[QUOTE=z-drive;168250]exactly, why not! We Even share between boats.[/QUOTE]
I’ve gotten waypoints / routes from other ships. The objection I would anticipate is that they might be errors. I think the benefits, time and effor saved, outweigh the risks. Creating waypoint for scratch is very error prone as well but those errors get caught in the voyage planning process. You just have to subject routes created by someone else to the same checks as the ones created on board.
I thought I would reproduce the Workboat article here with highlights added by myself
Faulty operations blamed for 2014 OSV, gas platform allision
By Ashley Herriman
9/3/2015
A long list of operational failures led to the allision of the offshore supply vessel Tristan Janice with a natural gas production platform in the northern Gulf of Mexico in February 2014, according to a recently released report from the National Transportation Safety Board.
With four crewmembers aboard, the 100.5’x26’x4’ Tristan Janice, operated by TRTB Inc., Cut Off, La., entered the open waters of the Gulf shortly before 3 a.m. on Feb. 18, 2014, after failing to obey company orders to stop in Port Fourchon, La., before proceeding to sea.
Shortly after entering Gulf open waters, the mate directed the on-duty deckhand to tie off the starboard engine throttle so it would remain in the full-ahead speed position. Crewmembers later indicated to the Coast Guard that there was a known throttle problem that prevented the starboard engine from maintaining full speed, and that TRTB had tried to fix the issue, but did not have the correct part. NTSB investigators found no log book entry about the throttle problem even though such entries were required by TRTB’s safety management system.
The Tristan Janice proceeded at full-ahead speed — between 8.6 and 9.7 knots — on a southwest course until 6:23 a.m., when it shifted course to west-southwest. When the captain entered the wheelhouse at 6:35 a.m. for a watch change, he found it empty, and he also observed that visibility was poor due to fog.
After spotting the mate on deck, the captain walked aft to talk with him. The two conversed on deck and in the wheelhouse. The mate told the captain he was checking on an engine vibration, but did not mention the tied-off starboard engine throttle. They also discussed log book entries, why the vessel did not stop at Port Fourchon, and operating in fog. They did not discuss whether to post a lookout, and no lookout was posted in spite of the fog. Although the captain and the mate had discussed vessel traffic in the vicinity, they did not discuss oil or gas platforms along the route.
Shortly after 7 a.m., the captain told investigators that he looked up from the radar to see a gas platform about 200 yards ahead. He was unable to slow the vessel, and said that although he tried to avoid the platform by turning the vessel while “throwing it into reverse,” his turn was initially unsuccessful because the vessel was in autopilot and he struggled to disengage it. Although he was able to disengage autopilot within 15-30 seconds, it was not soon enough to avoid the platform. The Tristan Janice allided with Ship Shoal 119 W, which was unmanned at the time, at a speed of 9.3 knots.
The crew did not report the allision to the authorities and proceeded west-northwest toward Freshwater City, La., at 9 knots.
While there were no injuries or resulting water pollution, the allision ruptured the platform’s gas service line, releasing more than 22,000 cu. ft. of natural gas into the atmosphere. Operations at the affected platform and neighboring platforms ceased for 20 days, and approximately $545,000 in damage was done to the vessel and the platform.
During their investigation, NTSB officials found confusion among all crew members as to who the captain of the vessel actually was, with the man designated as “captain” by TRTB claiming he did not believe he held the position of captain. Additionally, the NTSB was unable to find any records indicating that the vessel’s position was being plotted during the voyage.
“Tristan Janice proceeded at full speed in restricted visibility without the following: a proper lookout, a clearly identified person in charge, engines ready to maneuver, and regular monitoring of the vessel’s progress,” the reported noted.
As a result of the above failures, the NTSB assigned probable cause for the incident to the “the poor watchkeeping and operational practices of the captain and the mate to ensure that the vessel was safely navigated, and the vessel owner’s inadequate procedures and oversight of the vessel’s safety management system.”
so we have a mate who leaves the wheelhouse vacated with the vessel running at full speed in restricted visibility with fixed platforms in the vicinity, then we have a master do the same who when in the wheelhouse can’t see a platform on radar directly ahead and only visually sees in then periously close. He does not know how to quickly disengage the autopilot or to use “dodge” buttons on it.
He states shifting into reverse before trying to turn the vessel but this does not fit the procedure most would follow which is to try to turn first. I believe after he did manage to get the pilot disengaged, he saw he was going to hit the platform and then put the engines astern but too late. With 200yards ahead at 9kts, the vessel should have stopped in time if that was the first action taken. But to continue running at 9kts is 15feet/sec so 450feet in 30 seconds leaving only one boat length before collision. Shifting to reverse immediately should easily have stopped the vessel in 600feet. In other words the man panicked and did everything wrong to avoid the allision!
Then again, he wasn’t the master and in fact there was no master, but everybody was “the captain” so no body was responsible.
Also not mentioned in the NTSB report are the many spit full bottles on the wheelhouse console.
a gaggle of PHUCKING PHOOLS employed by a CRETINOUS Jeaukx Bawss!
.
TRTB sounds like a undeveloped third world operation. Is this outfit still in business?
[QUOTE=Kennebec Captain;168217]I agree about the SMS. If the SMS lacks specific guidance or the guidance is inadequate it can be difficult to keep appropriate standards as each crew sets their own.
Does any boat in the GOM that size do formal dock to dock voyage plans?
What blame shifting? The captain?[/QUOTE]
Most all of the boat companies have standard Voyage Plan forms generated from their SMS. Most oil companies require vessel operators to have OVID inspections, similar to SIRE for tankers, and voyage plans are in the question set and audited by the Major Oil Companies. That said, there is a category of small vessels that work for independent oil companies with no marine assurance divisions where you can find many gaps in their operation from a Safety Management perspective. This has changed considerably over the last 5-10 years, but they are still out there.
[QUOTE=Kraken;168258]Hehehehehe WTF? Who leaves the wheelhouse in heavy fog, to check on something he could do nothing about?
[/QUOTE]
And when they find the wheelhouse empty, leaves it to go find the guy who should be there…?
[QUOTE=jdcavo;168272]And when they find the wheelhouse empty, leaves it to go find the guy who should be there…?[/QUOTE]
That is just brilliant; I was thinking that way as well. Bad training, culture, and competency onboard that ship. Jim I know that you did the questions as NMC for a while, in your former life. I think case studies such as this should somehow be incorporated in these 100 ton courses. It takes very little effort and experience to get that level of licensing.
It’s almost like these 19 year old kids destroying their personal credit, having no clue even though taking economics in high school. Some just do not know how it applies to them, but can easily answer a test question.
[QUOTE=jdcavo;168272]And when they find the wheelhouse empty, leaves it to go find the guy who should be there…?[/QUOTE]
I read this and spit up my coffee. Sounds like a very logical thing to do for a moron.
Unbelievable
I recommend changing vessel name from Janet Tristan to Forrest Gump. What a show.
To small to be one of mine, it look s more like something you would own.
These men do not represent the talented Large OSV Masters I employ. Everyone knows the real Master of the vessel is the operations manager. He can run the entire boat from his desk or recliner. I just need good Mariners who can follow instructions from my operations department and take the fall when it doesn’t work.
[QUOTE=salt’n steel;168276]I recommend changing vessel name from Janet Tristan to Forrest Gump. What a show.[/QUOTE]
Forrest Gump was a Rhodes Scholar compared to this bunch
of course it is a third world operation…they are headquartered in Cut-Off for Christ’s Sake!
Is this outfit still in business?
owned and operated by Jeaukx Bawss Hawgg himself
yo slave…another barrel of fried chicken for the Bawss!
[QUOTE=anchorman;168271]Most all of the boat companies have standard Voyage Plan forms generated from their SMS. Most oil companies require vessel operators to have OVID inspections, similar to SIRE for tankers, and voyage plans are in the question set and audited by the Major Oil Companies. That said, there is a category of small vessels that work for independent oil companies with no marine assurance divisions where you can find many gaps in their operation from a Safety Management perspective. This has changed considerably over the last 5-10 years, but they are still out there.[/QUOTE]
I’ve seen crazier things then this back pre-Exxon Valdez when there was drinking aboard, those guys are almost all either gone, dead or reformed. The crackdown on drinking got rid of them.
Having to meet SMS standards is probably gong to drive a lot of guys like the crew in this case out.
I agree somewhat, but the Jeaux bosses have their favorites with whom the rules do not apply. Those are the ones who give us a bad rap. There are countless drunks, terrible boat handlers, guys more worried about the TV or refrigerator than what’s going on. A very small minority but more than there should be.
[QUOTE=z-drive;168307]I agree somewhat, but the Jeaux bosses have their favorites with whom the rules do not apply. Those are the ones who give us a bad rap. There are countless drunks, terrible boat handlers, guys more worried about the TV or refrigerator than what’s going on. A very small minority but more than there should be.[/QUOTE]
When our company first started using SMS the consensus pretty much was that it was bullshit. Most just figured it was just one more effing thing and slogged on but a few really hated it and never missed a chance to made it very clear that they thought it was all nonsense.
However, over time, little by little, after an incident, the paperwork would get checked, the procedure manual hauled out, a lot of us ended up getting egg on our faces becuase of incomplete permits or whatever, if we were lucky it was a minor incident. Slowly people began to realize that if there was an incident you were better off if all the documents were in good shape. Plus, in some cases being forced to follow procedures made us realize that it was just good practice. Some of it of course was bullshit but over time it got revised, sometimes for the worse, but a little more often for the better.
However it turns out the guys who really hated SMS and the related paperwork and never gave up the fight were the weak ones. Slowly, over time, they went away. SMS shifted the dynamics, more time then not, just a bit, in favor of the more competent.
In some cases, in a major incident, Joe Boss and his minions got in trouble, SMS can cause the shit to roll uphill. Companies had to start playing a straight game as well to minimize the risk of blowback from an incident. After an incident sometimes it would seem some authority would shift to more capable hands, not in every case but forces would push in that direction.
[QUOTE=z-drive;168307]I agree somewhat, but the Jeaux bosses have their favorites with whom the rules do not apply. Those are the ones who give us a bad rap. There are countless drunks, terrible boat handlers, guys more worried about the TV or refrigerator than what’s going on. A very small minority but more than there should be.[/QUOTE]
Jeaukx just loves it to death when his mariners are stoopid and compliant, hence his telling statement below.
[QUOTE=Jeaux Bawss;168290]Everyone knows the real Master of the vessel is the operations manager. He can run the entire boat from his desk or recliner. I just need good Mariners who can follow instructions from my operations department and take the fall when it doesn’t work.[/QUOTE]
They want men who are not more intelligent than the owners (which means really stoopid numbnuts in the GoM) and will never take a stand in opposition to the dictates of the bosses infinite and ultimate wisdom. The boss knows all and his mariners are expected to tow the line or else and as Jeaukx says, when the bawss fucks up wants the rank and file to take the fall. When the mariners fuck up like in this case, that is why the owners pay for insurance.
[QUOTE=Kennebec Captain;168297]Having to meet SMS standards is probably gong to drive a lot of guys like the crew in this case out.[/QUOTE]
is there even a requirement for owners of vessels under 200grt to have a Safety Management System?
I’m pro SMS, but way too often there are pieces written by people with no experience to write it; in some cases the whole thing is. My company isn’t bad, but I’ve seen some bullshit SMS written by people without a days experience on a boat.
[QUOTE=z-drive;168322]I’m pro SMS, but way too often there are pieces written by people with no experience to write it; in some cases the whole thing is. My company isn’t bad, but I’ve seen some bullshit SMS written by people without a days experience on a boat.[/QUOTE]
Same here. But initially I think that was what drove off the less competent. It was really difficult to maintain two systems. On the one hand you had this worthless paperwork shuffle to keep up and on the other you had to still keep the show on the road. Lots of guys could do one or the other but not both. Over time the two systems mergered.
The key is you have to have good feedback from the guys doing the work and someone sharp enough ashore to separate the wheat from the chaff. At first the quality of the feedback was not too good because we all thought the whole thing was bullshit.
We came around pretty slow, one fuck-up at a time. I understand that the phrase “learning things the hard way” implies there is an easy to way learn things but for a lot of us the “easy way” means we only need one hard knock per lesson.
[QUOTE=z-drive;168322]I’m pro SMS, but way too often there are pieces written by people with no experience to write it; in some cases the whole thing is. My company isn’t bad, but I’ve seen some bullshit SMS written by people without a days experience on a boat.[/QUOTE]
I don’t think all that many mariners in the GoM can even spell SMS let alone comply with one.
I wouldn’t even call a lot of them mariners. Many don’t know the first thing about knots, have no idea how to tie up a boat properly, painting is more like you set up a wet willy sprinkler in front of a bulkhead…the list goes on. Borderline retarded!! Arg!!
