A well thought out, well written opinion piece.
If it’s a tug, I would think you need to be tugging on something.
note to CaptLee - You might need to stay away from this one
Interesting. I have a basic question, though. And that is what was the first ATB, or at least manufacturer? For years, I was the engineer on the SEA SKIMMER (now the SEA RAVEN, I believe), assembled by Robert Bludworth from two old Navy salvage tugs, repowered and reshaped. I can say that the SEA SKIMMER was absolutely useless out of the notch. That and there are very few things more exciting than being ejected from the notch of a barge. It never happens in calm seas, at least the SEA SKIMMER was probably the worst riding vessel I have ever been on in a storm. The lounge became the zero gravity simulator pretty much until we got into sheltered waters.
I have also sailed on BELCHER PORT EVERGLADES, and, while not an articulated tug barge, it certainly had questionable sea keeping abilities.
cmakin,
about 10 years ago worked for Martin Oil & Gas on the tug Orion w/ barge Poseidon (old Army tug/Bludworth system)…was told that was the “first unit” and at the time looked it…she also was a “wild ride” after she “beat” herself out of the notch!!
[quote=seadawg;25328]cmakin,
about 10 years ago worked for Martin Oil & Gas on the tug Orion w/ barge Poseidon (old Army tug/Bludworth system)…was told that was the “first unit” and at the time looked it…she also was a “wild ride” after she “beat” herself out of the notch!![/quote]
I am familiar with the unit. I surveyed the barge and tug quite a bit back when I was with ABS. The POSEIDON was “conventional” when compared to the SEA SKIMMER. Hang on, I have a photo of the ol’ dawg out of the notch at Houston from back in the mid 80’s.
Back when Dow Chemical had the Sea Skimmer, there was an earlier one IIRC. The Artubar an acronym for Articulated TUg and BARge. I recall her coming into Gulf Tampa Drydock with severe hull damage after an ejection at sea in weather. I chatted with the crew and they all were so rusty (including the Captain) over boat handling, and going on the wire they holed both the tug and barge in the process.
Sort of like a wake up call to all the current ATBs out there. This is still an evolution that must be practiced from time to time. But there are NO requirements or details that accompany any ATB, No official requirements, and no official procedures.
When this happens (and, yes it will for sure) unfortunately it will take a catastrophe (like normal in the industry!) to have formal plans made, and mandatory practice.
I guess this sums up my feelings on whether a ATB crew should have a TOAR. YUP. Because when the chips are down is NOT the time to be figuring this stuff out. And NO dorothy you can’t earn a TOAR in 30 days either!
[quote=cappy208;29237]But there are NO requirements or details that accompany any ATB, No official requirements, and no official procedures.
When this happens (and, yes it will for sure) unfortunately it will take a catastrophe (like normal in the industry!) to have formal plans made, and mandatory practice.
I guess this sums up my feelings on whether a ATB crew should have a TOAR. YUP. Because when the chips are down is NOT the time to be figuring this stuff out. And NO dorothy you can’t earn a TOAR in 30 days either![/quote]
Love it! Thats the best reply I’ve heard in awhile.
And for further proof: an ATB became uncoupled this morning south of Long Island, and had to tow home on the emergency hawser! Did the guys need towing skills? Was there damage to the units? Could any one on watch have gotten on the wire?
Yes TOAR s are needed, and should be required.
For the last 7 years that I sailed on ATBs, I sailed with outstanding captains and mates. (with a couple of exceptions) Many were guys I sailed with on wire boats. I also sailed with a few guys who received the “ATB TOAR” in the operation. Most were outstanding in cargo-ops and were great in our maintenance programs. They could bring the units to the dock with skill that is expected with assist tugs. The “eye-opener” was when the pins were pulled and light boat handling skills were called into play. Some were down-right scarey.
I’ve experienced lock failures and a few asst sensor failures but was never knocked out of the notch. Most of that credit goes to the captains and mates that kept their cool and maintained proper over-ride and sea-keeping until the problems were resolved. I shudder to think of being knocked out of the notch onto the towline with a captain with no towing experience.
cappy208 :
“And for further proof: an ATB became uncoupled this morning south of Long Island, and had to tow home on the emergency hawser!”
More details please.
Yes more details please as I need sumthing to read as I’m on anchor watch in the harbor.
Well, on the East coast incident; It ‘appears’ the stbd pin was not fully inserted in the ladder. One could ask: How could that happen? Human error!
It appears that the ‘inserter’ did not ascertain whether the pin helmet was simply pressed up, versus fully inserted and pressed up. This is a wake up call for the vessels with pins that are not visible from the wheelhouse. Take the time to go look at the pins, and make certain for yourself they are inserted correctly. The Deckhand/tankerman involved apparently didn’t know what was a correctly inserted helmet. While trying to give some understanding to the crew; This was the first time they had pressed up and gotten underway with without an intercon rep aboard so ‘something’ was overlooked.
Just so all intercon users know: It is possible to pin up and pressup with the teeth NOT engaged properly. I know that my pins are at a certain extension when fully and properly inserted. I know if they are 4" shy of full insertion they are off by one tooth (horizontally). I know if they are off by 3" one helmet is rotated by 90o. If they are off by 6" both helmets are off by 90o. You just have to pay attention to the screen and get to know the numbers. These numbers are different for all boats and intercon types. Also, the numbers are approximate and aren’t exactly accurate. What may be the numbers for one boat may not be exact for another ‘sistership’.
On the other hand, the incident on the west coast (ATB Corpus Christi) the computer indicated a failure of the bushing lube system. The tug crew voluntarily punched out, and went on the hawser to avoid damaging the pins. It is still unclear whether the bushing system WAS defective, whether the pins were overheating, and whether they NEEDED to punch out or not. Maybe someone else will share the info on that.
I have heard from another regular that this IS an issue on some intercon units, with computer alarms, and unclear whether the alarms ARE valid, or false alarms. The more false alarms received, the more everyone tends to ignore the alarm system!
One thing that seems evident is intercon isn’t sharing info, or at least making this info public. The individual companies are keeping these issues private also, one would surmise to keep any customers from finding out. The sharing of information is needed to help ease the fears/misunderstanding that is circulating regarding the use of intercon systems.
Of course it’s very easy being an armchair quarterback but the biggest problem is that some are under the impression that Intercon pin systems are plug and play.
Regular inspection of extended pins and bushings with manual greasing and excercise before sailing are paramount. The screens have gotten fancier over the years but a “visual” while pinng up is just common sense. The rotation indicator potentiometers are pendulum actuated. Trim will affect the indication. The helmets can take a lot of stress, even cocked one tooth if sea conditions arn’t too rough.
The lube failure alarm can be caused by several problems. The most common is the grease drum emptying. Ambient temp dropping can cause the greasing system to slow down. The Trabon grease divider system has a stroke counter linked to the PLC. If one divider stops or clogs, the entire grease system stops. That’s when proper seakeeping comes in until the problem is resolved.
The bushing temp alarm is set for a 15 degree differential between the various sensors on the bushing and a reference sensor on the bulkhead. The problem there is that IF the bulkhead is 15 degrees warmer than the pins, you still get an alarm.
There are many problems that can be overcome if the crews know exactly how the systems works. Intercon reps have gone out of their way to answer any questions our crews have put to them. I was uncomfortable with the Intercon system at first but wouldn’t have reservations about going anywhere in the world with the 50 inch or larger pins.
[QUOTE=cappy208;29237]Back when Dow Chemical had the Sea Skimmer, there was an earlier one IIRC. The Artubar an acronym for Articulated TUg and BARge. I recall her coming into Gulf Tampa Drydock with severe hull damage after an ejection at sea in weather. I chatted with the crew and they all were so rusty (including the Captain) over boat handling, and going on the wire they holed both the tug and barge in the process.
Sort of like a wake up call to all the current ATBs out there. This is still an evolution that must be practiced from time to time. But there are NO requirements or details that accompany any ATB, No official requirements, and no official procedures.
When this happens (and, yes it will for sure) unfortunately it will take a catastrophe (like normal in the industry!) to have formal plans made, and mandatory practice.
I guess this sums up my feelings on whether a ATB crew should have a TOAR. YUP. Because when the chips are down is NOT the time to be figuring this stuff out. And NO dorothy you can’t earn a TOAR in 30 days either![/QUOTE]
I have a couple of stories about this. While on the SEA SKIMMER, we were ejected from the notch. Not a pleasant experience to be sure. The emergency hawser held and we were able to get into Freeport, Texas. Now, the emergency system on the SEA SKIMMER/PLAQUEMINE was very simple; a poly hawser shackled to an H-bit on the stern of the tug and to the bow of the barge and tied down the starboard side of the barge. Most of the guys in the wheelhouse had ocean towing experience, so that was never an issue.
Flash forward a couple of years to when I spent some time on board the BELCHER PORT EVERGLADES. NO ONE on board, other than myself (an engineer) had any time on the hawser. Because of some problems with the notch system, we had to make some trips under two. The ride alone was enough to make one re-think their career choices. The biggest problem, however, was the complete lack of knowledge of ocean towing in both the deck and engine departments.
I had taken the job as third assistant just to keep getting a paycheck. When we were getting ready to shorten tow and take arrival at Tampa Bay, the second engineer went out to start up the towing winch. Once he started the engine, he slipped and fell because of the rough seas and the way the boat rode. On his way to the deck, he reached for a hand hold and grabbed the air brake. He released it and the towing hawser began to run. At least he had the presence of mind to get back into the engine room and dog the door before the air flex clutch shattered from the high speed (and left indents to the bulkhead visible from inside the engine room). Needless to say, we lost the barge, and then spent the rest of the day catching up to and “end for ending” the hawser. When I asked the Captain and Mate why they were towing on the air brake and didn’t engage the hand brake, I got a look like I was a Martian. Kind of the same look when I asked them how often they freshened the wire in the towing shoe. Come to find out, the hand brake on the winch was inoperable, since it hadn’t ever been lubed OR exercised. I didn’t work for Coastal/Belcher much longer. In fact, my next hitch was spent in the shipyard in Port Arthur, and it was my last one at sea.