Earl,
Do you have the hyperlink to the Marathon ‘investigation’?
[QUOTE=BLISTERS;47194]Welcome back Alcor old chap.Long time no see.7 consecutive posts in one day…WOW!. back with a vengeance as per usual. Keep it coming…always very entertaining to read your posts, cuts the bore-dome for me. Hope you had a good stint during your leave of absence and hope you did not get strafed out of the country by your best buddy and cross dresser Gaddafi. .[/QUOTE]
Looks like Gaddafi has more cross-dressing friends than most people would imagine based on the following FACTS:
Perhaps, you’re filling up with gas compliments of the tyrant!!
[QUOTE=alcor;47211]Earl,
Do you have the hyperlink to the Marathon ‘investigation’?[/QUOTE]
Still there, plus a bunch of related stuff.
Cheers,
Earl
[QUOTE=alcor;47212]Looks like Gaddafi has more cross-dressing friends than most people would imagine based on the following FACTS:
Perhaps, you’re filling up with gas compliments of the tyrant!![/QUOTE]
Nothing of the sort. Just asking, seeing you have a passionately strong business relationship with this one time terrorist trisexual. Once I know know an entity is dubious I don’t do business with them. There’s -guilt by association- to consider, which incidentally is also why I drive past BP fuel kiosks these days. I wonder which partner plays the passive role ? How low would you stoop in the name of doing business with such pimp like characters ? Perhaps you have developed such thick hide you’re now rendered impervious to guilt, let alone a conscience.
This sort of thing is nothing new, heck embargoes have never done anything but punish the poor anyway. Halliburton did business with the embargoed Iraq back when former v-p Cheney was CEO but they did it thru a Grand Cayman subsidiary. Here’s a little known fact: For many years Iran and Israel have shared a pipeline and Iran, [Israel’s mortal enemy] has been one of Israel’s major oil suppliers. This went on from the Shah all the way past Khomeni and friends. The oil wasn’t sold directly to Israel by Iran because that just would not seem proper so it went thru a Swiss company before being traded but both sides were well aware and even facilitated the trade.
Cash is king and has no morals.
[QUOTE=BLISTERS;47225]Nothing of the sort. Just asking, seeing you have a passionately strong business relationship with this one time terrorist trisexual. Once I know know an entity is dubious I don’t do business with them. There’s -guilt by association- to consider, which incidentally is also why I drive past BP fuel kiosks these days. I wonder which partner plays the passive role ? How low would you stoop in the name of doing business with such pimp like characters ? Perhaps you have developed such thick hide you’re now rendered impervious to guilt, let alone a conscience.[/QUOTE]
The US imports 6% of Gaddafi’s oil. More importantly, the following US companies operate in Libya in partnership with Gaddafi. You’re going to be hard pressed to fill up anywhere with such lofty, selective principles. You’re a very good boy!
“Impervious to guilt, let alone a conscience”…You are selective in your principles…an example of a gullible fool who listens to others instead of examining the facts. Remember, the media who filled your mind with intolerable but factual images knew nothing of how or why a blowout occurs. The investigation began before the well’s failure was known. All assumed the failure occurred from the Annulus in which case BP would have been in the shit-house exclusively. But, the flow came up the Casing, the long way, and this is the most damaging evidence against TO.
Do you work for TO?
Additionally, conscience is the last thing on anyone’s mind when filling up. Mine is clear. Yours is selective!!!
Where does Libya’s oil go?
According to official trade data, in 2008 the majority of Libyan oil exports were sold to European countries like Italy (523,000 barrels a day), Germany (210,000 barrels a day), Spain (104,000 barrels a day) and France (137,000 barrels a day).
The US Energy Information Administration estimates the United States imported an average of 102,000 barrels of oil a day from Libya in 2008, up from 56,000 barrels a day in 2005.
In 2008, this meant around seven per cent of Libya’s exports went to the US, compared to around three per cent to the UK, according to the EIA/Global Trade Atlas.
What advice do we give to all the Drilling Contractors around the world concerning avoiding blowouts and how to prevent them, the action required in advance of all operations? Do we tell them TO’s actions on the Horizon were correct and an example to follow?
[B]The simple answer to both questions is TO failed to track volumes and pressure resulting in 1000 Bbls of hydrocarbon entry into the well [U][COLOR=“black”][COLOR=“black”][COLOR=“black”]without any knowledge of the flow occurring[/COLOR][/COLOR][/U][/COLOR][/B]. This is the key failure which BP’s Company Men had a part in (the negative test).
BP Co Men and TO Leaders, failed to recognise inconsistencies in the Negative test. But, all is not lost.
The Driller, the logger and the mud engineers were responsible for the displacement. All is lost when we don’t track volumes out of the well. We are gambling and hoping all is well! The OIM is responsible to ensure TO’s procedures on volume control at all times is adhered to and in accordance with bridging documents. The OIM is responsible for ensuring displacements are controlled. And, the Driller and Toolpusher on duty knew their obligation to volume control. Why was it ignored?
[B]Remember, a negative test on any well worldwide can pass, but fail while continuing with the displacement. We must [U][B]always[/B][/U] monitor the well’s volumes and take action to close a working BOP if flow occurs. We do not wait until the flow is hitting the Rig’s Crown.[/B]
Why the well’s volumes were not monitored is the biggest question mark, and TO’s response to this is they were following BP’s plans. More horse shit! TO, have an independent responsibility to police the well’s volumes, and must never instruct the logger to ignore volume control.
Did Vidrine or Kaluza order them to ignore volumes? I would find that hard to believe, but you never know!! On the other hand, it is the OIM’s duty to ensure volumes are monitored. He is the highest authority on the vessel, responsible for procedures and TO volume control policy to be adhered to. He failed to ensure this was done! Or, He had a plan which was overuled by the Driller, Swaco…which may be the case!! The investigation did not cover this area sufficiently, because they were not prepared to challenge the actions of those deceased. Whereas, they had a great opportunity to interview the OIM and surviving TP in detail. The importance was not apparent to the investigators, who were themselves trying to understand the complexities of drilling a well successfully.
[QUOTE=alcor;47232];…You are selective in your principles…[/QUOTE]
Alocr, Your evangelical rhetoric and repetitive postings of the ills of other parties involved in this disaster is starting to sound like a broken record. People are aware of that old trick, that is, keep repeating something over and over and over again and people will start to believe in it. Seeing that you are the self appointed guardian angle for BP on this forum, how about you balance things out and give us just for a change, a list of the disastrous errors due to BP’s bad judgment calls that brought on this disaster and its inept handling of the situation in the aftermath, least you accuse others of being selective. Perhaps you suffer from cognitive dissonance and don’t have to ability or strength to be unbiased. What can BP do differently to avoid a similar catastrophe rearing its head on the high seas again ?
[QUOTE=tengineer;47230] Cash is king and has no morals.[/QUOTE]
Only a weak and greedy king would subscribe to such a false notion. The King has to realize there are somethings in this world money can’t buy. Too bad it only dawns on low life, when they take their last breath only to realize, all the money in the world can’t save them.
Oh, well, I used to teach, so I don’t give up easily 
Alcor, old man, I really do understand that a) the operators should have monitored flow and pressure, and b) they didn’t. You don’t have to keep repeating that. What I am interested in is the question you yourself asked in post 6003: “Why was it ignored?” This is what I am interested in exploring, because I think it is key to preventing a recurrence. So here are some factors that I have encountered in reviews of one kind of incident or another:
-
Fatigue. An insidious killer. When I first read the descriptions of what happened and when it happened, I was struck by the fact that the crew was wrapping up and getting ready to leave. It reminded me of the first aircraft accident investigation I was (tangentially) involved in, when an air traffic controller gave an incorrect descent vector to a military aircraft and they crew flew straight into a mountain. When the flight data was run through a training simulator the investigators couldn’t believe the number of cues the crew ignored on their way to oblivion. The answer, of course, was that they were in “mission over” mode and thinking of home. Stress keeps you alert, and when the stress lifts the fatigue cuts in with a bang.
-
Self-medication. I’m not talking “Cheech and Chong Drill a Well,” I’m talking the unauthorized use of stimulants by overstressed and overworked crews desperate to make it through the last few hours of overtime. When these cut out it makes the fatigue crash even worse. And please, I’m not accusing the Deepwater crew of this, I’m making a general observation.
-
Sensory overload. A big problem with automated cockpits before we understood the need for flight management software. An engine catches on fire and every subsystem on the airplane starts screaming its head off. How many conflicting indicators were the operators getting during that fatal 49 minutes? What were they trying to sort out?
-
Display glitches. These can be a lot more subtle than just a blue screen of death, which is why I still would like someone who knows what one of these things looks like in the real world to interpret that Marathon slide about which system was displaying what when. In post 5966, Jones Act states “The Sperry records do not indicate a lack of data recognition prior to the disaster.” I’d like to know what records are being referred to (I’m not being argumentative, I’m just trying to understand) As far as I know, the melted remains of that Sperry system is currently sitting at the bottom of the Gulf. If the data was being shadowed on shore, that does not tell us what actually was on the operator’s screens on the rig. In particular, I’m curious about that “data available” qualifier on the pressure and volume column of the Marathon slide. Does this mean there was a data path but they were unsure if it was selected by the operators?
-
Insufficient training, in particular in dealing with rare and dangerous events. This is where the lack of simulator capability is IMHO an indictment of the industry/regulatory complex as a whole.
-
Command inhibition. Co-pilots reluctant to question command pilot’s judgment. Subordinates reluctant to overrule superiors. Sure, anybody can shut down the rig but at what cost to their current and future jobs?
-
Suicidal impulse. No indication whatsoever that it was a factor here, but included for completeness. Google on EgyptAir Flight 990 for an example.
Cheers,
Earl
[QUOTE=BLISTERS;47244]Alocr, Your evangelical rhetoric and repetitive postings of the ills of other parties involved in this disaster is starting to sound like a broken record. People are aware of that old trick, that is, keep repeating something over and over and over again and people will start to believe in it. Seeing that you are the self appointed guardian angle for BP on this forum, how about you balance things out and give us just for a change, a list of the disastrous errors due to BP’s bad judgment calls that brought on this disaster and its inept handling of the situation in the aftermath, least you accuse others of being selective. Perhaps you suffer from cognitive dissonance and don’t have to ability or strength to be unbiased. What can BP do differently to avoid a similar catastrophe rearing its head on the high seas again ?[/QUOTE]
Bias doesn’t form any part of the equation. I speak of facts concerning the correct behaviour of Drill Crews to recognise threats to their own vessel and personnel. My interests are ensuring that the crews I work with notice and react to anomalies in pressure and volume. Ignore it at your peril.
If the Macondo drill crew had control of volume/pressure they’d have been able to respond to the danger by closing the BOP and securing the well. The hydrocarbons would be pumped back into the reservoir and remedial action taken to cement the casing to verify a barrier is in place. None of us would even hear of the Macondo well!
Every well drilled requires confirmation of Barriers in place. All wells that follow the practice of the Deepwater Horizon gamble with ‘proven’ barriers failing (even though the barrier was not established on the Macondo well).
So, you’d be buying BP fuel if volumes had been observed!
Regarding the blowout, BP have nothing to answer for. Unless, they ordered the displacement to take place without consideration for volume control.
They are 100% incorrect on the negative test assessment which led to the continuation of displacement.
The cement job issue has yet to be fully explored but I feel their ‘cocktail recipe’ was incomplete.
They could have run temperature and CBL Logs to verify the presence of cement, but this would not verify the Shoetrack failure.
The choice of Autofill Collar was based on the sensitive loss circulation/weak zones. All we know is the Autofill did not convert. Mechanical issues like this are common in the offshore business.
And others…!
But, the well doesn’t blow because of any of the above!!!
[QUOTE=Earl Boebert;47247]Oh, well, I used to teach, so I don’t give up easily
Alcor, old man, I really do understand that a) the operators should have monitored flow and pressure, and b) they didn’t. You don’t have to keep repeating that. What I am interested in is the question you yourself asked in post 6003: “Why was it ignored?” This is what I am interested in exploring, because I think it is key to preventing a recurrence.
[B]I Don’t have the answer to this most pertinent of questions, and I believe the Investigation Team didn’t realise the importance of this action. The Investigation Team were still trying to get their heads around the fact that the failure occurred up the casing string and the implication that BP’s responsibilities were shared with others began to emerge. TO, the OIM, the surviving TP, the Logger, Vidrine, Kaluza and previous displacement plan records should set the record straight on whether this was a common occurrence, the culture, the way things were done[/B].
So here are some factors that I have encountered in reviews of one kind of incident or another:
-
Fatigue. An insidious killer. When I first read the descriptions of what happened and when it happened, I was struck by the fact that the crew was wrapping up and getting ready to leave. It reminded me of the first aircraft accident investigation I was (tangentially) involved in, when an air traffic controller gave an incorrect descent vector to a military aircraft and they crew flew straight into a mountain. When the flight data was run through a training simulator the investigators couldn’t believe the number of cues the crew ignored on their way to oblivion. The answer, of course, was that they were in “mission over” mode and thinking of home. Stress keeps you alert, and when the stress lifts the fatigue cuts in with a bang.
[B]The crew may have been fatigued, but this is for TO leading personnel to recognise and ensure operations go at a pace where the crews are not being stressed. And remember, those crews will respond to fair management. Piss them off with excess labour and you’ll get back sweet F-All. Was fatigue linked to ignoring displacement control? No, this is clearly leaders on the vessel suggesting it’s ok to backload to the boat without volume control. TO needed to approach BP if they were unable to maintain control…in advance of the operation taking place. It is TO who perform the function in agreement with SWACO personnel.[/B] -
Self-medication. I’m not talking “Cheech and Chong Drill a Well,” I’m talking the unauthorized use of stimulants by overstressed and overworked crews desperate to make it through the last few hours of overtime. When these cut out it makes the fatigue crash even worse. And please, I’m not accusing the Deepwater crew of this, I’m making a general observation.
[B]I don’t know if this is an issue in the GOM or on the Horizon, but I believe this is unrelated to controlled displacement.[/B] -
Sensory overload. A big problem with automated cockpits before we understood the need for flight management software. An engine catches on fire and every subsystem on the airplane starts screaming its head off. How many conflicting indicators were the operators getting during that fatal 49 minutes? What were they trying to sort out?
[B]The Driller prepares for displacement by confirming all designated mud pumps are lined up to the well or Booster line. The intentions of the displacement should be relayed to the crew in the form of a pre-job meeting where the logger attends and volume control is defined. All indicators were operational and the Driller had a complete overview from the displays. But, you can’t monitor volumes if you tell the logger to ignore returns from the well. So this was omitted, which means they only had pressure values to monitor the well. And, the Driller and TP are known to have discussed the fluctuating and increasing pressure values…without taking any action. These are facts. So, they were commenting on the displayed pressure values.[/B] -
Display glitches. These can be a lot more subtle than just a blue screen of death, which is why I still would like someone who knows what one of these things looks like in the real world to interpret that Marathon slide about which system was displaying what when. In post 5966, Jones Act states “The Sperry records do not indicate a lack of data recognition prior to the disaster.” I’d like to know what records are being referred to (I’m not being argumentative, I’m just trying to understand) As far as I know, the melted remains of that Sperry system is currently sitting at the bottom of the Gulf. If the data was being shadowed on shore, that does not tell us what actually was on the operator’s screens on the rig. In particular, I’m curious about that “data available” qualifier on the pressure and volume column of the Marathon slide. Does this mean there was a data path but they were unsure if it was selected by the operators?
[B]The DF personnel commented on the pressure values. The display was there to view. It is possible to select alternative displays, but all evidence points to the fact that the DF personnel were aware of inconsistencies.[/B] -
Insufficient training, in particular in dealing with rare and dangerous events. This is where the lack of simulator capability is IMHO an indictment of the industry/regulatory complex as a whole.
[B]Very True. There’s never enough training![/B] -
Command inhibition. Co-pilots reluctant to question command pilot’s judgment. Subordinates reluctant to overrule superiors. Sure, anybody can shut down the rig but at what cost to their current and future jobs?
[B]Very possible! The prospect of bullies deciding all action without ensuring compliance to organisational systems is a strong possibility.[/B] -
Suicidal impulse. No indication whatsoever that it was a factor here, but included for completeness. Google on EgyptAir Flight 990 for an example.
[B]N/A![/B]
Cheers,
Earl[/QUOTE]
Recurrence will happen again if people fail to see why this blowout occurred. I realise my simplistic and constant ramblings about volume and pressure irritate all viewers reading this response. But, if these are in place, the vessel and personnel are not threatened.
I wonder what TO are informing their offshore crews regarding volume control. Publicly, they admit to nothing. And yet, they are in charge of all volume control on the vessel.
[QUOTE=Earl Boebert;47207]OK, working from the Marathon slides, I have the following questions:
- Operators misread the negative pressure test. (slide 28)
[B]Slide 28, clearly shows that a cock-up occurred because the test had to be conducted through the Kill line to verify communication with the drill pipe pressure, DPP should reduce while bleeding off. The evidence is inconclusive, but apparently they bled off 3-15 Bbls and then shut in. This is too large a volume back meaning that volume was coming from somewhere.
The classic indication of an anomaly is the very slow build-up in pressure on the DP side (7&8 on the drawing). This would be more instantaneous, perhaps 20 seconds to build if it was due to the Spacer. It is what we call U-Tube pressure effect. Essentially, this build is showing the gradual exit of hydrocarbons from the reservoir into the ‘sealed’ (cemented) Annulus. Clearly, cement has failed and so has the Auto fill converted Float.
The crew were very wary of the results because no flow indication existed on the Kill side while 1400 psi remained on the DPP guage. So, they checked if the Kill side was full by getting the cementer to verify full.
It appears all were consoled by explaining the ‘bladder Effect’. But both guages should have read zero in the ideal displacement. This did not occur, Spacer apparently passed through the Annular causing a U-Tube effect on the DPP guage. Essentially, no indication of a good test existed and it’s incredibly surprising operations continued.[/B]
- Operators essentially froze at the controls for over 30 minutes and missed three indications that the well was flowing (slide 30)
[B]It may be they accepted the outcome of the negative test and switched off!!![/B]
- Final recognition that flow was occurring did not happen until 49 minutes after it had started (slide 34).
Slide 33 is fascinating. It shows that the operators had four indicators of what was going on in the well: The Transocean Flow Meter (what is this?) [B](They have a sensor to measure flow from the well)[/B], the Sperry-Sun Flow Meter (the NT based system), Drill Pipe Pressure "Available to Transocean and Sperry-Sun (does this mean fed into those displays?) and Pit Volume. [B](All were available in the displays).[/B]
At 20:58 the flow readings for Transocean and Sperry were affected by emptying the trip tank. At 21:08 Marathon says Transocean “should have” indicated flow. Presumably there’s no logging available so we don’t know. Sperry indicated flow “briefly.” Activity was displacing to seawater.
[B]It is quite clear the well is flowing and pressure increasing thereafter with constant flow on the Sperry display. All logging is accounted for. What we see is what was available to the DF, the TP office and the Co Man’s office.[/B]
At 21:10 the Sperry meter was bypassed and no reason is given. Activity was sheen test (what is this?)
[B]Sheen test is a test normally conducted by the Mud Engineers to confirm that returning flow from the well is not contaminated with oil residue from the mud.[/B]
[B][COLOR=“black”][B][B][COLOR=“black”]Drill pipe pressure showed abnormal throughout, but that data is still listed as “available” so I guess we don’t know if it was actually displayed[/B].[/B][/COLOR][/COLOR][/B]
[B][COLOR=“black”]Marathon didn’t know if Pit Volume was monitored prior to 20:10 but shows Pits bypassed at that point (again, why?) Because, they f-ed up with any kind of volume control! In my opinion, they failed to understand that barriers can fail at any time![/B][/COLOR]
Marathon places responsibility squarely on the shoulders of the Driller (slide 60). This seems consistent with the industry culture as expressed by alcor. I dunno. This reminds me an awful lot of the old days in aircraft accident investigation where “pilot error” was the oh-so-convenient explanation, made even more so because the poor soul was usually dead. After fellow pilots refused to accept such superficial explanations and the government/industry complex started looking deeper, a lot of things changed for the better. Just sayin’
[B]The requirements of a driller to police the well are no different to a Pilot policing the guages and monitors of an aircraft, if I can be allowed the allusion. The logger is supposed to sit in his shack observing the well’s parameters and comment to the driller ALL DAY LONG about his findings. There is constant conversation between the Driller/logger, so that, the well is monitored for gain/loss. This was not done. The Assistant Driler, told the logger that he’d apparently let him know when the volumes could be monitored again. Hang on! It’s supposed to be continuous!
In truth, the Driller is the most important person on a Drilling Rig with huge responsibility, with the power to shut in the well when he decides. He’s the main man! With power comes responsibility. [/B]
Cheers,
Earl[/QUOTE]
This is merely my opinion Earl, and it may be that I eventually learn something to make me retract some of the conclusions!
Any Volunteers to bring the BP inmates their Afternoon “tea and crumpits”? Alexander Cockburn | BP Faces Fines of Up to $10 Billion, Plus Jail Time for Guilty Officials :mad:In addition to criminal violations of the Clean Water Act and the Migratory Bird Act, [B]Uhlmann predicts there’ll be federal manslaughter charges[/B] for the deaths of the 11 workers who died when the Deepwater Horizon well exploded in April 2010. Uhlmann says “Under the Seaman’s Manslaughter Statute, it is a crime if a worker dies aboard a vessel because of negligence or inattention to duties by the master of the vessel or the owner of the vessel.” With criminal sanctions, the penalties facing BP would be far harsher, including possible jail time for individuals. Read the full article http://discomfit.blogspot.com/2011/02/sustainability-action-network.html
[QUOTE=alcor;47252]Recurrence will happen again if people fail to see why this blowout occurred…[/QUOTE] AGREED 100 % !!! as long the industry does not skimp on costs and time it takes to properly select and train personnel; as long as they remain afraid of allowing on board genuinely experienced personnel; as long as nothings done to protect " Co-pilot’s reluctant to question command pilot’s judgment" as Earl put it in point 6., and most of all as long as the industry and authorities fail to recognize and own up to their double standards. I hope recurrence never happens on this scale again…but all indications are that it will, its business as usual in my nick of the woods with total disregard to the lessons learn t from this disaster.
[QUOTE=New Orleans Lady;47260] “Under the Seaman’s Manslaughter Statute, it is a crime if a worker dies aboard a vessel because of negligence or inattention to duties by the master of the vessel or the owner of the vessel.” [/QUOTE]
The OIM, is the Master of the vessel and the owner of the vessel is TO. However, if the vessel is considered ‘underway’ then the Captain is the Master. They are the highest authority on the vessel and have ultimate decision-making responsibility. They have to sanction all operations, and if it’s discovered they’ve been inattentive to their duties prosecution will take place. There is no place for ignorance on any vessel. The Master, is responsible for all activity and must combat the plans of the Operator, as required, to maintain a safe working environment on the vessel.
[QUOTE=New Orleans Lady;47260]Any Volunteers to bring the BP inmates their Afternoon “tea and crumpits”? Alexander Cockburn | BP Faces Fines of Up to $10 Billion, Plus Jail Time for Guilty Officials :mad:In addition to criminal violations of the Clean Water Act and the Migratory Bird Act, [B]Uhlmann predicts there’ll be federal manslaughter charges[/B] for the deaths of the 11 workers who died when the Deepwater Horizon well exploded in April 2010. Uhlmann says “Under the Seaman’s Manslaughter Statute, it is a crime if a worker dies aboard a vessel because of negligence or inattention to duties by the master of the vessel or the owner of the vessel.” With criminal sanctions, the penalties facing BP would be far harsher, including possible jail time for individuals. Read the full article http://discomfit.blogspot.com/2011/02/sustainability-action-network.html[/QUOTE]
…“It’s a felony violation that could result in up to ten years in prison and significant fines. The worker deaths are an important part of the Gulf oil spill case that should not be forgotten. As terrible as the ecological harm was to the Gulf, this tragedy began with eleven people losing their lives.” “I expect the Justice Department to include criminal charges under the Seaman’s Manslaughter Statute in any indictment. Prosecutors will want to address the misconduct that caused those workers to die, and the Seaman’s Manslaughter Statute allows them to do so. I would be very surprised if charges are not brought based on the worker deaths.” BP has been clinging to the hope…“Deferred prosecution would be completely inappropriate after a tragedy like the Gulf oil spill. … Eleven people died. A fragile ecosystem was irreparably damaged. Communities along the Gulf suffered billions in economic losses.”…
[B]A Closer Look at The Commission Report on the Deepwater Horizon Disaster [I]“[BP Wells Team Leader] John Guide explained after the incident that losing returns ‘was the No. 1 risk.’ He and the other BP engineers worried that if their cementing procedure placed too much pressure on the geologic formation below, it might trigger another lost-returns event similar to the one on April 9.” [/I]unstable. Furthermore, BP also limited the volume of cement pumped down the well and chose a less-than-optimal rate of cement flow. While protecting the formation from damage, these compromises increased the risk of a blowout.
[I]Despite the compromises evident in the cement procedure and an earlier decision to use a riskier long string well design, BP decided to dismiss a team of Schlumberger technicians who were on standby at the rig to perform cement evaluation tests if required. Skipping the test saved BP both time—leasing the Deepwater Horizon reportedly cost as much as $1 million per day—and Schlumberger’s $128,000 fee.[/I]
[/B]
The rig crew performed the negative pressure test by bleeding off pressure in the drill pipe all the way down to zero pounds per square inch and then waiting to see if it built back up. The team performed this action three times but each time the pressure built up after it was bled off. After the discussing the situation with the Transocean crew, the BP Well Site Leader chose to perform an alternative negative-pressure test, this time on a pipe that connects the blow-out preventer to the rig called the kill line. The test on the kill line was successful and BP mistakenly concluded that the negative pressure test had confirmed the integrity of the cement job. Although the test on the kill line succeeded, the pressure on the drill pipe remained elevated and the Well Site Leaders and crew never reconciled the conflicting pressure readings even though they should have been identical .
In defense of the personnel conducting the test, BP and Transocean had no policies or procedures for running or interpreting negative pressure tests and the BP well-site team had not received formal training in this regard.
http://www.consumerenergyreport.com/2011/02/23/closer-look-at-commission-report-deepwater-horizon-disaster/ " I shall be honored, to serve our BP Inmates, a lovely serving of Tea, and crumpets!!!" … “Nothing like a little Southern Hospitality.” NoLa
When the BP and Transocean staff on the rig noted an anomalous pressure reading while attempting to convert float valves they concluded that the pressure gauge they had been relying on was broken. “BP’s team appears not to have seriously examined why it had to apply over four times the 750 psi design pressure to convert the float valves.”
In the minutes prior to the blowout the Transocean crew failed to notice an increase in pressure in the well—they failed to recognize that a natural gas kick was occurring until it was too late and the blowout was uncontrollable.
The Commission cites a lack of automated alarms in the displays used to monitor well pressures as a contributing factor http://www.consumerenergyreport.com/2011/02/23/closer-look-at-commission-report-deepwater-horizon-disaster/