Shell criticizes BP Oil Spill report, Well Design http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/39635309 Good Song:http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Of5qYrK--D8
LONDON — The chief executive of Royal Dutch Shell Plc has criticized the investigation that rival BP Plc conducted into the causes of its Gulf of Mexico oil spill, and the design BP chose for its blown out well.
Peter Voser told the Oil and Money conference in London on Tuesday that to correctly investigate the accident one had to examine the thinking behind the particular well design BP used – something BP’s report did not consider.
The Macondo well design included a number of cheaper options, including the use of a single tube from the surface to the reservoir, rather than two overlapping tubes, and U.S. lawmakers said these choices reflected a tendency on BP’s part to put profits before safety.
“Shell clearly would have drilled this well in a different way and would have had more options to prevent the accident,” Voser said, referring to Shell’s preference to include more barriers to hydrocarbon leaks in its well designs.
[B]BP has come under fire from rivals who have suffered heavy losses due to the drilling ban imposed by President Barack Obama in the wake of the oil spill.
Nonetheless, Voser accepted that Shell and others had not invested enough in developing solutions to clean up spills.[/B]
“The industry was not prepared to handle this spill,” he said.
Voser said he expected tighter regulation following the spill and that in future Shell would be more selective about who it would partner with on projects in the Gulf of Mexico.
“Frontline” will be doing a special on BP on October 26. Preview here:
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Earl
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LETTERSOCTOBER 16, 2010.We Want to Be Sure Future Drilling Is Done Properly .Article Comments (4) .EmailPrintSave This ↓ More.
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close Yahoo! BuzzMySpacedel.icio.usRedditFacebookLinkedInFarkViadeoOrkut Text Your editorial “Liberating the Gulf” (Oct. 13) suggests that the decision on ending the deep water drilling moratorium is about politics. It’s not. It’s about enhancing safety and protecting the environment. Interior Secretary Ken Salazar’s decision to end the deep water moratorium was based on a detailed report I prepared based on a series of public forums that focused on drilling and workplace safety, spill containment and oil spill response—not on the election cycle.
The editorial ignores what the public, and even the oil and gas industry, have recognized: that the Deepwater Horizon blowout and spill demand far-reaching changes in the way we regulate deepwater drilling.
Without question, our nation still needs to explore and develop oil and gas from the Outer Continental Shelf. But the American people also expect drilling to be done safely and with stronger protections for human life and the environment. That is why over the last several weeks we have substantially enhanced safety through a set of requirements that must be met before additional drilling is allowed to proceed.
Just as politics did not play a role in ending the moratorium, it will not play a role in reviewing permits or conducting inspections. We will approve drilling applications on the merits of each application, and only once the appropriate safeguards are in place.
Contrary to the claims of the editorial, my agency has not been “sit[ting] on drilling permits.” Indeed, six shallow water permits have been approved within the past two weeks because the applications had fully complied with the new requirements. Regrettably, the charges of a “de facto moratorium” continue, even in the face of meaningful progress and numerous permit approvals.
A safe, secure energy future for our nation begins with a strong, effective regulatory and enforcement program. The mere fact that it may take more time than in the past to ensure compliance with regulatory requirements does not create a “de facto moratorium”; it is more appropriately viewed as enhancing safety. As we build that program, we will remain focused on safety, not politics.
Michael R. Bromwich
Director
Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation
and Enforcement
Washington
side note,Please pray for the safety of the rig crew, on SeaDrill West Aquarius as they are running south, from Typhoon Megi, in the South China Sea. Cat 5 storm.
[QUOTE=alcor;42964]The Macondo well design included a number of cheaper options, including the use of a single tube from the surface to the reservoir, rather than two overlapping tubes, and U.S. lawmakers said these choices reflected a tendency on BP’s part to put profits before safety.[/QUOTE]
What the heck do US lawmakers know about deepwater well design and construction anyway? Or Shell’s CEO for that matter? Peter Voser was a CFO before he took the reigns at Shell…
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303496104575560422023190664.html?KEYWORDS=oil+spill BP links safety to staff pay in 4th quarter.
http://mobile.al.com/advmobile/pm_29193/contentdetail.htm;jsessionid=A93D0392403F79310D7642FFD05A4F4B?contentguid=FRXBR9Ph Good Read. Thanks “bud”
Final Copy Of GOM Newsletter for 10-18-10 FINAL[1]G.O.M. Newsletter
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CSB Seeks Investigator for the Deepwater Horizon
On June 21st the U.S. Chemical Safety Board announced its intention to investigate the root causes of the BP Deepwater Horizon blowout accident and is seeking an investigator to work on this project. Senior Investigator for the project will be Bill Hoyle a long time former union member and recent consultant to the USW Tony Mazzocchi Center.
The job will be full-time and permanent and has no education level requirement but does require knowledge of process safety management in regard to chemical and/or oil refinery incidents.
Details such exact job requirements, pay levels, benefits, etc. may be found here.
If you or anyone you know is interested in this position, the deadline to apply is October 29.
Our union has played a large roll in the establishment of the CSB and has been well represented by our past members in its ranks – this is a fine opportunity to continue this practice.
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CSB SEEKS INVESTIGATOR FOR THE DEEPWATER HORIZON Make sure you click on the “here” link where it further describes special qualifications. Note that the special qualifications never mentions experience drilling a well, overseeing a rig or any knowledge of drilling or completing any sort of well whatsoever. The job spec is for a person with an oil refinery background which has nothing to http://blog.uswtmc.org/?p=1037 do with the task at hand.
Interesting…
Apparently the CSB thinks that over $2.5MM in funds will be needed for them to carry out a proper investigation of this disaster. Here’s the letter they wrote
" WHATEVER HAPPENED TO OBAMA’S KATRINA" http://www.vanityfair.com/online/daily/2010/10/the-least-important-worst-disaster-in-history.html WORST DISTASTER IN HISTORY
Have You Gents, heard of this???,<we learn something new everyday…that’s so cool,> http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Louisiana_Offshore_Oil_Port?wasRedirected=true “LOUISIANA OFFSHORE PORT” GO Louisana!!
[QUOTE=Rob Almeida;43092]What the heck do US lawmakers know about deepwater well design and construction anyway? Or Shell’s CEO for that matter? Peter Voser was a CFO before he took the reigns at Shell…[/QUOTE]
Exactement!!! Shell, have very similiar completions in their records, and yet, they’re prepared to be outspoken when their exploration and financial commitments are affected by Gov’t intervention as has occurred in the Arctic. Naturally, they want to protect themselves, but need to be careful worldwide as to whether their relationship with other Operators becomes compromised.
The completion string was not the issue with the Macondo Well Blowout. Nothing failed in the well. Pressure and volume observation failed. It’s really quite simple. How we go about apportioning blame is the next consideration.
The only advice I can offer the industry today is this: You better make sure your drillers and Toolpushers are up to the job, because there are many people on your vessel expecting you to react to pressure and volume inconsistencies. Don’t expect the Co Man to know your rig! And, if the Co Man happens to be ascertaining whether or not pressure results are good or bad, be sure to be present…after all, it’s your vessel. Look after it.
Human error, _____--------->>>>>> F’d up bop, NO ALarms, are worth mentioning.<alarms would have at least spared some lives>
THE BUREAU OF OCEAN ENERGY MANAGEMENT,
REGULATION AND ENFORCEMENT
Office of Public Affairs
FACT SHEET
THE DRILLING SAFETY RULE
An Interim Final Rule to Enhance Safety Measures for Energy
Development on the Outer Continental Shelf
The Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Regulation and Enforcement (BOEM) is submitting to the Federal Register for publication the interim final Drilling Safety Rule. The Drilling Safety Rule will be effective immediately upon publication.
The Drilling Safety Rule imposes requirements that will enhance the safety of oil and gas drilling operations on the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS). It addresses both well bore integrity and well control equipment and procedures.
Well bore integrity provides the first line of defense against a blowout by preventing a loss of well control. It includes the appropriate use of drilling fluids and the well bore casing and cementing program. Provisions in the rule addressing well bore integrity are:
Making mandatory the currently voluntary practices recommended in the American Petroleum Institute’s (API) standard, RP 65 – Part 2, Isolating Potential
Flow Zones During Well Construction (an industry standard program)
Requiring submittal of certification by a professional engineer that the casing and cementing program is appropriate for the purposes for which it is intended under expected wellbore pressure
Requiring two independent test barriers across each flow path during well completion activities (certified by a professional engineer)
Ensuring proper installation, sealing and locking of the casing or liner
Requiring approval from the BOEM District Manager before replacing a heavier drilling fluid with a lighter fluid
Requiring enhanced deepwater well control training for rig personnel.
Well control equipment includes the Blowout Preventer (BOP) and control systems that activate the BOP. Provisions in the rule on well control equipment include:
Submittal of documentation and schematics for all control systems
Requirements for independent third party verification that the blind-shear rams are capable of cutting any drill pipe in the hole under maximum anticipated surface pressure
Requirement for a subsea BOP stack equipped with Remotely Operated Vehicle (ROV) intervention capability (at a minimum the ROV must be capable of closing one set of pipe rams, closing one set of blind-shear rams, and unlatching the Lower Marine Riser Package)
Requirement for maintaining a ROV and having a trained ROV crew on each floating drilling rig on a continuous basis
Requirement for auto shear and deadman systems for dynamically positioned rigs
Establishment of minimum requirements for personnel authorized to operate critical BOP equipment
Requirement for documentation of subsea BOP inspections and maintenance according to API RP 53, Recommended Practices for Blowout Prevention Equipment Systems for Drilling Wells
Require testing of all ROV intervention functions on subsea BOP stack during stump test and testing at least one set of rams in initial seafloor test
Require function testing auto shear and deadman systems on the subsea BOP stack during the stump test and testing the deadman system during the initial test on the seafloor
Require pressure testing if any shear rams are used in an emergency.
This Drilling Safety Rule is issued under an emergency rulemaking process consistent with Administrative Procedure Act (APA) requirements. The equipment, systems and improved practices stipulated in the rule are immediately necessary for the safety of OCS oil and gas drilling operations and the protection of the environment.
While the rule is effective immediately upon publication, BOEM will accept and consider public comments submitted within 60 days of the rule’s publication. The agency will then either publish a new rule with modifications in light of comments received or publish a notice that will confirm the rule as final with no additional changes.
This rule is based upon recommendations contained in Secretary Salazar’s May 27th, 2010, Safety Measures Report to the President and codifies ongoing requirements of Notice to Lessees No. 2010-N05 (NTL 5).
BOEM intends to address additional provisions considered appropriate in light of the Deepwater Horizon explosion in additional rulemakings in the coming months.
U.S. NEWS
AUGUST 26, 2010.On Doomed Rig’s Last Day, a Divisive Change of Plan . Text By RUSSELL GOLD And BEN CASSELMAN
Associated Press
The Deepwater Horizon oil platform on April 22, before it sank into the Gulf of Mexico.
.On April 20 at 10:43 a.m., a young BP PLC engineer sent a 173-word email to colleagues aboard the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig. The email spelled out a recent change to a key safety test that sparked confusion and debate aboard the rig.
Less than 12 hours later, the rig was engulfed in flames so hot they melted steel. Eleven workers were dead.
The worst offshore oil spill in U.S. history had begun.
The Deepwater Horizon blowout has become one of the most scrutinized maritime disasters ever. Congressional investigators and outside experts have identified a series of decisions in the weeks beforehand that made the blowout more likely.
But a central uncertainty remained: Why didn’t the crew recognize the warning signs in the final hours and bring the well under control while there was still time to prevent a lethal eruption?
The Wall Street Journal has reviewed BP internal documents along with hours of public testimony before a joint Coast Guard and Interior Department panel. The Journal also interviewed dozens of witnesses to the disaster. What emerges is a startling picture of the last day of the Deepwater Horizon—a day filled with disruption and disagreement.
Many workers on the rig didn’t find out until the morning of April 20 about the change in a pressure test that would help determine the well’s safety. BP wanted to remove an unusually large amount of the thick drilling fluid called mud from the well and then run the test. It was unorthodox and left crew members confused.
.Part Three of a Journal investigation finds that the last day of the Deepwater Horizon was a day filled with disruption and disagreement.
Part One: BP Decisions Set Stage for Disaster
Part Two: There Was 'Nobody in Charge’
Complete Coverage: Gulf Oil Spill
.The Key Players of the Deepwater Horizon
See the key players aboard the Deepwater Horizon rig, and some insight into their actions in the final hours prior to the explosion.
.The oil industry employs extraordinary cutting-edge technologies. BP uses some of the world’s fastest computers to locate oil reservoirs. Underwater robots tinker with wells beneath a mile of water.
But the truth about the modern oil industry is that it often relies on the judgment and instinct of men—and they are overwhelmingly men.
Wells must be listened to, they say. On April 20, a small group of men aboard the Deepwater Horizon listened to the nearly complete well and didn’t understand what it was telling them.
Key managers were out of the loop for parts of that day.
The veteran BP manager in charge of the rig said he was on shore for training with his phone off.
Two top managers from Transocean Ltd., the rig’s owner, spent much of the day hosting executives on hand to commend the crew for its safety record and to discuss coming maintenance.
Asked for comment for this story, BP and Transocean each said it had acted prudently and pointed fingers at the other company.
BP said Transocean workers were responsible for detecting and responding to problems in the well. BP also said the test “was performed in accordance with procedures established by BP and approved” by federal regulators.
Transocean said that BP was responsible for directing and interpreting tests of the well.
“The final interpretation of the test results is the responsibility of the operator’s personnel on the rig and on shore—the only personnel with complete information about the properties of the well and reservoir,” said a statement from the company.
Problems had plagued the well for weeks before April 20. Brian Morel, the young engineer who wrote the email that morning, had earlier called it a “nightmare well” to BP colleagues, according to an email released by investigators.
Workers had lost drilling tools in the well, fought off intrusions of explosive natural gas, run far behind schedule and over budget.
But the sun rose over calm seas that day and offered the promise that the nightmare would soon be over.
Workers had finished drilling the well 11 days earlier and had lined it with steel and cement. The job was close enough to completion that workers were already “worrying” about the next job, Mr. Morel later said, according to notes taken by BP investigators after the accident.
Mr. Morel’s attorney declined to comment for this story.
On Tuesday, Mr. Morel declined to testify before a federal panel, citing his rights under the Fifth Amendment.
Before the Deepwater Horizon crew could leave for another job, there was a final step: The well needed to be tested to make sure the cement and steel locked together, preventing any gas from leaking in and causing a fire or explosion.
If the well passed, giant cement plugs—as long as a football field—would be inserted. The well then could be temporarily abandoned until BP was ready to tap its oil and gas.
Despite its importance, this “negative” test—how to do it, how to interpret it—is basically left to the discretion of rig workers. And different rigs have different procedures.
Normally, workers on the rig remove about 300 feet of mud below the blowout preventer and replace it with seawater. Mud holds down any gas that leaks into the well. So companies usually test a well fully to make sure it is sealed against any influx of gas before removing too much of the mud.
But BP engineers in Houston, including Mr. Morel and his colleague Mark Hafle, had decided to set the cement plug much deeper than usual and remove 10 times as much mud as is normal before running the test. It was unusual, but BP says it changed the procedure in order to avoid damage to a key seal.
Ronald Sepulvado, the top BP manager who was on shore that day with his phone switched off, was asked under oath by the Interior Department-Coast Guard panel in July if he had ever run a negative test where so much mud had been removed.
“No, ma’am,” replied Mr. Sepulvado. Had he ever heard of BP doing so anywhere? “No, ma’am.”
BP had asked federal regulators for permission to use a deeper plug on April 16, and received approval after only 20 minutes. But Transocean workers and contractors aboard the rig later said that they weren’t informed of the change until the morning of April 20.
The decisions to pull out so much mud perplexed Robert Kaluza, BP’s day-shift manager on April 20. “Don’t know why—maybe trying to save time,” he later told BP internal investigators, according to notes from that conversation reviewed by the Journal. “At the end of the well sometimes they think about speeding up.”
.Mr. Kaluza has declined to testify before either Congress or the federal panel, citing the Fifth Amendment. BP has denied cutting corners to save time and money. BP said the notes are only investigators’ interpretation of Mr. Kaluza’s comments.
Jimmy Wayne Harrell also found the directive unorthodox. A 54-year-old from small-town Mississippi, Mr. Harrell had worked for Transocean almost his entire adult life. He was the most senior of the 79 Transocean workers aboard the rig that day.
At a daily 11 a.m. meeting in the rig’s cinema room, Mr. Kaluza told everyone about BP’s plan. Mr. Harrell protested.
“All these plans kept changing,” Mr. Harrell later testified. Mr. Harrell and Mr. Kaluza argued about the negative test, according to one witness.
“This is how it’s going to be,” Mr. Kaluza said, according to sworn testimony from one witness, and Mr. Harrell “reluctantly agreed.”
In sworn testimony, Mr. Harrell denied arguing with Mr. Kaluza. He said he just wanted to make sure that a negative test was performed and that Mr. Kaluza agreed. But his lawyer, Pat Fanning, said that Mr. Harrell also told Mr. Kaluza he didn’t want to remove so much mud before running the negative test and was overruled. Mr. Kaluza couldn’t be reached for comment for this story.
“It was BP’s well, they were paying for it. BP gave the marching orders,” Mr. Fanning said.
Not long after the meeting, a helicopter carrying a group of executives—two each from BP and Transocean—landed on the rig for a tour.
Mr. Harrell said he spent almost the entire rest of the day either showing them around or in his office.
By 5 p.m., Transocean workers had removed much of the mud and started the pressure test, according to a timeline of events prepared by BP.
It didn’t go well. Pressure built up unexpectedly, and no one was sure why. Workers in the rig’s central “drilling shack,” a type of control room, struggled to interpret the readings. In walked Mr. Harrell with the visiting VIPs.
Mr. Harrell stayed behind as the tour moved on, but he didn’t think the problem was serious. He ordered another worker to tighten down a valve at the top of the blowout preventer—the device that is supposed to pinch off the well in the event of disaster—that prevented mud above from leaking down.
This seemed to resolve the problem. Mr. Harrell testified that he was satisfied with the test results and went back to the visiting executives.
It was the last time there is any record of Mr. Harrell, the rig’s most experienced leader, setting foot on the drill floor. His lawyer says he wasn’t distracted by the visiting executives and that the crew could have asked for his help at any time, but never did.
Mr. Harrell’s second-in-command, Randy Ezell, stuck around the drill shack for a few more minutes, but soon he also left to return to the visiting executives. He later testified to the joint Interior Department and Coast Guard panel that if it hadn’t been for the tour, he would have stayed longer to deal with the situation.
With Mr. Harrell gone, the argument continued. Wyman Wheeler wasn’t convinced everything was all right. Mr. Wheeler was the dayshift toolpusher, the man who supervised the drilling crew for 12 hours each day.
“Wyman was convinced something wasn’t right,” Christopher Pleasant, another Transocean worker, later recalled in testimony. Mr. Wheeler couldn’t be reached for comment.
But Mr. Wheeler’s shift wrapped up at 6 p.m. on April 20. His replacement, Jason Anderson, came on duty and had his own interpretation of the test, according to Mr. Pleasant.
Mr. Anderson, 35, had worked on the rig since it left the shipyard in 2001.
A burly former high school linebacker, Mr. Anderson had earned the respect of his fellow rig workers, and now he assured them that the pressure readings weren’t unusual.
Mr. Kaluza decided to check with Donald Vidrine, an experienced BP manager who was due to relieve Mr. Kaluza at 6 p.m.
The two BP men conferred for an hour, with Mr. Vidrine peppering Mr. Kaluza with questions. Mr. Vidrine wasn’t satisfied. “I wanted to do another test,” he said, according to the notes of BP’s internal investigation seen by the Journal.
Workers performed the test again, but this time the results were even more perplexing. One smaller tube that led up from the well showed no pressure, a sign that the well was stable. But gauges on the main pipe did show pressure, according to BP’s preliminary investigation.
The two pipes were connected and should have had the same pressure. It wasn’t clear what was going on in the well. One possibility, put forward by engineers who have studied the events subsequently, is that the smaller pipe was clogged, interfering with pressure readings.
Finally, about 7:50 p.m., Mr. Vidrine made a decision, according to Mr. Pleasant. He turned to Mr. Kaluza, his colleague, and told him to call BP engineers in Houston and tell them he was satisfied with the test, Mr. Pleasant said.
View Full Image
Getty Images
This still image from a live BP video feed shows oil gushing from the leaking BP oil well-pipe on June 6 in the Gulf of Mexico.
.Mr. Vidrine, through his attorney, declined to comment.
Over the next two hours, there were other signs the well was slipping out of control. For one, more fluid was flowing out of the well than was being pumped in, according to electronic data reviewed by investigators after the explosion.
But none of the Transocean workers monitoring the well caught these signs. Investigators from the federal panel have said Transocean workers may have struggled to monitor the well because they were performing other work at the same time.
Around 9 p.m., the meeting of the executives wrapped up. A few of them went up to the bridge, including Pat O’Bryan, BP’s recently appointed vice president of drilling in the Gulf of Mexico.
The rig’s captain showed them a training simulator—a video game that allowed the crew to practice keeping the giant Deepwater Horizon in position during severe weather.
Mr. O’Bryan, 49, had earned a Ph.D. at Louisiana State University decades earlier on how to measure gas escaping into a well. Now, gas was escaping in, unchecked, and Mr. O’Bryan was on the bridge—standing around the simulator with the rig’s captain.
Mr. Ezell, the second-in-command, was lying in bed, watching television with the lights out, when his phone rang, he testified before the panel in May. He glanced at his clock. It was 9:50 p.m.
“We have a situation,” said Steve Curtis, an assistant driller, on the other end of the phone, according to Mr. Ezell. “Randy, we need your help.” Mr. Ezell got up, put on his clothes and went to get his hard hat as alarms rang. Before he could reach it, the first of two massive explosions ripped through the rig.
In the following few minutes, Messrs. Anderson and Curtis were killed. Mr. Wheeler was badly injured. The blowout preventer failed to pinch off the well. And most of the other men who made the crucial decisions of April 20 were fleeing for their lives.
Deep Trouble
Part One: BP Decisions Set Stage for Disaster
Part Two: There Was 'Nobody in Charge’
Key Players of the Deepwater Horizon
Deepwater Horizon Rig: The Final Moments
Complete Coverage: Gulf Oil Spill
.Write to Russell Gold at russell.gold@wsj.com and Ben Casselman at ben.casselman@wsj.com
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