Again, just trying to understand. In alcor’s 6009, he says:
[B]It is quite clear the well is flowing and pressure increasing thereafter with constant flow on the Sperry display. All logging is accounted for. What we see is what was available to the DF, the TP office and the Co Man’s office.[/B]
Does this mean that people at three separate monitoring stations failed to see the kick coming?
Cheers,
Earl
[QUOTE=New Orleans Lady;47282]http://www.consumerenergyreport.com/blogs/rsquared/
[B]A Closer Look at The Commission Report on the Deepwater Horizon Disaster [I]“[BP Wells Team Leader] John Guide explained after the incident that losing returns ‘was the No. 1 risk.’ He and the other BP engineers worried that if their cementing procedure placed too much pressure on the geologic formation below, it might trigger another lost-returns event similar to the one on April 9.” [/I]unstable. Furthermore, BP also limited the volume of cement pumped down the well and chose a less-than-optimal rate of cement flow. While protecting the formation from damage, these compromises increased the risk of a blowout.
[B]To get a blowout you need to remove the hydrostatic pressure overbalance in the well. At no time while cementing was there a threat of a blowout. Instead, there was the real possibility of losses to the weak formation. The cement failure merely means that the barriers are not in place, which should have become apparent at the Negative test and while displacing the well. Then, remedial action would take place to secure the well and either form a new barrier or plug the well and abandon same.
There are countless wells which have been in the same scenario of cement barrier failure. They don’t blow![/B]
[I]Despite the compromises evident in the cement procedure and an earlier decision to use a riskier long string well design, BP decided to dismiss a team of Schlumberger technicians who were on standby at the rig to perform cement evaluation tests if required. Skipping the test saved BP both time—leasing the Deepwater Horizon reportedly cost as much as $1 million per day—and Schlumberger’s $128,000 fee.[/I]
[B]Yes, it saved BP time and money. They should have performed the CBL and Temperature Log. But this information would only verify the presence of cement on the Annulus side. It doesn’t verify the shoe-track has a cement barrier. And so, the Negative test and SW displacement were the only things to verify this barrier was in place.[/B]
[/B][/QUOTE]
Optimal rates of flow sometimes induce the fracturing of weak formations because of the excessive Annular Pressure losses, the additional pressure acting on the weak formation with high or optimal flow-rates. It is common practice to start pumping at reduced rates and then build the rate in stages as the cement exits the Casing Shoe during the cement Job. But, if you decide to increase to optimal and formation breakdown occurs then you’ll have to answer for it later, especially if the vessel is threatened by losses to the weak formation, and an underground blowout occurs.
I know of many cement job failures, some associated with Reservoir Casing strings. They were solved. And the rigs concerned recognised the failure. TO, recently had a rig in the North Sea which passed the Negative Test, and then failed while the displacement to SW was ongoing. But, the crews were observing volumes and pressure throughout the displacement, as is required, and they noticed the volume and pressure anomalies.
No Blowout occurred, even though they had the same circumstances as the Macondo.
Either, we understand the value of Volume and pressure control or we just send BP to jail and learn nothing about how to avoid further incidents. I’ll bet you there aren’t any rigs out there right now ignoring volume control!
[QUOTE=New Orleans Lady;47284]The rig crew performed the negative pressure test by bleeding off pressure in the drill pipe all the way down to zero pounds per square inch and then waiting to see if it built back up. The team performed this action three times but each time the pressure built up after it was bled off. After the discussing the situation with the Transocean crew, the BP Well Site Leader chose to perform an alternative negative-pressure test, this time on a pipe that connects the blow-out preventer to the rig called the kill line. The test on the kill line was successful and BP mistakenly concluded that the negative pressure test had confirmed the integrity of the cement job. Although the test on the kill line succeeded, the pressure on the drill pipe remained elevated and the Well Site Leaders and crew never reconciled the conflicting pressure readings even though they should have been identical .
In defense of the personnel conducting the test, BP and Transocean had no policies or procedures for running or interpreting negative pressure tests and the BP well-site team had not received formal training in this regard.
[B]I wouldn’t defend anyone for failing to interpret the tests. No course is required for this one as the simple solution should have been 0 psi on both guages, the Kill and DPP. This is a cop out by the Investigating team to suggest that the BP/TO leaders didn’t have training. Apparently, the OIM stated that he always insists on them, so hopefully, he has some knowledge. In truth, they all knew how to conduct the test. They screwed up with the displacement and the Spacer dropped back into the well allowing for anomalous pressures to exist…but not 1400 psi. I suggest they had a wealth of experience on the vessel and didn’t consult any of the dignitaries, many well qualified to interpret.[/B]
http://www.consumerenergyreport.com/2011/02/23/closer-look-at-commission-report-deepwater-horizon-disaster/ " I shall be honored, to serve our BP Inmates, a lovely serving of Tea, and crumpets!!!" … “Nothing like a little Southern Hospitality.” NoLa[/QUOTE]
You can have the Negative test failures: Vidrine, Kaluza, OIM, Night TP, and Driller. They all failed!
But, still no blowout has occurred. The conditions for a blowout exist, and they exist on all wells. The uncontrolled displacement allows for the kick to enter the well resulting in a blowout.
Remember, there aren’t any other examples of a vessel taking 1000 Bbls of hydrocarbons before reacting to excessive surface flow. Too late! This is the critical failure. But, the blowout has still not occurred. This occurs eventually when even the BOP fails to withstand the pressure forces from the well, due to leaks (possibly developed as a result of the rapidly expanding gas).
[QUOTE=New Orleans Lady;47286]When the BP and Transocean staff on the rig noted an anomalous pressure reading while attempting to convert float valves they concluded that the pressure gauge they had been relying on was broken. “BP’s team appears not to have seriously examined why it had to apply over four times the 750 psi design pressure to convert the float valves.”
[B]No-one knows why the pressure to convert the Float was so excessive but to suggest that the team didn’t take the conversion pressures seriously is incorrect. They called ‘Town’ to get the OK to increase the pressure many times. They were concerned. But, flow was established eventually and though a concern it wasn’t life threatening. Mechanical failures occur in wells and they’d have been aware of this.
Hydrocarbons, later have the opportunity to enter the well on the negative test and displacement. These tests are the first opportunity to verify the barriers exist or fail. They failed but no-one noticed![/B]
In the minutes B[/B] prior to the blowout the Transocean crew failed to notice an increase in pressure in the well—they failed to recognize that a natural gas kick ([B]hydrocarbon Kick[/B]) was occurring until it was too late and the blowout was uncontrollable. [B]A working BOP would have saved the vessel and all onboard.[/B]
The Commission cites a lack of automated alarms in the displays used to monitor well pressures as a contributing factor ([B]Bullshit! The Driller is required to observe that the mud pump pressure reduces at a constant rate while the Spacer and mud are being displaced from the well. There is no constant pressure, and therefore, alarms would be going off every 5 mins as the pump pressure reduced. Infact, pressures rose and no-one took action despite being aware of the rising pressure and discussing it on the DF. [/B] http://www.consumerenergyreport.com/2011/02/23/closer-look-at-commission-report-deepwater-horizon-disaster/[/QUOTE]
There were many warnings to the Driller and TP.
[QUOTE=Earl Boebert;47295]Again, just trying to understand. In alcor’s 6009, he says:
[B]It is quite clear the well is flowing and pressure increasing thereafter with constant flow on the Sperry display. All logging is accounted for. What we see is what was available to the DF, the TP office and the Co Man’s office.[/B]
Does this mean that people at three separate monitoring stations failed to see the kick coming?
Cheers,
Earl[/QUOTE]
Earl, there may have even been one in the Mud Pump Room and even in the Mud Engineer’s office. The Logger is also included.
The Driller and logger have responsibility for tracking the well’s volumes and pressures. The TP and Co Man Offices have the Displays but are often in meetings in conference rooms. On a displacement, the Swaco mud engineer is supposed to also follow the volume control. Again, it did not exist.
[QUOTE=alcor;47310]Earl, there may have even been one in the Mud Pump Room and even in the Mud Engineer’s office. The Logger is also included.
The Driller and logger have responsibility for tracking the well’s volumes and pressures. The TP and Co Man Offices have the Displays but are often in meetings in conference rooms. On a displacement, the Swaco mud engineer is supposed to also follow the volume control. Again, it did not exist.[/QUOTE]
What makes you think it did not exist ? On another rig the logger called the rig floor on detecting and increase in flow out and pit volume but was told by the driller to F-OFF !!. Moments they took a massive blow out that did not ignite. Mudloggers data and charts were retrieved and the logger had several withnees in his unit and on the drill to prove he warned them. In another incident-under ground blowout - blatant connection gas was visible on the screens at the loggers shack, on the rig floor and by RTO people in town for 36 hours and no one noticed it. Subsequent inquiries revealed that although pit volume increases were clearly pointed out to the driller he did not understand what the logger was talking about. If fact he and his TP could not work out that 3 ft 6 in = 3 1/2 ft without the use of what we call in my nick of the woods a coon-arse tape measure ie: Tape measure demarcated in foot intervals but each foot is further divided into 10 sub divisions because they could not handle calculating 6/12 = 1/2. These are the idiots companies see fit to hire and or put in-charge of sophisticated state of the art deep water floaters. I guess there’s profit in F’ups.
Volume Control did not exist, It was ignored. This is the ultimate reason the Horizon allowed 1000 Bbls of hydrocarbons to enter the well. It is common training to ensure we recognise gains of 10-20 Bbls and react by shutting in the well. It is not the Co Man, TP or OIM who sanction this decision. It is the trained action of a good Driller and Logger working together. 1000 Bbls is too late! Too late to decorate the story with other faults. Other ‘faults’ occur in [U][B]all[/B][/U] wells, but the trained actions of drill crew are there to prevent escalation and recognise the anomalies.
I recognise that many of you on this site have never been on a rig or understand the complex systems employed, but I’m making a big effort to offer impartial knowledge. In our industry, it is known among drilling crews that components in the well fail and that we are trained to intervene. And, we will intervene. [B]How would we have intervened in the case of the Macondo if volumes were being monitored? I guarantee you that the well would have taken in a maximum of 20 Bbls of hydrocarbons if systems had been in place to monitor volumes. Hopefully, one of you guys advertises this fact to the realists in the industry! Guaranteed[/B]!
Bottom line: Volume control did not exist…and anything could happen! That ‘anything’ did happen!
And remember, the investigative team have absolutely no knowledge of the oilfield industry. And yet, their conclusions are considered ‘sound’.
Like I’ve said before, the guilty are Vidrine, Kaluza, OIM, Night TP (and Day TP who passed on info on how to proceed!!!), and the Driller, the people deciding the results of the Negative test. The Guilty concerning the volume control-less blowout are the Driller, the TP, the Swaco mud engineers and ultimately the OIM and Day TP.
Ignoring volume control is the reason why this whole fiasco is being considered by Joe Public, the reason armchair engineers think they understand better than the industry, the reason for rocket scientists in Universities to offer their thoughts on the subject.
All Blowouts are preventable with crews who understand the importance of pressure and volume control…and it doesn’t matter what fails in the well! Naturally, a working BOP is handy!
The big question to ask is: am I wrong? Is this arrogant son of a B wrong? Or, is the investigation simply a stage, a play, a place to smooth over the politics involved with finding an appropriate fall guy. I say trust the BP and Marathon reports. They have too much to lose if proved wrong!
And what of the other Operators who were questioned by the commission? Guaranteed, they enjoyed watching BP swim without realising their futures were also affected by the demise of the Macondo well. All this crap about “we wouldn’t have done this” is complete crap. They have all been in the shithouse but for intervention by good crews.
One final thought!..Why are BP so quiet about this considering the adverse publicity? Why not act earlier? Why not stand up for their CEO for so long? And why let him go? Why have they not fought this according to my forthright opinions? Obviously, the company is bigger than any ‘fall guy’, so they took the opportunity to alleviate some of the pressure hanging around their necks, and we all know the source of that uninformed pressure, by sacking the CEO.
Now, Justice is something we all crave, but appeasement will be the only result! There’s too much politics and too many other fall guys concerned. An escalation of this battle will only result in adverse publicity to the GOM drilling activity and you can be sure there will be privacy and closed doors on the official legal investigation to ensure no further widespread public agitation occurs. Armchair engineers!
Alcor wrote:
And what of the other Operators who were questioned by the commission? Guaranteed, they enjoyed watching BP swim without realising their futures were also affected by the demise of the Macondo well. All this crap about “we wouldn’t have done this” is complete crap. They have all been in the shithouse but for intervention by good crews.
Haven’t been out in the field for several years, but, the above statement was definitely accurate when I worked in the industry.
In fact, as I watched some “testimony” referenced to “we wouldn’t have done this” I was shouting out, "Now, that is BS!!!"
Thanks for posting the above statement Alcor…I wouldn’t post it because I have not been directly involved in so long.
and I realize that processes and procedures do change.
I thought I might be losing my memory…So I recently checked with several of my acquaintenances(5) who work(ed) cased hole completions from the mid seventies to present
for different service companies operating on land, inland water and offshore GOM for all the operators working out there… Their recollection in reference to running logs in liners was the same as mine…didn’t happen as often as the testimony seemed to indicate.
However, if the government wants to enforce setting liners in pay zones of all future production wells that would be fine with me.
Maybe they could get Dick Cheney to have one of his cronies in Congress to author legislation mandating the use of
Halliburtons VERSAFLEX liner hanger. HAL stock could use the boost from such a Government regulatory mandate.
Keep in mind However, in this case, the end result would have been the same as far as the blowout, the flow path was likely not through the annulus and having a liner with a tie back would have yielded the same result.
[B]Panel’s findings on oil spill to be delayed again[/B]
NEW ORLEANS — A federal panel investigating the cause of the Deepwater Horizon explosion and massive Gulf oil spill won’t finish its final report by the one-year anniversary of the disaster as it had hoped.
[B]Delays in testing the blowout preventer[/B] that failed to stop the spill forced[B] the joint U.S. Coast Guard-Bureau of Ocean Energy Management Regulation and Enforcement panel to seek another deadline extension.[/B] Its final report was due in March. Instead, the investigation team told The Associated Press on Friday [B]the panel now has until July. It will make a preliminary statement by mid-April.[/B]
The firm hired to do the blowout preventer testing should issue its findings by March 20. Its $3.6 million government contract for forensic analysis of the device, which was set to expire Monday, has been extended.
Blowout preventers sit at the wellhead of exploratory wells and are supposed to lock in place to prevent a spill in case of an explosion.
The 300-ton device that was used with BP’s blown-out Macondo well was raised from the seafloor on Sept. 4 and taken to a NASA facility in New Orleans, [B]where it sat for two months before testing began Nov. 16.[/B]
Since then, investigators have disassembled the device, run hydraulic fluids through parts of it and are preparing to test the pods that control the device to determine if they were functioning properly at the time of the explosion. [B]Cut drill pipe was found inside the blowout preventer, suggesting to investigators that the shear rams at least partially closed at some point.[/B]
Shear rams are components in a blowout preventer that cut, or shear, through drill pipe and form a seal against well pressure.
[B]No conclusions have yet been reached about what exactly happened and why oil was still allowed to flow to the sea.[/B]
The federal investigative panel expects to [B]hold another set of public hearings the week of April 4[/B] to focus specifically on the blowout preventer findings.
With all due respect to the rig crew…these investigaive committees have been “investigating” for months and still have not reached a definite final conclusion on several items.
Meantime, the rig crew was expected to make the correct decision in a span of four hours.
Alcor, I KNOW it was PRESSURE and VOLUME CONTROL and I agree with you on that issue so don’t jump me about that!!
Just saying, the “experts” who are investigating after the fact are not too sharp either!!
I am beginning to suspect that some of this negative news released in endless dribbles is being utilized by[I] investigators or their acquaintances[/I]
to manipulate stock prices of the companies involved. I seem to recall the Presidential Commission released negative Halliburton news
in three separate news releases when all of the info could have been released in one fell swoop. Savvy traders in the know could easily be picking up
a few bucks per share on a large volume with just a bit of advance information.
Looking at this prerelease news release- news release, it seems as though there are several more rounds of manipulating the news instead of
releasing a final report on this incident. Maybe some one should investigfate the Commissions for possible insider trading violations.
[QUOTE=alcor;47165]The focus area is all wrong in this investigation. It doesn’t matter if the Shoe Joint and Float Collar were made of junk/rust and the components failed. It’s irrelevant.
What’s relevant is the fact that no-one on the vessel interpreting data understood that the cement and the Auto fill Collar conversion had all failed. The barriers no longer existed. This was the point that hydrostatic pressure had to be re-established. And no-one would ever have heard the word “Macondo”.
I don’t care if the metallurgist tells me you ran an old rusty pipe down the hole. Nothing fails until I remove the hydrostatic pressure.
This is a black and white case if anyone cares to look!
Let’s assume all went well with recognising the negative test had failed, and full hydrostatic control of the well was re-established.
Would BP chase up the cementers and Weatherford for answers as to what went wrong? Absolutely yes!
Would they be implicated for the barrier failures? My gut feeling is yes! Does that mean that BP would pursue them for daily rig costs for the time required for the remedial action to be successful? Certainly, the issue wouldn’t be ignored. But, it’s hard to prove where the fault in the equipment initially arose.
Has a blowout occurred? No, so a typical recognition of failures would be recognised and the drilling industry advised.[/QUOTE]
You are 100 % right. This was the problem and there was no SWA invoked. It was like everything was on cruse control or a bad case of complacency.
I’d never say I had it right on all accounts, particularly the engineering angle, the potential failures in the well. However, I have it 100% correct on the duty of the Contractor’s to ‘police’ the well, meaning it is possible components of the well fail and the Contractor understands their responsibility in identifying failures, through pressure and volume control, the very subject all Contractor leading personnel are apparently well versed.
No well’s failure gets past good crews, when they are able to identify and respond to pressure and volume anomalies.
Was there a deficiency with the response of the TO crew? Yes!
Is there a deficiency with the current state of TO, the company, when they refuse to accept the failure of their crews’s actions on the Macondo? Yes! They fail to recognise that the vessel is their own asset, and that they have a responsibility to ‘watch’ the well, in the form of Pressure and volume control. I guarantee you they failed in this. And there’s no point in turning to BP and suggesting they should have done this and that…either we accept our role on the vessel or we change the well-established rules. But, you cannot get 2 Operator personnel to assume the role of all action on the vessel as well as consider next action on the vessel. Contractor’s drilling personnel are responsible for this role.
Remember, 15 years ago there was no town consultancy. We didn’t have the communication technology available. All decisions were agreed on the vessel by the Operator’s personnel and the Contractor’s personnel. Nothing is done on a vessel which the OIM hasn’t already agreed to,apparently!
What part did the OIM play in the activities of the vessel on the fateful day? I understand, He insisted on a Negative test, but did He impart to the crews how this should be performed. And, more importantly, did he insist on volume control while displacing the well? His own personnel instructed the Sperry Logger to ignore volume displacement. Did the OIM have control of the activities on his vessel? No! suggest, He had other things on his mind…and I hate to quote it but…“we always have the pinchers”!
Never let anyone tell you that the Operator is in charge of operations on a vessel. The Contractor sanctions the operation. And, the Contractor performs the operation…on their vessel.
What a fool I would be to lease out my vessel and let others assume control! Is this what TO are suggesting?
BP’s Bubbling Cauldron
[I]Some unattended HR issues regarding culture and leadership may have contributed to the Deepwater Horizon’s tragic explosion and spill. [/I]
[I]By Maura C. Ciccarelli
As John Hofmeister, retired president of Houston-based Shell Oil Co. from 2005 to 2008 and former group human resource director of the Shell Group based in The Hague, Netherlands, puts it: “Unfortunately, in the hydrocarbon industry, if you don’t take the HR profession seriously, people die.”
[FONT=Arial][SIZE=2][B]The Boiling Frog Syndrome[/B]
Tom Krause, chairman and co-founder of BST Consulting, a global safety consulting firm based in Ojai, Calif., compares BP’s decisions and culture to the parable about boiling a frog: If you throw a frog in very hot water, it immediately jumps out. But if you put a frog in water and heat it up slowly, it won’t realize it’s starting to boil until it’s too late.
That’s symbolic of organizations that lose their safety culture one degree at a time, says Krause, who has investigated catastrophic events, including NASA’s Space Shuttle Columbia disaster, looking for commonalities that can be spotted and fixed, before it’s too late. <Excellant article for all of us…> http://www.hreonline.com/HRE/story.jsp?storyId=533332933
[/SIZE][/FONT][/I]
http://mauraciccarelli.com/
A JOURNALIST.
It’s actually a well-written article which recognises many of the offshore industry failings.
But, it doesn’t focus on why the event occurred. It plays with quotes, but never directly states why ‘control’ of the well was lost. She dances with the main conclusions drawn by the investigation, high sounding words which don’t actually define ‘What went wrong’! At no point does she explore how a blowout occurs and the poor decisions/negligence required for it to take place. How can an accurate conclusion be drawn if comprehension is missing.
It’s a good article, repeating much of what we already know, and what many are brainwashed to understand!
She doesn’t question any of the conclusions. She simply endorses the known facts none of which truly explain the Macondo Blowout. I don’t think she even refers to the word ‘blowout’.
She writes:
Something – or, rather, many somethings – went horribly wrong, starting with a string of poor decisions leading to technical problems that contributed to the blast and subsequent gusher. Experts conclude that it ultimately came down to a culture in which an engineer, worried that the concrete centralizers that had been installed weren’t adequate for the job, wrote, in part, “But, who cares, it’s done, end of story, [we] will probably be fine… .”
I have no idea about her misleading remark: ‘concrete centralizers’. She also fails to finish the quote, where the engineer states clearly the remedial cement Squeeze is an option. There’s always remedial action.
I’d love to know if any of the ‘experts’ she refers to work in the offshore industry! The well didn’t fail because of the cultural issues. It failed because of blatant negligence and ignorance.
Alcor,are you bored , or desparate, You are talking to yourself, and answering,???,Oh, and by the way, BP was the “one” 49 miles southeast off the coast of La, in the Gulf of Mexico, so,it’s the Brits, who get credit for the Culture, in my GOM!!
[QUOTE=
Alcor writes:
The well didn’t fail because of the cultural issues. It failed because of blatant negligence and ignorance.[/QUOTE]
One of your recent posts alluded to the shortcomings of the culture in the Gulf.
Thanks for reconsidering and changing your position on the matter.
[QUOTE=alcor;47485]The well didn’t fail because of the cultural issues. It failed because of blatant negligence and ignorance.[/QUOTE]
Atta Boy Alcor… keep bangin’ that persistent Drum!
This forum has stagnated (except for Alcor’s drum beat) and those still trying to understand the “oilfield”
It’s time for Kaluza and and his Bitch Vidrine to show their true professionalism and tell us their own accounts of this sad saga.
Otherwise… the world will continue to call you both for what you are “Bubbas”.
…are you real and conscientious men… or just old, fat, tired and blubba Bubbas?
…which of you was ontop that day…?
[QUOTE=alcor;47400] (re OIM… What part did the OIM play in the activities of the vessel on the fateful day? I understand, …)
[B]“His own personnel instructed the Sperry Logger to ignore volume displacement”[/B].[/QUOTE]
Did he say this? Did they do this?.. where is it recorded??
[QUOTE=Infomania;47503]_____________________
One of your recent posts alluded to the shortcomings of the culture in the Gulf.
Thanks for reconsidering and changing your position on the matter.[/QUOTE]
On reflection, negligence and ignorance may well be considered a culture gone wrong. My mistake.
If displacement without volume control occurs regularly then a widespread culture exists.
re OIM… What part did the OIM play in the activities of the vessel on the fateful day? I understand, …)
"His own personnel instructed the Sperry Logger to ignore volume displacement
[QUOTE=AHTF;47519]Did he say this? Did they do this?.. where is it recorded??[/QUOTE]
The logger has clearly stated that he called the drill floor with the intention of monitoring volumes. The A/D informed him they’d call him later when normal monitoring could be resumed. This was taking place at a time when backloading to the boat was ongoing. It is quite clear well volumes were not being monitored. The other clue is the fact that 1000 Bbls of hydrocarbons entered the well before any action took place. The big question is: Did the OIM sanction this behaviour? And, what was his input in the planning phase for displacement?
AHTF, I’m going to keep this ‘clean’ in the interests of good debate.