[QUOTE=pumpjack hand;34421]How is this normal- What’s causing this discrepancy?
From BPs well schematic:
12,400# = 800’ 3-1/2” 15.50#
85,215# = 3450’ 5-1/2” 24.70#
103,748# = 4117’ 6-58” 25.20#
= 201,363# weight in air
From Halliburton last 2 hr. chart:
340,000#-400,000# buoyant hook load[/QUOTE]
Thanks. Interesting.
They could be bulling up against annular or ram using the compensator. I think they shut in the annular at 16:55. I remember a note of the drillstring being pulled into or through the annular tearing it up. This could happen if the pressure on the dsc was increased accidently or by a leaking valve. Is the hookload increasing gradually from around 17:00 hrs?
[QUOTE=company man 1;34456]So that would be 14 joints over 13,500’ run. Just how many extra joints is normally sent out on a casing run ?[/QUOTE]
Nothing extraordinary with those 3 joints, it only shows that they are taking the torqe&turn computer readings seriously. Preminum gas tight connections requires correct M/U with a confirmed “shoulder” seen on the torque&turn computer. If that fails they need to replace the joint. Sometimes they get damage to both box & pin and hence two jnts are laid down.
I am sure BP have had experts go through alle the torque & turn plots for each joint to see if they have any poor connections. Normally you send out 5%-10% excess jnts of casings.
[QUOTE=KASOL;34459]Nothing extraordinary with those 3 joints, it only shows that they are taking the torqe&turn computer readings seriously. Preminum gas tight connections requires correct M/U with a confirmed “shoulder” seen on the torque&turn computer. If that fails they need to replace the joint. Sometimes they get damage to both box & pin and hence two jnts are laid down.
I am sure BP have had experts go through alle the torque & turn plots for each joint to see if they have any poor connections. Normally you send out 5%-10% excess jnts of casings.[/QUOTE]
It would be nice to know what the connections were & how long it took to run casing. I haven’t run casing but a lot of premium thread chrome tubing & very seldom had to kick out joints. I understand about 2 at once if the threads are screwed. Seemed high to me.
I deleted speculation posts because that is exactly what it was. Went back & checked IADC report & they pulled setting tool & went back in hole W/ 3 1/2" on bottom of string.[QUOTE=paloma;34458]Thanks. Interesting.
They could be bulling up against annular or ram using the compensator. I think they shut in the annular at 16:55. I remember a note of the drillstring being pulled into or through the annular tearing it up. This could happen if the pressure on the dsc was increased accidently or by a leaking valve. Is the hookload increasing gradually from around 17:00 hrs?[/QUOTE]
[QUOTE=company man 1;34460]It would be nice to know what the connections were & how long it took to run casing. I haven’t run casing but a lot of premium thread chrome tubing & very seldom had to kick out joints. I understand about 2 at once if the threads are screwed. Seemed high to me.[/QUOTE]
You are usually more carefull when you M/U tubing and often you have experts from the manufactors out to run it. We should have had the same on the prod casing because it a very critical part of the barrier envelope. Normally only the csg crew run the casing. I have been on two HPHT wells where we have had gas leaks in premimum connections. The problem is that you do not discover these small leaks when you are in drilling operations. In both cases we got ok casing test using OBM. Both where found leaking after displaceing to clear fluid (no partickles) brine. So on the next well I am planning now I am demanding a Tenaris guy out.
The scary thing was when investigating the two incidents, in both cases the crew did not get the right M/U and shoulder but continued. In the first case they had L/D two joinst and it happened again. I guess they said %#¤¤ it, run it. So I now put in my drilling guidelines that the company man has to look at these M/U charts every day.
Hook load reading of 350-400k is correct. String weight of 200 k plus weight of block and top drive is roughly 150k plus 20-40 k overpull against the annular. it all adds up just right
[QUOTE=paloma;34464]Hook load reading of 350-400k is correct. String weight of 200 k plus weight of block and top drive is roughly 150k plus 20-40 k overpull against the annular. it all adds up just right[/QUOTE]
150k top drive ?
[QUOTE=KASOL;34463]You are usually more carefull when you M/U tubing and often you have experts from the manufactors out to run it. We should have had the same on the prod casing because it a very critical part of the barrier envelope. Normally only the csg crew run the casing. I have been on two HPHT wells where we have had gas leaks in premimum connections. The problem is that you do not discover these small leaks when you are in drilling operations. In both cases we got ok casing test using OBM. Both where found leaking after displaceing to clear fluid (no partickles) brine. So on the next well I am planning now I am demanding a Tenaris guy out.
The scary thing was when investigating the two incidents, in both cases the crew did not get the right M/U and shoulder but continued. In the first case they had L/D two joinst and it happened again. I guess they said %#¤¤ it, run it. So I now put in my drilling guidelines that the company man has to look at these M/U charts every day.[/QUOTE]
Why do I get the feeling some people on this thread are going to know as much as the engineers about this well by the time this is over ?
[QUOTE=paloma;34467]this rig has close to 2 mill lbs hook load capacity and the weight of the travelling block and top drive is approx 150k[/QUOTE]
Sad to loose a BIG MAC DADDY like that.
The spillcam is showing a cyclonic looking plume now. I wonder what’s changed in the flow or the flow exit path that’s causing this.
Edit: Back to “normal.” My only guess is that the flow rate increased and some of the oil (mud?) was coming out straighter and further from the end of the riser and the curved end of the channel was causing rotation of part of the flow. It was definitely interesting!
Some thoughs about the relief wells:
They will hit the flowing well just below the 9 7/8" liner and kill it in the annulus. I guess their biggest problem (worst case scenario) is if the well flows both outside and inside the 7" casing and the well is flowing from two zones sealed with cement. Annulus from top reservoir, inside liner from bottom and it has good cement in between. I am shooting from my hip now and thinking “loadly” as we say here in norway.
[QUOTE=KASOL;34471]Some thoughs about the relief wells:
They will hit the flowing well just below the 9 7/8" liner and kill it in the annulus. I guess their biggest problem (worst case scenario) is if the well flows both outside and inside the 7" casing and the well is flowing from two zones sealed with cement. Annulus from top reservoir, inside liner from bottom and it has good cement in between. I am shooting from my hip now and thinking “loadly” as we say here in norway. [/QUOTE]
The plan I heard today is to have the well killed before td. DD2 stack is now fitted with an H4 connector and has a modified slick joint with vents and a plug. They will pull the DWH lmrp with the DD2 subsea winch , cut off the fish, latch the DD2 stack on (open and venting through holed riser joint), shut it in, kill the well. (Need to be careful not to damage the profile on the DWH stack). Pull the DD2 lmrp, and go back with normal riser, run the diverter etc. Standby.
The problem with that is that you are taking a risk: Will the wellhead / casing design hold the pressure when you set the DD2 stack on and close the well ? or during the kill operations ?. Sounds like a risky job.
[QUOTE=TroubledByThis;34369] I look at Tony Hayward and I see a sociopath. [/QUOTE]
Then you are seeing what you want to see.
There are many tens of thousands of businesses operating around the world, which means there are many tens of thousands of CEOs at work – and yet disasters like this are exceedingly rare.
By contrast, those tens of thousands of businesses stay in business by providing goods and services valuable to their customers. Those businesses comprise the global economy that feeds, clothes and houses some 6+ billion human beings a day.
Those are not the sort of results one would expect if sociopaths were at the helm. So the evidence available to all of us contradicts your claim.
[QUOTE=company man 1;34381]No doubt, you make excellent points. And the way you see the cozy relationship going between Coast Guard officials & the top BP dogs & the sorry way these guys are responding to the oil coming ashore & the fact that BP has not kept the Coast Guard in the loop, they could esily end up in the net before it’s over. But there is one central theme pushing this engine. Money. BP put pressure on TO. TO put pressure on their hands. The hands let their sups know they were bypassing things, their sups let the TO rig manager & Co. man know. TO’s office let BP’s office know. BP says put speed ahead of safety. They proceed on. You know that’s how it works. That’s how it worked with the casing order. That’s how it worked with the cement job. That’s how it worked with the premature displacement. That’s how it worked with the testing. That’s how it worked with the decision not to log the cement. That’s how we all got here & that’s how it will continue to work until we stop it.[/QUOTE]
[QUOTE=Visitor from NC;34402]Some Greenpeace folks referred to the boom laying effort in the early days as “disaster response theater” and that concept has really stuck with me since.
BP seems to have been criminally negligent from start to finish, and so duplicity at this point just follows night/day logically.[/QUOTE]
What is your evidence that BP has been criminally negligent from “start to finish” on this problem? Had BP simply pulled up stakes and said, “Tough, guys, it’s your problem to solve”, that would be grounds for such an accusation. But since BP has already spent over a billion dollars fighting this thing, you need to present some pretty strong evidence to back up your assertion – and you’ve presented no such evidence.
[QUOTE=MichaelWSmith;34481]The fact that oil is leaking into the Gulf at a disastrous rate is proof that a disaster has occurred. It doesn’t tell us what caused the disaster.[/QUOTE]
Read: http://energycommerce.house.gov/documents/20100527/BP.Presentation.pdf we know a lot already.
I do not know the MMS rules but according to NORSOK standard used in Norway there is a lot of “flaws” in BOP design, casing design, cement design and verification, barrier criteria and verification, operational procedures and execution. There will be new rules and regulation in the states, that I am sure.
[QUOTE=company man 1;34422]I understand your points completely & I cannot make an arguement to defend Transocean’s actions or inactions overall, but when you have an operator giving bonuses for time saved because they are not only paying for a rig they are payin for a buttload of service crews, there is a very high probability that these types of corners will be cut. I am not excusing TO’s people, but waving money in front of a guy trying to save a donwpayment for a new house or buy a new car he couldn’t otherwise afford to skip proper procedure, to me is evil. You could also hang the MMS on the ESDs because it is their job to witness the use of those systems I believe every quarter. The main point of my argument is all of these things went on right in front of BP’s noses & being in those guys shoes I can just about guarantee you they not only informed those guys, they more than likely had an in house sales/tech./ engineer caling on the BP drilling staff 5 days a week 8 hours a day to let them know what was happening on location.[/QUOTE]
Oh baloney. People are paid money to get results in virtually every business no earth. But disasters like this are rare. Please explain why – if the paying of such “incentives” is the root of all evil that you make it out to be – please explain why these disaster aren’t happening on a daily basis.