U.S.C.G. El Faro Hearings in Jacksonville

Professional Mariner Forum
242

c.captain’s mea culpa about his past poor decision to steam in the face of bad weather is an excellent explanation as to why El Faro’s master steamed into the storm. No, I don’t mean that El Faro’s master was young and inexperienced. I mean an ‘older and wiser’ master would make the same mistake. How?

In c.captain’s recent posts he seems to accept that the master - and not the wicked shipping company - might actually be at fault. It seems the preponderance of evidence is leaning towards the master having made a mistake in judgement to steam in the face of good evidence not to.

El Faro’s master seems to have decided, for whatever reason, that he could skirt under the storm when most chose to avoid that stretch of ocean. The master decided on a verdict (I can make it) without having examined the evidence (storm plots, weather reports, prudence).

There are reams of posts by the ‘older and wiser’ c.captain displaying the same method of thinking. Here he swiftly decided on a verdict (wicked managers) and then had his trials and convictions on this forum despite scant evidence.

It’s a perfect fit. In the beginning the evidence as to the cause of the disaster was as scant and variable as a weather forecast several days out. As the voyage progressed and the information improves there comes a choice: examine the evidence further and perhaps chart a new course or stand fast and call down for more turns. c.captain and El Faro chose the later.

It wasn’t until it was too late for the doomed master did he seem to admit his error (this is an emergency / oh God) just as c.captain has just admitted the master, not the wicked company, may have been at fault.

Now I don’t mean to insult or provoke. All I’m saying is that an older and wiser mariner can still make the same type of mistake (as evidenced here) even after years of additional experience. Maybe it’s more likely that an experienced master would make that fatal mistake. Bounty’s experienced master seems to have done exactly that.

243

[QUOTE=DeckApe;179984]In c.captain’s recent posts he seems to accept that the master - and not the wicked shipping company - might actually be at fault. It seems the preponderance of evidence is leaning towards the master having made a mistake in judgement to steam in the face of good evidence not to.[/QUOTE]

don’t misinterpret my words…I have every reason to believe Davidson was directed by TOTE to not use the Old Bahamas Channel as he had used previously in August, but rather that once at sea the master alone is making decisions concerning the course to steer and whether to obey the tenants safe navigation and prudent seamanship. Certainly we cannot believe for one microsecond that TOTE would have been indifferent to their ship being damaged or lost by a severe storm and that yes, they would have allowed Davidson to stop moving ahead even if they were only acquiescing to the master grudgingly. Davidson alone was the man empowered with protecting the ship and her people with his decisions which proved to be hideously and criminally flawed just like my decision to put past Cape Spencer in January with a forecast strong storm in the immediate GoA scheduled to hit that night. Again, it was nothing I did which protected the ship but the hand of God and His Providence and the engineers aboard to ensured that no machinery shut down unexpectedly. My own experience very closely matches that of the EL FARO’s other than the loss of the plant. That is why the loss of the EL FARO struck so close to home for me and how it was that I believed myself to have been on her bridge that morning because in one sense, in my own psyche I had been there already and was reliving the horrible experience.

I do not in anyway consider myself to be an infallible man or master and have made other mistakes in my career but none which had the potential for the death of all aboard my vessel purely by my own action. I consider myself able to use that experience and awareness of my own guilt of using terrible judgement to render my judgement on Davidson. I was lucky and he wasn’t, otherwise we were both guilty of the same STOOPIDITY. I am just fortunate it was not me in the news in 1990 with having killed myself and 65 other souls for no good reason except that I was young and had not yet acquired a healthy respect for the power of the sea. It is not an excuse but only a reason why I failed to see the danger however Davidson was over 20 years older that that inexperienced punk who risked the GALAXY. He certainly should have known better to take the risk he did and I am at a loss as to even begin to wonder what was the reward he was seeking? Some pat on the back and a shot at one of the newbuilds? Staggering to think one would knowingly risk their ship and all the souls on here for that! Maybe a very young man with high ambitions but not someone who has been in the industry for three decades…I SHAKE MY HEAD IN SADNESS.

244

Respectfully, you are hedging. Regardless that is not the point.

You, an experienced mariner, chose your verdict early despite the evidence just as Bounty and El Faro chose their courses despite the forecasts. You made the same mistakes. I contend you made those mistakes BECAUSE you are an experienced mariner who sometimes slips into the comfort of complacency.

Trouble is we all sometimes slip into complacency. Hopefully it happens on a message board and not in the face of a hurricane.

245

I have watched most of the hearing but if there has been testimony on the subject of the high turnover of Chief Mates, I missed it. I remember reading that there were 3 CMs in the month prior to the sinking. Mr. Torres testified this morning that he was CM on the El Faro until shortly before the catastrophe but is now 2nd officer on the El Yunque. He also testified that he had been selected to crew on the new class of Tote ships which would indicate that he was well regarded by the company. If we consider that going from CM to 2nd officer to be a career step backwards, it does not seem likely that it was initiated by the company. Given the board’s thoroughness, I was waiting for someone to ask him if he requested the change. Why would a CM with a Master Unlimited license on an upward career track request to be moved a step backwards. Was there something about the El Faro he was uncomfortable with? Anyone else wondering about this?

246

It seems that the beacon of the El Faro’s S-VDR never could have worked due to an expired battery. Nice. Read the whole article here.

247

[QUOTE=Dutchie;179993]It seems that the beacon of the El Faro’s S-VDR never could have worked due to an expired battery. Nice. Read the whole article here.[/QUOTE]

He never said, “never could have worked”, in fact he did a good job avoiding saying that. He said no more or less than is quoted in the article on the topic on that matter that the battery had a May 2015 expiration date.

What they didn’t appear to ask which I wished they would have is, if the capsule was violently ripped from its place and wire severed, would the unit still be protected from water and pressure effects to its required limits? And would the acoustic beacon work under such a situation?

248 
  It was not voluntary the stepdown fro c/m to 2nd.   And it did not have anything to do with his work ethic or capacity as a C/M.

The high turnover of C/M after C/M Torres was moved to 2nd mate is related directly (my opinion)with the caribbean run being almost imposible to handle with all the hours at port while cargo and then doing seawatches plus all the other work a C/M has aboard those ships.Only one third mate was carried aboard. That job was for a young man such as C/M Torres, not everybody could handle all those hours on a 60 day hitch. Horizon lines under MMP contract had 2 thirds mates and a 2nd running the sea watches.

249

[QUOTE=Kennebec Captain;179981]

I’ll have to look at the forecasts again, is there a forecast that matches up with the captain saying he will have 65 miles on the system?[/QUOTE]

I don’t remember seeing one. Its just possible that there might have been a model forecast track that he might have been looking at that would have given him such an idea, but that is not the same thing (& not to be trusted).
Seeing this again as a graphic with times reminds me of that email which Wallbridge sent from Bounty when heading towards Sandy: “Right now we are on a converging course. I am actually headed to the dangerous side of it. Hoping like a deer if I aim at it, it won’t be there when I get there…”

250

[QUOTE=Mat;179996]I don’t remember seeing one. Its just possible that there might have been a model forecast track that he might have been looking at that would have given him such an idea, but that is not the same thing (& not to be trusted).
Seeing this again as a graphic with times reminds me of that email which Wallbridge sent from Bounty when heading towards Sandy: “Right now we are on a converging course. I am actually headed to the dangerous side of it. Hoping like a deer if I aim at it, it won’t be there when I get there…”[/QUOTE]

This would have been the NWS from the night before: 30/1700 local.

HURRICANE CENTER LOCATED NEAR 24.3N 73.1W AT 30/2100Z
POSITION ACCURATE WITHIN 20 NM

PRESENT MOVEMENT TOWARD THE SOUTHWEST OR 225 DEGREES AT 7 KT

ESTIMATED MINIMUM CENTRAL PRESSURE 967 MB
EYE DIAMETER 45 NM
MAX SUSTAINED WINDS 75 KT WITH GUSTS TO 90 KT.
64 KT… 30NE 30SE 20SW 20NW.
50 KT… 40NE 50SE 30SW 30NW.
34 KT…100NE 110SE 80SW 80NW.
12 FT SEAS…160NE 100SE 90SW 130NW.
WINDS AND SEAS VARY GREATLY IN EACH QUADRANT. RADII IN NAUTICAL
MILES ARE THE LARGEST RADII EXPECTED ANYWHERE IN THAT QUADRANT.

REPEAT…CENTER LOCATED NEAR 24.3N 73.1W AT 30/2100Z
AT 30/1800Z CENTER WAS LOCATED NEAR 24.5N 72.9W

FORECAST VALID 01/0600Z 24.0N 73.8W
MAX WIND 85 KT…GUSTS 105 KT.
64 KT… 30NE 30SE 20SW 20NW.
50 KT… 60NE 60SE 40SW 60NW.
34 KT…120NE 120SE 80SW 80NW.

FORECAST VALID 01/1800Z 23.9N 74.5W
MAX WIND 90 KT…GUSTS 110 KT.
64 KT… 40NE 40SE 30SW 30NW.
50 KT… 70NE 70SE 40SW 50NW.
34 KT…130NE 130SE 80SW 100NW.

FORECAST VALID 02/0600Z 24.5N 75.0W
MAX WIND 95 KT…GUSTS 115 KT.
64 KT… 40NE 40SE 30SW 30NW.
50 KT… 70NE 70SE 50SW 50NW.
34 KT…150NE 150SE 90SW 120NW.

That would have put them about 65 miles or so from the reported center had made a straight course to SJU, just north of the Turks and Caicos. Instead it looks like they were headed a little north of that track.

They may having been using info from somewhere else? The was some talk about the weather forecast but what I heard was only what was emailed. Standard practice (in my experience) would have been to plot also by hand on a chart the SafetyNet text forecast that came by SAT-C.

251

[QUOTE=0rion;179995]It was not voluntary the stepdown fro c/m to 2nd. And it did not have anything to do with his work ethic or capacity as a C/M.[/QUOTE]

Then what was the reason?

252

[QUOTE=Jamesbrown;179994]He never said, “never could have worked”, in fact he did a good job avoiding saying that.[/QUOTE]

I can’t guarantee this is what Dutchie meant but if you transpose “never” and “could” the statement makes sense. Try, “the SVDR (beacon) [I]could never[/I] have worked.” That’s a good paraphrase of what the guy said, though the key word being BEACON as the SVDR itself wasn’t compromised.

(I think it is even more clear like this: “the SVDR beacon could have never worked.”)

253

[QUOTE=DeckApe;179991]Respectfully, you are hedging. Regardless that is not the point.

You, an experienced mariner, chose your verdict early despite the evidence just as Bounty and El Faro chose their courses despite the forecasts. You made the same mistakes. I contend you made those mistakes BECAUSE you are an experienced mariner who sometimes slips into the comfort of complacency.

Trouble is we all sometimes slip into complacency. Hopefully it happens on a message board and not in the face of a hurricane.[/QUOTE]

I do not get what you driving at here at all. A 28 year old kid with only 6 years as a licensed officer does not possess the wisdom of a 52 year old man with 30 years. My complacency in taking the GALAXY out into weather that had the potential to spell death for all aboard her was because I did not appreciate the severity of the seas the ship would encounter because I had not faced that before so lacked experience to guide me. Truth be told but the forecast winds were from the south and I was intending to go north so saw that as being a good push to get to where I was going but of course there was no push at all because we had to throttle back and run just fast enough to keep steerage but no so fast to bury the nose of the GALAXY when she drove down each sea into the tough. I doubt we made better then 3kts out there when we could have been sitting in Bartlett Cove snug as a bug in a rug.

Being a very round bilged vessel with a tendency to roll on wet grass, we were rolling steady 35’s out there that night and made it up to Cape St. Elias on Kayak Island just fine by daylight however, my own lack of experience failed to consider the risk of losing an engine in such conditions. Having a single rudder, you could not steer the vessel with only a single engine but that had not occurred to me because I was too young to realize any of this. Had we lost an engine or the steering, we would have lost the ship. In the conditions that night no one would have made it. This was now 26 years ago but I am never going to forget it and only want my admission to be for others to learn from the close shave I luckily made it through to never take their ships for granted. Any ship can fail you at the absolute worst possible moment as happened with the EL FARO. You must consider every possible even if highly unlikely scenario before assuming any risk which will endanger the ship in any way. Peoples lives hang in the balance.

.

254

[QUOTE=Capt. Phoenix;180020]I can’t guarantee this is what Dutchie meant but if you transpose “never” and “could” the statement makes sense. Try, “the SVDR (beacon) [I]could never[/I] have worked.” That’s a good paraphrase of what the guy said, though the key word being BEACON as the SVDR itself wasn’t compromised.

(I think it is even more clear like this: “the SVDR beacon could have never worked.”)[/QUOTE]

Thats a good paraphrase of what the guy said where? He made no statement that i recall or see in the article dutchie linked. He said that the battery expiration was unacceptable based on a company policy that batteries which would expire before next test are to be replaced, nothing about likely functionality after the date.

255

[QUOTE=Jamesbrown;180030]Thats a good paraphrase of what the guy said where? He made no statement that i recall or see in the article dutchie linked. He said that the battery expiration was unacceptable based on a company policy that batteries which would expire before next test are to be replaced, nothing about likely functionality after the date.[/QUOTE]

personally, I believe that IF the VDR capsule is ever recovered that with prolonged time at great pressure the investigators will find NO readable data on it

here is a question regarding the hearings…has even one single word come out if what actually caused the loss of propulsion?

256

[QUOTE=Dutchie;179993]It seems that the beacon of the El Faro’s S-VDR never could have worked due to an expired battery. Nice. Read the whole article here.[/QUOTE]

The same were said of the batteries on the black boxes on MH 370: http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/03/08/391624343/mh370-had-expired-battery-on-black-box-pinger-report-says
Yet signals were heard from the pinger(s) just before the 30-day period was out.

I.e. Expiry date doesn’t mean that the batteries dies, only that the guarantied life at full power expires.

257

[QUOTE=Capt. Phoenix;180020]I can’t guarantee this is what Dutchie meant but if you transpose “never” and “could” the statement makes sense. Try, “the SVDR (beacon) [I]could never[/I] have worked.” That’s a good paraphrase of what the guy said, though the key word being BEACON as the SVDR itself wasn’t compromised.

(I think it is even more clear like this: “the SVDR beacon could have never worked.”)[/QUOTE]

The statement between the brackets is what I really meant to say, but please also note that I started the sentence defensively with “It seems”. My English is a bit awkward… In view of what Ombugge remarks that even after the expiring date there could be some juice left in the battery is true, but it is in this case still to be expected that probably the beacon would not function for the full 30 days. There are beacons with a 90 day lifetime but they are more expensive. An example of this can be found here. The company who produces this equipment is situated more or less round the corner from Jacksonville in Sarasota Fl.

It should be possible to add a simple battery test to the equipment. Pushing shortly a test button on the Data Collection Unit would connect a load, for instance a resistor, over the beacon’s battery. The voltage then read on a meter would give a very good indication of the battery’s condition. They test your car battery in the very same manner with green, yellow or red zone indications. No rocket science involved. This would improve the safety, well as long as somebody pushes that button every now and then… But even that can be automated by making a programmed connection once a week for instance and if the battery voltage drops below a certain threshold level an alarm will sound.

258

To sum up the last few days of comments:

Tote pressured Davidson to stick to the schedule.

Davidson probably would have preferred to take the same prudent route via the Old Bahama channel, as he did for Hurricane Erica, but for pressure from Tote.

Davidson probably started out with a reasonable strategy to stick to the schedule on the normal route and sufficiently avoid Joaquin.

Once Joaquin tracked SW blocking the intended route, Davidson should have stopped, reversed course, diverted through The Hole In The Wall, or otherwise given Joaquin a wide berth.

Davidson and Tote should have anticipated the possible loss of propulsion.

The route selected should have been planned to give the Hurricane a wide berth so that the ship would remain safe even if it lost propulsion.

Trying to stick to the schedule cost 33 lives, a ship, it’s cargo, and Tote’s reputation. It ended up costing Tote many times more than a couple days of delay.

Lessons Tote (and other operators) learned? Probably none.

259

[QUOTE=tugsailor;180064]To sum up the last few days of comments:

Tote pressured Davidson to stick to the schedule.

Davidson probably would have preferred to take the same prudent route via the Old Bahama channel, as he did for Hurricane Erica, but for pressure from Tote.

Davidson probably started out with a reasonable strategy to stick to the schedule on the normal route and sufficiently avoid Joaquin.

Once Joaquin tracked SW blocking the intended route, Davidson should have stopped, reversed course, diverted through The Hole In The Wall, or otherwise given Joaquin a wide berth.

Davidson and Tote should have anticipated the possible loss of propulsion.

The route selected should have been planned to give the Hurricane a wide berth so that the ship would remain safe even if it lost propulsion.

Trying to stick to the schedule cost 33 lives, a ship, it’s cargo, and Tote’s reputation. It ended up costing Tote many times more than a couple days of delay.

Lessons Tote (and other operators) learned? Probably none.[/QUOTE]

I have missed most of the hearing but I have read the twitter feeds of people at the hearing.

The only indication of pressure from TOTE is the one email where Davidson appears to be asking about changing the route back. A second email was read where a captain told TOTE they were taking a longer route and the response was along the lines of OK, stay safe. TOTE no doubt has hundreds if not thousands of email that will demonstrate if the ships were being run from ashore. My bet is that they will easily be able to show that it was up to the captains.

As far as using the Old Bahama Channel, possibly that was never considered given Joaquin’s forecast at the time.

With regards to anticipating loosing propulsion, the captain would have some handle on the likelyhood of that happening based on what had happened in the past. Chances of loosing propulsion right when you need it the most are very low. A better approach is to leave sufficient margin in the possibility of any unlikely event. Being in heavy weather both increases the probability of problems while it decreases the crew’s ability to deal with them.

What is sufficient margin? A crude but simple and understandable rule is stay out of the 34 kt wind field regardless of what miscalculations etc led you that situation in the first place.

HURRICANE CENTER LOCATED NEAR 24.3N 73.1W AT 30/2100Z
POSITION ACCURATE WITHIN 20 NM
ESTIMATED MINIMUM CENTRAL PRESSURE 967 MB
EYE DIAMETER 45 NM
MAX SUSTAINED WINDS 75 KT WITH GUSTS TO 90 KT.
64 KT… 30NE 30SE 20SW 20NW.
50 KT… 40NE 50SE 30SW 30NW.
34 KT…100NE 110SE 80SW 80NW.
12 FT SEAS…160NE 100SE 90SW 130NW.
WINDS AND SEAS VARY GREATLY IN EACH QUADRANT. RADII IN NAUTICAL
MILES ARE THE LARGEST RADII EXPECTED ANYWHERE IN THAT QUADRANT.

260

Again. Maritime severe weather «compulsory no go zone», 34 KT Rule and upward, if owners or charterers wish not to be liable for damages and / or be unable to produce the ship’s log in court as evidence of perils at sea but in lieu, legal amnesty for their involvement.

No other choice but to avoid.

261

Interesting blog about the El Faro incident by David Burch. I have his book ‘Emergency Navigation’ on the bookshelf. One of the comments made by a retired Chief Engineer with 35 years experience struck me.

A boiler was shut down and being repaired while Captain maintained course: hurricane bound. Forty foot seas will challenge any propulsion system, even if in good repair. There are trips on turbines and controls on boilers or diesel engines that don’t always fair well when the ship is being slammed by severe whether it should have been hundreds of miles away from.
Is it true that one boiler was shut down for repairs?

Slamming and severe accelerations caused by a heavily rolling and pitching ship could lead to all kinds of damage, also in the engine room especially when this is not in a shipshape condition.