my first post: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wi9OALsPb_8&feature=related http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LXZGQcfukyc&feature=related 2 and three at site http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OBtioiGlHTI&feature=related
Heads up and God Speed
Re: alcor’s 5633:
My dear fellow, there really is no need to shout. And I must warn you that I am not susceptible to being convinced by what one of my late colleagues in the security business called “proof by emphatic assertion.” My suggestion to read Taleb’s book was a serious one, in the hopes that it would suggest to you the inherent weaknesses in the “we’ve done it this way forever and haven’t killed anybody yet” argument. (For those who are interested, the title comes from the belief that all swans were white, since every swan everyone saw was white. Until people went to Australia, where there are black swans.)
You and I are clearly poles apart in our assessment of the robustness of the current practices on the rig. You seem to see an inherently robust process which was let down by the ineptitude of the personnel. I see an inherently fragile process which depends far too much on skill and judgement to prevent catastrophic events, and which operates without the backup of a positive alarm system. I further see an industry which doesn’t take the prevention of catastrophic events seriously enough to invest in the R&D to provide such a positive alarm system.
Permit me to illustrate my position by the example of another high-risk industry, that of uranium enrichment by gas centrifuge. This process involves piping around a material called uranium hexaflouride, which is pretty nasty stuff. So the engineering question is, how do you detect a leak? One approach, which is done, is to have operators monitor pressure and flows at various places in the plumbing. It doesn’t, however, stop there: radiation monitors are distributed throughout the complex which, if they detect a rise in radiation, trigger without any human intervention the appropriately named “SCRAM” alarm. What I see on these rigs is safety being wholly dependent on human judgement with no SCRAM alarm as backup.
My question about the interaction between the various human elements in an emergency was also a serious one. I still would be interested having people who lived through one of these things to describe how the various actors in the hierarchy interacted under stress. I especially wonder if there is any analogy to the risks generated on flight decks by copilots who for cultural or other reasons are slow to challenge improper decisions by pilots.
Cheers,
Earl
[QUOTE=Earl Boebert;42028]Re: alcor’s 5633:
My dear fellow, there really is no need to shout. And I must warn you that I am not susceptible to being convinced by what one of my late colleagues in the security business called “proof by emphatic assertion.” My suggestion to read Taleb’s book was a serious one, in the hopes that it would suggest to you the inherent weaknesses in the “we’ve done it this way forever and haven’t killed anybody yet” argument. (For those who are interested, the title comes from the belief that all swans were white, since every swan everyone saw was white. Until people went to Australia, where there are black swans.)
You and I are clearly poles apart in our assessment of the robustness of the current practices on the rig. You seem to see an inherently robust process which was let down by the ineptitude of the personnel. I see an inherently fragile process which depends far too much on skill and judgement to prevent catastrophic events, and which operates without the backup of a positive alarm system. I further see an industry which doesn’t take the prevention of catastrophic events seriously enough to invest in the R&D to provide such a positive alarm system.
Permit me to illustrate my position by the example of another high-risk industry, that of uranium enrichment by gas centrifuge. This process involves piping around a material called uranium hexaflouride, which is pretty nasty stuff. So the engineering question is, how do you detect a leak? One approach, which is done, is to have operators monitor pressure and flows at various places in the plumbing. It doesn’t, however, stop there: radiation monitors are distributed throughout the complex which, if they detect a rise in radiation, trigger without any human intervention the appropriately named “SCRAM” alarm. What I see on these rigs is safety being wholly dependent on human judgement with no SCRAM alarm as backup.
My question about the interaction between the various human elements in an emergency was also a serious one. I still would be interested having people who lived through one of these things to describe how the various actors in the hierarchy interacted under stress. I especially wonder if there is any analogy to the risks generated on flight decks by copilots who for cultural or other reasons are slow to challenge improper decisions by pilots.
Cheers,
Earl[/QUOTE]
It may be that you wish to oversimplify how to drill a well. Perhaps, you’d prefer to liken it to flying a plane or producing electricity from a uranium plant!!! Obviously, drilling a well is incomparable to the mundane task of flying a plane, there is no repitition in driling wells, every day provides another obstacle to consider; whereas, the plane only has to consider 4 engines, the weight of the plane, take-off, landing, and the Pilot’s good judgement. Throw in a couple of engineers and external inspectors and the plane is fit to go. I’m not sure what daily rates a plane commands in terms of income, but the Horizon was commanding $500,000 per day.
No two days are the same in the offshore mobile vessel world. No two wells are the same. None of the Operators are the same, and this applies to Contractors too.
When I point out that 20,000 wells have managed to avoid this type of accident it is because of the fact that people are in place to interpret information from the well. Remember, we’re drilling through rock, and the lithology is again different for every well drilled. We don’t know when we might expect to hit an overpressured zone which may threaten the rig. We have many back-up plans in place, as long as they are functioning.
I suggest you don’t look at the outcome on the Horizon as a commonplace thing in the offshore exploration business. Systems are in place to detect gain and pressure. Nothing goes out of the well if either of these two are not compromised. Compromise them and we require to shut the BOP, one of the back-up safety systems (which didn’t work on the Macondo!!).
As to challenging the call made by a Supervisor, whether he be an Operator or Contractor you have the opportunity not to agree, and to halt proceedings. Then, interpretation takes place. If a bully exerts his influence you have a choice to succumb or tell him to take a flying jump, with consequences if you make the incorrect decision. Life is about making decisions based on real time experience, not the advantage of reflecting later, although this is an excellent way of finding and condemning the offender.
I work on a rig where the high standards required to operate are always being challenged and updated. Nothing is taken for granted, but we do rely on the interpretational skills of the driller and Logger to be at the forefront of ‘listening’ to the well. All blowouts are preventable.
The Financial Times article referenced in #5637 says that 23 inspections, one as recent as July 2010, of BP rigs in the North Sea resulted in 11 criticisms including 8 cases of missed refresher training on oil spill handling procedures, plus other infractions including not having enough dispersant on board.
As a lurker from the time of fire I would like to thank you all for this excellent source of knowledge.
[QUOTE=alcor;42029]It may be that you wish to oversimplify how to drill a well. Perhaps, you’d prefer to liken it to flying a plane or producing electricity from a uranium plant!!! Obviously, drilling a well is incomparable to the mundane task of flying a plane, there is no repitition in driling wells, every day provides another obstacle to consider; whereas, the plane only has to consider 4 engines, the weight of the plane, take-off, landing, and the Pilot’s good judgement. Throw in a couple of engineers and external inspectors and the plane is fit to go. I’m not sure what daily rates a plane commands in terms of income, but the Horizon was commanding $500,000 per day.
No two days are the same in the offshore mobile vessel world. No two wells are the same. None of the Operators are the same, and this applies to Contractors too.
When I point out that 20,000 wells have managed to avoid this type of accident it is because of the fact that people are in place to interpret information from the well. Remember, we’re drilling through rock, and the lithology is again different for every well drilled. We don’t know when we might expect to hit an overpressured zone which may threaten the rig. We have many back-up plans in place, as long as they are functioning.
[/QUOTE]
Absent your comments on aviation, what you say is undoubtedly true but off-topic for this thread. The catastrophic event did not occur during drilling, it occurred during P&A. And I view the ad hoc nature of your business as a systemic source of risk, and do not view back-up plans as the equivalent of a positive alarm system because plans are implemented by humans who have proven to be fallible.
[QUOTE=alcor;42029]I suggest you don’t look at the outcome on the Horizon as a commonplace thing in the offshore exploration business. Systems are in place to detect gain and pressure. Nothing goes out of the well if either of these two are not compromised.[/QUOTE]
I never asserted that it was commonplace; quite the contrary. That’s where Taleb’s book is useful, because it treats the very low probability, very high consequence cases. 20,000 safe operations carries the same intellectual weight as 20,000 sightings of white swans – it doesn’t mean that the next swan is inevitably going to be white, or that the process is inherently safe.
[QUOTE=alcor;42029]Compromise them and we require to shut the BOP, one of the back-up safety systems (which didn’t work on the Macondo!!).[/QUOTE]
I don’t view the BOP as a safety system but rather a safety subsystem; the transition from unsafe to safe state is made by the BOP and the operators. I would also like someone who is familiar with the design history of BOPs to explain why so much complexity is required to squeeze a piece of pipe shut.
[QUOTE=alcor;42029]As to challenging the call made by a Supervisor, whether he be an Operator or Contractor you have the opportunity not to agree, and to halt proceedings. Then, interpretation takes place. If a bully exerts his influence you have a choice to succumb or tell him to take a flying jump, with consequences if you make the incorrect decision. Life is about making decisions based on real time experience, not the advantage of reflecting later, although this is an excellent way of finding and condemning the offender.[/QUOTE]
Experience in other industries has shown that the “anybody can call a halt” doctrine is a pretty fragile safeguard, especially in times of economic pressure. I don’t see many places today where “take this job and shove it” is a viable tactic.
[QUOTE=alcor;42029]I work on a rig where the high standards required to operate are always being challenged and updated. Nothing is taken for granted, but we do rely on the interpretational skills of the driller and Logger to be at the forefront of ‘listening’ to the well. All blowouts are preventable.[/QUOTE]
And I view these skills as a very slender reed that is in dire need of technological support, especially in an era of globalization and managements dominated by finance types. The easiest way for such managers to cut costs, improve profits in the short term, and line their own pockets is to fire the senior (and highly skilled) employees and replace them with cheap newbies. Which is one reason I am deeply suspicious of BP, which was put together by a finance type.
Cheers,
Earl
[QUOTE=Earl Boebert;42049]Absent your comments on aviation, what you say is undoubtedly true but off-topic for this thread. The catastrophic event did not occur during drilling, it occurred during P&A. And I view the ad hoc nature of your business as a systemic source of risk, and do not view back-up plans as the equivalent of a positive alarm system because plans are implemented by humans who have proven to be fallible.
I never asserted that it was commonplace; quite the contrary. That’s where Taleb’s book is useful, because it treats the very low probability, very high consequence cases. 20,000 safe operations carries the same intellectual weight as 20,000 sightings of white swans – it doesn’t mean that the next swan is inevitably going to be white, or that the process is inherently safe.
I don’t view the BOP as a safety system but rather a safety subsystem; the transition from unsafe to safe state is made by the BOP and the operators. I would also like someone who is familiar with the design history of BOPs to explain why so much complexity is required to squeeze a piece of pipe shut.
Experience in other industries has shown that the “anybody can call a halt” doctrine is a pretty fragile safeguard, especially in times of economic pressure. I don’t see many places today where “take this job and shove it” is a viable tactic.
And I view these skills as a very slender reed that is in dire need of technological support, especially in an era of globalization and managements dominated by finance types. The easiest way for such managers to cut costs, improve profits in the short term, and line their own pockets is to fire the senior (and highly skilled) employees and replace them with cheap newbies. Which is one reason I am deeply suspicious of BP, which was put together by a finance type.
Cheers,
Earl[/QUOTE]
Earl,
Be specific about what you’re proposing and I’m sure it’ll be considered. Just remember, the operation which compromised this well was quite a simple task to perform. We read about all the failings of various components in the well. They are irrelevant. A number of people on this rig allowed 900 Bbls of hydrocarbons to enter the wel before any action was being taken. That includes the TO personnel and the BP Co Man who failed to interpret a chart relating to pressure control of the well.
The only relevant things for a driller to consider are pressure and volume control, and interpretation. It’s really quite simple. Ignore or misunderstand, and all wells will result in the same way.
I’m prepared to listen to what you’re proposing. So, rather than highlighting ‘failure’ continuously You might provide us with a method of getting the driller/TP/Co Man/Logger/onshore team to pay attention. Consider this, alarms for pressure and volume control must have been ignored or overrided. Would we override your proposal. Or do we have a cultural problem in the GOM? Gung Ho?
Furthermore, there is constant background gas, drilled gas/oil indication while drilling wells. During P&A you may find a certain amount of hydrocarbon gas in the oil based mud. I’ve never heard of sensors which can be placed in each joint of casing relaying data to surface which accurately distinguish between 1 ppm or 1000 ppm hydrocarbon concentration. I’d imagine you’d need a sampling point in each joint of casing!!
I wonder what the cost per joint would rise to to include these ‘sensors’.
I’m all ears! We’re always prepared to learn from new technology. But, be specific about its use in each well and which casing would be run with this new technology, all or some??
And, if you could anticipate any future failures in our systems we’ll gladly accept the crystal ball analysis in preference to after the event.
As an afterthought, I have worked in the industry for more than 20 years, and have had experience with 11 Operators. They all operate in exactly the same manner. BP, are under the microscope, which gives them the advantage to get their house in order. But, I do believe the GOM is rife with a cultural issue…well demonstrated by the popular series on the Discovery Channel. Perhaps, that could also be considered in your analysis.
alcor asks: [I]“I wonder what the cost per joint would rise to to include these ‘sensors’.”[/I]
With full economies of scale, the incremental out of pocket cost of a sensor chip would probably be a couple of dollars. A couple more $$ for drilling a hole and gluing it in to the drill pipe coupling. For the casing it is a lot more expensive. There is no large hub from which space can be stolen. Instead a hole is punched in the casing and a short pipe coupling is welded in. Of course, any time you add something like that it is probably $1000 per unit.
[QUOTE=billslugg;42064]alcor asks: [I]“I wonder what the cost per joint would rise to to include these ‘sensors’.”[/I]
With full economies of scale, the incremental out of pocket cost of a sensor chip would probably be a couple of dollars. A couple more $$ for drilling a hole and gluing it in to the drill pipe coupling. For the casing it is a lot more expensive. There is no large hub from which space can be stolen. Instead a hole is punched in the casing and a short pipe coupling is welded in. Of course, any time you add something like that it is probably $1000 per unit.[/QUOTE]
And what about the ‘weakness’ created by drilling holes? How will it affect the burst/collapse pressure of the casing? Is there any extrusion internally or externally which could become ruptured or broken off. If so, it’s a non-starter.
I’ve noticed how quiet this site has become since apparently discovering the failure in the well came from the casing instead of the Annulus. All those advising the Hearings committee ought to offer a statement on ths site to either advance their earlier assertions or retract presumptuous statements made. Meanwhile, Heyward is gone, and the witchhunt managed to get its way.
It may well be that many are preparing to extend their necks one more time on the results of further investigations. It’s a bold stateemnt for BP to make regarding the failure in the well.
All the same, this site has become ever so quiet compared to the confident mood of the past!
Evidence is an imperative when prosecuting. Lack of evidence and early conclusions suggest that it may be better to wait before offering condemnation ([B]Dell, you as a lawyer ought to know better, and I wonder how your tutors would be commenting on your early judgement).[/B]
I’d imagine the Hearings committee must feel terribly embarassed about the Heyward witchhunt…but, then again, they probably have a politician’s conscience…none, much the same as many of you who made early condemnation!
And, BTW, this episode has never happened on a drilling vessel before, 900 Bbls of hydrocarbons entering a well before anyone noticed anything! Is that BP’s responsibility? I’m interested in your answers, especially those who convict in advance of a trial. Perhaps, it’s a cultural thing!
alcor
Yes, my point was to figure out some way to insert a small sensor in the drill pipe and in the casing such that it does not decrease the strength of the pipe. No decrease in strength is an absolute given. There is no margin to play with. Since there is no free lunch, something has to give. What will change is that some metal will have to be added somewhere to account for it. The diameter inside nor outside can change. The overall length cannot change. The only available volume you have in drill pipe is the necked down area between the couplings. The coupling could probably be made a tad longer. The overall length of the drill pipe segment would not change but the couplings would be slightly longer and the pipe heavier as a result. Less than a pound. You have to find that spot on the drill pipe that will receive the fewest dings. I would go find old drill pipe and plot the areas of metal loss. The outside of the coupling is subjected to the wrench. The skinny part of the pipe is held by an elevator. The ends of the pipes cannot be modified as no changes can be made to the critical area where the pipes butt each other. The only spot I see is the curved neck. And even that will get hung on the rams in the BOP. You would look at the coupling and see only a ring of tiny holes, small as a hair located in the curved neck area just shy of the full diameter. The sensors would be buried in the pipe. No epoxy or plastic would be exposed. Just a few tiny holes for pressure sensing. Pipe could be mixed in the inventory system. Once you got a few smart pipes in your well they would start talking to each other. If there was a computer on deck that could listen to them, you would be in business. If you had no onsite computer you could buy some smart pills and pump them down and retrieve them and get your data back at the office.
[QUOTE=alcor;42086]I’ve noticed how quiet this site has become since apparently discovering the failure in the well came from the casing instead of the Annulus. All those advising the Hearings committee ought to offer a statement on ths site to either advance their earlier assertions or retract presumptuous statements made. Meanwhile, Heyward is gone, and the witchhunt managed to get its way.
It may well be that many are preparing to extend their necks one more time on the results of further investigations. It’s a bold stateemnt for BP to make regarding the failure in the well.
All the same, this site has become ever so quiet compared to the confident mood of the past!
Evidence is an imperative when prosecuting. Lack of evidence and early conclusions suggest that it may be better to wait before offering condemnation ([B]Dell, you as a lawyer ought to know better, and I wonder how your tutors would be commenting on your early judgement).[/B]
I’d imagine the Hearings committee must feel terribly embarassed about the Heyward witchhunt…but, then again, they probably have a politician’s conscience…none, much the same as many of you who made early condemnation!
And, BTW, this episode has never happened on a drilling vessel before, 900 Bbls of hydrocarbons entering a well before anyone noticed anything! Is that BP’s responsibility? I’m interested in your answers, especially those who convict in advance of a trial. Perhaps, it’s a cultural thing![/QUOTE]
Thus spake Alcor the Great.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6p4T7_XI7WM
I hope the relief well will finally kill this thing for good !
[QUOTE=alcor;42060]Earl,
Be specific about what you’re proposing and I’m sure it’ll be considered. [/QUOTE]
My apologies for not being clear. I wasn’t proposing a single magic bullet, but rather trying to give an example of the kinds of technical approaches that could be, but evidently have not been, applied to the safety problem. I am also not interested in the blame game (DoJ will devote plenty of energy to that) but rather in the high-level systems interactions, both human and technological. My current understanding of these are as follows:
-
The rig is in an unsafe state when hydrocarbons enter the well.
-
Detection of this unsafe state is indirect, using manual interpretation of real-time pressure and flow readings.
-
The techniques used for interpretation have developed through a process of evolution, and have not been subject to the kinds of rigorous analysis common in other environments where catastrophic failure is possible.
-
While these techniques have maintained safety in the past, in this case they failed, resulting in eleven fatalities, significant environmental damage, and the loss of the rig.
-
No technology is currently applied to directly detect hydrocarbons in the well.
-
There exist technologies with the potential to back up the manual determination of unsafe state with autonomous direct detection of hydrocarbons in the well. These include, but are not limited to, micro and nano sensors, unconventional communications methods, swarm robotics, and advanced materials.
An interesting question is why R&D effort has not been directed to such an obvious need. Everybody will have their own theory. Mine, based on BP’s organizational and operational history, is that it is a classic case of a company dominated by finance types.
For these people safety is not an absolute but rather a cost element to be coldly assessed against the likely cost of an accident. Kill some employees? Well, they are “small people” (in BP Chairman Svanberg’s revealing phrase) whose survivors won’t have the resources to seek anything but the most minimal compensation – which in any case can be delayed indefinitely by legal maneuvering. Environmental damage? Again, your lawyers can mitigate the consequences of that – just look at Exxon Valdez.
Now you’re not going to hear this from BP legal or PR, and shelves of official policies will say quite the opposite. You discover it by following the money. For example, look at how much goes to pure safety-related R&D (technology that improves safety but does not contribute to efficiency or effectiveness) vs. how much is paid out in executive bonuses.
Aside 1: I really would like someone who is familiar with the engineering of the BOP to explain the design rationale for that beast. To me it looks like an interconnected set of failure modes: pipes and fittings and wires and electronics and hydraulics, all operating in an extreme environment. Not the sort of simple, elegant gadget that I would want to be my last defense against catastrophe.
Aside 2: I do not share your sympathy for Tony Hayward. To understand why, just compare his statements to the quote below, which is the message Dwight Eisenhower drafted for release in case the D-Day landings failed:
“Our landings in the Cherbourg-Havre area have failed to gain a satisfactory foothold and I have withdrawn the troops. My decision to attack at this time and place was based upon the best information available. The troops, the air and the Navy did all that bravery and devotion to duty could do. If any blame or fault attaches to the attempt it is mine alone.”
Cheers,
Earl
[QUOTE=Earl Boebert;42108]My apologies for not being clear. I wasn’t proposing a single magic bullet, but rather trying to give an example of the kinds of technical approaches that could be, but evidently have not been, applied to the safety problem. I am also not interested in the blame game (DoJ will devote plenty of energy to that) but rather in the high-level systems interactions, both human and technological. My current understanding of these are as follows:
- The rig is in an unsafe state when hydrocarbons enter the well.
[B]Correct, it is an unwanted scenario, but can be managed. In theory, the whole of the well can fill with gas and the BOP should be in position to withstand the pressure, and the casing should ‘hold’ the pressure (by design).[/B]
- Detection of this unsafe state is indirect, using manual interpretation of real-time pressure and flow readings.
[B]Incorrect and correct. Alarms are set both by the logger and the driller regarding ‘gain’ control. An audible alarm sounds if a 5 Bbl gain is taken, and driller response/interpretation/communication to senior personnel is required after stopping pumps and flow checking. This is manual interpretation and requires manual input of alarm criteria relating to volume and pressure.[/B]
- The techniques used for interpretation have developed through a process of evolution, and have not been subject to the kinds of rigorous analysis common in other environments where catastrophic failure is possible.
[B]The rigorous adherence to education of drillers is without doubt a main priority of Contractors. In this industry, we have a requirement to start/stop/change pump rates/stop pumps/ flowcheck/ close BOPs/condition mud/control weight of mud in and out of the hole/treat gas-cut mud/drill the well/pull out of the hole/run in the hole…the list is endless, and reqires constant human intervention and analysis of the well’s situation. On top of this is the logger monitoring the well for flow etc…Furthermore, there are downhole tools to record potential hydrocarbon areas while driling. [/B]
[B]The process of ensuring all well control functions on the BOP are functioning are rigorous. It is possible to by-pass these tests by ‘cheating’.[/B]
[B]Essentially, we work in an environment where the chances of catastrophic failure are all prevented by human judgement and interpretation…and long may that continue. There isn’t that much to interpret or understand. We either have volume and pressure control or we don’t.[/B]
- While these techniques have maintained safety in the past, in this case they failed, resulting in eleven fatalities, significant environmental damage, and the loss of the rig.
[B]In this case, the well volumes have been ignored completely, something Transocean will be answerable for. I’ve never heard of a well before where the Contractor’s crew no longer have volume control of the well. It is an unprecedented scenario. This failure has nothing to do with interpretation by humans, it has everything to do with complete lack of control of the well’s volumes…by choice, I would imagine.[/B]
- No technology is currently applied to directly detect hydrocarbons in the well.
[B]When drilling, we often have what we call drilled gas, meaning that there is a constant gas reading in the mud system (another alarm detection), and Mud weight out of the hole shows us whether or not our hydrostatic pressure is sufficient. The shape of the cuttings from the well reveal much about our ‘overbalance’. The mud Engineer is constantly checking the mud for wellbore fluid contamination. The cuttings are constantly analysed etc…[/B]
[B]The point is we drill into a hydrocarbon zone and then pul out of the hole. Volume is the only method of knowing what’s happening in the well at this point. We observe all volumes and account for any steel pulled form the hole/run in the hole.[/B]
[B]And yet, there is a certain amount of hydrocarbons in the well while ‘tripping’. But it is measured in terms of hydrocarbon gas in the mud, the gas being the big threat, and we don’t pull out of the hole until the gas levels are less than 1%.[/B]
[B]Thereafter, we watch volumes. And if we suspect any gain we shut the well in at the BOP and check for any pressure build, which may not occur, but will occur later if we don’t take action to circulate the gas out of the well.[/B]
- There exist technologies with the potential to back up the manual determination of unsafe state with autonomous direct detection of hydrocarbons in the well. These include, but are not limited to, micro and nano sensors, unconventional communications methods, swarm robotics, and advanced materials.
[B]Get them commissioned and add them to the barrier system already in use.[/B]
An interesting question is why R&D effort has not been directed to such an obvious need. Everybody will have their own theory. Mine, based on BP’s organizational and operational history, is that it is a classic case of a company dominated by finance types.
[B]BP, is exactly the same as all other Operators. One or two BP guys made a very poor call on integrity tests on the rig. They didn’t appear to be able to understand or interpret what action had occurred or where to take it from there. TO personnel, apparently convinced the BP Reps of a strange Balloning effect which would account for the Drill Pipe Pressure reading 1400 psi when it should have read ‘0’.[/B]
[B]TO personnel, were aware of there being anomalies with the testing of the well. Why did they choose to ignore well volume control and pressure until it was very very late.[/B]
[B]Most people in the industry are baffled by the procedure to displace without any form of well control.[/B]
[B]As for your assertions about BP, all I can say is that in my opinion they have more experience than any other Operator with drilling deepwater wells.[/B]
[B]I wonder if I could perhaps direct some of your research and development to the culture issues in the GOM.[/B]
For these people safety is not an absolute but rather a cost element to be coldly assessed against the likely cost of an accident. Kill some employees? Well, they are “small people” (in BP Chairman Svanberg’s revealing phrase) whose survivors won’t have the resources to seek anything but the most minimal compensation – which in any case can be delayed indefinitely by legal maneuvering. Environmental damage? Again, your lawyers can mitigate the consequences of that – just look at Exxon Valdez.
[B]Now you’re quoting a Swede who never meant to express the ‘small people’ in the way that you’ve interpreted or the scandalous manner that the media and US Gov’t jumped on the bandwagon. The guy was genuinely concerned. No-one could interpret that fact because of the seething anger directed at any culprit for the demise of the GOM beaches and fish industry, the 11 dead long ago forgotten, the only consideration how to seek recompense…and perhaps even a little extra[/B].
Now you’re not going to hear this from BP legal or PR, and shelves of official policies will say quite the opposite. You discover it by following the money. For example, look at how much goes to pure safety-related R&D (technology that improves safety but does not contribute to efficiency or effectiveness) vs. how much is paid out in executive bonuses.
[B]MMS, was supposed to be in control in the GOM ensuring standards were set and that Operators abided by them. In the absence of any safety you’ll have to go through your Gov’t first, who promote the culture and standards required.[/B]
Aside 1: I really would like someone who is familiar with the engineering of the BOP to explain the design rationale for that beast. To me it looks like an interconnected set of failure modes: pipes and fittings and wires and electronics and hydraulics, all operating in an extreme environment. Not the sort of simple, elegant gadget that I would want to be my last defense against catastrophe.
[B]Too long to get into, save this:[/B]
[B]The BOPs are tested every 2 weeks to the highest expected test pressure the well can throw at us! All functions are tested, except the unlatch functions. This area is under investigation, but is a very big topic.[/B]
Aside 2: I do not share your sympathy for Tony Hayward. To understand why, just compare his statements to the quote below, which is the message Dwight Eisenhower drafted for release in case the D-Day landings failed:
[B]Is Obama or Bush responsible for the troops who died in Iraq? They were sent there by the President.[/B]
“Our landings in the Cherbourg-Havre area have failed to gain a satisfactory foothold and I have withdrawn the troops. My decision to attack at this time and place was based upon the best information available. The troops, the air and the Navy did all that bravery and devotion to duty could do. If any blame or fault attaches to the attempt it is mine alone.”
Cheers,
Earl[/QUOTE]
You raise some excellent points and anything you can offer the industry to improve our ‘early-warning’ signals can only be good.
Thanks.
Earl
Don’t fall prey to the media types who did Svanberg a disservice. Here is the quote:
[I]“And we care about the small people. I hear comments sometimes that large oil companies are greedy companies or don’t care. But that is not the case in BP. We care about the small people.”
[/I]
Toby Odone, a spokesman for BP, told The Associated Press: [I]“What he means is that he cares about local businesses and local people. This was a slip in translation.”[/I]
Svanberg was likely looking for the English word “local” and he came out with “small”.
It would be similar to one of us using the Swedish “liten” meaning little, when we really wanted to say “plats” meaning local. And then, we found out that we had made a faux pas.
If I was Svanberg, I would be saying the exact same thing that the guys on the DDIII were saying when they got hit by lightning and caught on fire while sitting over the blown out Macondo.
“OH, so THAT’S how it could get worse!!”
Reservoir in the Gulf may still be used http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/19/us/19well.html?src=mv&ref=us Hopefully by a more responsible company such as Shell . If BP is allowed, tho, God help us. Nice song :http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mQZmCJUSC6g
I realise that many have no idea what to make of the leaders’ decisions within BP and TO concerning the fateful day when so many lives were lost, and so much environmental damage occurred in the GOM.
One thing worth pondering, is the fact that many apparent sane Leaders, Fathers, and Mothers subject their children to a form of castration of the penis when they are no more than 2 months old. Is this a celebration or castration? Is this not some sort of brutal act handed down by our Leaders of the past.
I’m trying to work out the difference between someone in the GOM making a poor decision concerning pressure test results and a parent of a child accepting the ‘guillotine’ for their child’s most private area? Is it that we allow ourselves to be led?
Now, it may be that many wonder about the analogy. Truly, it seems strange! How could the two be connected? Perhaps, we are inclined to believe that one thing is acceptable but another is not, regardless of the fact that mother nature gave us both. But I still wonder about the circumcision of children, especially African female circumcision. Strange old practice that our leaders offer us to follow!!
The point is that Leaders make decisions on the rig which may affect our normal questioning habbit. They say, do it! We, do it!
Was there a problem on the rig concerning unreasonable leadership?
Alcor, humor break,<and ya bette find it funny> this article is for you to make an informed decision re your male offspring. btw,I ll do it only to you , for free. he , he. http://www.free-news-release.com/The-Advantages-of-Circumcision-Detail_21659.html song: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4NwP3wes4M8
[i]Was there a problem on the rig concerning unreasonable leadership? - alcor[/I]
Yes, absolutely, with out a doubt. There must be but one leader, but the leader must have all subordinates pulling in the same direction. When the leader has to discount another’s opinion, then perhaps the best decision is not being made. I have led a patrol den, Scout Troop, manufacturing team, papermachine, engineering department, etc. I know when the decision has to be made and if I cannot get all of my subordinates agreeing, then yes I will pull the switch myself. It WILL happen when it has to happen, BUT I’ll be damned if I am going to run up that hill with 55 of 56 guys shooting at the enemy and ONE guy shooting at me. I take the proactive step of building each team through extended - week long - discussions. We do roles/responsibilities/mission/vision/strategy/tactics. We agree on startup criteria, abort criteria, decision trees for all foreseeable decisions, principles and values to help us make unusual unforeseen decisions. Me personally, I get 100000% agreement from each person in the organization who has a stake in each decision, and I get it in front of every other employee. I go around the room one person at a time and personally ask them if they agree with the agreement on the table. If even one guy does not agree, then we all sit back down and give him the floor as long as he wants it. Notice - we are not in the middle of a well unloading. We are sitting in a conference room at the hilton eating stale crackers and diet coke. I have done these type things with every single team I have been responsible for, due to the generous upper management where I worked. In fact, all teams do it all the time. Once a year. One week offsite. Every team. Fully paid. We shut the plant down. That is how I would run an oil company. There would be no shouting matches. Stuff would not fall through the cracks. Good stuff happens. The organization takes off like a rocket. Input from every last janitor gets into the equation and weighed on its merits. There must be an efficient system to sniff out that kind of input and integrate it into the decision making process. Some of the most valuable information can come from the most unlikely source.