I think the BOP stuff is a no-brainer. If there is a joint blocking the blind rams then requiring 2 sets of blind rams allows the politicians to say “Look! We fixed the problem.”
There’s no requirement for real-time telemetry for the drilling data. Just the BOP controls. That’s seems like a miss to me.
The attestation is meaningless. Either it shuts down the industry (which I don’t think is the intention), or like Sarbanes-Oxley, it will require lots more paperwork that doesn’t really change stuff on the ground.
I suspect this will mean that the CEO has to attest that a blowout won’t happen, but if it does, then he gets a pass provided the relief wells kill it within 90-ish days.
It might be interpreted as meaning the operator is fined $150,000 per day until it is killed (the well, not the operator), but since that’s maybe 15% of the daily cost of drilling 2 relief wells I don’t think it matters much.
This is a draft. The lobbyists haven’t started grinding it down yet.
In the hosp setting, we have safety first, and it s really worthwhile,; sometimes, it seems redundant, but when you have your fellow worker, co sign for high risks meds, and they find an error, you sigh with relief, that you had that best practise, in place. People are human, and working 12 hour shifts, mental fatigue, can cloud judgements, and people not intentionally are vulnerable to human error. Safety first, can save your life, and your comrades.
[QUOTE=company man 1;38326]Pumping jack, I agree with you r premise that No company is or could have expected to be prepared for a blowout of this magnitude. I agree that no matter how much testing, certification, regulation, & oversight we make, There is still a very small minute chance there will be a well control occurance. That is why & especially why in deep water drilling where the stakes are so high that these companies must do everything to avoid what happened to the DWH. I respect your input & opinion, but have heard you say that the other operators are just as bad at throwing caution to the wind in well design & cost cutting in cement design, etc. That is obviously not accurate. When one of the heads of the rest of the five families testified before congress. He was as honest as a man can be about it. He said no matter what you do or how many boats you have or how much boom, if there is an occurance like this its gonna catch you with your pants down. He further went on toi state that’s why prevention is the only way to focus. These guys all said they would have never allowed a well design like this to make it to the field. I have heardno one in the United States disagree. The only thing even the enemies of drilling can come up with is an inadequate spill response plan used by all the operators.
I have a feeling that is about to get updated, but the things the operators knew about which was prevention, are being done differently with a different attitude at the other operators. If it weren’t so some one like you know who or others would have posted some kind of experience or evidence by now. The truth is once again, Prevention is the only solution. If there is any doubt err on the side of caution, not the side of risk. In the grand scheme of things, was BP’s game plan of save a buck before anything else worth it to them? In their minds the big picture for them is possibly. If they survive, it means they were granted dispensation to contimue operation, which will be construed by their management as acceptable necessary risk. How do I know this? Look at their track record across the spectrum of their company.
The way WE get back to work is to quit blaming all the industry for the ingrained outlaw mentality of one & punish the one to the maximum of the law. That sends the message to any other possible outlaw regime that they will pay the price for not erring on the side of caution. When that message is conveyed to all, it will resonate for generations to come & there will never be another MC 252 Macondo #1.[/QUOTE]
Boss Man, you relentlessly frame everything in your context, I did not ever say what you disagree with me saying, but since you keep saying I did even though I already told you once that I didn’t, all you have to do is quote me saying it and I’ll believe you, okie dokie?
And you skirted around my other point, my point is the sure fire way to get back to work is if a system is in place capable of handling all occurrences. From what I’m reading, some are saying a system was in place that could deal all occurrences including operator error, and it was drilling crew error that allowed the blowout. Others are saying that an unforeseeable event occurred due to operator error, and there was nothing the drilling crew could do about it, so the well control system evidently can’t handle all scenarios.
a. Since no operator has a plan for worse case scenario
b. Since all operators have cut a corner or two,
c. Then if we go back to work there is always a chance lightening could strike twice unless there is a well control system in place that can deal with all occurrences including operator error.
So the gov’t has covered itself with a ban, the court has overturned the ban. Say we get back to work quickly and lightening strikes twice then the blame is on…… or we may go a very long time if we’re lucky…. Do you feel lucky…. well do ya?
I’m just staring into the abyss and it’s staring back into me. So which driller would you work floors for?
[QUOTE=rlanasa;38328]The President and or the Congress have not yet defined what “the bottom line is in order to get back to work”. There is very real risk the US offshore oil industry is finished. The entire 100% !!! Congregational delegation has come out very publicly against any offshore drilling in the GOM. Today Louisiana and Mississippi are the only states pressing to reopen the Gulf. With Florida controlling most of the recent presidential elections every day we get closer to the election in 2012 the stronger the chance the GOM will remain closed until the next global crude oil shortage. Once the rigs sail to another part of the world it will take 10 years to reopen exploration. We have days to get the GOM open or lose it for this generation. You will also find some who position the GOM as a gigantic strategic oil reserve only to be used in a time of crisis.
This spring marked the last days of work for 1000’s in the GOM for 1000’s. How is your Portuguese and Chinese?[/QUOTE]
You forget that Obama had just given offshore drilling a big boost two weeks before the blow out, he does realize the essence of the necessity. Salazar is coming out with a new approach since the court ruling, it’s a catch 22 for them, the Gulf states, and the nation, but watch for the industry to be on it’s best behavior to prevent incidents as CM1 predicts when drilling resumes, and maybe…. So which driller would you work floors for?
OK, I know where everyone on my rig here in Argentina is: in camp watching the Argentina Mexico soccer game, but here on g Captain it seems slow too. Maybe something will break here and I’LL have to go out and fix it, that would break my boredom, since all my Electricians are in camp.
[QUOTE=dsmith;38347]Way back in post #4019 Pumpjack Hand copied in part of a document titled “The mechanics of blowouts and how to prevent them.” In this article it stated in part:
“GENERAL
Blowout prevention is not a matter of the number of valves in the preventer system, their arrangement, or the ability of people to operate them. Although these things — along with a number of techniques — are important, they are not the prime essential. Blowout prevention is a frame of mind existing throughout the drilling crew and supervisory staff. A determination on the part of the operator’s management to eliminate blowouts is far more valuable than the addition of several pieces of equipment to control blowouts.”
“… is a frame of mind existing throughout the … crew and supervisory staff.”
This is the perfect definition of a “Safety Culture.” I worked for the first 31 years of my working life for a company that embraced these policies, I thought that everyone worked that way, that it was Standard Operating Procedure. Then the market down turn came and the company decided we should see how things were done in the outside world. Since then I have had my eyes opened. One job I done did not have a “Safety Culture” in place. I did not want to quit but I was very thankful to be laid off before I had to witness somebody being killed.
Go back to your crews and develope a “Safety Culture” and maintain it!
The part of the document that Pumpjack Hand copied was interesting and informative, I wish I could get the entire document.[/QUOTE]
I scanned it from SPE reprint #42 “Well Control” with a couple dozen more papers included, but you can get it also here for the same $20 price, it’s a classic: http://www.onepetro.org/mslib/servlet/onepetropreview?id=API-60-041&soc=API&speAppNameCookie=ONEPETRO
Also, a couple days ago I ran across another historical piece “Petroleum Resources in Basement Rocks” in AAPG Vol. 44, No. 19 (10/1960) excerpt “Basement rock accumulations obtain their oil from one of three possible sources: 1) overlying organic rock, from which the oil was expelled downward during compaction, (2) lateral, off-the-basement but topographically lower, organic rock from which oil was squeezed into an underlying carrier bed through which it migrated updip into the basement rock, and (3) lower lateral reservoirs from which earlier trapped oil was spilled due to tilting, or to overfilling.
I hate to be defending Alcor but Mike (like me who didn’t) doesn’t understand that the BOP in spite of taking care of its PLC. The HyDrill is made to shed rubber as it’s striped through, that wouldn’t have caused a big failure (I’ve been told) IF it had tested good before. Keep in mind Mike is the one who is going to be asked about the code in the BOP PLC’s I’ve been talking about and IF he had changed something (under orders I’m sure, but can he get proof?) in that code to make the BOP harder to ‘accidently’ activate the shear rams he is in deep s—t. MANY MANY questions about understanding the ‘logic’ of the BOP to many on the witness stand (no ET’s) who all said: “that was the ET’s responsibility”, Mike is very nervous, I would be, and VERY Lawyer’ed up, at least i hope so.
Of course the displacement of the mud is another story and it was a big mistake that is in BP’s lap.
Check out the fumes. Maybe it’s insitu burning, but if you zoom in (click) it appears to be a consistent haze – and the burning that takes place is spotty and only in small numbers.
When the winds turn southerly, this crap is going to be blowing across the gulf-coast states.
[QUOTE=kwCharlie;38364]OK, I know where everyone on my rig here in Argentina is: in camp watching the Argentina Mexico soccer game, but here on g Captain it seems slow too. Maybe something will break here and I’LL have to go out and fix it, that would break my boredom, since all my Electricians are in camp. [/QUOTE]
Argentina!!!..fabulous!!..I thought you were just down the street. lol be safe. btw,. thanks for your input…this is all Argentina…I mean, Greek to me.
It’s a good article. What it doesn’t cover is this:
When the negative tests were performed all lining up and reading of guages is the duty of the TO perssonel. The TO Supervisors are there to ensure the tests are conducted correctly. This means that if volumes are found to be inconsistent, and standpipe pressure is rising while the test is being conducted something is wrong. If volume comes back up the rig, there has to be an energy source. This has to come from the Reservoir, and probably from the Annulus where the Seal Assy has failed. The dilemma facing the rig crew is that volumes are wrong. They have no idea what has failed. But, they must know that gas is the only energy source. They must shut in the well and displace back to 14 ppg mud with the BOP closed.
The well must be closed in immediately by TO. Don’t even wait for an interpretation from the Operator. If He orders you to continue displacing the TO Supervisors must refuse. TO, are responsible for the vessel.
Obviously, the TO OIM relented and accepted the decision to continue displacing. And, there was no volume control while this displacement took place. The charts for the last 2 hours show that pressure and volume anomalies existed. Attempts to close the well were made too late, and we suspect now that the Hanger and Seal Assy were blown out of the well.
We need BP to release the data on the negative tests, and volumes back while this test was conducted. When the well speaks we must react accordingly.
[QUOTE=alcor;38149]If the rig receiving return flow can remain latched on we might even get away with 14 ppg. But, I believe they’ll go for more weight.[/QUOTE]
I was wondering about this. Coming from a production background I know that drilling mud can wreak havoc on separating vessels. I assumed they would have to unlatch, lest their receiving tanks fill with heavy oily-mud.
Can you elaborate any?
Is my concern really a non-issue and they will remain latched during the kill operation???
[QUOTE=alcor;38158]In the case of the DWH, decisions were made about positive and negative tests which showed either inexperience, or an insane risk taker at the helm. This decision making has to addressed.[/QUOTE]
Who interprets? Who makes the call? The Company Man? Someone on the beach?
[QUOTE=company man 1;38159]Now they [Anadarko] stand a chance of going under over this mess, because a well design they approved of as a partner was changed at the eleventh hour & they weren’t even consulted about it.[/QUOTE]
CM1, what was the change in well design that was made at the last hour?
[QUOTE=New Orleans Lady;38351]In the hosp setting, we have safety first, and it s really worthwhile,; sometimes, it seems redundant, but when you have your fellow worker, co sign for high risks meds, and they find an error, you sigh with relief, that you had that best practise, in place. People are human, and working 12 hour shifts, mental fatigue, can cloud judgements, and people not intentionally are vulnerable to human error. Safety first, can save your life, and your comrades.[/QUOTE]
Twelve hour shifts are standard offshore; rigs, boats, barges, the lot. No alternative without increasing personnel.
I missed any actual work but did see, as the ROV was being hoisted onto its ship, that the ROV task was Compatt Installation. A quick google shows this.
The Computing and Telemeter
Transponder (Compatt) is a
microcomputer controlled subsea
transponder used for acoustic
navigation and positioning.
Another ROV task shows ‘LDIS Pile Installation’. Any idea what this is?
[QUOTE=bigmoose;38183]
My reading said that Boots and Coots are on DDIII to manage the well kill operation. [/QUOTE]
You mean they didn’t want to let Don Vidrine oversee this well!???
.
.
.
(Okay, that was wrong of me, I know)
[QUOTE=pumpjack hand;38323]Any floor hands reading along here? If you heard one driller say, “Our well control system can control any kick situation and save your life if we react and implement according to procedure,” and then also heard another driller say, “Our well control system can usually control any kick situation if the engineers and company men and pushers have done their job properly, trust them,” which driller would you want to go out with?
In this highly emotionally charged very verbose discussion here we may have lost sight of what the bottom line is in order to get back to work. Or am I not seeing the forest for the trees?[/QUOTE]
I would trust the one who is being honest with me. The one who is being hoest with me would say," This well control system has been tested to API standards & has been gone through thoroughly & SHOULD be reliable in an emergency situation to save your life. Having said that, we will not attempt to rely on a BOP stack to stop an uncontrolled flow of gas coming directly from a hydrocarbon zone to within 5 feet of our BOP stack without any means of circulating the kick out. We will make sure any and all means have been used by the operator to isolate that zone & those isolation barriers have been tested properly & that all lockdown rings for isolation devices & cement plugs have been placed before we displace a well to underbalance conditions. This is the right thing to do & it is the way we will do it or not work for the operator.
That’s the driller I would trust.
[QUOTE=~~~;38380]CM1, what was the change in well design that was made at the last hour?[/QUOTE]
The chane on 4/15/20 from a casing tieback design to a tapered casing design. BP also did away with running all the centralizers Halliburton recommended to avoid gas channeling on the cement job.
[QUOTE=~~~;38377]I was wondering about this. Coming from a production background I know that drilling mud can wreak havoc on separating vessels. I assumed they would have to unlatch, lest their receiving tanks fill with heavy oily-mud.
Can you elaborate any?
Is my concern really a non-issue and they will remain latched during the kill operation???[/QUOTE]
An important thing to remember is that there’s a weak zone where the mud losses took place a couple of weeks before the blowout. It may be that this weak zone is already charged with hydrocarbons, and therefore, no longer an issue.
Will they remain latched? I would imagine they will to begin with. They may start pumping with very heavy fluid initially, anything up to 17 ppg ans see what effect that has on surface returns.
If we assume they’ll remove the Riser at some point the Hp of the SW will produce 2236 psi pressure at 5000 ft.
The Reservoir pressure is approx 12,000 psi, I’ve heard suggested.
So, from 5000 to 18,000 ft (I’m not 100% on the depth of entry), we have to put mud in place which equals the formation pressure minus 2236 psi = 9764 psi.
The minimum weight required to balance the well would be 14.45 ppg. Obviously, they’d require a safety factor or overbalance as long as the formation can withstand it.
They had a mud weight of 14 ppg, so we know the formation can withstand a Hp of 13322 psi static pressure with additional dynamic pressure while they had been circulating. Let’s call it 13,600 psi. This is still valid if the flow area is not restricted in the BOP.
So, what are they going to do to stop the flow?
I’d imagine this will be attacked in stages, while still latched to see what effect the heavy mud being pumped will have at surface.
Would it be possible for them to keep pumping heavy mud until they see that return flow was reducing, and then reduce the MW in stages while recording its effect on returns.
I’m not 100% sure what the handling capabilities are on the surface vessels. Remember, the flow from the well will be double the current flow when the mud is included. But, as the mud mixes with the hydrocarbons, seperators on the surface vessels may not be able to handle the returning volumes. We still have to seperate the gas and oil from mud at surface. Perhaps, they have in place more seperators.
At some point they are going to have to unlatch. Will that be when pumping mud or when they’ve completely secured the well by pumping cement?
Anyone have an opinion?
I would imagine that they’ll be latched on initially meaning that all returns of mud/hydrocarbons will go to the rig.