Deepwater Horizon - Transocean Oil Rig Fire

[New_Orleans_Lady]

Question : what were the default alarms set at?? Were they set at a level, whereby they would alarm at such a low and high number, that they would not alarm at gains and/or losses, 200 or 300 psi,and so that would explain why they did not alarm , and warrent further attention. The defautl alarms, in my unit have to be mannually adjusted depending on my patients’ needs. For example, if I m titraiting Nipride, I need to reset my upper, and lower default alarms, because if I wait for the telemetry monitor technicians to notify when a systolic, lower alarm preset at 80, to call me,my patient could possibly die,therefore I tweak my alarm to go off at 110,as nipride’s action is instantaious, and if I m notified, at an alarm level of 80, then its posssible, that by the time, I get to that pt’s room it could fall to a lethal level See pages 110-115 of the report to the President, …"DEEP WATER THE GULF OIL DISTASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING.[QUOTE=Jones Act;46734]Dear New Orleans Lady -

There is no evidence that the “Blue Screen of Death” acted up during the day or night of 04/20/2010. The Sperry records do not indicate a lack of data recognition prior to the disaster.[/QUOTE]

[alcor]

Causes of blowouts:

Cause of blowouts

[edit]Reservoir pressure
See also: Petroleum formation

A petroleum trap. An irregularity (the trap) in a layer of impermeable rocks (the seal) retains upward-flowing petroleum, forming a reservoir.
Petroleum or crude oil is a naturally occurring, flammable liquid consisting of a complex mixture of hydrocarbons of various molecular weights, and other organic compounds, that are found in geologic formations beneath the Earth’s surface. Because most hydrocarbons are lighter than rock or water, they often migrate upward through adjacent rock layers until either reaching the surface or becoming trapped within porous rocks (known as reservoirs) by impermeable rocks above. However, the process is influenced by underground water flows, causing oil to migrate hundreds of kilometres horizontally or even short distances downward before becoming trapped in a reservoir. When hydrocarbons are concentrated in a trap, an oil field forms, from which the liquid can be extracted by drilling and pumping. The down hole pressures experienced at the rock structures change depending upon the depth and the characteristic of the source rock.[citation needed]
[edit]Formation kick
The downhole fluid pressures are controlled in modern wells through the balancing of the hydrostatic pressure provided by the mud used. Should the balance of the drilling mud pressure be incorrect then formation fluids (oil, natural gas and/or water) begin to flow into the wellbore and up the annulus (the space between the outside of the drill string and the walls of the open hole or the inside of the last casing string set), and/or inside the drill pipe. This is commonly called a kick. If the well is not shut in (common term for the closing of the blow-out preventer valves), a kick can quickly escalate into a blowout when the formation fluids reach the surface, especially when the influx contains gas that expands rapidly as it flows up the wellbore, further decreasing the effective weight of the fluid.
Additional mechanical barriers such as blowout preventers (BOPs) can be closed to isolate the well while the hydrostatic balance is regained through circulation of fluids in the well.
A kick can be the result of improper mud density control, an unexpected overpressured gas pocket, or may be a result of the loss of drilling fluids to a formation called a thief zone. If the well is a development well, these thief zones should already be known to the driller and the proper loss control materials would have been used. However, unexpected fluid losses can occur if a formation is fractured somewhere in the open-hole section, causing rapid loss of hydrostatic pressure and possibly allowing flow of formation fluids into the wellbore. Shallow overpressured gas pockets are generally unpredictable and usually cause the more violent kicks because of rapid gas expansion almost immediately.[citation needed]
Early warning signs of a well kick are:
Sudden change in drilling rate;
Change in surface fluid rate;
Change in pump pressure;
Reduction in drillpipe weight;
Surface mud cut by gas, oil or water.[16]
The primary means of detecting a kick is a relative change in the circulation rate back up to the surface into the mud pits. The drilling crew or mud engineer keeps track of the level in the mud pits and/or closely monitors the rate of mud returns versus the rate that is being pumped down the drill pipe. Upon encountering a zone of higher pressure than is being exerted by the hydrostatic head of the drilling mud at the bit, an increase in mud returns would be noticed as the formation fluid influx pushes the drilling mud toward the surface at a higher rate. Conversely, if the rate of returns is slower than expected, it means that a certain amount of the mud is being lost to a thief zone somewhere below the last casing shoe. This does not necessarily result in a kick (and may never become one); however, a drop in the mud level might allow influx of formation fluids from other zones if the hydrostatic head at depth is reduced to less than that of a full column of mud.
[edit]Well control
The first response to detecting a kick would be to isolate the wellbore from the surface by activating the blow-out preventers and closing in the well. Then the drilling crew would attempt to circulate in a heavier kill fluid to increase the hydrostatic pressure (sometimes with the assistance of a well control company). In the process, the influx fluids will be slowly circulated out in a controlled manner, taking care not to allow any gas to accelerate up the wellbore too quickly by controlling casing pressure with chokes on a predetermined schedule.
In a simple kill, once the kill-weight mud has reached the bit the casing pressure is manipulated to keep drill pipe pressure constant (assuming a constant pumping rate); this will ensure holding a constant adequate bottomhole pressure. The casing pressure will gradually increase as the contaminant slug approaches the surface if the influx is gas, which will be expanding as it moves up the annulus and overall pressure at its depth is gradually decreasing.[citation needed]
This effect will be minor if the influx fluid is mainly salt water. And with an oil-based drilling fluid it can be masked in the early stages of controlling a kick because gas influx may dissolve into the oil under pressure at depth, only to come out of solution and expand rather rapidly as the influx nears the surface. Once all the contaminant has been circulated out, the casing pressure should have reached zero.
Sometimes, however, companies drill underbalanced for better, faster penetration rates and thus they “drill for kicks” as it is more economically sound to take the time to kill a kick than to drill overbalanced (which causes slower penetration rates). In this case, calling a well-control specialist is usually unnecessary as qualified personnel are already on site.

[B]I don’t know where all the other horse shit comes from regarding how the Macondo Blowout occurred.
Does anyone still need a definition of how a blowout occurs?
Are we still assuming that ‘emails’ caused the flow of hydrocarbons from the reservoir?
Drill crew action prevents escalation of events, when small amounts of hydrocarbons enter a wellbore, by closing the BOP. 1000 Bbls entered the wellbore. This is a TO failure to monitor volumes and protect their vessel and all personnel onboard.
The only way for hydrocarbons to enter a wellbore is for human failure to prevail on the vessel. That will be BP and TO Leading personnel at the negative test, and TO/Swaco personnel regarding the uncontrolled displacement. Others, such as Sperry and Halliburton also have responsibilities regarding volumes, pressure and planning.

All other conclusions for the failure are simply ‘decoration’ to achieve the desired goal of damning BP exclusively. And, TO would love that to happen.

Does anyone have an alternative understanding as to why or how Blowouts occur? [/B]

[alcor]

[QUOTE=New Orleans Lady;46969]Question : what were the default alarms set at?? Were they set at a level, whereby they would alarm at such a low and high number, that they would not alarm at gains and/or losses, 200 or 300 psi,and so that would explain why they did not alarm , and warrent further attention. The defautl alarms, in my unit have to be mannually adjusted depending on my patients’ needs. For example, if I m titraiting Nipride, I need to reset my upper, and lower default alarms, because if I wait for the telemetry monitor technicians to notify when a systolic, lower alarm preset at 80, to call me,my patient could possibly die,therefore I tweak my alarm to go off at 110,as nipride’s action is instantaious, and if I m notified, at an alarm level of 80, then its posssible, that by the time, I get to that pt’s room it could fall to a lethal level See pages 110-115 of the report to the President, …"DEEP WATER THE GULF OIL DISTASTER AND THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING.[/QUOTE]

Volumes were ignored.
Pressure was commented on without any action.
Alarms were not set.
The Sperry logger was told to ignore volumes by the A/D.
Volume pumped should equal volume back. They got an extra 1000 Bbls back. Why? I’d like you to answer that. And believe me when I say this, it had sweet F-All to do with a nurses monitor!!!

[alcor]

[QUOTE=A Cooke;46450]A long time since I last visited. A lot of finger pointing still going on. There was the accident and then there was the response to that accident. With respect to the accident there has been a very thorough investigation. No glory for any party. The lack of inquiry into the response still puzzles me. My question remains as posted in August. Why, if every tinpot forum on the planet had plenty of novices saying “bolt another BOP on top of the first one”, did the experts ignore this solution and take 4 months of messing around, polluting the planet & wrecking livelihoods before they did exactly that? It could have been sealed in 3 to 4 weeks. Who was making the wrong calls at this time ? Why is there so little interest in this failure ?[/QUOTE]

I believe the burst disks concerned everyone. However, BP were probably not allowed to continue with operations as they would have wished. The Gov’t took on the decision-making role and eventually came up with the plan to shut in and bullhead. Agreed, it should have been tried sooner. I also wonder why that decision took so long!

[alcor]

[QUOTE=Infomania;46901]Thank you New Orleans Lady and Earl for posting info on this Microsoft trash. If mike Williams ’ testimony is accurate, I can envision the frustration from crashes , hangups and blue screens.
By the way, just because Microsoft has those disclaimers doesn’t mean you can’t try and burn them, especially in this case with all the publicity and such. Believe me, Microsoft doesn’t want anyone to associate them with this case. Halliburton has the same type of disclaimers in their contracts…doesn’t seem to be providing them much protection from negative press at this time. If I were a plaintiff’s attorney I certainly would give serious consideration to loading one pellet for Microsoft in my shot gun suit. Seems as though Microsoft, Weatherford, MI Swaco (Schlumberger) have been getting “a free pass” so far in this investigation.

Mr. Earl, if you have further info or insight on this software topic it sure would be nice to hear more of your thoughts on this issue.

Alf, Alcor, Blisters, New Orleans Lady, any personal experiences on rigs or at your workplace or further research, it would be nice to to expand a bit on this topic…[/QUOTE]

When data is no longer available, as in screen failure, the only option available to a Driller is to stop all activity and monitor the well on the trip tank until the anomaly is fixed. They, who suggest the rig is doomed because of software issues need to get their heads examined. There is always remedial action to take in order to ensure well volumes and pressures are monitored, including closing a BOP if required. This is the professional approach. Mike Williams is an alarmist! But, we all recognise how traumatic the horrific events of that night must be to him, and his personal quest to get answers is understandable.
It is the duty of all Drillers to secure the well in the event of data communication failure.

[alcor]

[QUOTE=New Orleans Lady;46852]It is still unanswered, as to why it happened,with regard to “decisions” with those “experienced crewmen”, who had to work, on that “rig from hell”.,Found this article, re windows software. Feel free to critique it,as I m just a messenger.
[B]10.12.10[/B]

[B]Guest Article: Windows NT and the Deepwater Horizon[/B]

Posted in Microsoft, Windows at 2:48 am by Dr. Roy Schestowitz. http://techrights.org/2010/10/12/deepwater-update/ Williams said the software was chronically bad, leaving a “blue screen of death” on the driller’s interface and often causing the driller to lose crucial data about what was going on in the well. Once, when the Deepwater Horizon was drilling a different well, the computer froze up and the rig took a kick of natural gas while the driller was looking at “erroneous data,” Williams said.[/QUOTE]

“rig from hell”, “decisions”, “experienced crewmen”!!! Why not offer fact instead of alarmist slogans borrowed from other sources. Who called this the “rig from hell”? Surely, you meant the “well from hell”! And, that is a common offshore quote for troublesome wells, nothing more than that. Macondo was an ordinary well, nothing unusual about it in the slightest. It should have been controlled as soon as volumes were inconsistent.

There are back-up systems to data/screen failure…even if you have to get a guy to stand at the trip tank to monitor volume…or simply close the BOP until the software anomaly is repaired.
Let’s not over-sensationalize things you haven’t a clue about! And, if you want to learn facts, ask. Don’t present a case where knowledge is absent!

[Earl_Boebert]

[QUOTE=alcor;47131]“rig from hell”, “decisions”, “experienced crewmen”!!! Why not offer fact instead of alarmist slogans borrowed from other sources. Who called this the “rig from hell”? Surely, you meant the “well from hell”! And, that is a common offshore quote for troublesome wells, nothing more than that. Macondo was an ordinary well, nothing unusual about it in the slightest. It should have been controlled as soon as volumes were inconsistent.

There are back-up systems to data/screen failure…even if you have to get a guy to stand at the trip tank to monitor volume…or simply close the BOP until the software anomaly is repaired.
Let’s not over-sensationalize things you haven’t a clue about! And, if you want to learn facts, ask. Don’t present a case where knowledge is absent![/QUOTE]

OK, let’s look for facts. Here are my questions:

1. Is the computer display in question the primary pressure/volume source for the operator?

2. If so, why in the world are we using in 2010 a circa 1993 operating system which is known to be far from robust?

3. What are the backup pressure/volume display systems?

4. What is the time lag in switching over to them vs. the primary?

5. What written procedures/training material exists to enable the operator to resolve conflicting readings between the primary and backup?

Note that the referenced article said that not only did the display crash, it would also occasionally lie to the operator by freezing up. So I have another question for those who have actually stared at one of these things for a living:

6. How dynamic is the display, and how much time elapses before you suspect that you’re not seeing true data?

I have my own suspicions about all this. From my examination of NT (which included visiting Redmond and reviewing MS development and integration practices) I think there are a lot of ways that the system could lie to the operator. I would be very interested in whether people have seen false positives (kick where no kick existed) as well as false negatives (kick going on but no indication on the display).

So I’m far from ready to rule out the idea that the display was contributing factor, if only by delaying operator reaction (“Is that a kick or a glitch?” “Damned thing hiccups all the time.” etc. etc.)

I might also add that in my experience you often end up in a controversy about the degree to which a display system is safety critical. The example I used in my project management classes is that most venerable of aircraft instruments, the turn and bank indicator. Is it flight critical? On a clear day, probably not. In the middle of clouds at night, try flying without one. Vendors usually want to shrink the safety-critical perimeter as small as possible to avoid liability and regulatory oversight: “It’s just a display, it doesn’t actually operate anything.” So the poor soul who was bombarded with incorrect and conflicting data in the middle of a crisis takes the rap.

Cheers,

Earl

[Infomania]

[FONT=Trebuchet MS, sans-serif]Alcor, Welcome back. Hope you had a good hitch. [/FONT]

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[FONT=Trebuchet MS, sans-serif]I think New Orleans Lady did intend to say “rig from hell”[/FONT]
noting the bolded items below from the Counsel to the Commission report…the maintenance department personnel on the Deepwater horizon sure sound a bit confused and frustrated to me.

Having worked in maintenance for over 30 years I can tell you the system as described msy have frustrated efforts to perform efficiently on the job…

Also, I am looking at this from a evidentary standpoint, in other words, situations casting “beyond a reasonable doubt” , or 'preponderence of the evidence", not a criminal prosecution level of [SIZE=1][COLOR=black][B]BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT[/B].[/COLOR][/SIZE]

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http://law.jrank.org/pages/9341/Preponderance-Evidence.html
[LEFT]For most civil claims, there are two different evidentiary standards: preponderance of the evidence, and clear and convincing evidence. A third standard, proof [B]BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT[/B], is used in criminal cases and very few civil cases.

[/LEFT]

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[FONT=Trebuchet MS, sans-serif]Maintenance[/FONT]
[LEFT][FONT=Georgia, sans-serif][SIZE=3]A deepwater drilling rig like the [I]Deepwater Horizon [/I]has literally[/SIZE][/FONT]
thousands of pieces of equipment that need routine monitoring and
[FONT=Georgia, sans-serif][SIZE=3]repair.1 The [I]Deepwater Horizon[/I]‘s crew performed more than[/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Georgia, sans-serif][SIZE=3]550 preventative maintenance jobs each month on the [I]Deepwater[/I][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Georgia,Italic, sans-serif][SIZE=3][I]Horizon [/I]and had spent more than 30,000 work hours on maintenance in the[/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Georgia, sans-serif][SIZE=3]10 months prior to the explosion.2[/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Trebuchet MS, sans-serif][SIZE=1]6[/SIZE][/FONT]
It is nevertheless possible that poor maintenance contributed to technical failures. According to
[FONT=Georgia, sans-serif]pre-explosion BP emails, the rig was ―getting old and maintenance has not been good enough.‖[SIZE=1]7[/SIZE][/FONT]
[B][FONT=Georgia, sans-serif]Most notably, Chapter 4.9 of this report explains that certification of blowout preventer (BOP)[/B][/FONT][B]equipment was overdue and that if blowout preventer maintenance was inadequate, it could have [/B][B]affected the ability to shut in the well.[/B]
Other issues may have affected maintenance but, based on available information, likely did not contribute to the blowout.

Transocean’s Rig Management System
Transocean had in place comprehensive procedures and systems for scheduling, implementing, [FONT=Georgia, sans-serif]and monitoring maintenance.[SIZE=1]8 Like all Transocean rigs, the [I]Deepwater Horizon [/I]used the [/SIZE][/FONT][FONT=Georgia, serif]computerized ―[B]Rig Management System II[/B]‖ (RMS), which Transocean had implemented as a [/FONT][FONT=Georgia, sans-serif]result of its merger with Global Santa Fe.[SIZE=1]9 Transocean personnel used RMS to schedule [/SIZE][/FONT][FONT=Georgia, sans-serif]maintenance work based on information including equipment data, maintenance records,[SIZE=1]10 [/SIZE][/FONT][FONT=Georgia, sans-serif]information on certification and surveys,[SIZE=1]11 and risk assessments.12 Based on these materials, the[/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Georgia, sans-serif]automated system generated preventative maintenance[SIZE=1]13 items for the rig.14 The rig crew would [/SIZE][/FONT][FONT=Georgia, sans-serif]perform these tasks and then record their completion in the system.[SIZE=1]15 Transocean‘s goal in using [/SIZE][/FONT]the system was to ensure consistency, consolidate information, and facilitate personnel
[FONT=Georgia, sans-serif]movement from rig to rig.[SIZE=1]16[/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Georgia, serif]While the Chief Counsel‘s team interviewed [I]Deepwater Horizon [/I]crew members who found the [/FONT][FONT=Georgia, serif]RMS useful (despite the fact that it ―definitely had some bugs in it‖) and who used it daily,[SIZE=1]17 [B]the [/B][/SIZE][/FONT][B]team also found evidence to suggest that the system had problems.[/B] Transocean installed the RMS [FONT=Georgia, sans-serif]on the [I]Horizon [/I]in September 2009,[SIZE=1]18 [B]but according one witness it was ―still a work in progress‖ at [/B][/SIZE][/FONT][FONT=Georgia, sans-serif][B]the time of the blowout.[/B][SIZE=1]19 For instance, while the system produced thousands of preventative [/SIZE][/FONT][FONT=Georgia, serif]maintenance orders for Transocean‘s fleet,[SIZE=1]20 [B]many orders were disorganized, erroneous, or [/B][/SIZE][/FONT][B][FONT=Georgia, sans-serif]irrelevant to individual rig crews. The [I]Deepwater Horizon[/I]‘s rig crew was forced to actively search [/FONT][FONT=Georgia, sans-serif]the system for the [I]Deepwater Horizon[/I]‘s maintenance items and to continually submit requests to [/FONT][/B][FONT=Georgia, sans-serif][B]remove duplicate maintenance orders or orders meant for another rig[/B].[SIZE=1]21 [B]The system also[/B][/SIZE][/FONT][/LEFT]
[B]222 generated work orders for equipment that had already been repaired, leaving the rig crew to[FONT=Georgia, sans-serif]determine if work orders generated by the system actually needed to be performed.[SIZE=1]22 According [/SIZE][/FONT]to chief engineer Stephen Bertone, the rig crew ―went through them as much as [they] could just [/B][FONT=Georgia, serif][B]poking through the system, but
there were still issues with it.[/B]‖[SIZE=1]23 [B]According to assistant driller [/B][/SIZE][/FONT][B][FONT=Georgia, sans-serif]Allen Seraile, the system was chaos at one time.[SIZE=1]24 Chief electronics technician Mike Williams [/B][/SIZE][/FONT][FONT=Georgia, serif][B]described the system as ―overwhelming[/B].‖[SIZE=1]25[/SIZE][/FONT]
[LEFT][B]The crew expressed confusion regarding the new system and concerns about its implementation.[/B]
In a March 2010 Lloyd‘s Register survey, [B]crew members stated that system changes to the RMS [/B][FONT=Georgia, sans-serif][B]and other rig systems were ineffectively implemented.[/B][SIZE=1]26[B]They thought that new systems were [/B][/SIZE][/FONT][FONT=Georgia, sans-serif][B]introduced too frequently and before the previous system was understood[/B].[SIZE=1]27 [B]The rig crew also [/B][/SIZE][/FONT][B]thought there was insufficient support to implement changes and that system changes required a [/B][FONT=Georgia, sans-serif][B]level of technical capability not typically available throughout the rig[/B].[SIZE=1]28 [B]An April 2010 Transocean [/B][/SIZE][/FONT][B][FONT=Georgia, sans-serif]assessment also found that the maintenance system was not understood by the crew.[SIZE=1]29[/B][/SIZE][/FONT][/LEFT]

Lack of Onshore Maintenance
[LEFT]Some maintenance can only be performed when a rig is moving between well sites or when the rig
[FONT=Georgia, sans-serif]is brought into shore.[SIZE=1]35 But the [I]Horizon [/I]had never been to dry dock since it was built in 2001.[/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Georgia, serif]Transocean instead conducted ―Underwater Inspection in Lieu of Dry-docking‖ (UWILD) and[/FONT]
[FONT=Georgia, sans-serif]other at-sea inspections.[SIZE=1]36 In the March 2010 Lloyd‘s Register survey some of the rig crew[/SIZE][/FONT]
expressed concern that the lack of dry dock time could generally undermine equipment [FONT=Georgia, sans-serif]reliability.[SIZE=1]37 According to the survey, the maintenance department was looking forward to a [/SIZE][/FONT]scheduled dry dock visit in 2011 ―to carry out evasive [preventative maintenance] routines [FONT=Georgia, serif]that they normally could not do.‖[SIZE=1]38 [B]Lack of time in dry dock may have resulted in a lapse in [/B][/SIZE][/FONT][B][FONT=Georgia, sans-serif]BOP certification.[SIZE=1]39[/B][/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Georgia, sans-serif]Following company policy,[SIZE=1]40 Transocean commissioned an inspection in April 2010 to assess [/SIZE][/FONT][FONT=Georgia, serif]equipment and prepare for the rig‘s scheduled 2011 shipyard maintenance.[SIZE=1]41 [B]The inspection [/B][/SIZE][/FONT][B]found that some problems identified in September 2009 remained unaddressed and identified[/B]
[B]| 223[/B]
[FONT=Georgia, sans-serif][B]several new maintenance issues[/B].[SIZE=1]42 [B]As of April 2010, Transocean documents listed 35 critical [/B][/SIZE][/FONT][B]items of equipment that either were in bad condition, had shown excessive downtime, had passed [/B][FONT=Georgia, sans-serif][B]manufacturer wear limits, or that the manufacturer no longer supported.[/B][SIZE=1]43 As discussed in [/SIZE][/FONT][FONT=Georgia, sans-serif]Chapter 4.9, [B]the list included BOP elements that had passed their certification date.[/B][SIZE=1]44 According [/SIZE][/FONT][FONT=Georgia, sans-serif]to witness testimony, Transocean had decided to extend the [I]Horizon[/I]‘s anticipated time in dry [/FONT][FONT=Georgia, sans-serif]dock because of the number of repairs necessary.[SIZE=1]45 [/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Georgia, serif][B]The Chief Counsel‘s team requested but was [/B][/FONT][B][FONT=Georgia, sans-serif]not able to obtain a list of repairs scheduled for the [I]Horizon[/I]‘s 2011 dry dock visit.[/B][/FONT]
.
Transocean Resolved Many Maintenance Issues Identified in the
September 2009 BP Audit
[FONT=Georgia, sans-serif]In September 2009 BP audited the [I]Deepwater Horizon[/I]‘s drilling equipment and the vessel [/FONT][FONT=Georgia, sans-serif]itself.[SIZE=1]52 [B]The audit found 390 maintenance jobs overdue and identified some of those as [/B][/SIZE][/FONT][B][FONT=Georgia, sans-serif]high-priority items.[SIZE=1]53 BP estimated that the work would require 3,545 man-hours of labor.54 [/SIZE][/FONT]The audit may have overestimated the sheer number of jobs that were overdue because of errors [/B][FONT=Georgia, sans-serif][B]and duplicates in the RMS system[/B], which Transocean had recently installed.[SIZE=1]55 BP asked [/SIZE][/FONT][FONT=Georgia, sans-serif]Transocean to undertake certain repairs before allowing the [I]Horizon [/I]to resume operations.[SIZE=1]56[/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Georgia, sans-serif][/FONT]
[FONT=Georgia, sans-serif]A few days later, BP determined that the rig was operational,[SIZE=1]57 and the rig resumed operations [/SIZE][/FONT][FONT=Georgia, sans-serif]on September 22, 2009, five days after the audit ended.[SIZE=1]58[/SIZE][/FONT]
BP and Transocean increased communication and coordination to monitor implementation of [FONT=Georgia, sans-serif]outstanding audit recommendations.[SIZE=1]59 For example, auditors communicated conditions to the rig [/SIZE][/FONT][FONT=Georgia, sans-serif]crew during the audit itself in order to ensure that certain repairs were made promptly.[SIZE=1]60 BP and [/SIZE][/FONT][FONT=Georgia, sans-serif]Transocean held weekly meetings to track progress,[SIZE=1]61 and Guide or well site leaders signed off on[/SIZE][/FONT]
[FONT=Georgia, sans-serif]corrective actions taken in response to the audit.[SIZE=1]62 [B]By March 30, 2010, 63 of 70 had been [/B][/SIZE][/FONT][FONT=Georgia, serif][B]completed, [/B]progress BP described as ―commendable.‖[SIZE=1]63 [B]Twenty-six other outstanding items were [/B][/SIZE][/FONT][B][FONT=Georgia, sans-serif]in progress and deemed not safety-critical.[SIZE=1]64[/B][/SIZE][/FONT]
BP and Transocean Believed the Rig Was in Safe Working Order
[FONT=Georgia, sans-serif]At the time of the blowout, both BP and Transocean believed the [I]Deepwater Horizon [/I]was in safe [/FONT][FONT=Georgia, sans-serif]operating condition.[SIZE=1]65 Well site leader Ronnie Sepulvado did not believe there were serious [/SIZE][/FONT][FONT=Georgia, sans-serif]outstanding safety issues,[SIZE=1]66 and neither he nor the other well site leaders indicated that the vessel [/SIZE][/FONT][FONT=Georgia, sans-serif]was unsafe to operate.[SIZE=1]67 Guide recognized that the rig was operating safely and making very good [/SIZE][/FONT][FONT=Georgia, sans-serif]progress on addressing audit items.[SIZE=1]68[/SIZE][/FONT]
An April 1, 2010 MMS inspection of the rig found no incidents of noncompliance and did not [FONT=Georgia, sans-serif]identify any problems justifying stopping work.[SIZE=1]69 [/SIZE][/FONT]
[B][FONT=Georgia, sans-serif][/B][/FONT]
[B][FONT=Georgia, sans-serif]But, as discussed in Chapter 6, the inspection [/B][/FONT][B][FONT=Georgia, sans-serif]did not identify that the [I]Deepwater Horizon[/I]‘s BOP had not been certified.70[/B][/FONT]

[B]224 | [/B][FONT=Trebuchet MS, sans-serif]National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Offshore Drilling[/FONT]
Maintenance Findings
Inspections, audit programs, and statements by rig- and shore-based leadership indicate that BP, [FONT=Georgia, sans-serif]Transocean, and government regulators believed the [I]Deepwater Horizon [/I]was in safe operating [/FONT]order at the time of the blowout. [B]With the exception of potential BOP maintenance issues, the [/B][B]Chief Counsel‘s team found no reason to believe that maintenance problems may have [/B][B]contributed to the blowout.[/B] However, the Chief Counsel‘s team believes the following issues may [FONT=Georgia, serif]have compromised the rig‘s maintenance regime:[/FONT]
 [B][FONT=Georgia, serif]Transocean‘s RMS system may have complicated routine maintenance and monitoring.[/B][/FONT]
[B]The rig crew appears to have been confused about the system, and the system issued[/B]
[B]duplicate and erroneous maintenance instructions; and[/B]
[B] [FONT=Georgia, sans-serif]the fact that the [I]Deepwater Horizon [/I]had never been in dry dock may have delayed or[/FONT][/B][/LEFT]
[B]prevented certain repairs that could only have been done onshore.[/B]

[Infomania]

Alcor wrote:
They, who suggest the rig is doomed because of software issues need to get their heads examined.

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The same applies to "they who suggest’ that Weatherford has no possible civil libility whatsoever in this incident,

Correct me if I’m wrong, but, didn’t Weatherford provide approximately 13,364’ of casing, the[FONT=Georgia][SIZE=2] Flow-Activated Mid-Bore Auto-Fill Float Collar[/SIZE][/FONT], and centralizers. That doesn’t automatically make them guilty of anything, however, it doesn’t give them a “free pass” as Alcor indicated several weeks ago.

[New_Orleans_Lady]

Alcor ,it was a rig from hell when you consider the management anomalies,which set the stage for this disaster.Top
Notch equipment is essential,which btw is a managerial responsibility, and really you don’t have to talk to me, like I’m some sort of a dumbass,which in all honesty ,you portray like a real veteran.

[alcor]

[QUOTE=Earl Boebert;47146]OK, let’s look for facts. Here are my questions:

1. Is the computer display in question the primary pressure/volume source for the operator?
   [B]The Driller has his own data display as well as Sperry’s. The display reflects sensor readings for pressure and volumes in the pits and Manifolds under pressure at a time of drilling, pressure testing etc… [/B]

2. If so, why in the world are we using in 2010 a circa 1993 operating system which is known to be far from robust?
   [B]This question has to be addressed by TO. Operating systems are only half of the problem. Often, software from independent companies can become erroneous through bugs and viruses.[/B]

3. What are the backup pressure/volume display systems?
   [B]Physical Visible Volume, is a phrase often used by cementers. The volume in the cement tanks is verified visually. Most rigs have Trip Tank visual display as back-up to the driller, in the event that display or sensors fail.
   In the event of loss of display while drilling, tripping, running casing, or simply displacing a well, the priority is to stop pumping and go with the visual systems for monitoring volumes. And, close any BOP if required, and monitor the manual guages for pressure.[/B]

4. What is the time lag in switching over to them vs. the primary?
   [B]30 seconds to go manual.[/B]

5. What written procedures/training material exists to enable the operator to resolve conflicting readings between the primary and backup?
   [B]TO are the same as all Contractors. No display/no volume control. Go on the trip tank and monitor the well volumes. A written rule is not available for all circumstances facing the rig’s crews, but volume control is The Bible to drill crews, meaning we must stop as if taking a flow check of the well.[/B]

Note that the referenced article said that not only did the display crash, it would also occasionally lie to the operator by freezing up. So I have another question for those who have actually stared at one of these things for a living:

6. How dynamic is the display, and how much time elapses before you suspect that you’re not seeing true data?
   [B]In my experience, the data is still valid, but the screen display starts to be fuzzy followed by ‘blank’.[/B]

I have my own suspicions about all this. From my examination of NT (which included visiting Redmond and reviewing MS development and integration practices) I think there are a lot of ways that the system could lie to the operator. I would be very interested in whether people have seen false positives (kick where no kick existed) as well as false negatives (kick going on but no indication on the display).
[B]There are occasions when the Driller asks the Derrickman to clean the sensors in the pits due to inconsistent values. This is normally due to vapour build-up or volume variation indication due to pit agitators. The Driller will pick this up immediately.
In the case of frozen values, it is immediately apparent that data is not changing, and action needs to be taken to monitor the well while the Technician addresses the failure.[/B]

So I’m far from ready to rule out the idea that the display was contributing factor, if only by delaying operator reaction (“Is that a kick or a glitch?” “Damned thing hiccups all the time.” etc. etc.)
[B]My opinion is that the screen display was functioning on the day in question. The Driller would have shut down operations otherwise. However, they ignored any form of volume control.[/B]

I might also add that in my experience you often end up in a controversy about the degree to which a display system is safety critical. The example I used in my project management classes is that most venerable of aircraft instruments, the turn and bank indicator. Is it flight critical? On a clear day, probably not. In the middle of clouds at night, try flying without one. Vendors usually want to shrink the safety-critical perimeter as small as possible to avoid liability and regulatory oversight: “It’s just a display, it doesn’t actually operate anything.” So the poor soul who was bombarded with incorrect and conflicting data in the middle of a crisis takes the rap.

Cheers,

Earl[/QUOTE]

So many people have been led astray by the early conclusions of the investigation, myself included! We now find ourselves in a situation where the only real failures took place on the vessel, the failure to recognise inconsistencies in pressure initially and volumes later. Someone should have asked the investigating authorities: “How does a blowout occur”? Perhaps, they’d have sailed a different course.

[alcor]

[QUOTE=Infomania;47152]Alcor wrote:
They, who suggest the rig is doomed because of software issues need to get their heads examined.

---

The same applies to "they who suggest’ that Weatherford has no possible civil libility whatsoever in this incident,

Correct me if I’m wrong, but, didn’t Weatherford provide approximately 13,364’ of casing, the[FONT=Georgia][SIZE=2] Flow-Activated Mid-Bore Auto-Fill Float Collar[/SIZE][/FONT], and centralizers. That doesn’t automatically make them guilty of anything, however, it doesn’t give them a “free pass” as Alcor indicated several weeks ago.[/QUOTE]

I’ve run Auto-Fill Casing Collars. The decision to run them is based on surge pressure in the well which may result in losses to weak formations. Closed-end displacement compared to open end displacement is a considerable difference. We’ve had success with our efforts but have been watchful of volumes inside and outside the casing to ensure we don’t see any internal or external casing flow, and ensure a emergency plan is in place.
Weatherford, have nothing to answer for. We check their equipment prior to run it in the well. We don’t actually know why the conversion pressure was so high. Personally, I believe it may have been junk but no-one can ever say for sure what caused the high conversion pressure.
If I implicated Weatherford a couple of weeks ago, I take it back!
Centralisers do not cause blowouts. People’s pressure data interpretation and absence of volume control cause blowouts.

[alcor]

[QUOTE=New Orleans Lady;47153]Alcor ,it was a rig from hell when you consider the management anomalies,which set the stage for this disaster.Top
Notch equipment is essential,which btw is a managerial responsibility, and really you don’t have to talk to me, like I’m some sort of a dumbass,which in all honesty ,you portray like a real veteran.[/QUOTE]

It was a fantastic rig. Management was poor. And, you should stick to syringes and bed baths! Your comments are continuous speculative horse shit! Top Notch!

[alcor]

Infomania,
I’m going to wait for the DNV report on the BOP to appraise their findings. But, we all know the BOP failed and maintenance issues existed…as well as functional issues of the BOP.

[Infomania]

[QUOTE="alcor"
If I implicated Weatherford a couple of weeks ago, I take it back![/QUOTE]

---

no sir, you DID NOT implicate Weatherford. You are maintaining a consistent position that Weatherford could not have any liability and that is OK.
I on the other hand maintain that none of the participants can be eliminated, even though several reports have been released.

Alcor, if you had personally inspected that equipment I might be in favor of you testifying as an expert witness in Weatherford’s behalf at a civil trial. Even with that powerful evidence I still would wonder if your professional visual inspection would have the power to over rule testimony from a metallurgist potentially introducing photo micrograms of same type equipment depicting potential weak spots or flaws in the material used in that equipment.

Remember, the plaintiff is only trying to create reasonable doubt in the minds of a jury or trial judge. Maybe you have never been involved in a civil trial in America’s court system. The outcome is not as predictable as you would expect. Been there done that several times. Sometimes the results are astounding.

[alcor]

[QUOTE=Infomania;47163]______________
no sir, you DID NOT implicate Weatherford. You are maintaining a consistent position that Weatherford could not have any liability and that is OK.
I on the other hand maintain that none of the participants can be eliminated, even though several reports have been released.

Alcor, if you had personally inspected that equipment I might be in favor of you testifying as an expert witness in Weatherford’s behalf at a civil trial. Even with that powerful evidence I still would wonder if your professional visual inspection would have the power to over rule testimony from a metallurgist potentially introducing photo micrograms of same type equipment depicting potential weak spots or flaws in the material used in that equipment.

Remember, the plaintiff is only trying to create reasonable doubt in the minds of a jury or trial judge. Maybe you have never been involved in a civil trial in America’s court system. The outcome is not as predictable as you would expect. Been there done that several times. Sometimes the results are astounding.[/QUOTE]

The focus area is all wrong in this investigation. It doesn’t matter if the Shoe Joint and Float Collar were made of junk/rust and the components failed. It’s irrelevant.
What’s relevant is the fact that no-one on the vessel interpreting data understood that the cement and the Auto fill Collar conversion had all failed. The barriers no longer existed. This was the point that hydrostatic pressure had to be re-established. And no-one would ever have heard the word “Macondo”.
I don’t care if the metallurgist tells me you ran an old rusty pipe down the hole. Nothing fails until I remove the hydrostatic pressure.
This is a black and white case if anyone cares to look!

Let’s assume all went well with recognising the negative test had failed, and full hydrostatic control of the well was re-established.
Would BP chase up the cementers and Weatherford for answers as to what went wrong? Absolutely yes!
Would they be implicated for the barrier failures? My gut feeling is yes! Does that mean that BP would pursue them for daily rig costs for the time required for the remedial action to be successful? Certainly, the issue wouldn’t be ignored. But, it’s hard to prove where the fault in the equipment initially arose.
Has a blowout occurred? No, so a typical recognition of failures would be recognised and the drilling industry advised.

[New_Orleans_Lady]

Alcor dear,be careful for what thou wishes for. I am inclined to grant you your wish.

[alcor]

[QUOTE=New Orleans Lady;47171]Alcor dear,be careful for what thou wishes for. I am inclined to grant you your wish.[/QUOTE]

My consideration of the Deepwater Horizon’s outcome is based on fact and not fiction. If I have it wrong I’ll offer apologies to all. But, I’m not sure whether your interests are truth or vindictive assault and threat!
If you have an objective point to make then offer it. Surely, all understand that this is a place for professional consideration of fact.

[BLISTERS]

Welcome back Alcor old chap.Long time no see.7 consecutive posts in one day…WOW!. back with a vengeance as per usual. Keep it coming…always very entertaining to read your posts, cuts the bore-dome for me. Hope you had a good stint during your leave of absence and hope you did not get strafed out of the country by your best buddy and cross dresser Gaddafi. .

[Earl_Boebert]

OK, working from the Marathon slides, I have the following questions:

1. Operators misread the negative pressure test. (slide 28)

2. Operators essentially froze at the controls for over 30 minutes and missed three indications that the well was flowing (slide 30)

3. Final recognition that flow was occurring did not happen until 49 minutes after it had started (slide 34).

Slide 33 is fascinating. It shows that the operators had four indicators of what was going on in the well: The Transocean Flow Meter (what is this?), the Sperry-Sun Flow Meter (the NT based system), Drill Pipe Pressure "Available to Transocean and Sperry-Sun (does this mean fed into those displays?) and Pit Volume.

At 20:58 the flow readings for Transocean and Sperry were affected by emptying the trip tank. At 21:08 Marathon says Transocean “should have” indicated flow. Presumably there’s no logging available so we don’t know. Sperry indicated flow “briefly.” Activity was displacing to seawater.

At 21:10 the Sperry meter was bypassed and no reason is given. Activity was sheen test (what is this?)

Drill pipe pressure showed abnormal throughout, but that data is still listed as “available” so I guess we don’t know if it was actually displayed.

Marathon didn’t know if Pit Volume was monitored prior to 20:10 but shows Pits bypassed at that point (again, why?)

Marathon places responsibility squarely on the shoulders of the Driller (slide 60). This seems consistent with the industry culture as expressed by alcor. I dunno. This reminds me an awful lot of the old days in aircraft accident investigation where “pilot error” was the oh-so-convenient explanation, made even more so because the poor soul was usually dead. After fellow pilots refused to accept such superficial explanations and the government/industry complex started looking deeper, a lot of things changed for the better. Just sayin’

Cheers,

Earl