Oil spill’s psychological toll quietly mounts
http://www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5gIXWYBTpLtSayJtg41LKXpxSxVPAD9GJQL780
[QUOTE=company man 1;38386]I would trust the one who is being honest with me. The one who is being hoest with me would say," This well control system has been tested to API standards & has been gone through thoroughly & SHOULD be reliable in an emergency situation to save your life. Having said that, we will not attempt to rely on a BOP stack to stop an uncontrolled flow of gas coming directly from a hydrocarbon zone to within 5 feet of our BOP stack without any means of circulating the kick out. We will make sure any and all means have been used by the operator to isolate that zone & those isolation barriers have been tested properly & that all lockdown rings for isolation devices & cement plugs have been placed before we displace a well to underbalance conditions. This is the right thing to do & it is the way we will do it or not work for the operator.
That’s the driller I would trust.[/QUOTE]
This is absolutely correct. Barriers must be in place. If we decide to proceed without those barriers then we must understand what the consequences of our actions are.
We do not displace if a test proves that an energy source is forcing mud from the well, gas.
We close the BOP straight away and secure the well from any further ‘gains’. The vessel is now protected and BP have a dilemma on their hands, gas is/may be migrating up the Annulus or wellbore. No-one knew then and no-one knows now if the leak is from the Seal Assy or from the wellbore production casing. But, we know our BOP is closed and we’re ready to close the Shear Rams. We observe for pressure build up. There is no way to circulate the Annulus volume. But, we can bullhead the gas back into the formation if a high enough pump rate can be established.
The vessel and all onboard are safe.
[QUOTE=~~~;38378]Who interprets? Who makes the call? The Company Man? Someone on the beach?[/QUOTE]
The Co Man, the OIM, the Cementer. The driller, the A/D, the Logger are perfectly capable of interpreting the results. Volume back is volume back. A roughneck can tell you that the well is flowing.
Something went very wrong with the interpretation of flow.
Remember, the whole of the well is underbalanced when the Kill line full of SW is checked for pressure. If there is 0.5 Bbls back then that is flow. You must line up and understand the seriousness of the tests taking place. Besides, you check for pressure first in a closed system, and read any build up of pressure. I don’t know what they did, but reading pressure is the first task. Then, open the choke and check for flow for 30 mins.
[QUOTE=alcor;38390]This is absolutely correct. Barriers must be in place. If we decide to proceed without those barriers then we must understand what the consequences of our actions are.
We do not displace if a test proves that an energy source is forcing mud from the well, gas.
We close the BOP straight away and secure the well from any further ‘gains’. The vessel is now protected and BP have a dilemma on their hands, gas is/may be migrating up the Annulus or wellbore. No-one knew then and no-one knows now if the leak is from the Seal Assy or from the wellbore production casing. But, we know our BOP is closed and we’re ready to close the Shear Rams. We observe for pressure build up. There is no way to circulate the Annulus volume. But, we can bullhead the gas back into the formation if a high enough pump rate can be established.
The vessel and all onboard are safe.[/QUOTE]
Correction. We can not bullhead back into the annulus because we will reseal the casing hanger into the casing hanger bore. This will keep us from bullheading so there is no way of killing the well.
Edit: That is why changing the casing design was so negligent. It makes it impossible to kill this well if the putrid barriers that BP opted for don’t hold.
[QUOTE=company man 1;38393]Correction. We can not bullhead back into the annulus because we will reseal the casing hanger into the casing hanger bore. This will keep us from bullheading so there is no way of killing the well.
Edit: That is why changing the casing design was so negligent. It makes it impossible to kill this well if the putrid barriers that BP opted for don’t hold.[/QUOTE]
Furthermore, due to gas migration to surface, proven results show that 13,000 PSI migrating to the bottom of the stack minus 14 pound mud in the riser of 3689 = 9311 PSI. This is well above BOP tested pressure & almost approaches BOP rated working pressure. Furthermore, it is well above the rated burst pressure of the 16" & certainly above the rated pressure of the rupture discs run in the 16" casing. In short, we’re having a blowout one way or the other.
[QUOTE=company man 1;38386]I would trust the one who is being honest with me. The one who is being hoest with me would say," This well control system has been tested to API standards & has been gone through thoroughly & SHOULD be reliable in an emergency situation to save your life. Having said that, we will not attempt to rely on a BOP stack to stop an uncontrolled flow of gas coming directly from a hydrocarbon zone to within 5 feet of our BOP stack without any means of circulating the kick out. We will make sure any and all means have been used by the operator to isolate that zone & those isolation barriers have been tested properly & that all lockdown rings for isolation devices & cement plugs have been placed before we displace a well to underbalance conditions. This is the right thing to do & it is the way we will do it or not work for the operator.
That’s the driller I would trust.[/QUOTE]
That’s pretty good. Would you object to something like this: give the floor hands more acceptable risk and a better fighting chance, by putting pressure sensors and pressure relief mechanisms at the well head. Putting turbines in the SSBOP to guarantee sustained battery charge as long as there is flow. Using a high pressure riser with staged pressure sensors and pressure reliefs and a back up SBOP.
Well control can evolve just like state of the art drilling tech is constantly evolving. If you have a pretty fast connection and are interested in seeing a similar drilling system as the one being used to find intercept the Macondo these are interesting animations:
http://www.halliburton.com/ps/Default.aspx?navid=24&pageid=395&folderid=MSE%3A%3A1045229747050391
then click the link “[U]Wellbore placement in real time animation[/U]” (136MB) and also “[U]Geo-pilot rotary steerable system animation[/U]”
[QUOTE=pumpjack hand;38395]That’s pretty good. Would you object to something like this: give the floor hands more acceptable risk and a better fighting chance, by putting pressure sensors and pressure relief mechanisms at the well head. Putting turbines in the SSBOP to guarantee sustained battery charge as long as there is flow. Using a high pressure riser with staged pressure sensors and pressure reliefs and a back up SBOP.
Well control can evolve just like state of the art drilling tech is constantly evolving. If you have a pretty fast connection and are interested in seeing a similar drilling system as the one being used to find intercept the Macondo these are interesting animations:
http://www.halliburton.com/ps/Default.aspx?navid=24&pageid=395&folderid=MSE%3a%3a1045229747050391
then click the link “[U]Wellbore placement in real time animation[/U]” (136MB) and also “[U]Geo-pilot rotary steerable system animation[/U]”[/QUOTE]
Read my previous two posts & explain to me how, assuming they would have shut in at the very beginning, they could have killed this well. There was simply no way to do it without running in with wireline under pressure & shooting perfs. This would have taken time to get tools & men on location. During this time, the gas migrating up the 9 7/8" would have surely blown out the rupture discs on the 16" & blown out of the 16" & this well would be flowing out of control without a wellhead on it.
Edit: No matter how you slice it & dice it, it all comes back to cause. The cause of this accident was in changing from a tieback system to a tapered string after running rupture discs in the 16" casings & not cementing to the shoe of the 18" to isolate that. The other mechanisms BP chose to ignore led to a blowout one way or the other. I have been trying to explain this for weeks, but now I feel my words are hitting home.
[QUOTE=company man 1;38393]Correction. We can not bullhead back into the annulus because we will reseal the casing hanger into the casing haner bore. This will keep us from bullheading so there is no way of killing the well.[/QUOTE]
We don’t know that the Seal Assy was correctly positioned. We don’t know that the flow was coming from the Annulus. It may be that it’s coming from the main bore. These are the questions facing the crew at that time. Hindsight, on our part is a luxury. All they know is that they have a leak. Space out the TJ and Close the Rams. Prepare for Shear. Read pressures on the Choke, and assess where the gas is coming from. If it’s the Annulus, see if we can establish bullheading flow. If not, the dilemma develops. What next, and next, and next. We have control of our vessel and all hands are secure. It may have been possible to allow the gas to migrate. After all, there’s a weak zone which will break down first and possibly stop any further influx by maintaining BHP. It depends on the volume of gas that came into the well.
It may be that as pressure builds up we are able to bleed off small amounts to allow the gas bubble to increase in size thus reducing the impact when it sits under the WH/BOP.
There’s always action we can take.
If for some reason, the volume allowed in is too great we better get that BOP closed asap. And Shear. We’re still safe, and the vessel is too.
Remember, DWH isn’t the only vessel that’s had to deal with gas entering the well. You get a kick and you form a plan to fight it. And, that action is understood by all crews. It doesn’t require hindsight.
[QUOTE=pumpjack hand;38395]That’s pretty good. Would you object to something like this: give the floor hands more acceptable risk and a better fighting chance, by putting pressure sensors and pressure relief mechanisms at the well head. Putting turbines in the SSBOP to guarantee sustained battery charge as long as there is flow. Using a high pressure riser with staged pressure sensors and pressure reliefs and a back up SBOP.
Well control can evolve just like state of the art drilling tech is constantly evolving. If you have a pretty fast connection and are interested in seeing a similar drilling system as the one being used to find intercept the Macondo these are interesting animations:
http://www.halliburton.com/ps/Default.aspx?navid=24&pageid=395&folderid=MSE%3A%3A1045229747050391
then click the link “[U]Wellbore placement in real time animation[/U]” (136MB) and also “[U]Geo-pilot rotary steerable system animation[/U]”[/QUOTE]
I loved your idea of a second set of BOPs closer to the surface, but that would take a redesign of the riser assemby & the flex joint to bring it to within a couple of hundred feet of sea surface. the mere weight of this contraption would be…HEAVY. I like your ideas, but as I said before, if you don’t fix the casue the engine is going to blow no matter what you do.
[QUOTE=alcor;38397]We don’t know that the Seal Assy was correctly positioned. We don’t know that the flow was coming from the Annulus. It may be that it’s coming from the main bore. These are the questions facing the crew at that time. Hindsight, on our part is a luxury. All they know is that they have a leak. Space out the TJ and Close the Rams. Prepare for Shear. Read pressures on the Choke, and assess where the gas is coming from. If it’s the Annulus, see if we can establish bullheading flow. If not, the dilemma develops. What next, and next, and next. We have control of our vessel and all hands are secure. It may have been possible to allow the gas to migrate. After all, there’s a weak zone which will break down first and possibly stop any further influx by maintaining BHP. It depends on the volume of gas that came into the well.
It may be that as pressure builds up we are able to bleed off small amounts to allow the gas bubble to increase in size thus reducing the impact when it sits under the WH/BOP.
There’s always action we can take.
If for some reason, the volume allowed in is too great we better get that BOP closed asap. And Shear. We’re still safe, and the vessel is too.
Remember, DWH isn’t the only vessel that’s had to deal with gas entering the well. You get a kick and you form a plan to fight it. And, that action is understood by all crews. It doesn’t require hindsight.[/QUOTE]
Using the benefit of hindsight I am telling you that no matter what they did on surface it doesn’t matter & until you admit that, then you’re being ignorant by choice. The fact is they could not lubricate & bleed & they could not use the driller’s method of relief because every time they pumped up on the seal assembly from the top it would set back down in the bore & you know that. The rest is symantics & you know that. So quit it. If you are nearly the smart guy you say you are you know where the well was flowing from & any other crap you come up with is just reaching for the moon & you know that too.
[QUOTE=company man 1;38396]Read my previous two posts & explain to me how, assuming they would have shut in at the very beginning, they could have killed this well. There was simply no way to do it without running in with wireline under pressure & shooting perfs. This would have taken time to get tools & men on location. During this time, the gas migrating up the 9 7/8" would have surely blown out the rupture discs on the 16" & blown out of the 16" & this well would be flowing out of control without a wellhead on it.
Edit: No matter how you slice it & dice it, it all comes back to cause. The cause of this accident was in changing from a tieback system to a tapered string after running rupture discs in the 16" casings & not cementing to the shoe of the 18" to isolate that. The other mechanisms BP chose to ignore led to a blowout one way or the other. I have been trying to explain this for weeks, but now I feel my words are hitting home.[/QUOTE]
If you are saying they didn’t have the tools to avert dying on the drill floor under worse case scenario, then I say they shouldn’t go to the drill floor until you give them the tools. These wells are only going to get more difficult. Let them know they have the tools.
[QUOTE=company man 1;38396]Read my previous two posts & explain to me how, assuming they would have shut in at the very beginning, they could have killed this well. There was simply no way to do it without running in with wireline under pressure & shooting perfs. This would have taken time to get tools & men on location. During this time, the gas migrating up the 9 7/8" would have surely blown out the rupture discs on the 16" & blown out of the 16" & this well would be flowing out of control without a wellhead on it.
Edit: No matter how you slice it & dice it, it all comes back to cause. The cause of this accident was in changing from a tieback system to a tapered string after running rupture discs in the 16" casings & not cementing to the shoe of the 18" to isolate that. The other mechanisms BP chose to ignore led to a blowout one way or the other. I have been trying to explain this for weeks, but now I feel my words are hitting home.[/QUOTE]
The intention would be to maintain BHP in order to ensure no further influx occurs. We’d need to maintain an overbalance. We would bleed off pressure to allow the bubble to expand, thereby reducing the pressure as it migrates. We don’t want to break down the weak formation so our overbalance is limited. We have to ensure that the influx volume size is known. We bleed off whatever volume is required to maintain BHP with a slight overbalance.
Our Rams are closed. We can even Shear the pipe. All is well.
Well intervention is not my speciality, but as you’ve pointed out we can run wireline to perforate the Production Casing and then circulate the gas out.
Where there’s a will there’s a way.
There are hundreds of recorded wells where bleeding and pumping has been a way of securing the well back to Primary well control.
[QUOTE=pumpjack hand;38400]If you are saying they didn’t have the tools to avert dying on the drill floor under worse case scenario, then I say they shouldn’t go to the drill floor until you give them the tools. These wells are only going to get more difficult. Let them know they have the tools.[/QUOTE]
Once this well was drilled to TD & the decision made to run casing the tools were a proper casing design & a proper cement job followed by a CBL run to confirm. I guarantee you they would have eventually run a CBL no matter what. I guarantee you the rig costs on that CBL run wouldn’t have been free. I guarantee you it would have been against another AFE for completion instead of drilling. Just think this all may have occured because someone was worried about an AFE.
[QUOTE=alcor;38401]The intention would be to maintain BHP in order to ensure no further influx occurs. We’d need to maintain an overbalance. We would bleed off pressure to allow the bubble to expand, thereby reducing the pressure as it migrates. We don’t want to break down the weak formation so our overbalance is limited. We have to ensure that the influx volume size is known. We bleed off whatever volume is required to maintain BHP with a slight overbalance.
Our Rams are closed. We can even Shear the pipe. All is well.
Well intervention is not my speciality, but as you’ve pointed out we can run wireline to perforate the Production Casing and then circulate the gas out.
Where there’s a will there’s a way.
There are hundreds of recorded wells where bleeding and pumping has been a way of securing the well back to Primary well control.[/QUOTE]
I am glad to know you understand well control basics. That does not change anything. This well started coming in when gas started migrating & changing places with the mud. As they would have allowed the bubble to expand more gas influx would have taken its place & you would have the same conditions that caused the occurance. I wish they would have caught it sooner & I wish they would have at least bought themselves more time, then we may not have been having these fun times over the last several weeks. But whether you admit it or not, This well was going to blow out once the gas started migrating up the hole. From the blowout Kasol showed the video of I believe this one would have been several times wors & possibly could have capsized the whole rig & killed everyone. Whether it happened at 21:50 or 0200 the next morning it was coming & I think deep down you realize that now. You can driticize the crew all you want for not running the game plan, but a hail mary at that point when you’re already down by 3 touchdowns just doesn’t get it.
[QUOTE=alcor;38401]The intention would be to maintain BHP in order to ensure no further influx occurs. We’d need to maintain an overbalance. We would bleed off pressure to allow the bubble to expand, thereby reducing the pressure as it migrates. We don’t want to break down the weak formation so our overbalance is limited. We have to ensure that the influx volume size is known. We bleed off whatever volume is required to maintain BHP with a slight overbalance.
Our Rams are closed. We can even Shear the pipe. All is well.
Well intervention is not my speciality, but as you’ve pointed out we can run wireline to perforate the Production Casing and then circulate the gas out.
Where there’s a will there’s a way.
There are hundreds of recorded wells where bleeding and pumping has been a way of securing the well back to Primary well control.[/QUOTE]
When you have a flow path to pump. Have you never been on a job with a sand up & tried to pump in the well & couldn’t but the well could flow all day long back at you? We know the casing seal assembly was tested & that was done right. There is now way they could have done that if the casing seal wasn’t seated.
For those of you who don’t know how to perform a negative test on the Seal Assy here’s some relevant information:
We have 14 ppg mud in the well.
We run our drillpipe to 8300 ft.
We close our BOP.
We have SW in the Choke line.
We line up to Halliburton Cement unit down the Choke.
We equalise pressure by applying the difference in Hp of SW and 14 PPG mud to 5000 ft, which is 1404 psi.
Halliburton is reading 1404 psi on his guages.
We open the Choke line Failsafe valve.
No increase will be seen.
We bleed off 250 psi every 5 mins and observe for an increase in pressure.
If, at any point a pressure increase is seen, we have a leak.
We immediately re-establish full control of the well by getting Hallib to pump up to 1404 psi.
We know we have a leak.
BP’s problem.
How much gas did we allow to enter the Wellbore. The same volume the cementer bled off to go from one 250 psi interval to the next, a small amount, no more than a quarter Bbl. This may migrate.
We have established there is a leak somewhere in the well.
We don’t have a crystal ball. We don’t know where the leak is. But, we have re-established full control of the well, despite any irregularities that may exist in the well, despite any componenets that may have been what some consider to have been run ‘on the cheap’.
The point is that we, TO, have full control of the well and the vessel is safe.
From this point on, if we’re being badgered into taking other action then we are fools to even consider it.
No. Fullstop.
This well would never have blown out if the correct procedure for conducting a negative test had been in place.
Does anyone know what TO’s published procedure for negative testing is?
[QUOTE=alcor;38405]For those of you who don’t know how to perform a negative test on the Seal Assy here’s some relevant information:
We have 14 ppg mud in the well.
We run our drillpipe to 8300 ft.
We close our BOP.
We have SW in the Choke line.
We line up to Halliburton Cement unit down the Choke.
We equalise pressure by applying the difference in Hp of SW and 14 PPG mud to 5000 ft, which is 1404 psi.
Halliburton is reading 1404 psi on his guages.
We open the Choke line Failsafe valve.
No increase will be seen.
We bleed off 250 psi every 5 mins and observe for an increase in pressure.
If, at any point a pressure increase is seen, we have a leak.
We immediately re-establish full control of the well by getting Hallib to pump up to 1404 psi.
We know we have a leak.
BP’s problem.
How much gas did we allow to enter the Wellbore. The same volume the cementer bled off to go from one 250 psi interval to the next, a small amount, no more than a quarter Bbl. This may migrate.
We have established there is a leak somewhere in the well.
We don’t have a crystal ball. We don’t know where the leak is. But, we have re-established full control of the well, despite any irregularities that may exist in the well, despite any componenets that may have been what some consider to have been run ‘on the cheap’.
The point is that we, TO, have full control of the well and the vessel is safe.
From this point on, if we’re being badgered into taking other action then we are fools to even consider it.
No. Fullstop.[/QUOTE]
From this point the gas continues to migrate up the hole into the annulus. It eventually goes beyond the rupture disc pressure in the 16" It ruptures the disc between the 16" & the 18" casing shoe. It contiues to gather & increase pressure until it reaches 13,000 PSI & blows out from below the shoe uncontrolably until reaching the surface. It creates an enormous bubble so big it capsizes the rig & the stand by boat. all on board are thrown no telling where. The well now flows uncontrolably into the Gulf of mexico at God only knows what rate & very few if any people survive the capsizing of the vessel. That is a very likely scenario & you know it. Does anybody have that video of Kasol’s to repost?
The duty of the driller and logger is to observe and control volumes in the well. If this is not done then we may as well quit drilling. Volume and pressure are everything in our business.
If some idiot tells you to carry on regardless of your concerns, quit. And, contact MMS straight away if your company don’t back you up.
Does this mean we need drillers who can interpret what volume gain and pressure gain means?
You bet your sweet ass we do.
All operations are controlled.
[QUOTE=company man 1;38406]From this point the gas continues to migrate up the hole into the annulus. It eventually goes beyond the rupture disc pressure in the 16" It ruptures the disc between the 16" & the 18" casing shoe. It contiues to gather & increase pressure until it reaches 13,000 PSI & blows out from below the shoe uncontrolably until reaching the surface. It creates an enormous bubble so big it capsizes the rig & the stand by boat. all on board are thrown no telling where. The well now flows uncontrolably into the Gulf of mexico at God only knows what rate & very few if any people survive the capsizing of the vessel. That is a very likely scenario & you know it. Does anybody have that video of Kasol’s to repost?[/QUOTE]
Incorrect. Our 1/4 Bbl of gas has to be allowed to expand. We monitor the SICP on the Choke guage and bleed off as required at surface to ensure the WH integrity is not compromised. Our weak zone may help if the volumes are small, in that the bubble will expand on its own. The casing will not be ejected from the well. The Rams are closed, and pressure above and below the Seal Assy/Hanger are the same if a leak exists.
[QUOTE=alcor;38407]The duty of the driller and logger is to observe and control volumes in the well. If this is not done then we may as well quit drilling. Volume and pressure are everything in our business.
If some idiot tells you to carry on regardless of your concerns, quit. And, contact MMS straight away if your company don’t back you up.
Does this mean we need drillers who can interpret what volume gain and pressure gain means?
You bet your sweet ass we do.
All operations are controlled.[/QUOTE]
I won’t argue this point with you again since you haven’t even attempted to tell me I’m wrong. You, as well as Pumping Jack as well as Alf as well as Kasol and any others who have first hand experience on a rig all know that the way I explained it is the way it was going to happen. There was no choice. This well was either going to blow inside or outside of the 16" casing when the gas started migrating. The underbalance didn’t cause the migration. It just revealed it. The cause wasn’t well control failure during displacement, although I certainly agree with you that it didn’t help. The cause was putting nitrous oxide on 1500 horse power car without any breaks then telling the driver to put the pedal to the metal because it was all ok. In this case was the driver wrong for not checking the breaks first? You have that point, but it didn’t matter because he got in the middle of the track with cars going around him at over 200 miles an hour & it was either drive or get run over. But either way he was going to crash. Those choices were made days before this blowout occured.