A couple of thoughts:
Seems there was a whole lot of blame shifting going on there.
Mate made some very poor decisions.
Captain made some very poor decisions.
These vessels remain undermanned for safe operations in many conditions.
This demonstrates why it’s important to understand and follow your company’s SMS. If it’s in the book, and you didn’t do it, you (the mariner) will shoulder the blame.
Wow. I’m pretty new and all but that report reads like a bad April Fools joke.
[QUOTE=txh2oman;168212]http://www.workboat.com/news-feed/2015/faulty-operations-blamed-for-2014-osv-gas-platform-allision?utm_source=Informz&utm_medium=Email&utm_campaign=eNewsletter
A couple of thoughts:
Seems there was a whole lot of blame shifting going on there.
Mate made some very poor decisions.
Captain made some very poor decisions.
These vessels remain undermanned for safe operations in many conditions.
This demonstrates why it’s important to understand and follow your company’s SMS. If it’s in the book, and you didn’t do it, you (the mariner) will shoulder the blame.[/QUOTE]
I agree about the SMS. If the SMS lacks specific guidance or the guidance is inadequate it can be difficult to keep appropriate standards as each crew sets their own.
Does any boat in the GOM that size do formal dock to dock voyage plans?
What blame shifting? The captain?
From the NTSB report:
About 2230 on the evening before the accident, February 17, the Tristan Janice was shifted (moved) between berths near Golden Meadow, Louisiana. Four crewmembers were on board―a captain and a mate (both credentialed masters) and two deckhands. During the berth shifting, the captain had the conn, or navigational control, of the vessel.
According to crew statements, shortly after shifting berths, a brief watch turnover was held. During this turnover, the captain mentioned that the starboard engine throttle had a small air leak but that he did not think it was a serious problem. After the turnover, the mate took the conn, and at 2324, the Tristan Janice left Golden Meadow with company orders to proceed to Port Fourchon, Louisiana. On arriving at Port Fourchon, the vessel was to remain in the vicinity of the port overnight and then continue to sea at 0600 on February 18. However, the mate continued the transit and passed Port Fourchon, entering the open waters of the Gulf of Mexico at 0236 on February 18. The captain told investigators he did not know that the transit continued, as he was off duty and asleep at this time.
Although it could not be confirmed by data or crew statements, investigators believe that the steering on board the Tristan Janice was placed in autopilot mode about the time the vessel entered the open waters of the Gulf of Mexico.
The Tristan Janice was powered by twin diesel engines, each driving a propeller. Shortly after entering the Gulf of Mexico, the mate believed that the starboard engine was not maintaining full speed. He directed the on-duty deckhand to use a line to tie off the starboard engine throttle in the machinery space so that it would remain in the full-ahead speed position. This engine room alteration effectively removed control of the starboard engine throttle from the wheelhouse. Two crewmembers told the Coast Guard that the vessel owner, TRTB Inc., had tried to remedy the throttle problem a few days earlier but did not have the correct part. Investigators found no log book entry about the throttle problem, even though entries about faulty or unsafe equipment were required by TRTB’s safety management system.
According to automatic identification system (AIS) data, between 0242 and 0623, the Tristan Janice followed a southwest course of about 233 degrees. The vessel speed was full ahead, between 8.6 and 9.7 knots. The on-duty deckhand told investigators that, at 0615, the mate directed him to wake the other two crewmembers so that they could assume the watch. At 0623, according to AIS data, the vessel altered course to 260 degrees, or about west-southwest.
The captain told investigators he entered the wheelhouse at 0635 and found no one there. He said visibility was poor at the time―about 0.125 miles―due to heavy fog. He then spotted the mate, who was on the after deck, and walked aft to talk to him. The mate told the captain he was checking on an engine vibration he had detected; however, he did not inform the captain about the starboard engine throttle he had directed the deckhand to tie off in the engine room.
Shortly after the discussion about the engine vibration, the captain and the mate entered the wheelhouse, where, until 0700, they discussed log book entries, why the vessel did not stop at Port Fourchon as originally directed, and operating in fog. They did not discuss whether to post a lookout in the fog. The captain told investigators he then walked to the port side of the wheelhouse to smoke, and when he turned back to face the mate, the mate had exited the wheelhouse without a formal watch turnover. The captain then assumed control of the vessel and adjusted the radar and AIS.
According to AIS data, between 0653 and 0711, the vessel’s course was 280 degrees, or about west-northwest, and its speed was 9.5 knots. Visibility remained poor, but no lookout was posted. Sometime between 0700 and 0711, the mate returned to the wheelhouse where he and the captain discussed vessel traffic in the vicinity. No mention was made about oil or gas production platforms along the route. The captain told investigators he reduced the vessel speed; however, AIS data showed that the vessel maintained its speed.
The captain told investigators he then looked up from the radar and saw a gas platform about 200 yards ahead. He said he tried to slow the vessel but stated the speed “was entirely too fast for [the] clutch.” He said he tried to avoid the allision by turning the vessel while “throwing it into reverse,” but his turn was initially unsuccessful because the vessel was in autopilot and he had trouble disengaging it. Within 15–30 seconds, he managed to take the vessel out of autopilot. He placed it in manual steering and altered course, but his actions were too late to avoid the platform. About 0712, the Tristan Janice allided with the platform―Ship Shoal 119 W, which was unmanned at the time―at a speed of 9.3 knots, according to AIS data.
Shortly after the allision, with the starboard engine still engaged in the full-ahead position, the two deckhands entered the engine room and removed the line tied to the starboard engine throttle. About 0714, 2 minutes after the allision, the Tristan Janice’s course and speed were east-northeast at 74.9 degrees and 1.3 knots, according to AIS data. About 0730, without reporting the allision to the authorities, the crew navigated the vessel west-northwest toward Freshwater City, Louisiana, at 9 knots.
2 NTSB/MAB-15/18
SMS… I think you and txh2oman are confused about the way companies of this caliber work.
Having the throttle tied wide open should have been a give away.
[QUOTE=coldduck;168226]SMS… I think you and txh2oman are confused about the way companies of this caliber work.[/QUOTE]
No, not confused. SMS at companies like this is there for two (maybe three) reasons – customer requires it, insurer/lein holder requires it, and to cover the owner’s ass in the event of an accident. I am aware it is most often ignored by crews.
Yeah, the captain: “Huh? I’M NOT THE MASTER …”
More from the report:
Crew statements were unclear as to whether the captain or the mate was the designated captain of the vessel. The person described as “captain” in this report was, according to a TRTB representative, the company-designated captain. However, the company-designated captain told investigators he did not believe he held the position of captain. TRTB’s safety management system did not provide guidance as to how captains were designated and assigned.
In addition to the confusion about who was captain, no records indicate that the vessel’s position was being plotted during the voyage, and no lookout was posted even though the vessel was transiting in restricted visibility. Also, wheelhouse control of the starboard engine’s speed was intentionally defeated by its throttle being tied off in the engine room. Hence, Tristan Janice proceeded at full speed in restricted visibility without the following: a proper lookout, a clearly identified person in charge, engines ready to maneuver, and regular monitoring of the vessel’s progress.Probable Cause
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the allision of offshore supply vessel Tristan Janice with a natural gas production platform was the poor watchkeeping and operational practices of the captain and the mate to ensure that the vessel was safely navigated, and the vessel owner’s inadequate procedures and oversight of the vessel’s safety management system.Voyage Planning
It is prudent for vessel crews to establish a voyage plan before getting under way. Voyage plans should identify hazards to navigation along the intended route, considering factors such as (but not limited to):
Restricted waters
Weather conditions
Ice
Restricted visibility
Traffic separation schemes, and
Areas of extensive tidal effects*
Voyage plans should be made from dock to dock, outlining courses, expected times of course changes, speeds, available aids to navigation for fixing positions, and alternative routes or areas of refuge.
There was so much stupid going on on that boat it’s impossible to know what the first mistake was. Probably leaving the dock in the first place.
[QUOTE=Kennebec Captain;168217]Does any boat in the GOM that size do formal dock to dock voyage plans?[/QUOTE]
I did if I had time and I could slide it past a master who would say: “Naw, we don’t do that shit on here …,” particularly if it was a route I was not familiar with. It really is a helpful exercise, and I can foresee circumstances where it might be critical to have that.
But, again, it comes down to manning and the pace of operations. Hard to prepare the voyage plan, supervise cargo loading, talk to the dispatcher and the company man, move the boat, bunker, prepare two reports and the daily log and depart on schedule when you’re the only officer on watch.
[QUOTE=txh2oman;168233]I did if I had time and I could slide it past a master who would say: “Naw, we don’t do that shit on here …,” particularly if it was a route I was not familiar with. It really is a helpful exercise, and I can foresee circumstances where it might be critical to have that.
But, again, it comes down to manning and the pace of operations. Hard to prepare the voyage plan, supervise cargo loading, talk to the dispatcher and the company man, move the boat, bunker, prepare two reports and the daily log and depart on schedule when you’re the only officer on watch.[/QUOTE]
Yeah, none of the boats/tugs/small ships I worked on did formal voyage plan. I think that in many cases small vessels could benifit from a more formal system but also I think the NTSB saying berth to berth voyage plan is just boiler plate.
As far as manning and pace, that’s the nature of the situation and it’s tough to push back.
For example loading cargo, if the ship gets a good stow plan the third mate can stand a cargo watch while the C/M gets caught up on paperwork or rest. But making a good stow plan takes time and effort. Just give the ship a shitty stow plan, now the C/M can’t leave the deck. Costs/manhours/time/hassles can be shifted from shore to vessel but not the other way.
“All ambiguity is resolved at the tip of the spear.” In the end the boat catches it.
Formal voyage plans: documents passed within the fleet where dates and corresponding tidal information is changed just for compliance. Everyone has a full inventory of normal runs to share and use.
Wow.
Everything about that NTSB report indicates that the crew was incompetent. Starting with decision making. I work for a company that is not known to be in the forefront of ISM compliance or any other compliances for that matter…and we do a fucking voyage plan if we move from dock to dock 1000 feet away. Tugs are uninspected vessels and we seem to have an inspection every 3 months. I’m rambling but I’m just flabbergasted.
I save all of my copies for future use. Why not?
exactly, why not! We Even share between boats.
[QUOTE=coldduck;168227]Having the throttle tied wide open should have been a give away.[/QUOTE]
This thread is about the NTSB report.
The throttle and the poor operational practices were covered in the report. Keeping a good lookout, proper watch, it’s basic seamanship and it’s all ground that’s been heavly plowed already. Not much more to say.
There are mariners and companies out there however that don’t fully comprehend the impact of the SMS. It has to do with which way the shit rolls. Contrary to the saying, it sometimes rolls uphill.
Mariners should know what’s in the book, that’s good advice.
Okay, what a stupid joke of a company. If they would have had an engineer in the engine room, the mate wouldn’t have been diagnosing a vibration with his feet, but I’m guessing a shitty little company like this doesn’t have engineers. Hell if they had a good engineer they might not have had throttle problems to begin with. Idiots have to work somewhere, better there than on my boat.
The N in Janice was painted backwards on the bow for years.
The captain told investigators he entered the wheelhouse at 0635 and found no one there. He said visibility was poor at the time―about 0.125 miles―due to heavy fog. He then spotted the mate, who was on the after deck, and walked aft to talk to him. The mate told the captain he was checking on an engine vibration he had detected; however, he did not inform the captain about the starboard engine throttle he had directed the deckhand to tie off in the engine room.
Hehehehehe WTF? Who leaves the wheelhouse in heavy fog, to check on something he could do nothing about?
[QUOTE=Kraken;168258]Hehehehehe WTF? Who leaves the wheelhouse in heavy fog, to check on something he could do nothing about?[/QUOTE]
I’ll tell you who…STOOPID, ILLITERATE, PHUCKING MORON mariners in the Gulf of Mexico working for BACKWARDS, INBRED owners…that’s who!
whadya say Jeaukx? That one of YOUR boats there?
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