“i personally witnessed a Maser supervising the welding of a support bracket for an LRIT antenna while it was drizzling.”
Wow, do you realize you were seconds away from fixing the problem? Your company would save a ton of hassle if, instead of improving ISM, they started looking into improving the Darwin Principal.
[QUOTE=Allwyn;15063]Ship safety became a major concern only when incidents like Exxon Valdezs’ grounding occurred. [/QUOTE]
[B][I]Wait, I’ve got the solution!
[/I][/B]
See you’re right, It’s not captains OR MANAGEMENT that have saved lives, it’s the environmentalist outcry after PWS got covered in oil that lead to change in the industry. So all you need to find is an environmentalists that have served as ship officers and, bingo, you’re problem is solved!
Maybe Peter Brown isn’t a moron, maybe he’s the solution to all our problems! My suggestion: go hire Peter and report back to us in 6 months.
Jeff, fact is only when insurance companies faced the heat due to massive environmental damages that massive implementation of safety measures began. Managements and yes people in important positions have to be literally forced to follow safety principles. Hence the requirement for the ISM. What do you think FOC managements payout in case of injury or death? Peanuts and at times nothing. Thats why PSCs and organizations like the USCG/ AMSA conduct sustained campaigns…
Domer you raised some good issues. Will get back.
This may be one of the most important concepts of this entire discussion. Here you have described a Master supervising, which is his job. The subject matter expert in this case study is supposed to be the guy holding the welding torch in his hand. So if your engineer type who is welding in the rain doesn’t have enough experience to stop the job, what is wrong with this picture? What’s wrong is that the master signed off on a hot permit based on information provided by someone who is supposed to know better. He has been poorly served by the person for whose work he is responsible. If the welder kills himself welding in the rain, guess who else fries? Not the C/E, who is warm and dry down in the basement. You’ve given us your first person account of what I detected in your first post: The near total lack of communication between deck and engine departments aboard your ships. You don’t have a problem with your Masters nearly as much as you appear to have a systemic culture issue within your organization that needs to be changed and brought into the 21st century.
A critical piece that is missing in your understanding of the nature of command authority is the fact that you’ve never held it. There is no land-based parallel authority that I can think of. The absolute responsibility for one’s crew, cargo, and ship is an awesome one, and is not for the faint at heart. You’ve expressed your opinion that the Master’s only real concern is navigation, while navigation is actually the second mate’s primary concern. The master has the whole ball of wax to keep track of, and having a great Chief downstairs goes a long way towards making the master’s job easier. Truth be told, I haven’t met too many C/Es who want to be legally in charge of everything. They’ve got plenty to keep them busy and they are delegated an enormous amount of responsibility and authority by the master anyhow. Plus, they’d have to come up for air once in a while if they were in charge of the whole thing. They get bloody noses at that altitude.
A photo’s worth 1,000 words and here’s what Allwyn would like the Captain to be doing:
This is an interesting issue. It’s a valid point that Masters often don’t know enough about engineering. The training usually just isn’t there. There isn’t time for it, especially considering all of the training requirements now in place for a Master’s license.
In respect to pollution, the Master and Chief Engineer share the responsibility for meeting the requirements and regulations. Most MARPOL violations are the direct fault of the Chief Engineer though. Incorrect ORB entries, unauthorized modifications to the OWS, etc. If the Master had the time and training to monitor this, some of these types of violations would be reduced. The Master is busy meeting all of the other regulatory requirements, even the useless ones.
Division of responsibility and cross training in the modern regulatory environment certainly deserve discussion. This should occur at the level of the IMO though. A company cannot make a unilateral decision to give the Chief Engineer complete executive power.
From Manu’s Scripts - Undermining overriding authority.
[B]“In practice and in my experience, the “Master’s overriding authority” is often a hollow term selectively used by managements.[/B]”
Master’s overriding authority is an ace up the sleeve, you get dealt one every five years or so, don’t try and use it more often however or you will feel the heat. Management can make life very difficult for masters who don’t keep the cargo moving on time.
[I]Here you have described a Master supervising, which is his job.
[/I]Apologies, but the Master is not qualified to supervise just any job on board. There are errors being made on this count. The Master cannot directly supervise a whole lot of things on board. You do not seem to understand the incident: The Master and fitter were together when i found them in he drizzle.
[I]So if your engineer type who is welding in the rain doesn’t have enough experience to stop the job[/I]
The fitter was under the mate. Captain hired him and since no signature is above the Captains, he felt a 5 minute arc welding job could be done in the rain. Wrong, it should not have been done. There was no tearing hurry to install he LRIT frame support anyways.
[I]
This may be one of the most important concepts of this entire discussion.[/I]
There is no concept here. Simply the management rightly concluded that Masters at our disposal do not have adequate knowledge to supervise such work. Their signatures though mandated by law, hold little guarantee for our Management against casuality prevention and hence claims. So we had to rope in Engineers to sign HW permits, since they understand the risks involved and the chances of such errors would be minimized. This incident was documented internally by he company.
[I]A critical piece that is missing in your understanding of the nature of command authority is the fact that you’ve never held it.[/I]
Command Authority systems of management are obsolete everywhere. Command authority works under exremely close supervisory tasks. Not remotel controlled ones. Dictators like Saddam were full responsible and in full command. They ran a bad ship. Transparency, so essential to good operations and management systems runs counter to the Command Authority that you refer so subjectively, and has been pointed so by some posters here. However, on the same vein i can counter question how, you as a Master would support a Chief Engineer and his team working on trouble shooting a crane where a situation from an intermittent failure to complete failure in luff/slew operations is underway. Since the crane serves 2 hatches, if it fails we incurr costs over $300,000 getting a sore crane to discharge the rest of cargo.
Such instances we pressure the Chief, not the Master. So question again, what would you do as a Master? How would you assist the Chief in the troubleshooting or otherwise? Do you have experience in troubleshooting engineering systems under a time frame? Or would you use your command authority to get it done somehow?
[I]They’ve got plenty to keep them busy and they are delegated an enormous amount of responsibility and authority by the master anyhow.[/I]
The Master is not delegating any authority to the Chief Engineer. The Chief Engineer comes armed with that authority and responsibility over all ship machinery and equipment under the ISM code. He wears the same number of stripes on his shoulders that the Ship Master does. You certainly are not comprehending the pressures that troubleshooting engineering systems entail on the Chief.
[I]Many deck officers on this board deal with equipment[B] more complicated than what’s found in their engine rooms[/B] ( Dynamic Positioning Systems, LNG cargo, Heavy Lift ballast systems, many others).
[/I]Domer, Deck Officers operate these equipment. Operating eqquipment is very different from being able to understand the processes involved and troubleshooting them. Ship Cranes are operated by people with a few days/ weeks course, some experience. Troubleshooting problems that arise in these is a different ball game.
Bolded part: You have to know what you just stated is subjective, generalized and something you don’t have adequate skills/ knowledge to back up with. So whats more complicated in the systems you mentioned than any other system in the ER? he physical principles involved, technology, handling skills, the electronics? I am curious how you understand the word complicated.
[I]You simply can’t do this on the cheap. You NEED to make the difficult choice of spending money to fix the problem.[/I]
Extremely good point. This is where we are in a fix. We also work under budgets and constraints. In this recession there are commodit markets that are hit. We try and manage within our means. And yes, there are not thousands of people available. Our biggest shortage are Engineers. They seem to be leaving fast and retiring early from sea life.
[I]In respect to pollution, the Master and Chief Engineer share the responsibility for meeting the requirements and regulations. Most MARPOL violations are the direct fault of the Chief Engineer though. Incorrect ORB entries, unauthorized modifications to the OWS, etc. [B]If the Master had the time and training to monitor this, some of these types of violations would be reduced.
[/B][/I]This is a good point and i mentioned it earlier. As far as the IOPP and IAPP goes, Masters have little idea of what goes into it. They cannot possibly know that there are ways even without magic pipes one can discharge illicitly overboard. Even experienced USCG or AMSA officers cannot know. I have seen and supervised OWS system installation on board ships as late as 2008 fall. It took less than a few minutes to twitch the sysem. Nothing is fool proof. It is a SIN to make a Master sign an ORB and hold him equally responsible to a C/E in the case of an IOPP violation. There are techniques to countercheck, but that takes time to follow. Every ship is a bit different. Chiefs who get saddled with ships made before 95 types, have incinerator systems that require an engineer burning waste all the time to cope with sludge production. This is not possible in case of older ships. I personally try and make a case for shore disposal on such ships, but again all ports don’t have these facilities.
IAPP is another thing thats already in. But if yyou have time go through the technical files. There are going to be real headaches in the implementation of these. Keeping track of nozzles, spindle guides for fuel valves, exhaust valve seat/ spindle interchanges…a whole lot of paper work and documentation that is going to come soon as an avalanche for the Chief Engineer. Again it will be criminal to hold the Master responsible. The management cannot chase the Master on these issues.
We face a number of problems on these matters an example, called some of the Master/ Chief Engineers for briefing on implemenation of experimenal condition based monitoring systems insallation and their suggestions: The Masters did not understand what condition based monitoring sytems were or what they did, or how they were enhancing anti pollution efforts by the company. These things we put forward and bring in responsibility to those who actually can understand, comprehend and yet make willful or otherwise errors. Our intention is not to blame Masters for everything, but to keep him focussed on his core competencies. We don’t want Masters to be held responsible for pollution incidents specially concerning IOPP and IAPP. We want the Chief Engineer to be.
We must share responsibility and yes power too for proper functioning on board.
You know the problem I really have with this thread is that Allwyn is painting with an extremely broad brush. Generalizations seem to fly from your fingertips Allwyn, and that might just be the core issue of your management theory and the systemic problems piling up around your fleet.
In addition to sailing as Master, I have also spent time working on shore as a Director of Marine Operations. So believe me when I say that I have seen a lot of really good and really bad communication, leadership and management techniques both inter- and intra-vessel / shore.
However, I’ve typically found that when crewmembers are treated as individuals strengths are emphasized, weaknesses are addressed, and training gaps are identified and dealt with. Does this take a lot of time, effort, energy and money? Oh heck yeah. Is it worth it? Most definitely.
Operations that don’t invest in their human capital and look for shortcuts instead of investing in training and communication are what I call “Gillette Ops”. Treat your people like a disposable razor and they all get pretty dull pretty quick.
[QUOTE=Allwyn;15104]We must share responsibility and yes power too for proper functioning on board.[/QUOTE]
So this is about power? Ah, it is all beginning to make sense, now. We have a bit of envy, don’t we, Allwyn? (And when I say “we”, I mean you.)
[I]You know the problem I really have with this thread is that Allwyn is painting with an extremely broad brush. Generalizations seem to fly from your fingertips Allwyn, and that might just be the core issue of your management theory and the systemic problems piling up around your fleet.
[/I]The assessment is incorrect. I have not generalized anything here. I am talking about the rule here, not the exceptions. My posts have been backed with singular examples. Not generalized ones.
[I]So this is about power? Ah, it is all beginning to make sense, now.[/I]
Ok assume you are correct, why should this come as some sort of revelation? I mentioned the need for C/Es to feel freer in contacting the company for example. My first post is about executive role on board ships. Nothing difficult to comprehend there. And once you understand that, you understand i mean that Master signatures taken for example granted on ORBs and Hot work permits must cease for safety sake.
Why do Masters want to sign on something they cannot possibly certify as correct?
PS: No signature of the Chief Engineer is compulsorily required on the ORB.
Allwyn, out of curiosity, where are your vessels flagged?
[QUOTE=Allwyn;15111]
[/I]The assessment is incorrect. I have not generalized anything here. I am talking about the rule here, not the exceptions. [/QUOTE]
After re-reading the entire thread, I disagree. But, it seems like you already had your conclusions before you began your first post.
Go start gEngineer.com, Allwyn.
Allwyn,
You’ve made a lot of blanket statements that I have feelings about, but I am not going to try to address them all. Your firm is hiring deck officers that have completed the minimum STCW requirements to obtain a license in their flag state, but hire engineers from 4 year institutions - true? Does this reflect a cost savings for your firm? Does it present a source of contention between the folks that have invested 4 plus years in their education and the folks that did the STCW in 6 months - or less? Do you pay the entry level engineer the same as an entry level deck officer? Are they actually able to communicate or do they “meet” the standard for English as a second language?
It sounds as if you are a proponent of management by committee - something that I abhor. Your contention that the command system isn’t viable in this “new management era” seems based in safe, run of the mill, every day operations where nothing is going wrong. By wrong, I mean WRONG! People are about to die, period.
These incidents aren’t going to be prevented by the typical safety manual, etc. Best practices can be standardized, but in the end when the unexpected happens, having a chain of command helps to eliminate indecision in those critical moments when action MUST be taken.
If your C/E needs to phone home for technical advice, great. Your example of trouble shooting a crane is not an emergency - it is the job of the engineering department. Now if the crane was on fire, the fire plan is going to be implemented, and this is now an emergency. Input from the C/E is going to be expected by the Capt. in order to make the best use of available resources in order to extinguish the fire. This is all about Incident COMMAND and span of control - not management by committee.
If you need an example of the highly successful use of this organization look into the Incident Command System that evolved within wildland fire fighting and has now been adopted (some would say co-opted) by various emergency services agencies. The Incident Commander is the shore side version of a Captain.
I would suggest that you would be better served by seeking out the successful crews that man your vessels and build upon their interactions, rather than support those that are performing poorly through a shoreside crutch…
As some background, I just received my deck license, have a B.Sc, a AAS in engineering, US Navy training in basic electronics and electricity, can weld, wire, pipe fit, rebuild the motor or tranny in your car, truck (or Unimog) - or for that matter fix your crane! Sadly, I am going to struggle to find employment in this market…
MTSKIER
Allwyn have you talked to any engineers that want to take on the day to day running of a ship along with running the engin room?
[quote=seadawg;15054]Allwyn,
Sir…I am surprised anyone bothered to respond to your babble…it is far from worthy of comment!![/quote]
it is with great glee that I digress…I suspect this gentleman is a Emmett Kelly wantabe who imagines he can steer a vessel from behind a desk over the phone as well.
[quote=Capt. Fran;15115]After re-reading the entire thread, I disagree. But, it seems like you already had your conclusions before you began your first post.
Go start gEngineer.com, Allwyn.[/quote]
That’s funny. Never realized that anyone actually expected the Master of the vessel to know how to rebuilt a diesel or troubleshoot a PLC, and on top of that assume some mitigation of responsibility as a result.
That’s makes about a much sense as mitigating the responsibility of the Presidency because the President knows less about finance than the Federal Reserve Chairman and less about military tactics than the Chiarman of the Joint Chiefs.
[quote=Allwyn;15111]
Why do Masters want to sign on something they cannot possibly certify as correct?[/quote]
It is required that the master signs it - With this ring I do thee wed.
My take is that that Port State Control is telling me that if I can’t trust the chief I have to do something about it. I had a chief who I didn’t trust. Now I have one that I do.
