Has too much of the decision making been moved ashore?

The weekend there have been three incidents on Statoil operated platforms and rigs in the Norwegian sector of the North Sea.
The union claim that this MAY be because of cuts in the maintenance budget decided by “Paper People” ashore without consulting the personnel on the platforms especially: https://www.nrk.no/rogaland/statoil-ansatte-bekymret-etter-brann-og-lekkasjer-pa-plattformer-1.13182341

Anybody have an opinion on the subject?

Is this also the case in the US?

The incidents were probably caused by those super trained and highly competent STCW crew on the marine side. We all know the drilling side is incapable of any wrongdoing. You can probably further pin this on the underpaid third world STCW qualified American seaman that all Norwegian companies employ in the North Sea.

Were these incidents on Maersk owned Statoil contracted rigs? If so then maybe Maersk brought in an incompetent American academy engineering grad to run the maintenance department. They make it seem like all the maintenance policy decisions were all his ideas. This way they run it on a shoestring budget and when catastrophe hits they have their fall guy ready o take one for the team. Everyone will automatically assume he was the problem since Americans are stupid. Then they will all have a good laugh that their dumb American diversity hire didn’t pan out. They will all slap each other on the back for being so progressive to give the less fortunate American a chance knowing he would fail miserably.

Yes, to much has been moved shoreside

What? Cuts in maintenance budgets? Maintenance being deferred? Sounds positively irresponible. Sounds like what some are accusing Transocean of in the recent Horizon threads?

Follow the money ombugge. Seems it’s been a long time since corporate concerns with profit, social responsibility and “quality” were in balance. Quality meaning doing a good professional job where employees feel they are part of something bigger than themselves and have a sense of accomplishment.

Anyway maintenance managers gotta answer to somebody. People behind desks can easily make arbitrary decisions that set processes in motion with serious consequences. Then the normalization of deviance spoken of in other threads on the Macando/Horizon incident sets in and you get a fire here, a leak there. You find out how little regard for “stop the job” desk dwellers actually have.

But hey thanks for the whole Dylan Nobel prize thing, speaking of answering to those ashore…

//youtu.be/6CwHby-YTNo

Has too much of the decision making been moved ashore?

Let me check with the office and get back to you.

[QUOTE=Fraqrat;191596]The incidents were probably caused by those super trained and highly competent STCW crew on the marine side. We all know the drilling side is incapable of any wrongdoing. You can probably further pin this on the underpaid third world STCW qualified American seaman that all Norwegian companies employ in the North Sea.

Were these incidents on Maersk owned Statoil contracted rigs? If so then maybe Maersk brought in an incompetent American academy engineering grad to run the maintenance department. They make it seem like all the maintenance policy decisions were all his ideas. This way they run it on a shoestring budget and when catastrophe hits they have their fall guy ready o take one for the team. Everyone will automatically assume he was the problem since Americans are stupid. Then they will all have a good laugh that their dumb American diversity hire didn’t pan out. They will all slap each other on the back for being so progressive to give the less fortunate American a chance knowing he would fail miserably.[/QUOTE]

There aren’t any STCW qualified crew on concrete production platform, nor any Americans, educated or otherwise.
On the MODU that took a kick there would be a Master Mariner as OIM however, as well as educated and [U]certified[/U] Drill Crew who controlled it by the book.

I actually raised a serious question and would appreciate a serious answer.

In my experience it has gone too far. In my early days in offshore operations too much was decided by people on board with too little understanding of the actual dangers.

In the last 20 years or so I have seen several occasions where nobody on board dared to take a decision without instruction from shore based managers, which caused dangerous situations to escalate.

As Warranty Surveyor I have stopped Marine Operations for this reason, both before and of late.

Which is worst, Tool pushers making decisions on Marine aspects, or somebody sitting ashore issuing instructions without fully understanding the situation is an open question.

I employ the sharpest minds from the US Maritime Academies. There is no better place to operate a vessel than from the third floor. These are facts proven over and over again by repeating the same incidents. If you people can’t make good decisions and follow policy I will remove that responsibility from you. I have had my lawyers layout and word the SMS and Safe Ops manuals in such a way to create confusion. This way you have no choice but to call the office for important decisions. If you and your operations manager make a wrong decision I have plenty of latitude to fire both of you for cause. It is this crippling fear of losing your job that helps keep you people from ruining my reputation and losing me business opportunities.

As far as deferred maintenance goes we are in a bust cycle. This means I move the bean counters into position to save the goose that lays the golden eggs. There is no need to worry about poor maintenance when you employ the best mariners in the world. Proper preventive maintenance in good times means the equipment is in fantastic state when times are lean. There again having the best crews money can buy pays off in spades in these dark times. Perhaps Statoil should quit hiring the local idiots and hire highly trained and over qualified American engineers to maintain their broken down last gen equipment.

Perhaps Statoil should quit hiring the local idiots and hire highly trained and over qualified American engineers to maintain their broken down last gen equipment.

Yes Norway tried that back in the 1970’s and learnt a lesson never to be forgotten, or repeated.

Here is a legal opinion on the subject in Maasmond Newsletters today:

Debate on plight of ship’s masters, bullied, micro-managed from afar
THE status of a ship’s captain, once the master of all he surveyed, has been much reduced while his responsibilities have been much increased, say London lawyers. Ship’s masters are held as a “legal hostages”, when local and port authorities, sometimes corrupt, find something wrong with the ship, its operations and/or its cargo, said former seafarer Michael Grey, council member of the London Shipping Law Centre (LSLC). To discuss the matter, Mr Grey will participate in the 14th Cadwallader Debate and Dinner at Drapers’ Hall, London on October 26, organised by the LSLC’s Maritime Business Forum. Mr Grey feels the master’s traditional authority is widely perceived as being diminished while his responsibility has increased, frequently in matters over which he/she has little or no control, reports London’s Tanker Operator. The London debate will look at whether the role of the master is under attack; and how his authority and responsibilities have been undermined in an age of instant communication between ship and shore, and by a growing volume of laws and regulations affecting the way the master runs his ship. Mr Grey spoke of the growing difficulties facing ship masters, citing external interference in loading and stowage, course, speed and performance decisions, sometimes overriding the master’s safety concerns and backed by bullying. With an estimated 150,000 new merchant officers required in the global shipping industry by 2025, Mr Grey expressed concern that these factors could well discourage those contemplating a career at sea and ultimate command.Under the chairmanship of Lord Clarke of Stone-cum-Ebony, the speaker’s panel will be led by InterManager secretary general, Capt Kuba Szymanski, as moderator. He will be supported by director Michael Kelleher, west of England P&I Club; global head of shipping, Faz Peermohamed, Ince & Co; partner Michael Chalos of K&L Gates (New York); and director of Commercial Regulations and Standards, Jeff Lantz, of the US Coast Guard. source: Schednet

drop a Master on a Modu who knows nothing about drilling and you havnt really improved anything, just added one more person who cant make a decision in the decision tree

When ships go autonomous the 3rd floor might have to lift their game?

First, you need experience in drilling to know what can or cannot be improved upon, and then be able to recognize if it was or not.

For example, what would “about drilling” would you need to know to be an effective Master on a drill ship? Or, is that just some general statement that makes sense without any knowledge?

Do you think the Master, OIM, or the Drilling Superintendent actually makes the initial decision to shut in a well if influx gets in the well bore?

Most Masters that are OIMs have ample knowledge of drilling ops/parameters, safety procedures, drilling margins/breaks, FIT & LOT, negative tests, subsea/surface well control equipment, topside pipe handling equipment, EDS (BOP), and ESDs to name a few things…, but will never have the cyber experience the driller has, the NOV courses the ADs have, the crane cert the crane operator has, and on and on.

So what decision tree / type of knowledge are we talking about exactly?

[QUOTE=powerabout;191794]drop a Master on a Modu who knows nothing about drilling and you havnt really improved anything, just added one more person who cant make a decision in the decision tree

When ships go autonomous the 3rd floor might have to lift their game?[/QUOTE]

Where do you gt it from that a Master Mariner cannot know anything about drilling technology, or that you have to have hung on the break handle to do so??

All MODUs (incl. jackups) under Norwegian flag, has [U]always[/U] been required to have a Master Mariner as OIM.
Since the Alexander Kielland accident in the early 1980’s all OIM has to have attended 4 months of special training to qualify for the position on any MODU working in the Norwegian EEZ.

It is VERY different from the one week “OIM Column Stabilized” course required for a Driller or Tool Pusher to hold the OIM position in the GoM, or many other parts of the world.

This training includes understanding of Drilling Technology and Well Control, as well as MODU Stability and Mooring Analysis, which is not part of STCW requirements and training to obtain an unlimited Masters CoC.

In 1978 I was Captain on an American owned and operated Drillship working in S.E.Asia. Among other things I was tasked to administer a correspondence course in Basic Drilling Technology from the University of Texas, Austin, which was offered to all comers.
Unfortunately there were little interest among the crew, so I ended up being the only one who actually completed the course. Not because it was required, but because I liked to understand what was going on, both on the Drill floor and down the hole.

When the Operator arranged a Well Control Course for the Drill crew, from Ass. Driller to the Drilling Superintendent, I put my name forward as well. I had some experience with the aftermath of Blowouts from my time as Warranty Surveyor prior to that job and with shallow gas on that rig. I wanted to learn more to understand the basics.
After some persuasion my application was accepted with some astonishment; But you don’t HAVE to do this! What do you need this for?? etc. I passed the test at the end of the two day course, but the Drilling Superintendent failed.

Moral of the story? That it is good to know more then what is minimum require, especially if you are [U]legally[/U] the Master and responsible for the safety on a ship with 90-100 people on board.

PS> The sister ship capsized in the Gulf of Thailand a few years later with the loss of all on board, basically because the Master was not actually in command and was overridden by orders from shore. (In this case the Operator was also the Owner)

This article in Fairplay could have been posted elsewhere as it cover subjects discussed in several threads here on the forum.
I chose to put it here due to the comments on the Hoegh Osaka incident: http://fairplay.ihs.com/safety-regulation/article/4276706/the-accident-man-steve-clinch-marine-accident-investigation-branch-chief-inspector?utm_source=email&utm_medium=newsletter&utm_campaign=dailynewswire&mgs1=daafofMLwC

[QUOTE=ombugge;191802]Where do you gt it from that a Master Mariner cannot know anything about drilling technology, or that you have to have hung on the break handle to do so??

All MODUs (incl. jackups) under Norwegian flag, has [U]always[/U] been required to have a Master Mariner as OIM.
Since the Alexander Kielland accident in the early 1980’s all OIM has to have attended 4 months of special training to qualify for the position on any MODU working in the Norwegian EEZ.

PS> The sister ship capsized in the Gulf of Thailand a few years later with the loss of all on board, basically because the Master was not actually in command and was overridden by orders from shore. (In this case the Operator was also the Owner)[/QUOTE]

4 months land based course and you can make decisions on board a drill rig??

PS the Master who sailed on that drill ship that rolled over in Thailand clearly knew nothing about stability or he would have never left the dock. which is what the previous crew did, they left.

[QUOTE=powerabout;191820]4 months land based course and you can make decisions on board a drill rig??

PS the Master who sailed on that drill ship that rolled over in Thailand clearly knew nothing about stability or he would have never left the dock. which is what the previous crew did, they left.[/QUOTE]

You think that a Tool Pusher with a 5 day “OIM Class” is qualified to make marine decisions??

No the crew did not leave, but the former Captain, who had been on every one of that class of drillships during construction and the first year or so in operation, left because he could not get the Operator/Owner to follow his advice and orders.
The derrick had been extended to fit a Top drive but no changes were made to stability data, or operating procedure.

These were small drillships built by Far East Livingstone in Singapore and very susceptible to bending, hogging when in transit with anchors and chains in, sagging when drilling, which had to be compensated for with ballast.
The former Captain knew this VERY well, (as did I) and we watched like hawks that the bending moments were kept within allowable limits. If you did not, they could easily develop cracks in the moon pool area in a seaway.

PS> This was back in the Cowboy days and I had a few cases where the Driller called the Motorman to fill ballast tanks around the moon pool without my being told. (Believing that it would reduce heave)

[QUOTE=powerabout;191820]4 months land based course and you can make decisions on board a drill rig??

PS the Master who sailed on that drill ship that rolled over in Thailand clearly knew nothing about stability or he would have never left the dock. which is what the previous crew did, they left.[/QUOTE]

I doubt seriously he meant 4 months of land base courses are a stand alone qualifyer. You need to have years of experience to even qualify for the class, and then need the nod from management before a promotion in that position.

[QUOTE=anchorman;191826]I doubt seriously he meant 4 months of land base courses are a stand alone qualifier. You need to have years of experience to even qualify for the class, and then need the nod from management before a promotion in that position.[/QUOTE]

That is right, nobody becomes OIM directly from secondary school.
You need to already be a Master Mariner, holding an unlimited ticket and with experience from MODUs in lower positions, usually starting as Ballast Control Operator/DPO, then Stability Section Leader/Senior DPO, before qualifying as OIM.

Besides Stability and Mooring of MODUs the course contains knowledge of Maritime Law, Rules and Regulations pertaining specifically to MODUs, as well as Drilling Technology and Well Control.
Of cause, even if you hold the required qualification, you still need to be accepted by the Owner as capable of taking responsibility for their multi-million asset.

Powerabout; It is a different world to the one we are used to in S.E.Asia, or in the GoM for that matter.

I must admit that I never went through all this additional training myself, but I can definitely see the need for it. To step from Master of a deep sea ship, or OSV, directly onto a MODU as OIM is not easy, or advisable.

An OIM with Maritime background does not “take charge” of day-to-day drilling operation, that is the business of the Tool pusher. He don’t tell the Chief Engineer how to run his Engine Room either, but it helps to know a bit about what is going on when “the sh*t hits the fan”.

Neither should a Tool pusher with a rudimentary 5 day “OIM course”, (with multiple choice “exam” on the last day) be in charge of Marine Operations, nor have final say-so on when to prepare for a storm etc.

Even worse, when shore based Managers and Operator personnel give orders without having full understanding of an emergency situation. In three of the four worst accidents offshore it was found that the “Line of command” was not clear and that this contributed to the catastrophic outcome. (Ocean Ranger, Glomar Java Sea and Sea Quest)

In all three cases the Master was over ridden by orders from shore, or by Operator personnel on board.
The fourth one was the Alexander Kielland, which capsizing while acting as an accommodation unit at Ekofisk field in 1980.

This last one resulted in the before mentioned additional training for OIM in Norway, as well as additional stability requirements for Semisubs and changes to operating procedures, later adopted world wide.

What did the other three result in? Since the accident investigation recommended that there should be a “Maritime qualified person” in charge on MODUs, the rudimentary “OIM course” was invented to allow the Tool pushers to still be in charge.

On the small Drillship I was Captain on in 1978-80 we drilled in an areas with frequent shallow gas occurrence.
We established a system that worked fine; When drilling uncased top hole into the zone where gas was likely, the Tool pusher would be on the drill floor, I would be in the wheel house. Both of us with head phones and throat microphone connected to our VHFs. (Anybody that has been in a shallow gas blowout situation would know why)Personnel manning the winches would be briefed and all watertight doors closed.

When we hit gas it would first be diverted to blow itself out, which could take some time.
If it could not be controlled, the Tool pusher would shout to me to move off, which would be by “sling shooting”, either to Port or starboard, depending on the conditions.

That decision would be conveyed to the winch operator by blowing the horn and ringing the bells; 1 blast to Stbd., 2 blasts to Port. (We did have a remote system, but that would drop 6 chains on the seabed)

This was not a system instigated from ashore, or mandated in any written manual, but something we worked out by ourselves. No ego clash over who was “the Boss”.
This would be discussed with the Company man before spud-in, but not when the decision was made to move off. He would be observing, but not interfering.

BTW; Contrary to popular belief the Company man is not all powerful. He is there to look after the interest of the Operator and is not taking any responsibility for safety of the rig, or the crew.

All true but the catch with a modu is who gives seatime to become a master so you have to come from a drill ship then you might not be able to keep your ticket working on a modu?
Some flag states let you hold a ticket but cannot progress using that seatime.
Hence all the fudged rules covering them.
In the GOM a year or so back they just placed UL Masters onboard and the USCG were happy.
Or they have one on board when not latched up and fly them off the rest of the time.
So who as an UL Master would join a MODU to become a ballast operator?

[QUOTE=powerabout;191836]All true but the catch with a modu is who gives seatime to become a master so you have to come from a drill ship then you might not be able to keep your ticket working on a modu?
Some flag states let you hold a ticket but cannot progress using that seatime.
Hence all the fudged rules covering them.
In the GOM a year or so back they just placed UL Masters onboard and the USCG were happy.
Or they have one on board when not latched up and fly them off the rest of the time.
So who as an UL Master would join a MODU to become a ballast operator?[/QUOTE]

I have performed OVID inspections on nearly every drilling operator as well as for most oil companies.

You can see a remarkable difference between a drilling company that got into shipping versus a shipping company that got into drilling. The latter; Seadrill, Pacific Drilling, Stena, Maersk…all have Masters as OIM. Not only can you see the difference in the SMS, but most Masters are highly qualified and have a very good grasp on drilling operations & procedures, top side pipe handling & TDS, FOSV & IBOP functionality, primary well control hydrostatics as well as subsea and surface well control equipment, drilling margins and breaks, LOT/FIT/Negative test, and last but not least, EDS sequences and ESD philosophy. All of this knowledge ties together with what you have already learned as a Chief Mate (night PIC), and skills developed as Ballast Control Operator, DP operator, and the entire suite of F&G and operations on the bridge or control room.

At the end of the day, it’s not the OIM, Captain, or Drilling Superintendent that makes the initial decision if there is a well control issue; that would be the driller in every case. If he doesn’t do his job, then you have major issues.

What Master would join a MODU to become a a Ballast Operator? Most anyone that expects to get a job with an operator where the OIM & Master wear the same hat. Drill Ships are classed as MODUs. There are several classes of MODUs; bottom bearing, floating, underway, on-location…

[QUOTE=anchorman;191840]I have performed OVID inspections on nearly every drilling operator as well as for most oil companies.

You can see a remarkable difference between a drilling company that got into shipping versus a shipping company that got into drilling. The latter; Seadrill, Pacific Drilling, Stena, Maersk…all have Masters as OIM. Not only can you see the difference in the SMS, but most Masters are highly qualified and have a very good grasp on drilling operations & procedures, top side pipe handling & TDS, FOSV & IBOP functionality, primary well control hydrostatics as well as subsea and surface well control equipment, drilling margins and breaks, LOT/FIT/Negative test, and last but not least, EDS sequences and ESD philosophy. All of this knowledge ties together with what you have already learned as a Chief Mate (night PIC), and skills developed as Ballast Control Operator, DP operator, and the entire suite of F&G and operations on the bridge or control room.

At the end of the day, it’s not the OIM, Captain, or Drilling Superintendent that makes the initial decision if there is a well control issue; that would be the driller in every case. If he doesn’t do his job, then you have major issues.

What Master would join a MODU to become a a Ballast Operator? Most anyone that expects to get a job with an operator where the OIM & Master wear the same hat. Drill Ships are classed as MODUs. There are several classes of MODUs; bottom bearing, floating, underway, on-location…[/QUOTE]

Thanks, you save me from a lot of typing and explaining.
One of the biggest problem with having the Tool pusher as the OIM on a floater that also require a Master is that Maritime Law say the Master is responsible, while the Owner / Operator doesn’t think so.

[QUOTE=ombugge;191841]Thanks, you save me from a lot of typing and explaining.
One of the biggest problem with having the Tool pusher as the OIM on a floater that also require a Master is that Maritime Law say the Master is responsible, while the Owner / Operator doesn’t think so.[/QUOTE]

The mindset of those operators are slowly being changed. Even Noble as of late has combined the Master and OIM position on their drill ships. One of the silver linings of a down market is only the highest qualified are being retained, and that is increasing the confidence of drilling contractors to get their house in order and use what talent they have to combine the Master and OIM position as it should be. OIM is a relic from jack-ups, and those companies that grew from that sector to floaters did not handle the transition well, but now they have a chance to do so. Most old school OIMs rather consentrate on operations and not deal with day-to-day responsibilities of Master/OIM, and just wear the drilling superintendent hat and achieve good performance (flat times), and safety record. You need to maintain both KPIs if you expect to keep working in this competitive market.