d be lucky to find the dimmer switch on the console much less operate this stuff. They must all be brainiacs to understand this phaser to phaser fuse breaker stuff.
[QUOTE=Fraqrat;147947]This system sounds so space age and complicated. I’d be lucky to find the dimmer switch on the console much less operate this stuff. They must all be brainiacs to understand this phaser to phaser fuse breaker stuff.[/QUOTE]
hardly…the WSF engineers are little smarter than any GoM engineer when it comes to diesel electric power management. The entire report completely fails to discuss a human element as if the entire propulsion system on the TACOMA was designed to operate fully automatically without any manual intervention.
You tell me, if breakers open then a generator is no longer producing current…correct? The breakers for generators #4 and then #3 opened at 12:31:01 but a flashover still occurred…why if the breakers were open? Did someone manually close the breakers again? They must have and that is the moment when everything went poof. Also the report says that generator #1 remained connected, why would the ship go black at that point…it wouldn’t…would it? WHAT THE FUCK HAPPENED IN THE TIME BETWEEN 12:31 AND THAT UNDETERMINED MOMENT THAT THE SHIT EXPLODED IN ONE HUGE ARC FLASH?
Also, it must be mentioned that the report states that TACOMA has a split buss arrangement with gens #1 & #2 one one buss and #3 & #4 on a second. Even if the tie breakers did not open, how on earth did the ship go black after the breakers for gens #3 & #4 opened or that later arc flash occurred? Gen #1 was still connected according to the report…when did the second buss become lost and how?
The root cause report is written to completely protect the engineroom staff by omitting them from it. Where is the human element included in it? I CALL BULLSHIT!