The El Faro report will be published sometime today. I just received an advance copy and will be updating our readers soon but here is a link to our first article.
And I can already hear the bean-counters screaming. But I like that idea… A LOT.
Yes and by not specifically mentioning that the PLB’s need to be gps enabled I worry that they will save the $10 per unit and get the non-gps version. This is just a recommendation, we’ll have to see what the final rule is once it’s written, but this recommendation is so non-specific that they could even purchase a 121.5mhz plb.
And who is going to be the first safety mfg to offer a super stripped down life jacket plb at a major discount??
First thought -great idea as offshore industry (North Sea) have had this for this for a long time (well 121.5 MHz anyway). Second thoughts as a vessel manager is thinking about the overhead regarding testing, record keeping and additional time taken for annual Cargo ship safety radio certificate. Third thought… 4,500 life jackets on a passenger ship
Oh sweet baby Jesus, I hadn’t thought of that nightmare… plus the additional fun of the passengers that think they’d make great souvenirs of their trip… followed shortly by giving it to their toddler to play with in the tub since he didn’t go with them on the trip… yeah. Good times…
Here is brief with executive summary, conclusions, and recommendations http://gcaptain.com/coast-guard-releases-el-faro-investigation-report-summary-conclusions-recommendations/
Not a requirement for survival suits though? And no GPS requirement even for the ship’s EPIRB?
I’d bet my boat is in the minority, but our charterer (not the boats owner, whom the crew and myself are employed with) already has PLBs for every one on board. 20 personnel including crew.
Great idea, and although the cost would add up like mentioned on a cruise ship, plus the logistical issues of PLBS with passengers, can we really put a price on utilizing all available resources to prevent deaths and help rescue? You get what you pay for.
That’s a good point. So on a vessel with survival suits as well as pfds, a PLB for each?
It would have to be the case, since I know that the survival suits and PFDs on my current vessel are not compatible.
Something else that isn’t addressed is the stowage location for survival suits and PFDs. Most vessels I’ve been on store them in a cabinet in the stateroom. My stateroom is inside the house at one of the furthest points from entry/exit to the house. I’d have to get there, then pass through my office into my actual stateroom to get my stuff. I’ve taken to stowing my gear and go bag under the couch right inside the office door, but it’s not the “approved” location per ship’s drawings. We’ve got two PFDs and two gumby suits in the ECR, but if we were dealing with a major engine casualty it wouldn’t be unrealistic to assume that we had the entire engine department downstairs (all six of us). Now four of us would have to get from the engine room, up 12 decks and then go to our staterooms to grab our gear and then run for the boats or rafts. My vessel “meets the minimum standards,” which in my mind tells me that the standards are inadequate.
I realize that you cannot plan and prepare for every possible situation, but it seems to me there is plenty of room for improvement.
The Marine Board of Investigation identified the following series of events and associated contributing factors.
Event #1: EL FARO Sailed Within Close Proximity to Hurricane Joaquin
TOTE did not ensure the safety of marine operations and failed to provide shore side nautical operations supports to its vessels.
TOTE did not identify heavy weather as a risk in the Safety Management System (SMS) and the Coast Guard had not exercised its flag state authority to require identification of specific risks.
TOTE and the Master did not adequately identify the risk of heavy weather when preparing, evaluating, and approving the voyage plan prior to departure on the accident voyage.
TOTE and the Master and ship’s officers were not aware of vessel vulnerabilities and operating limitations in heavy weather conditions.
TOTE did not provide the tools and protocols for accurate weather observations. The Master and navigation crew did not adequately or accurately assess and report observed weather conditions.
TOTE did not provide adequate support and oversight to the crew of EL FARO during the accident voyage.
The National Hurricane Center (NHC) created and distributed tropical weather forecasts for Tropical Storm and Hurricane Joaquin, which in later analysis proved to be inaccurate. Applied Weather Technologies used these inaccurate forecasts to create the Bon Voyage System (BVS) weather packages.
The Master and deck officers were not aware of the inherent latency in the BVS data when compared to the NHC forecasts. Additionally, the Master and deck officers were not aware that they received one BVS data package with a redundant hurricane trackline.
The Master and deck officers relied primarily on graphical BVS weather forecasts rather than the most current NHC data received via SAT-C. EL FARO crew did not take advantage of BVS’s tropical update feature and the ability to send BVS weather information directly to the bridge.
The Master did not effectively integrate the use of Bridge Resource Management techniques during the accident voyage. Furthermore, the Master of EL FARO did not order a reduction in the speed or consider the limitations of the engineering plant as EL FARO converged on a rapidly intensifying hurricane. This resulted in loss of propulsion, cargo shifting and flooding.
The Master of EL FARO failed to carry out his responsibilities and duties as Captain of the vessel between 8:00 PM on September 30 and 4:00 AM on October 1, 2015. Notably, the Master failed to download the 11:00 PM BVS data package, and failed to act on reports from the 3/M and 2/M regarding the increased severity and narrowing of the closest point of approach to Hurricane Joaquin, and the suggested course changes to the south to increase their distance from the hurricane.
The cumulative effects of anxiety, fatigue, and vessel motion from heavy weather degraded the crew’s decision making and physical performance of duties during the accident voyage.
Event #2: EL FARO Experienced an Initial Starboard List and Intermittent Flooding
EL FARO developed a sustained wind heel to starboard as a result of the course change from 155 degrees to 116 degrees after passing south of San Salvador at approximately 1:30 AM on October 1. The wind heel brought the 2nd deck closer to the water line.
Intermittent flooding into one or more cargo holds on EL FARO began at this time. Water was able to enter Hold 3 through the open scuttle, and likely through deteriorated internal structures and open cargo hold ventilation fire dampers, which compromised watertight integrity.
The increasing of EL FARO’s load line drafts following the 2005-2006 conversion, combined with loading to near full capacity with minimal stability margin, increased the vessel’s vulnerability to flooding in heavy weather.
Despite the apparent increase in cargo carrying capacity and increase load line draft which would result, the 2005-2006 conversion was not designated as a major conversion by the Coast Guard. Based on the available documentation, the final decision was based on the “Precedence Principle,” in that the Coast Guard had previously not designated similar conversions of sister vessels EL YUNQUE and EL MORRO as major conversions.
The crew’s complacency, lack of training and procedures, and EL FARO’s design contributed to the crew’s failure to assess whether the vessel’s watertight integrity was compromised.
EL FARO’s conversion in 2005-2006, which converted outboard ballast tanks to fixed ballast, severely limited the vessel’s ability to improve stability at sea in the event of heavy weather or flooding.
The Master, C/M, and crew did not ensure that stevedores and longshoremen secured cargo in accordance with the Cargo Securing Manual, which contributed to RO/RO cargo breaking free.
The practice of sailing with open cargo hold ventilation system fire dampers in accordance with SOLAS II-2, Regulation 20 and U.S. regulations created a downflooding vulnerability which is not adequately considered for the purposes of intact and damage stability, nor for the definitions of weathertight and watertight closures for the purpose of the applicable Load Line Convention.
The Coast Guard practice of verbally passing deficiency information to the ACS surveyor without written documentation of the deficient condition resulted in an unknown or incomplete compliance and material condition history of EL FARO.
Event #3: EL FARO experienced a reduction in propulsion
EL FARO’s reduction in speed, from approximately 16 knots to 9 knots that occurred between 3:45 AM to 4:15 AM on October 1 was the result of the routine blowing of tubes and the C/M making course changes. EL FARO never reached a speed through the water above 10 knots for the remainder of the voyage.
EL FARO’s departure with a main lube oil sump level of 24.6”, which was below the Machinery Operating Manual recommended operating level of 27”, reduced the crew’s ability to maintain lube oil suction for the main propulsion plant.
Prior to 4:36 AM, EL FARO’s main propulsion unit developed intermittent lube oil problems due to the starboard list.
Event #4: EL FARO Incurred a Severe Port List and Lost Propulsion
At 5:54 AM on October 1, the Master altered course to intentionally put the wind on the vessel’s starboard side to induce a port list and enable the C/M to access and close the Hold 3 starboard scuttle. This port list was exacerbated by his previous order to transfer ramp tank ballast to port, and resulted in a port list that was greater than the previous starboard list and a dynamic shifting of cargo and flood water.
The port list, combined with the offset of the lube oil suction bellmouth 22” to starboard of centerline, resulted in the loss of lube oil suction and subsequent loss of propulsion at around 6:00 AM.
Coast Guard and ABS plan review for EL FARO’s lube oil system did not consider the worst case angle of inclination in combination with the full range of lube oil sump operating levels specified in the machinery operating manual. This led the crew to operate with a lube oil sump level within the operating range specified on the Coast Guard and ABS approved drawing, but below the 27” operating level, which was the only level reviewed by ABS.
The Master and C/E did not have a complete understanding of the vulnerabilities of the lube oil system design, specifically the offset suction. This lack of understanding hampered their ability to properly operate the ship in the prevailing conditions.
TOTE’s lack of procedures for storm avoidance and vessel specific heavy weather plans containing engineering operating procedures for heavy weather contributed to the loss of propulsion.
Event #5: EL FARO sank
The loss of propulsion resulted in the vessel drifting and aligning with the trough of the sea, exposing the beam of the vessel to the full force of the sea and wind.
Even after securing the scuttle to Hold 3, water continued to flood into cargo holds through ventilation openings, and also likely between cargo holds through leaking gaskets on large watertight cargo hold doors.
The EL FARO crew did not have adequate knowledge of the ship or ship’s systems to identify the sources of the flooding, nor did they have equipment or training to properly respond to the flooding.
Even though EL FARO met applicable intact and damage stability standards as loaded for the accident voyage, the vessel could not have survived uncontrolled flooding of even a single cargo hold given the extreme wind and sea conditions encountered in Hurricane Joaquin.
Event #6: All 33 Persons Aboard EL FARO Are Missing and Presumed Deceased
A lack of effective training and drills by crew members, and inadequate oversight by TOTE, Coast Guard and ABS, resulted in the crew and riding crew members being unprepared to undertake the proper actions required for surviving in an abandon ship scenario.
After 5:43 AM on October 1, the Master failed to recognize the magnitude of the threat presented by the flooding into the hold combined with the heavy weather conditions. The Master did not take appropriate action commensurate with the emergent nature of the situation onboard EL FARO, including alerting the crew and making preparations for abandoning ship.
When the Master made the decision to abandon ship, approximately 10 minutes before the vessel sank, he did not make a final distress notification to shore to update his earlier report to TOTE’s Designated Person Ashore that they were not abandoning ship. This delayed the Coast Guard’s awareness that EL FARO was sinking and the crew was abandoning ship, and impacted the Coast Guard’s search and rescue operation.
Although EL FARO’s open lifeboats met applicable standards (SOLAS 60), they were completely inadequate to be considered as an option for the crew to abandon ship in the prevailing conditions.
The Coast Guard’s existing Search and Rescue equipment and procedures were unable to effectively mark and track a deceased EL FARO crew member for eventual recovery. As a result the crew member remains missing and unidentified.
The ACP is mentioned as well…and here is the biggest rub: The USCG is supposed to oversee US vessel safety and operational inspections BUT, through ACP that function is delegated to a TPO, in this case ABS, who is paid by shipowners, to certify that vessels are in condition to operate in their designated trade. I find it disturbing that the stated reason for the ACP is “the cost” of multiple, and admittedly in some cases, duplicate inspection services.
It is crap, all of it…blaming cost for mandatory safety inspection changes. Back in '96 I was sailing on the first ship in my former fleet that used SIP. (I know it is a different program) Properly done and audited, it can work but under ACP, I have serious doubts that the current scheme is very effective…too much opportunity to work angles… What type of bizarre world are we living in where this type of stuff happens?!? Yes, I know I am naive for believing that anything beyond the bottom line will ever drive a management decision and that the “Master’s Overriding Authority” is (should be) the final decision on safety issues but we all know what can occur in the real world.
Sorry for any disjointed thoughts or a rambling tone but as I read the report I had the same sick feeling in my stomach as when I read the VDR transcript last winter.
I also find troubling the solution. Recommendations #21-26 are what kept me awake in bed last night. The report makes a clear case for eliminating ACP but these recommendations are convoluted and I fear they will result in opaque rules in which the ship owners and class will likely be able to find loopholes.
Also troubling are is the near total lack of enforcement recommendations in regard to the Admirals who implemented and were in charge of the ACP and zero mention of any possible actions against class for the failures that are clearly mentioned in the report.
Why was ACP pushed towards the end of the recommended action list? Why did it not mention/mimic the straight forwardness of the Marine Electric finding stated here: http://bit.ly/2hHiisA ??
Just like when the transcript of the VDR was released, parts of this report made my stomach turn.
Fuck those guys, This is probably less than $50.00 worth of electronics in 2017, at qty 1 pricing.
Why was ACP pushed towards the end of the recommended action list? Why did it not mention/mimic the straight forwardness of the Marine Electric finding stated here: http://bit.ly/2hHiisA2 ??
Because there is no one with Dominic Calicchio’s background, experience, and sense of right and wrong currently serving in a senior capacity within the US Coast Guard. That is my 2 cents, anyway.
Yep. That has always been the problem in my humble opinion. And so it goes.
Loopholes, always loopholes, gray areas, “subject to interpretation”…you are either seaworthy and ready to sail or you are not! (obviously my decision to not hunt/fish/fish due to today’s weather or watch football have given me WAY to much time on a Sunday afternoon)
My latest article: El Faro MBI Report – Heavy On Blame, Light On Penalty