[QUOTE=A Cooke;39433]Alf like many, including myself is looking for reliable souls to get us out of this jam. [snip]
I made an earlier post that:
on 1 day Kent Wells told us the diamond cutter was the tool of choice for cutting the riser off near the joint and the super shear was not suitable for this application.
On the next day, after the diamond cutter failed, the super shears were put into action and the consequent twisting and deformation of the flange has caused all sorts of consequent problems.
The conclusion was that the contradiction of the assertion on day 1 and the reality of actions on day 2, were not commensurate with a well thought out plan. Kent is put forward as the senior technical guy of BP. Throughout my whole working life in engineering, albeit not the petro-chemical industry, technically competent people are reserved and careful about what they commit to, on the basis that they know better than anyone else that they are responsible for execution and are familiar with all the pitfalls to that execution. I was shocked because, in my modest book, saying one thing one day and doing something completely different the next, smacks of a marketing man masquerading in technical guise and every time I have come across that little combination, in my life, disaster lurks somewhere not far ahead.
Kent clearly stated in an earlier briefing that all attempts at stopping the flow of oil/gas, based on control at the sea-floor, were off. He stated clearly that bottom -kill was the only way of stopping the flow of oil/gas and that from this moment on sea-floor activity was wholly related to collecting as much of the leaking oil/gas as possible.
I have just listened to his latest video 10th July. Make your mind up Kent. If now, several months in, you are not sure as to whether the casing retains integrity, and possibly it does and it can be shut in with a new BOP stack then, what they h**l were you messing about for during the last XXX days? Virtually every forum out there had somebody saying “stick a new BOP on top”. You told us “no”. I am now scared. Would anyone let an industry that cannot determine some pretty basic facts and make sensible decisions as a consequence, be responsible when the consequences of failure are so horrific ? Would they be allowed to run a nuclear plant or run an airline, like this ? [/QUOTE]
There have been a few other comments about Kent Wells and his veracity/competence. I think it is useful to point out that more than one thing can be true about a person: Kent Wells can be an extraordinarily competent and thoughtful engineer, he can also at the same time be a fine, fine bullshitter. When you get promoted to the level that KW has reached, you often find people who are both. The Kent Wells I saw in the video describing the proposed Top Kill was, in my view, (and experience around the type) the former: a very competent and thoughtful engineer, describing a proposed process and the plans b, c, etc… He was backed up with an extremely well-rehearsed and well-choreographed presentation. An impressive performance. In that video, and also subsequent videos, I’ve seen him actually be quite careful to say they are working on multiple contingency plans and options, while he (rightly) focuses on describing the “A” plan. He is most definitely an extraordinarily competent, thoughtful, and obviously well-spoken engineer.
That said…
He is also a first-class bullshit artist. He relentlessly calls this an “event”, which is kind of the same as calling the Hindenburg, or Chernobyl or Three Mile Island “events”. No Kent, this is not an “event”, it is a motherfucking DISASTER, caused by a major league “ACCIDENT” that was entirely PREVENTABLE and was caused by YOUR COMPANY’S MAJOR-LEAGUE FUCK UP. So let’s not pussy-foot around this, shall we? Again, this is not an “event”, it is not a “tragedy”, it is a MAJOR-LEAGUE FUCK UP. And not to belabor the point Kent, but this MAJOR-LEAGUE FUCK UP happened in the sector for which you, as Senior Vice President - Exploration and Production, had direct responsibility. I’m not sayin’, I’m just sayin’!
Now I understand where Kent is coming from: this is a career-defining moment for him, in fact, he probably advanced in his career in response to some previous, similar fuck up. Why do I say this? Because I have been in more than one “War Room”, surrounded by “The best minds in our field”, when responding to more than one MAJOR-LEAGUE FUCK UP. I understand the dynamics, and I understand the types of individual who are advanced as a result. The tools you need in “The War Room” are prioritized as follows:
- Be extraordinarily self-confident.
- Be extraordinarily well-prepared, well-organized, well-spoken, and careful with your words. Not guarded, but careful
- Have a commanding presence/deep voice.
- Alpha dog proclivity
- Academic/experience credentials (better to batter your less-educated competitors, they call it a “War Room” because the war mainly takes place in the room). Not afraid to insult your “inferiors”.
- Be close personal friends with the lead stakeholder in the War Room.
- Champion a conveniently easy solution to the problem, which is cheap, ignores complications and peripheral impacts, and although not fool-proof, is easily explained and completed. Bonus points if it deflects responsibility to a third party.
- Champion an innovative approach to the problem which, although expensive, guarantees success, and includes a solution to peripheral impacts.
- Have an incredibly nuanced technical grasp of the problem/fuck up and the myriad of potential fixes.
You will note the emphasis is on presentation, authority and ass-covering; nobody involved wants to say/do the wrong thing, so they will defer to the carefully-spoken individuals who project authority. Also note that simplicity, low-cost and deflection of responsibility are also highly prized. Technical prowess is actually NOT that important, even if the state of minute technical details are critical to the success/failure of the operation (as they are here). Those details are typically left to the lower echelon of engineers/technicians who are tasked with implimenting the plan. If the plan fails, it is then their fault/bad luck, not the failure of the plan to address important technical details. It is also their fault (or the fault of the person with the carefully nuanced grasp of the technical details) for not suffiently/properly communicating (there’s that word again) these details to their “superiors” in the war room. This is a very important point, everyone in the war room is aware of the technical details, but those details are less important than other factors. I’ll discuss why this is important below.
So Kent Wells is exhibit A. Contrast this with Tony Hayward, who has clearly failed at this most critical performance criteria. The knives are being sharpened for you Tony, and the raven is croaking your name…
I have confidence that BP are doing all that anyone could do right now and have been doing for several weeks. What I don’t have, is any confidence that this industry goes about what it does with the level of responsibility commensurate with the consequences. A red hot Alcor, or any number of other competent, diligent and professional individuals, whose heartfelt comments I read here, on the guages every day, every second of every day, making sure that there is no blow out on their rig, is great for that rig, it is not a solution. Somewhere, there will be an idiot that is not awake, not watching. The risk of failure is too close. The capability to interrogate the mode of failure (as we see here - is the casing integrity compromised ?) and take action as a consequence (stick more gaffer tape on the spanner) is not up to the task.
Kent - I am not impressed and again, the gulf between technology applied to extraction and technology applied to dealing with failure, is shown as being huge and incompatible with the nature of the task…
You are clearly right that relying on “the best in their field”, and “eternal vigilance” is not a safety culture. In fact, without a safety culture, or structured approach to safe operations (created by the operations management of a company, i.e. people like Kent Wells - Senior Vice President - Exploration and Production), the most diligent individual in the world is nothing more than a future statistic.
I think the biggest mistake people can make in trying to understand this disaster is to assume that BP and people like Kent Wells are not highly competent. They are. But the aspects of competence we may value (rigorousness, responsibility, innovation) are not the same as what they value (simplicity, communication, economy), and a leopard doesn’t change its spots. They are making the choices they are making, and responding to this disaster in the same way they have conducted the day-to-day business which got them where they are, and us all into this mess in the first place. If you look carefully you can see the same modus operandi, here in no particular order is what i observe:
- Failure to take complete responsibility.
- Oversimplification and disregarding technical details (by choice, as it negates simplicity or contraindicates a preferred economical plan)
- Economy (delays in response, mobilizing equipment and subcontractors, cost-cutting in plans)
- Bullying of partners (i.e. Coast Guard, US Government agencies, TO, Halliburton, Schlumberger)
- Withholding important technical information
- An emphasis on ass-covering/careful and well-executed communication over forthrightness, candor and promptness of communication.
The examples of all this are too numerous to detail or list.