Having said that one may expect from a proud and skilled helmsman some feedback reminding all others of his presence and function with:
“I am still maintaining course 083 or abt”
or
" my wheel is hard port and I have a problem maintaining 083 or abt"
or simple
" no steering!!!"
I heard such feedback many times despite having much less docking experiences then participating here Pilots. Can not believe They have never heard such cries from conscious and participating helmsman .
True
It just feels wrong to be blaming a Burmese Helmsman with all the other crap that was going wrong.
I am not blaming Him I am speculating the power distance could be contributing factor.
Yes I do think that had a big part as well.
Here is my four legged stool theory based on observation and privete experience.
Had all PH crew. Decided to fix the light obove my doors leading to master office.
Needed 4 legged stool to reach the place and had this item in my cabin.
Fixed the problem and left the stool near the doors.
The door was adjacent to bridge stairway so the stool obstructed abt 1/3 Rd of the stairway first step.
Forgot to bring the stool into my office for abt 36hrs. When decided to bring it in suddenly was struck with the idea. Just leave it and see what PH officers and crew will do about it.
For 10 days nothing happened. Neither Officers nor Bosun or Messman did anything abt it or even asked me why I kept it there.
Then I called them to my office and asked why they ignored the presence of sth that was clearly disturbing the passage to the bridge and my office.
All answered same: they thought it was important to me, they did not want to offend me or disturb with such a question, they did not want to interfere with some unknown master idea or even embarrass me.
Yes it is an important issue the Power Distance one.
I can remember the very first time I heard about it in a formal way. I think during some BRM training.
I was quite shocked in one sense but in another it was something that I somehow knew existed.
Going back to the accident, with the high wind speed I would imagine the noise levels on the bridge would have been quite high
giving a helmsman the course to maintain once, as pilot, you have the ship there is fine.
The approaching a turn and going right 10, immediately followed by steady on 090 is weak piloting IMO - get the ship steady on the new course than give the helmsman to order to steer it.
The helmsman not saying anything while struggling was poor seamanship on his part
No one in the wheel house not looking at the rudder angle indicator was negligent.
I just watched Sal’s video, from the ROT, heading and rudder angle it looks like the helmsman was not struggling. Presumably he was very focused on his task because he did a very good job in a difficult situation.
A 333m LOA LCV with a 5 high deck stack, significant windage, a tight entrance channel, wind gusts exceeding 50 knots plus a dysfunctional bridge team.
What could possibly go wrong………..
The helmsman did what he was told and there were two pilots who should have had a better idea of what was going on. The bridge team could have been better but the pilots fell down on the job.
The rudder is always going to be the biggest force especially at Full Ahead.
The art of leadership is delegation, give the helmsman a course to steer but step in with helm orders when struggling and for large course alterations or controlled turns.
As to the question as why did the pilot not switch to helm commands; likely it was due to high cognitive work load.
There’s a limit to how much information a person can hold in short-term memory, In that situation it’s possible when the helmsman reported that the rudder was hard to port that the pilot might have been lost from working memory that he was giving courses and not helm commands. What he retained instead was the rudder was hard port.
Four tugs, the position of the ship, heading, COG, ROT, helm orders, changing wind speeds etc it was just too much for one person.
There were 2 pilots 
Had the second one been paying attention..,.
And anyway how do you think we do it on an everyday basis with no incident.
We have all been caught out by changing weather conditions and had to manage
Just watched Sal s video.
I think he just about nailed it.
When, in all of this manoeuvre, was there a specific intent to start the necessary turn to port and maintain it?
There was none.
The result is obvious. The ship stayed on the entrance channel course throughout and hit exactly where it would have if the helmsman steered a steady course the entire way. The pilot’s view of the fixed blue transit beacon lights were still in line (ie good for mid entrance channel, not mid this part of the channel) when he hit.
Every ship entering has to turn to port, starting well before the new track is visible, probably as the ship passes South Mole.
Efforts to slow the ship by tugs seem to me to stop the ship turning to safe water.
I might add that cross winds in the entrance channel are standard and often strong, but cross wind dies suddenly at Arthur Head in the lee of the Maritime Museum, Fremantle Port Authority building (multi storey with control tower atop) and subsequent wharf sheds.
This is a short and intense Pilotage. 1.5nm from entrance to berth.
Clearly, it has been determined by the relevant authority, that two Pilots and four tugs are required to safely transit a 333m LCV inwards to the terminal……in a sustained 20 knots of wind during daylight hours.
There is absolutely no excuse for the second Pilot to be at the rear of the wheelhouse whilst on the mobile phone with the vessel being subjected to extreme meteorological conditions well outside accepted and documented limits.
This was a complete breakdown in professional standards by experienced individuals who should have known better.
Aus,
I am not normally one to criticise my fellow Pilots but in this case I totally agree with you.
Also IMHO that manoeuvre was totally doable even in those wind conditions with that amount of Tug Power available.
If only they had not allowed the helmsman to steer straight into a frikking wall.
Not the helmsman’s fault, he was just doing as he was told
244,
I have intentionally kept out of this for that very reason…..until I read the interim report this evening which really concerned me on a number of fronts.
We complain about Doctors closing ranks although, on this occasion, this Maritime incident needs to be called out for what it is……
We have a kaleidoscope of mariners on this forum comprising Masters, Mates, Engineers, Able Seamen, Pilots, Surveyors, Social Media Commentators and Academics…..to mention a few. None of us should be immune from criticism when the shoe fits.
EDIT: I draw parallels between this incident and that of the “Grand Rodosi” incident which occurred at Port Lincoln/ South Australia in 2012. Jughead will know what I am talking about.
Oh yes after looking it up I remember it now.
No one noticed that there was no 
or anything else when the engine did not go astern 
