[QUOTE=New Orleans Lady;43397]http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703960004575427142505940502.html# On the Doomed Rigs Last Day , A Devisive Change Of Plan…Must Read.[/QUOTE]
Big time accuracy. But, still some way to go. I appreciate this article and the fact you draw our attention to it.
[QUOTE=New Orleans Lady;43397]http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703960004575427142505940502.html# On the Doomed Rigs Last Day , A Devisive Change Of Plan…Must Read.[/QUOTE]
Thanks for posting this New Orleans Lady.
I also second Alcor’s comment referenced to your posted link…
Purdue University web site
A resource site for educators, scientists,engineers, and other interested parties.
Oilspillhub.org is an online resource for those studying the largest environmental disaster in U.S. history. The site provides an archive of the underwater video of the event, as well as additional tools and resources for educators, scientists, and engineers who are expanding our knowledge of environmental issues.
Oilspillhub.org is developed and hosted by Purdue University working in cooperation with the U.S. Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works and the House Select Committee on Energy Independence and Global Warming and the Energy and Environment Subcommittee in the House Energy and Commerce Committee.
414 video segments, 162 hours
http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/g/a/2010/10/25/prwebprweb4689204.DTL
[LEFT][B]Texas Maritime Lawyers Challenge Transocean’s Decision To Cut Injured Oil Rig Workers’ Salaries[/B][/LEFT]
[LEFT]Houston maritime attorney Kurt Arnold says he is shocked that Transocean Ltd. will cease paying full salary and benefits to crew members who [/LEFT]
[COLOR=#000000]were injured in last April’s Deepwater Horizon oil rig disaster in the Gulf of Mexico.
[LEFT]
[LEFT]According to news reports, the company said it will slash the salaries and benefits by Dec. 15, just six months after an explosion and fire aboard the oil rig killed 11 workers and triggered the enormous BP oil spill.
[LEFT].[/LEFT]
[/LEFT]
[/LEFT]
According to news reports, the company said it will slash the salaries and benefits by Dec. 15, just six months after an explosion and fire aboard the oil rig killed 11 workers and triggered the enormous BP oil spill.
“It’s appalling that this company, which has already caused so much damage and suffering, would now take men who made $10,000 to $15,000 a month and cut their salaries to $25 a day,” says Arnold, a partner in the Houston maritime law firm of Arnold & Itkin LLP, which is representing about 25 of the injured Transocean workers. “These workers don’t deserve this type of treatment.”
[LEFT]
Read more: http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/g/a/2010/10/25/prwebprweb4689204.DTL#ixzz13REydAKD
[/LEFT]
[/COLOR]
[LEFT]
[B]Report deadline extended on failed Deepwater Horizon BOP[/B]
Oct 25, 2010
[B]By OGJ editors
[LEFT]http://www.ogj.com/index/article-display/6900008187/articles/oil-gas-journal/general-interest-2/hse/2010/10/report-deadline_extended.html[/LEFT]
HOUSTON, Oct. 25[/B] – A joint investigation team (JIT) of the US Coast Guard and the US Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation, and Enforcement received a 60-day extension of the deadline for the JIT final investigation report following a massive oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.
The JIT is charged with completing forensic testing into the failed blowout preventer (BOP) from Transocean Ltd.’s Deepwater Horizon semisubmersible. An Apr. 20 blowout of BP PLC’s deepwater Macondo well on Mississippi Canyon Block 252 resulted in an explosion and fire on the semi, killing 11 people.
USCG and BOEMRE officials said they granted the extension to allow additional time for testing the BOP and also to provide more time to prepare for a final public hearing on the forensic evidence. The hearing tentatively is scheduled for the week of Jan. 24, 2011.
The JIT was asked to issue a report containing the evidence and its conclusions and recommendations. The deadline for that final report has been moved to Mar. 27, 2011.
Previously, Det Norske Veritas was hired to conduct the BOP forensic testing. The BOP and lower-marine riser package was taken to the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Michoud Assembly facility in New Orleans on Sept. 11. Federal officials and DNV has been working out final BOP testing protocols.
[I]Oil & Gas Journal[/I] Topic and Resource Categories:
[/LEFT]
[QUOTE=Infomania;43413]http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/g/a/2010/10/25/prwebprweb4689204.DTL
[LEFT][B]Texas Maritime Lawyers Challenge Transocean’s Decision To Cut Injured Oil Rig Workers’ Salaries[/B][/LEFT]
[LEFT]Houston maritime attorney Kurt Arnold says he is shocked that Transocean Ltd. will cease paying full salary and benefits to crew members who [/LEFT]
[COLOR=#000000]were injured in last April’s Deepwater Horizon oil rig disaster in the Gulf of Mexico.
[LEFT]
[LEFT]According to news reports, the company said it will slash the salaries and benefits by Dec. 15, just six months after an explosion and fire aboard the oil rig killed 11 workers and triggered the enormous BP oil spill.
[LEFT].[/LEFT]
[/LEFT]
[/LEFT]
According to news reports, the company said it will slash the salaries and benefits by Dec. 15, just six months after an explosion and fire aboard the oil rig killed 11 workers and triggered the enormous BP oil spill.
“It’s appalling that this company, which has already caused so much damage and suffering, would now take men who made $10,000 to $15,000 a month and cut their salaries to $25 a day,” says Arnold, a partner in the Houston maritime law firm of Arnold & Itkin LLP, which is representing about 25 of the injured Transocean workers. “These workers don’t deserve this type of treatment.”
[LEFT]
Read more: http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?f=/g/a/2010/10/25/prwebprweb4689204.DTL#ixzz13REydAKD
[/LEFT]
[/COLOR][/QUOTE]
Our industry is notorious for good and bad times, employment-wise, but could any company stoop as low as this? I wonder if it isn’t in response to legal claims against Transocean by the rig’s employees.
TEST INDICATE HALLIBURTN CEMENT MAY HAVE BEEN UNSTABLE
(Halliburton stock drops 8% on initial news report.)
http://www.nola.com/news/t-p/frontpage/index.ssf?/base/news-15/1288161014264620.xml&coll=1
[B]Federal drilling rig inspectors generally know little or nothing about the process of safely lining and sealing an offshore oil well.[/B]
Wednesday, October 27, 2010
By David Hammer
Staff writer
Members of President Barack Obama’s Oil Spill Commission said this week that they were shocked to learn during their months of investigation that federal drilling rig inspectors generally know little or nothing about the process of safely lining and sealing an offshore oil well.
Now, with a revamped federal regulatory agency promising to add dozens of new employees to exercise more robust control over offshore drilling, the commission wonders if the new front-line inspectors will understand the issues that played critical roles in the Deepwater Horizon disaster, which killed 11 workers and fouled the Gulf of Mexico for months.
Commission co-chair William Reilly said Monday that he was alarmed to see interviews and online surveys conducted by the Interior Department’s inspector general in which rig inspectors professed ignorance about the cementing process that seals a well off from dangerous bulges of natural gas, or about devices like centralizers installed to help ensure a good cement seal.*
I see in the evening news today that the Feds have put the equivalent of yellow, crime scene tape, around the area of DWH wreckage, to preserve potential criminal evidence. About time! I’ve been wondering why all those special marine assets remain on site (just look at www.marinetraffic.com/ais and see that about 15 vessels are still on site). But at the same time, all the camera feeds have been blank for some time. So, what the heck goes on? Are those assets and underwater accessories being used to cache things that TO or BP would rather not have to worry about later? I think about things like the tally books that every supervisor carries in his back pocket, to record important stuff, like when a client tells the electrial installation supervisor not to pour those electrical seals until later.write,write,write, sign here, etc. Where are all the tally books that were in all those back pockets? I wanna know!
The truth,will be revealed,in it s own good time,and justice will be served,http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=MRBSsyowtVc
The NYT is running with the cement story this morning:
All the best Folks.
http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/ How quickly we forget,Gagliano, warned BP, Cement might, fail, without, the proper number of Centralizers,"DOnt be quick to blame, Haliburton,…and for goodness, sakes, don t sell your stock. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703447004575450110807492410.html
http://uk.news.yahoo.com/21/20101029/tuk…st-6323e80.html
Journalists, appear to report a variety of conclusions on the investigation revelations. Perception, is always interesting!
Does anyone have the statement made by the investigation team? Then, we can all determine our own conclusions based on what they state.
[B]Has the actual statement been published?[/B]
The cement may have failed, but that was not the cause of the blowout. So, hang on to your stock. The cause of the blowout is related to loss of hydrostatic pressure in the well. This is the responsibility of BP and Transocean. Halliburton, have simply been professionally sloppy, with unbelievable consequences. On the other hand, journalists and other commentators may have a different understanding and perception.
[ATTACH]1168[/ATTACH][QUOTE=alcor;43528]
Journalists, appear to report a variety of conclusions on the investigation revelations. Perception, is always interesting!
Does anyone have the statement made by the investigation team? Then, we can all determine our own conclusions based on what they state.
[/QUOTE]
Attached (link at top, for some reason).
Cheers,
Earl
[QUOTE=Earl Boebert;43539][ATTACH]1168[/ATTACH]
Attached (link at top, for some reason).
Cheers,
Earl[/QUOTE]
Earl,
You are Top Dog!
Thanks.
alcor-
My experience is outside the oil industry but I know that there must be unity of command. No gaps in responsibility and no overlap of responsibility.
Maintaining hydrostatic pressure should be the responsibility of one person, the driller, thus TO is responsible, by definition, for the loss of control. The fascination with the cement is, as you rightly point out, irrelevant to the disaster. So are centralizers, lack of a tieback, the BOP failure, etc. Am I wrong in this assertion?
[B]“Frontline” report( hr. long ) … dated October 26, '10. can be viewed in full screen.[/B]
Thanks so Much Nauticart,I was so disappointed, that I missed this show,and look forward, to watching, it this afternoon,in between, watching our Saints,kick- a$$ with the Steelers,<throw away, dat towel,!!! Geaux Saints!!![QUOTE=NAUTICART;43555][B]“Frontline” report( hr. long ) … dated October 26, '10. can be viewed in full screen.[/B][/QUOTE]
I watched the ‘Frontline’ report offered by Nauticart. There’s no doubt about the facts concerning many of the safety issues raised, but I do wonder about the journalistic ‘hairbrushing’ in order to deliver their message, as well as, the willingness of families to be paid off by withholding information, a very serious cause for concern in the US where the $ may be a more important recompense than justice! What does this say of culture anywhere in the US?
Bill, with regard to your position on ‘Unity of Command’ (principle of management stating that each subordinate should report to only one superior) the following points may be considered pertaining to authority and responsibility:
BP, sets the agenda for daily activities on the drilling vessel and discuss their intentions with the OIM in the morning meetings. All intentions for the well are approved by the OIM. The OIM will support or reject the procedures during these meetings. The plans are organised and delivered in advance from onshore engineering sources, in advance where possible. When agreed, the language and understanding of the procedures should be understood by the Toolpusher, Driller, Assistant Driller, Logger…actually, the whole crew. Instructions are clear, and it is the OIM’s responsibility to ensure the TO crew performing the operations understand the instruction. The instruction is often not spelt out but refers to existing procedures which the contractor has in place and must follow.
So, BP deliver their procedure and the Co Man discusses it with all relevant service companies and the OIM in the morning meeting. Naturally, plans may change throughout the day which will require permits and analysis to be in place (SJA).
The OIM, the responsible person on the vessel, has the responsibility to ensure his crew adhere to the plans.
The Driller, is responsible for all activities in his area and is the sole person in control of the operation, with guidance from the Toolpusher when required. The Driller directs all crew members to perform tasks. The crew members provide feedback. The Assistant Driller, discusses the operation with the driller, and Toolpusher if required, to prepare in advance all equipment. The Derrickman, is in charge of the mud pumps and mixing system and reports to the Driller and the Mud Engineer. The A/D supports him as requested.
The Service companies always report to the Driller when entering the DF.
The Driller reports anomalies to the Toolpusher who may seek further clarification from the OIM depending on the situation.
The system requires continuous communication. It’s not uncommon for a Driller to answer 150 telephone calls in a day, and answer the radio set a similiar number of times. There is constant comunication. And, there is a constant reference to the Operator’s programme, whilst still questioning its content. Never swallow a pill you can’t digest!
So, the well had many failures that are being investigated. Bill, as you also suggest…none of it is relevant to the blowout.
Hydrostatic pressure is everything in a well. It prevents hydrocarbons entering the wellbore. We observe for volume gain and pressure changes to verify an anomaly exists.
BP, wanted to displace the well to Sea Water. They planned to do this in stages whilst still maintaining an overbalance in the well by pumping a heavy 16.0 ppg spacer. The OIM agreed to this. No problem as far as I’m concerned.
How was the test to be performed, and who are the authorities while this test is ongoing? BP, state how to conduct the test. Did BP state the line-up required? I don’t know what the Driller or Toolpusher were instructed to do. One thing you never do is open the bleed-off on the standpipe to perform the Negative test. TO opened the Bleed-off and took returns up the standpipe without controlling the volume back. They no longer had hydrostatic overbalance pressure in the well, and therefore, allowed hydrocarbons to enter the well at this point, without understanding what occurred. Meanwhile, losses took place because the Annular wasn’t holding and further confusion ensued. Eventually, the Annular sealed when additional closing pressure was applied.
The test was then required to be re-performed using the Kill Line with Halliburton observing volumes back (the correct way to conduct the test). The Kill line registered ‘0’ psi while the drill pipe registered 1400 psi. Let’s assume nothing entered the well before this test. Now is the time to establish whether or not we can continue with the displacement. We have ‘0’ psi against ‘1400’ psi. BP, the Toolpusher, the OIM and the Driller are all capable of understanding that the test failed. Why? Because both values should have read ‘0’ without any flow from the well.
Who conducted the test? TO.
Who lined up the test? TO.
Who explained the ‘bladder effect’? TO. It doesn’t exist!
TO failed to look after their own interests. Meanwhile, the senior TP and the OIM were hosting VIPs on the rig! Why weren’t they involved in the critical operation to verify if the displacement could continue or not? Their concern for the operation appear to be of little input, a very dangerous way for leaders to behave.
But, the BP engineer on the rig has to overule the anomalous readings. He didn’t. Was he still listening to some sort of ‘bladder effect’ which wasn’t taught at engineering school?
So, we carry on with the displacement. What was the requirement of TO at this stage? To monitor the well’s volumes and the pressure reduction as the heavy fluids are removed from the Annulus. What happened? Pressure increased and volumes were ignored. How much volume of fluids entered the well prior to action/phone calls being made? More than 1000 Bbbls. This is the worst case of invasion of hydrocarbons into a well without anyone taking action.
Responsibility lies very heavily with TO for not observing the well’s volumes and pressures. Who is responsible for this action, the OIM. He plans the work. It’s his vessel to protect. His men are in position to police the well. There’s no point in any of us looking for someone else in this example. BP, may have failed to interpret a Negative test, but all is not lost at this point. All is lost when volumes and pressure are ignored.
[QUOTE=billslugg;43552]alcor-
My experience is outside the oil industry but I know that there must be unity of command. No gaps in responsibility and no overlap of responsibility.
Maintaining hydrostatic pressure should be the responsibility of one person, the driller, thus TO is responsible, by definition, for the loss of control. The fascination with the cement is, as you rightly point out, irrelevant to the disaster. So are centralizers, lack of a tieback, the BOP failure, etc. Am I wrong in this assertion?[/QUOTE]
The driller is in charge of the operation and reports to the Toolpushers and OIM, and BP Co Man when required. He is assisted by the Data Engineer to observe the well’s volumeand pressure control, among other things. He directs proceedings in accordance with the programme provided by BP, and signed/sanctioned by the OIM. He is required to understand the steps in the procedure, and must request assistance from the Toolpusher or OIM to verify his understanding when required.
Problem: What if the Toolpusher doesn’t know how to conduct a Negative test or doesn’t follow TO procedures? Now we have a dilemma created by TO, and the OIM, in particular, whose duty it is to ensure the integrity of the well is verified…with his own eyes, I would suggest. Remember, he had that chance when he arrived on the DF and discovered problems with the Annular. He, didn’t hang around long enough to verify the test himself. He has the highest authority on the vessel and ignored critical testing procedures in order to attend to VIPs.
The function of authority and responsibility on this vessel appears to be weak, at this stage of proceedings.
Nothing has been said about the displacement plan. Whether prepared by MI Swaco or anyone else it is the duty of the Driller to understand it and verify it is factually and mathematically correct, with expected pressure trends while Sea Water is pumped, and volumes from the well in accordance with the pump rate.
[B]Has anyone seen the plan for displacement? This is a very big issue for both BP, the OIM and the Driller/Toolpusher.[/B]
The lines of authority may have been ignored on this vessel.