The last know position given
7:56 am EDT on October 1, was 23.52°N, 74.02°W–
is about 23 miles SE of San Salvador Island and that position is about 30 miles or so from the position given by the second mate at about 0730, 48 miles E of San Salvador I. .
If the ship was planning on using Crooked I. Passage seems like the ship should have been west or south of San Salvador.
San Salvador is show here as Watling. Looks like the ship was close to the original (green line) track
Transcript of the three phone calls:
Audio 1: Voicemail left by Capt. Davidson to John Lawrence, designated person a shore
Captain Lawrence, Captain Davidson, Thursday morning 0700. We have a navigational incident. Umm,
I’ll keep it short. A, uh, scuttle popped open on 2 deck and we were having/had some free
communication of water go down the 3… 3-hold. Have/getting a pretty good list. I want to, uh, just
touch – contact you verbally here. Everybody’s safe, uh, yeah but I want to talk to you.
Audio 2: Call by Capt. Davison to the call center
Operator: Okay sir?
Capt. Davidson: Yup. Are you connecting me through to a QI?
Operator: That’s what I’m, uh, getting right now is seeing who is, uh, on call and I’m going to get your right to them; give me one second sir, I’m going to put you on a quick hold. So one moment please.
(<click> )
Operator: Okay, sir, I just need your name please. (Capt, Davidson is speaks inaudibly in the background)
Capt. Davidson: Yes, ma’am, my name is Michael Davidson, Michael C. Davidson.
Operator: Your rank?
Capt. Davidson: Ship’s master.
Operator: Okay thank you. Ship’s name?
Capt. Davidson: El Faro
Operator: Spell that E- L…
Capt. Davidson: Oh man, the cl – uh – the clock is ticking. Can I please speak with a QI? El Faro, Echo – Lima – Space – Foxtrot – Alpha – Romeo - Oscar, El Faro. What’s his position?
Operator: Okay in case I lose you, sir, what is your phone number please.
Capt. Davidson: Phone number 870-773-206-528.
Operator: Got it.
Capt. Davidson: That’s my globe and let me give you the mini M.
Operator: Yes
Capt. Davidson: You ready to copy?
Operator: Yes.
Capt. Davidson: 870-764-6672-72
Operator: Got it sir. Again I’m going to get you reached right now, one moment please.
And, uh, mate, what else to do you see down there? What else do you see?
(<click>)
Operator: I’m going to connect you now, okay. Hi, good morning, my name is Sherida. Just give me one moment I’m going to try to connect you now, okay. Mr. Davidson?
Capt. Davidson: Okay.
Operator: Okay, one moment please.
(<click>)
Operator: Hi, thank you for waiting.
Capt. Davidson: Oh God.
Operator: Just really briefly what is your – um, what is the problem you’re having?
Capt. Davidson: I have a marine emergency and I would like to speak to a QI. We had a – a - a hull breach. A scuttle blew open during a storm. We have water down in 3-hold with a heavy list. We’ve lost the main propulsion unit. The engineers cannot get it going. Can I speak with a QI please?
Operator: Yes, thank you so much, one moment.
Audio 3: Call between John Lawrence and U.S. Coast Guard in Miami
Capt. Lawrence: John Lawrence.
Coast Guard: Hey John this is Petty Officer Chancery I’m from, uh, the Coast Guard in Miami, Florida. How are you?
Capt. Lawrence: Yes, sir. Uhhhm.
Coast Guard: Hey I’m calling you back. You were listed as a POC for the El Faro.
Capt. Lawrence: That’s correct.
Coast Guard: Okay, do you have contact or direct communications with the vessel?
Capt. Lawrence: I did. They had called me; I was just actually trying to call them back, and I couldn’t, uh - the satellite is dropping the call. I can give you the phone number.
Coast Guard: Yeah give me the phone number for the vessel That’s fine.
Capt. Lawrence: Ok, the satellite number, uh, so you’d have to dial, 8 – uh - usually it’s like 011 first to get the, uh satellite
Coast Guard: Uh, huh, yeah, 011
Capt. Lawrence: Alright 870-773-
Coast Guard: 773
Capt. Lawrence: 206-
Coast Guard: 206
Capt. Lawrence: 528.
Coast Guard: 528. Okay, I’m going to repeat that back. 011-870-773-206-528.
Capt. Lawrence: That’s correct, that’s what they called me on. I - I tried calling them back a few minutes ago to see if they had had any contact with you guys yet.
Coast Guard: Mmm Hmm, They Have
Capt. Lawrence: Oh, they have; you ‘ve talked to…?
Coast Guard: We contacted the – they’ve contacted LANT Area.
Capt. Lawrence: Oh, yeah - yeah, they uh - RCC Norfolk. Yeah I talked to them and they said they were notifying you, and then they’re, uh, I guess you - can you tell me what the, uh, what the plans, what you planning on doing now? You going to – they said said you were going to contact the Bahamas, I guess?
Coast Guard: Well yes, sir. So – so here’s the deal and that depends. Umm - so right now, right now based off all the information that you’ve, uh, that you’ve provided me, uh, you know I’m not – I’m not in the distress phase currently, uh, because ----
Capt. Lawrence: Okay.
Coast Guard: …because they’re not at risk of sinking and uh, they have dewatered and they uh – I’m looking at - they are without power and engines, uh…
Capt. Lawrence: Correct.
Coast Guard: Are they – so are they able to anchor that boat right there?
Capt. Lawrence: Uh I don’t think, they’re 48 miles East of, uh, San Salvador, so I don’t think so.
Coast Guard: Yeah. Well – but the position that I’m looking at they should be able to anchor.
Capt. Lawrence: Oh really, okay.
Coast Guard: It’s not that deep, um, and there’s some small islands that they’re right near. So I’m trying to ---- I’m trying to pull this up.
Capt. Lawrence: Yeah, I haven’t - you’ve got a better – you’ve got a better map than me right now. I’m sorry your last name is - Chancellor?
Coast Guard: Yeah – yeah. Chancery – C – H – A – N – C – E – R - Y. Um and – and - and right now – yes - I am going to pass this information on to the Bahamas. And, uh - you know it – it - it just depends because this is a large motor vessel.
Capt. Lawrence: Correct.
Coast Guard: So generally – generally for these types of situations where – where there’s not like an emergency distress where we would need to, you know, go out there and remove people from the vessel or something like that.
Capt. Lawrence: Correct.
Coast Guard: Uh, if they are just disabled, um, then – then generally it would be up to the company to provide some type of tug assist or – or something else like that.
Capt. Lawrence: Okay – okay.
Coast Guard: and have you guys - have you - you know, do you guys have like commercial towing assistance or – or any type of – uh - salvage contracts in place already?
Capt. Lawrence: Yes. Yes we do. And I can contact them.
Coast Guard: I would say to contact them sooner rather than later, um –
Capt. Lawrence: Okay.
Coast Guard: Because – uh - you know, I’m going to obviously call the ship and – uh - try to get a better – you know - feel of what the situation is. But – from what was passed on to me right now we would be – we would generally go that route.
Capt. Lawrence: Okay, no that – that makes sense.
Coast Guard: And also you’re in the – you’re in the territorial seas of foreign countries as well. So I’m looking ----
Capt. Lawrence: Right.
Coast Guard: I’m looking at right now. And - your nearest – your nearest probably safe haven where they could pull in would beTurks and Caicos.
Capt. Lawrence: Okay.
Coast Guard: All right?
Capt. Lawrence: Okay.
Coast Guard: And I will give you a call back with updates. Are you going to be the point of contact – uh - through this case with me?
Capt. Lawrence: Yes.
Coast Guard: Okay. All right, great. Alright, I’m going to try to give the ship a call and get a better handle on what the situation is and what’s going on now. And, uh, if you hear from them just give me a call back.
Capt. Lawrence: Okay. And what’s your direct number?
Coast Guard: It’s 305.
Capt. Lawrence: Okay.
Coast Guard: 415
Capt Lawrence: Okay.
Coast Guard: 1600.
Capt. Lawrence: Okay, sir.
Coast Guard: Thank you.
Capt. Lawrence: Thank you.
Coast Guard: Bye.
Capt. Lawrence: Okay.
Boredom, Apathy (by sailing the same route again and again for years) leads to Complacency.
A clever person solves a problem. A wise person avoids it.
You can’t solve a problem with the same spirit that created it.
You are not stuck where you are unless you decide to be.
Just because things seem going well now doesn’t mean they can suddenly go horribly wrong.
When a great team loses through complacency, it will constantly search for new and more intricate explanations to explain away defeat.
For one death there were 600 near misses…
[QUOTE=Jamesbrown;179913] Still a telling factor, don’t you think?[/QUOTE]
Yes, of course. I’d be the first to agree with you that they shouldn’t have ended up where they did.
That said, if i’d been in the water, I would have been as happy to be picked up by a 60m landing craft as a 300m tanker. Unfortunately the conditions were such that no one could have done anything. And that, I suppose, is the point (as stated so eloquently by Nimitz).
[I]The failure of HMS BOUNTY Organization and Capt. Wallbridge to effectively evaluate and determine if prevailing and forecasted weather conditions were favorable for sailing. This constitutes negligence.
Capt. Wallbridge chose to steer towards Hurricane Sandy at a near constant bearing and decreasing range with no compelling reason to do so. His actions conflicted with all known maritime methodologies for storm avoidance. It can only be concluded that he was not trying to avoid it at all. He purposefully placed his crew and his vessel into extremely dangerous conditions. This constitutes negligence.
Capt. Wallbridge decided to notify the Coast Guard and HMS BOUNTY Organization regarding their distress much too late. When asked by CMS to call the Coast Guard, he refused stating that they would be better off working on the pumps. His decision smacked of pride, and was illogical given the danger they were in. He should have made calls for assistance on Saturday, October 27th at the first indication that the electric bilge pumps were not keeping up with the water ingress. This would have given them some opportunity to come up with an alternate plan or better their chances to receive assistance. This constitutes negligence.[/I]
Some similarities here don’t you think! Not that many improvements since then! We are the best in postmortem microscopic analysis but to put our head on the block to propose proactive and tangible solutions?
[QUOTE=Kennebec Captain;179922] Looks like the ship was close to the original (green line) track
[/QUOTE]
In a text reply to vacationing Second mate Charles Baird, Capt Davidson stated "he planned to follow his normal route but would skirt “under,” or south, of Hurricane Joaquin, Baird said."
Nowhere have I seen mention that the Crooked Island Passage was the plan, even though the AIS track lined up with it perfectly. He could just have been trying to squeeze an extra 50nm between the ship and the storm.
But it is still unclear how they got from that last AIS pos west of San Salvador to a position east of that island. It still seems more likely to me that they passed between Rum Cay and San Salvador, but perhaps not.
[QUOTE=Mat;179936]Nowhere have I seen mention that the Crooked Island Passage was the plan, even though the AIS track lined up with it perfectly.[/QUOTE]
There’s no evidence that it was Davison’s intention but it was definitely not the plan before departure. Remember, they had plenty of time after leaving text range to decide to alter course to give the storm more room.
We simply made an informed guess based on the obvious course change on the AIS track.
[QUOTE=Mat;179936]In a text reply to vacationing Second mate Charles Baird, Capt Davidson stated "he planned to follow his normal route but would skirt “under,” or south, of Hurricane Joaquin, Baird said."
Nowhere have I seen mention that the Crooked Island Passage was the plan, even though the AIS track lined up with it perfectly. He could just have been trying to squeeze an extra 50nm between the ship and the storm.
But it is still unclear how they got from that last AIS pos west of San Salvador to a position east of that island. It still seems more likely to me that they passed between Rum Cay and San Salvador, but perhaps not.[/QUOTE]
I was thinking they wanted to get as much distance as possible and Crooked Island Passage was the first chance to get it. The captain said he was going to have 65 miles on the system, I assumed the was the minimum they could get without turning back. It didn’t occur to me anyone thought 65 miles was adequate. That doesn’t even take into account the position errors, forcast errors, the size of the wind field, seas etc.
It just noticed today the postions didn’t add up.
I think that Bounty’s master gets off relatively easy being judged as merely “negligent.” With the higher stakes goes a higher standard of care. He sailed into the path of Sandy, a massive hurricane, not some nameless gale. I would call it full-on gross negligence, with prejudice.
As for solutions, well, I think everyone knows what the answer is. It’s whether or not we can bring ourselves to actually withstand the pressures to do what we know deep down we shouldn’t do, and accept that we may potentially lose our jobs over it. Saying no can be extremely hard sometimes. But how hard was it for El Faro’s master to look his crew in the eye as their clock ran out? It makes me feel queasy just thinking about it.
For those masters that are either too ignorant to fully understand the risks or too arrogant to believe that their judgment will ever fail them (and by extension, their entire crew), well, learning it the hard way is often the only way it ever gets learned, if ever.
Sometimes I think we mistake having opposing thumbs for possessing an innate god-like wisdom that we just don’t have and never will.
I suspect that most of the disdain for Mario Vittone’s brutal but very accurate assessment of the major malfunction that occurred with El Faro is that a. he isn’t “one of us” and so therefore doesn’t understand, and b. that what Davidson did is something many among us recognize as something we might have conceivably done too, even if we can’t admit it. The truth hurts. C.captain has done everyone a solid turn by testifying in detail about his own potentially deadly misjudgment early in his career, and I hope that prime learning opportunity isn’t wasted. El Faro’s master was “experienced.” But he much did that experience turn out to be worth in the end?
It’s really frightening to think that we could ever fail as badly as Davidson did, but we surely can. So the tendency is to want to cut him slack because, in so doing, we can then cut ourselves the same slack, and that feels a hell of a lot better than the alternative. But we’re not doing ourselves any favors by going easy on ourselves.
As for the shoreside management? There aren’t too many likely scenarios. They either pressured him into sailing a risky route that led into a checkmate position with Joaquin, or simply didn’t care (or were unable/incompetent) to supervise their masters adequately and left him fully to his own devices when they bloody well ought not have. Whichever it is, it reflects terribly on them. If it was the former, and I suspect it was, they had to have a deeply toxic culture that led them to where they are today.
The bottom line is we don’t need the VDR to know that Davidson gambled it all on a highly-questionable bet and, as things went steadily from bad to worse, kept doubling down when he should have folded. That bet cost him his life and the lives of 32 others, and agony for who knows how many family members.
It was avoidable. Without hindsight it was still easily avoidable.
[QUOTE=captjacksparrow;179949]I think that Bounty’s master gets off relatively easy being judged as merely “negligent.” With the higher stakes goes a higher standard of care. He sailed into the path of Sandy, a massive hurricane, not some nameless gale. I would call it full-on gross negligence, with prejudice.
As for solutions, well, I think everyone knows what the answer is. It’s whether or not we can bring ourselves to actually withstand the pressures to do what we know deep down we shouldn’t do, and accept that we may potentially lose our jobs over it. Saying no can be extremely hard sometimes. But how hard was it for El Faro’s master to look his crew in the eye as their clock ran out? It makes me feel queasy just thinking about it.
For those masters that are either too ignorant to fully understand the risks or too arrogant to believe that their judgment will ever fail them (and by extension, their entire crew), well, learning it the hard way is often the only way it ever gets learned, if ever.
Sometimes I think we mistake having opposing thumbs for possessing an innate god-like wisdom that we just don’t have and never will.
I suspect that most of the disdain for Mario Vittone’s brutal but very accurate assessment of the major malfunction that occurred with El Faro is that a. he isn’t “one of us” and so therefore doesn’t understand, and b. that what Davidson did is something many among us recognize as something we might have conceivably done too, even if we can’t admit it. The truth hurts. C.captain has done everyone a solid turn by testifying in detail about his own potentially deadly misjudgment early in his career, and I hope that prime learning opportunity isn’t wasted. El Faro’s master was “experienced.” But he much did that experience turn out to be worth in the end?
It’s really frightening to think that we could ever fail as badly as Davidson did, but we surely can. So the tendency is to want to cut him slack because, in so doing, we can then cut ourselves the same slack, and that feels a hell of a lot better than the alternative. But we’re not doing ourselves any favors by going easy on ourselves.
As for the shoreside management? There aren’t too many likely scenarios. They either pressured him into sailing a risky route that led into a checkmate position with Joaquin, or simply didn’t care (or were unable/incompetent) to supervise their masters adequately and left him fully to his own devices when they bloody well ought not have. Whichever it is, it reflects terribly on them. If it was the former, and I suspect it was, they had to have a deeply toxic culture that led them to where they are today.
The bottom line is we don’t need the VDR to know that Davidson gambled it all on a highly-questionable bet and, as things went steadily from bad to worse, kept doubling down when he should have folded. That bet cost him his life and the lives of 32 others, and agony for who knows how many family members.
It was avoidable. Without hindsight it was still easily avoidable.[/QUOTE]
Experience can be “doing things wrong for many years”.
As said by others here, we have all taken chances in our lives and got away with it. Some learn from it, some don’t.
From the transcript:
Operator: Hi, thank you for waiting.
Capt. Davidson: Oh God.
Operator: Just really briefly what is your – um, what is the problem you’re having?
Capt. Davidson: I have a marine emergency and I would like to speak to a QI. We had a – a - a hull breach. A scuttle blew open during a storm. We have water down in 3-hold with a heavy list. We’ve lost the main propulsion unit. The engineers cannot get it going. Can I speak with a QI please?
Operator: Yes, thank you so much, one moment.
Does this possibly indicate that the Operator had talked to whoever she managed to locate and been asked to find out “what’s the problem”?
[QUOTE=captjacksparrow;179949]
As for solutions, well, I think everyone knows what the answer is. It’s whether or not we can bring ourselves to actually withstand the pressures to do what we know deep down we shouldn’t do, and accept that we may potentially lose our jobs over it. Saying no can be extremely hard sometimes. But how hard was it for El Faro’s master to look his crew in the eye as their clock ran out? It makes me feel queasy just thinking about it.
[/QUOTE]
[I]Ron LaBarre: I sailed with TOTE for 30 years, 17 as Master, all in their Alaska trade. I delayed sailing numerous times due to heavy ice leaving the dock and a few times due to heavy weather outside Cook Inlet. So, politely, you’re wrong. I had to report my delayed sailing, but I was never questioned or challenged about it. So when you say you can “pretty much guarantee” you are incorrect. Never happened with TOTE. I actually know from experience.
Ron LaBarre: I sail with TOTE for 30 years, 17 as Master. I was Master of all their vessels at one time or another, including the El Faro when she was the Northern Lights. Despite what some people say, TOTE is a great company with excellent people.[/I]
According to that testimony, I would have no doubt but to keep my vessel safe into a holding pattern and resume once sound to do it. You report and turn the page. Being sacked for such a decision would be extremely perilous for an American owner. I would anyhow proceed that way, as I did in a similar circumstance. You’re master or not, life first.
[QUOTE=ombugge;179956]From the transcript:
Does this possibly indicate that the Operator had talked to whoever she managed to locate and been asked to find out “what’s the problem”?[/QUOTE]
Now that you mention it looks that way. Is Sherida may be a second operator on the line? Mentioning her name at that point seems odd, normally you do that at the start of the conversation and not in the middle.
Davidson says before that: “Oh God” I suppose that he reacts, makes an observation, to an occurrence on board the ship? I donot see a direct connection with that remark with the conversation at that point.
[QUOTE=captjacksparrow;179949]I think that Bounty’s master gets off relatively easy being judged as merely “negligent.” With the higher stakes goes a higher standard of care. He sailed into the path of Sandy, a massive hurricane, not some nameless gale. I would call it full-on gross negligence, with prejudice.
As for solutions, well, I think everyone knows what the answer is. It’s whether or not we can bring ourselves to actually withstand the pressures to do what we know deep down we shouldn’t do, and accept that we may potentially lose our jobs over it. Saying no can be extremely hard sometimes. But how hard was it for El Faro’s master to look his crew in the eye as their clock ran out? It makes me feel queasy just thinking about it.
For those masters that are either too ignorant to fully understand the risks or too arrogant to believe that their judgment will ever fail them (and by extension, their entire crew), well, learning it the hard way is often the only way it ever gets learned, if ever.
Sometimes I think we mistake having opposing thumbs for possessing an innate god-like wisdom that we just don’t have and never will.
I suspect that most of the disdain for Mario Vittone’s brutal but very accurate assessment of the major malfunction that occurred with El Faro is that a. he isn’t “one of us” and so therefore doesn’t understand, and b. that what Davidson did is something many among us recognize as something we might have conceivably done too, even if we can’t admit it. The truth hurts. C.captain has done everyone a solid turn by testifying in detail about his own potentially deadly misjudgment early in his career, and I hope that prime learning opportunity isn’t wasted. El Faro’s master was “experienced.” But he much did that experience turn out to be worth in the end?
It’s really frightening to think that we could ever fail as badly as Davidson did, but we surely can. So the tendency is to want to cut him slack because, in so doing, we can then cut ourselves the same slack, and that feels a hell of a lot better than the alternative. But we’re not doing ourselves any favors by going easy on ourselves.
As for the shoreside management? There aren’t too many likely scenarios. They either pressured him into sailing a risky route that led into a checkmate position with Joaquin, or simply didn’t care (or were unable/incompetent) to supervise their masters adequately and left him fully to his own devices when they bloody well ought not have. Whichever it is, it reflects terribly on them. If it was the former, and I suspect it was, they had to have a deeply toxic culture that led them to where they are today.
The bottom line is we don’t need the VDR to know that Davidson gambled it all on a highly-questionable bet and, as things went steadily from bad to worse, kept doubling down when he should have folded. That bet cost him his life and the lives of 32 others, and agony for who knows how many family members.
It was avoidable. Without hindsight it was still easily avoidable.[/QUOTE]
Some very good points and well written CJS.
However I have a different take on things, this could easily be a seperate thread.
The NTSB and the USCG have different roles in this hearing. NTSB is looking for cause and the USCG is looking for fault or seeking someone to blame. However each understands the others role. Not so on this forum.
Of course people responsible should be held accountable but For my own part I see no need to find someone to blame because as we are both aware there is going to be more then enough of that to go around. However I do believe that there is a shortage of expertise, my goal here is to contribute what I am able to the technical side of the question, I am interested in the cause but I’ve no real interest on who’s to blame, I’ll leave that for others.
Unlike the NTSB and the USCG there is not always recognition on this forum of these separate roles of cause and blame and what is in fact intended to be technical observation or question is instead interpreted as an excuse for someone actions.
In this case I think an important point is that it’s more difficult to turn around and back-track when running trapped next to the coast then it is to open up more margin when sea room is available. This is intended as an observation of human nature and the decision making process. For people with a blame mindset this could be seen as an intended to deflect blame or making excuses.
I see this blame game in some cases as justification not to examine their own decision making process objectively.
I think this is more along the lines of a "this is fucking ridiculous" reaction. You can hear the frustration in his voice, he just wants to speak to someone from his company. I'm assuming this is some type of call service TOTE uses. For the life of me I don't understand why they don't have a 24 hour manned ops center. Staffed with people who understand what's going on when a call like that is received. Another benefit is someone watching where all vessels are located on the planet and assisting with wx tracking. I'm stunned at the fact that everyone of these TOTE suits questioned had no idea where their ships are or what they are doing. How do you not know where a large company asset is or be indifferent to its operational status? They act like they own a fleet of old mail trucks being repurposed for meals on wheels to the elderly.
[QUOTE=Fraqrat;179968]I think this is more along the lines of a “this is fucking ridiculous” reaction. You can hear the frustration in his voice, he just wants to speak to someone from his company. [/QUOTE]
yes, there is obvious frustration but there is also fear in his voice. The words “marine emergency” and “the clock is ticking” are more than telling us that he knows the ship cannot stay in its condition for very long. Of course, we are left with no recording of that third conversation between Davidson and Lawrence. Lawrence says that Davidson was not displaying fear yet he was plainly scared only a few moments before so why would he not be during his conversation with Lawrence? We also know there was not a damned thing TOTE was going to be able to do for the ship at that moment and that is was purely up to the ship’s people to save themselves. I am surprised what little urgency Lawrence displayed when he spoke with the USCG.
Once again, I hold that people were working like madmen to get the EL FARO going again and focused on that rather that being paralyzed in mortal fear but then the final knock down came it was tremendous, the cargo rapidly came adrift and the vessel could not recover. Those who were still alive and conscious suffered terror in those moments but not for long. Maybe a couple of minutes before the ship submerged forever with most of her people trapped inside.
[QUOTE=c.captain;179971]yes, there is obvious frustration but there is also fear in his voice. The words “marine emergency” and “the clock is ticking” are more than telling us that he knows the ship cannot stay in its condition for very long. Of course, we are left with no recording of that third conversation between Davidson and Lawrence. Lawrence says that Davidson was not displaying fear yet he was plainly scared only a few moments before so why would he not be during his conversation with Lawrence? We also know there was not a damned thing TOTE was going to be able to do for the ship at that moment and that is was purely up to the ship’s people to save themselves. I am surprised what little urgency Lawrence displayed when he spoke with the USCG.
Once again, I hold that people were working like madmen to get the EL FARO going again and focused on that rather that being paralyzed in mortal fear but then the final knock down came it was tremendous, the cargo rapidly came adrift and the vessel could not recover. Those who were still alive and conscious suffered terror in those moments but not for long. Maybe a couple of minutes before the ship submerged forever with most of her people trapped inside.[/QUOTE]
I would rather hope that they were all knocked unconscious in the end. I know it isn’t likely but I would rather think along those lines.
[QUOTE=RespectMyAuthority;179973]I would rather hope that they were all unconscious. I know it isn’t likely but I would rather think along those lines.[/QUOTE]
we certainly can all hope that was the case…whether is was or not is only something the Lord knows today
This is a "wrap up" of I think yesterday’s hearing. It’s a short report, at the end they interview Robert Frump, the author of [I]Till the sea shall free them:[/I] about the [I]Marine Electric[/I]. Frump is attending the hearings. He might be planning a book on the incident.
This is the graphic of the El Faro’s route that was just used now in the hearing.
So the El Faro left “typical route” at the north tip of Cat Island and more or less followed the track used by ships planning to use Crooked I. Passage but after passing between San Salvador and Rum Cay the track turns to a course just a bit left of the original track-line. The line ends at about 23-40 N 74 W.
The final position given was 23.52°N, 74.02°W, about 12 miles north of the end of the track-line.
Here is with the times, this might have been posted already. The star at the end is more or less at the time when the phone call was made.
I’ll have to look at the forecasts again, is there a forecast that matches up with the captain saying he will have 65 miles on the system?
