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So what no rudder angle indicator on the bridge? Donāt they have one of them big honkin things hanging from the overhead viewable from all angles of sight?
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MO-2024-001 Interim report.pdf](https://www.atsb.gov.au/sites/default/files/2025-04/MO-2024-001%20Interim%20report.pdf)
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The report supplies a lot more context:
For example this:
During the inbound transit through the DWC, the Maersk Shekou experienced sustained strong winds. By 0518, while on a southerly heading, the relative wind gusts peaked at 54 knots from about 4 points on the starboard bow
It seems there is an interim report on the reasons for this.
Very interesting. I always thought the Maersk Shekou simply didnāt turn to port as usual from the entrance channel into the port area and the reasons for that are in the report.
And a bit more detail from ATSB.
https://www.atsb.gov.au/media/news-items/2025/atsb-interim-report-details-container-ship-collision-leeuwin-tall-ship-fremantle
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Having thought through this a bit more I donāt think itās so much a case of helmsman and pilots working against each other as simply the pilot not taking direct charge and giving positive helm orders and not a course to steer in conditions in which the helmsman had difficulty steering the course ordered.
It seems to me the pilots should have noticed the amount of rudder being used and the lack of effect it had. If the helmsman is using 30 degrees both ways somethingās wrong. Starboard rudder would never have been applied under positive helm orders. The helmsman was also seemingly ordered to steer a course when other methods of turning (thruster, tugs) are used.
It follows that the helmsman should have voiced his inability to maintain course in the later stages. Iām actually surprised that the captain didnāt say something.
Whilst in my much smaller ship I order the helmsman to steer the course in the entrance channel there are times with wind conditions similar to this that the helmsman has difficulty maintaining course in the channel and I revert to direct helm orders. I always use helm orders from the turn to berthing.
The wind conditions experienced before turning onto the harbour entrance were over the limits for berthing. The pilots should have considered abandoning the approach when there was still opportunity to do so after passing the Deep Water Channel.
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Concur on direct helm orders. I would also add, where was the watch officer at the throttles watching the helmsman. An alert comment by OOW and even helmsman iterating last course command as an interrogative would be SOP
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Also concur with helm orders.
Itās an unfortunate fact of life that if the Pilot misses something it is unlikely that the bridge team will pick it up.
It seems to me that they were operating at the very limits of control and even this one small error was enough to cause a loss of control
Unlikely is putting it very kindly.
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Although there were two pilots on the ship, you would have thought one of them should have picked up what the rudder was doing.
The pilot should always be the first one to see what a helmsman is doing eg struggling to steer, putting the rudder the wrong way etc.
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Yes totally agree.
But I must add the pilot is the ONLY one that sees the mistake.
This is of course in my experience of 23 years of piloting.
Bridge teams are a great asset but quickly become overwhelmed when there is even the slightest departure from the plan.
I am trying hard not to make this a Pilot Vs Captain post but it is the reality when things start to go tits up.
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With regards to the helm orders:
0607 pilot ordered the helmsmen to steady on 083Ā°
0610 pilot ordered a course of 085Ā°
0612 pilot ordered first port 25Ā° rudder then port 30Ā° rudder
0613 pilot ordered a course of 083Ā°
0614 helmsman reports wheel is hard port but the vessel is swinging to starboard
0614 pilot ordered full ahead to maintain steerage
0615 helmsman steadied on the ordered course of 083Ā°
After that the pilot used the tugs and bowthruster in an attempt to turn the vessel to port while the helmsman continued to try to maintain the heading of 083Ā°.
Yes, makes you wonder what the Captain, Mate, secondary Pilot as well as the Primary Pilot were doing (??) Didnāt ANY of them at ANY point in time even think to glance at the indicator at least once?? Didnāt ANY of them notice the movements of the helmsman??
Yes, everyone has to read the whole article to get context. But I believe that the high winds and adverse conditions (compared to normal) would have demanded the Pilot(s) pay even more attention to the rudder position and the commands he should have been giving. That the Pilot was using both tugs and thruster, makes me wonder how/why he totally forgot about his rudder position. Had he āthoughtā about his rudder he would have noticed (we would think) that the QM was literally doing his own thing and would then have corrected his actions.
I canāt fathom how everyone on the bridge had lost situational awareness to the point nobody noticed the helmsman spinning the wheel with little regard to what else was going on.
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In fact, if the Pilot was having trouble steering, all the more reason he should have been MORE aware of where his rudder was and what he, the Pilot, was doing with it.
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Apart from the bridge team failingsā¦ā¦which were numerous, the question needs to be askedā¦ā¦why did the vessel enter under the prevailing and at times sustained very fresh wind conditions?
As stated in the report, the FP maximum allowable sustained entry wind speed for this size vessel was 20 knots.
It is apparent, that after entering, the vessel was making significant northward leeway whilst rounding up to starboard with the strong SWāly wind pushing on the starboard quarter well aft of the pivot point. This is not the time to give the quartermaster a course to steer nor is it the time for the secondary Pilot to be immersed in a mobile phone conversation. Shades of āEver Forwardā sadly.
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I canāt believe, under the given circumstances, he gave a 5 degree change in angle rudder order. As if that would have a demonstrable difference??? I also have never heard ANY one give a 25 degree rudder order, seems a bit odd. A 10, 20, 30 order seems pretty standard, though I guess it depends upon where you work.
Where I work, we board ships and with ten minutes or less we are driving the ship constantly. Iāve rarely (basically never) given courses to steer as we are typically always driving large ships through a channel subject to breezy trade winds (15-18 knots). So we are giving helm orders all the time.
In training new Pilots I let them try that approach for awhile (telling the AB to steer a course) and watch their response to the ship wildly going all over the place in a narrow channel. After changing their underwear a few times, I strongly suggest they simply steer the ship themselves. āYou are driving, not the AB. Put the rudder where you want it and there is no guess work.ā
I have witnessed the āsteering by courseā approach on many US Navy ships and even some cargo/passenger ships prior to my assuming the conn. In confined channels the watch officers Iāve witnessed get very frustrated very quickly because the ship isnāt doing what they want, even though the excellent helmsman is attentively carrying out his orders.
It takes some experience and understanding to make a ship sail straight down a channel under ever changing headings, while the ship is bodily still making good the range line, all the while the speed is decreasing (reduced speed commands) as you are entering a turning basin and the rudder constantly needs different (more?) angle because of the decreasing speed. Thats the kind of thing that Pilots learn from simple repetition at the port they are working.
As if all that wasnāt enough, now add in a swell or surf on your stern or quarter. Only complicating the wind factor even more.
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Nice clip from Dr. Sal here
Apart from the obvious stated here in by various participants pls do not forget sth
like POWER DISTANCE .Burmeese helmsans/ ABs are not trained in BRM and May have not guts to question action of Australian two pilots + Ukrainian master & ch/matÄ on the bridge.
4 master licences on the bridge , Vts eye in the sky watching it all +. 4 TUGS !!!
What else one needs to do it right. ???Where are Voice records ??
Normally one hears ships are undermanned and underequipped.
May be this time it was overmanned and overequipped and poor helmsman was over- whelmed by the oversaturation of authority let alone equipment marshalled for the action .
The quartermaster did his job as instructedā¦ā¦.nothing more and nothing less. The balance of the bridge team failed dismally in carrying out their responsibilities and duties.
The ATSB narrative is nothing short of embarrassing.
The Pilot PPU would have been set up with a three minute predictive shipshape plus the vesselās ECDIS should have been similarly configured. So, at all times at the noted SOGāsā¦..approximately 650~700 metres ahead of the vessel position lay a shipshape which was telling them the future outcome of their actions in addition to the effect of external forces acting on the vessel.
One means of overcoming the poor steerage rather than going to full ahead was to employ the Port quarter tug pushing up full to induce a positive port ROT. This would have tracked the pivot point away from the Leeuwin in the early stages but we were a wee bit too busy on the mobile phoneā¦ā¦ā¦.
Clearly, there was little attention paid to the PPU, ECDIS and RAI.
The lights were on but no one was home.
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Yup it does look like they really screwed the pooch on this one.
The helmsman was only doing what he was told.
Iām sorry but I canāt agree with you about steering yourself.
On a coaster when everything is at your finger tips and your view is good then maybe. On a 300+ m boxboat you do not want to be engaged in steering yourself. You need to move around to see everything.
Giving the helmsman a course to steer relives you of one task. If the course is not having the desired result then you can correct it. The vast majority of helmsmen are very good and proud of their skills.
When things started to go tits up helm orders are appropriate but also a sharp eye on the rudder angle indicator to ensure that your orders are being carried out correctly.
Second pilot on a mobile phone in very difficult circumstances is simply unbelievable