[QUOTE=Earl Boebert;42022]Quotes from alcor in italics:
[I]The costs involved make this a non-starter. This production casing will have oil flowing through it, that’s the eventual intention.[/I]
Thus reinforcing my impression of the relative importance of safety in this industry.
[B]It’s always been there. There is nothing more for a driller and logger to do than observe the well’s volumes, pressure, and other guages while drilling. The science is simple. The effort of drilling these wells is enormous. Safety, was never compromised on this well, until Negative tests were performed to evaluate whether or not all components of the well could withstand the reduction in hydrostatic pressure, the removal of the weighted mud and replacing it with SW. This test is a rudimentary test. It has been performed on 20,000 wells without incident. Naturally, the test will have highlighted the very same deficiecies as the Macondo well, a failure, and immediate action takes place to ensure hydrostatic pressure is put back in place to combat the signs of failure. This well spoke of failure. No-one was listening. This well had to take an influx of approx 600 to 900 Bbls of oil/gas into the well, and no-one reacted. Not BP reps, and not TO personell incharge of watching the operation. This well did not offer the oil/gas in one super ‘flow’. It happened over a period of time. It happened because no-one was able to interpret the pressure charts, coupled with mistakes made during the Negative tests. If you aren’t an offshore worker, or engineer, you’ll need to sit down for about the next 3 years to understand what is and isn’t possible.[/B]
[I]There have been over 20,000 wells drilled without any problem with the customary method of pressure and volume control.[/I]
Recommended reading: “The Black Swan” by Nassem Nicholas Taleb.
[B]If that’s an answer, here is my question![/B]
[I]There’s no need to exaggerate what occurred on this well. Pressure and volume control were absent.[/I]
As was any backup system to notify operators of a pending catastrophe.
[B]What is currently in place to defend against a well blowout? The driller’s console, the logger’s console, the TP and BP co Man’s consoles. All are watching real time what’s going on in the well. The driller and logger are communicating constantly, and the logger is supposed to put comments on the live charts describing the action occurring on the rig. The charts offered to us show no comments. The question needs to be asked, was the logger watching or even there? Nevertheless, there are supposed to be competent Driller, TP, BP Co Man observing trends in the well, particularly the pressure and volume trends. If they can’t work out that a massive gain has taken place on the rig (1730-1805 hrs if you wish to check the charts), then this well was doomed from day one. So what went wrong? Simple enough, no-one was able to understand that the well was flowing, nothing unusual in the offshore industry, but action should have been taken immediately. As for back-up systems many companies have onshore personnel watching the real time charts to observe what’s going on. In this case, even their interpretations were wrong. So, the question has to be asked was this some sort of GOM interpretation of how to commission a well? I’m still wondering![/B]
[I]Yeah! There was a failing component in the well. Pressure and volume control reveals all failings…if anyone cares to interpret the data.[/I]
Could you provide us with a reference to a Failure Effects Analysis or other engineering paper that supports your assertion?
[B]I can offer you my experience of interpretation. Have a look at the BP Charts on the activity occurring between 1730 and 1805 hrs. Notice the gain in the Active volume (250 Bbls +). No pumps are running. No cement pump is running, and yet, there is clear indication of gas in the return volumes which discounts any cleaning of the trip tank. I believe a valve is open while a discussion concerning the correct way to conduct a Negative Test is occurring. I’m not 100% sure if the drill crew are changing over at this point, but it appears no-one is observing the 250 + Bbls entering the pits…from where? Either through the Kill line or through the DP. It’s my own personal assertion, but if you’d care to have a look:[/B]
[B]http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/incident_response/STAGING/local_assets/downloads_pdfs/Deepwater_Horizon_Accident_Investigation_Report_Appendices_CDE.pdf[/B]
[I]This is a very simple case of the BP Co Man offshore and the TO Leaders failing to understand what was going on, what all the data was showing. The failures are clear. No-one on the rig understood what was happening. Meantime, the innocent R/N’s, Derrickman and Mud Engineers were hoping for some leadership. It didn’t come from BP and it didn’t come from TO offshore personnel.[/I]
I would be very interested to hear from individuals who have lived through similar emergencies on these rigs how such leadership manifests itself. I’ve studied more than a few crew interactions in in-flight emergencies and I’d really like to know what the expected responses are when the heat is on.
Cheers,
Earl[/QUOTE]
[B]Who is in charge of monitoring the volumes and pressure in the well? The TP and the driller. They direct their men to line up for tests and take the responsibility that this has been achieved.[/B]
[B]The Co Man, observes the tests taking place.[/B]
[B]In this particular case, the Annular did not seal, meaning the testing would be affected by High Viscosity weighted Spacer falling back down into the well past the Annular (no volume is confirmed, though 60 Bbls has been established as a guide!!!). So, now we have weighted spacer in the well. And it was considered ok to continue with the testing, by BP, I presume. The second test provided zero flow through the Kill Line, and 1400 psi on the DP pressure guage. The guage would have read zero if the test was conducted without the Spacer in place. Unfortunately, becausew no flow came up the kill line, it was considered a good test. Since then, arguements have ensued over whether or not the Kill line was open to atmosphere or whether or not the Kill line was plugged with the spacer fluid.[/B]
[B]Bottom line for me, the well was flowing and no-one noticed. So, everyone considered the well integrity to be good. Until, pleas from the Mud pump room to reduce pump rates due to being unable to handle the returning mud from the well (the well was unloading and gas was expanding). The charts clearly show evidence of the flow and inconsistent pressure (rising pressure on the guages), of course this was much later, and by then we had a well full of hydrocarbons without anyone realising.[/B]
