Deepwater Horizon - Transocean Oil Rig Fire

[QUOTE=MikeDB;37379]Do you see the ties into my post on page 134?

Should Obama Resign over February 13?

By Kevin McCullough
Published June 21, 2010
| FOXNews.com

While defending his own policies President Obama has routinely been rude and sarcastic to his predecessor, George W. Bush. Yet Obama appears to be making the resident of the previous White House look like a genius compared to his own serious missteps in office.

Case in point – Interior Secretary Ken Salazar’s performance and the communication of priorities on the issue of oil rig safety in the Gulf of Mexico.
It seems incomprehensible that the president and other members of the administration still have jobs when it is now being reported that the federal government was apprised by BP on February 13 that the Deepwater Horizon oil rig was leaking oil and natural gas into the ocean floor.

In fact, according to documents in the administration’s possession, BP was fighting large cracks at the base of the well for roughly ten days in early February.
Further it seems the administration was also informed about this development, six weeks before to the rig’s fatal explosion when an engineer from the University of California, Berkeley, announced to the world a near miss of an explosion on the rig by stating, “They damn near blew up the rig.”

Article at http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2010/06/21/kevin-mccullough-obama-bp-spill-february-salazar-resign-change/[/QUOTE]

In my opinion, this opinion ‘piece’ is on the dramatic side of things to try and substantiate the author’s point of view.

It appears, Mr. President, that you were informed by BP about problems on Deepwater Horizon on February 13 and the company wanted your help. What did you say?

Show me where BP asked President Obama for help. The date in question, BP informed MMS they were having problems with fracturing. Can someone comment on this that knows the rules? Is it a requirement of an Operator to inform MMS of issues such as this? BP is reluctant to ask for help now, after the blowout. Do you really think they asked the government, the President no less, for help while they were drilling the well. And in SNL fashion. Really?

Pretty much the rest of his points rest with this ill-fated first point.

I didn’t write the article.

It’s at FOX News.

[QUOTE=company man 1;37385]A politically driven ratings system of zero help in determing the cause/ outcome in the GOM disaster.[/QUOTE]

CM1,

I agree with your comment, frankly. But what I’m getting at (or trying to), is, simply, this: assuming that one tries to buy gas from ‘good guys’ rather than ‘bad actors’, where should one go?

MikeDB
Losses to the formation is a common drilling problem. Thats why they have all the casing strings. They have a very small drilling window i.e difference between pore pressure and fracture of the formation. I just drilled a well where we struggled for 7 weeks to drill 200meters and lost 1800 m3 drilling fluid to the formations.

[QUOTE=company man 1;37368]Alvis this is a good story on the BOPs. I didn’t like the way they took it upon themselves to try to throw in the cement job with inacurate statements.[/QUOTE]

Time to look again at the sworn testimony of the prinicipals:

[B]Testimony of Miles Ezell, Transocean, senior tool-pusher[/B]
Miles Ezell, the senior tool-pusher on the Deepwater Horizon, gave a vivid and horrifying description of the destructive moments when the rig lost control of the well, and natural gas and oil shot to the surface and ignited, killing 11 of his colleagues. Ezell had handed off control of drilling operations to his relief, Jason Anderson. Ezell knew there was some concern about a negative pressure test conducted about 4 p.m. on April 20, and he offered to stay and help Anderson and the others. But Anderson told him, “I got this, I’ll call you if there’s a problem.” Ezell said he had worked with Anderson a long time and trusted him completely. “He was probably more experienced shutting in kicks than anybody on the Deepwater Horizon,” Ezell said of Anderson. “In fact, he’d just been offered a position running well-control training.” A few hours later, Anderson was killed by a kick of gas that shot out of control.
Ezell said he was just settling in to sleep when he got a call from the drill floor.
"It was 10 minutes to 10. It was Steve Curtis, the assistant driller. He said, ‘We have a situation, the well is blowing out, we have mud going to the crown.’ I was just horrified. I said, ‘Do y’allhave it shut in?’ He said, ‘Jason’s shutting it in now.’ Then he said, and I’ll never forget this: ‘Randy, we need your help.’"
As Ezell went to get his boots, an explosion threw him across the room and against a bulkhead. Heavy smoke filled the quarters and methane droplets hit his face, he said. He found a colleague, Wyman Wheeler, lying in the rubble. Then he found a visiting official from Transocean crying for help under a pile of debris. He stayed with his comrades until stretchers came and helped them into life rafts.
[B]Testimony of Christopher Haire, Halliburton, cementer:[/B]Senior Chief Petty Officer Mike O’Berry / U.S. Coast Guard Christopher Haire, a cementer with Halliburton, discusses what transpired aboard the Deepwater Horizon rig when it exploded, April 20. The Halliburton employee who performed several of the cement lining jobs on the Deepwater Horizon said Friday that only the deepest casing in the well was closed with a new kind of light, quicker-curing nitrogen-infused cement.
The testimony from cementer Christopher Haire was something of a surprise because Jimmy Harrell, the top drilling official on the rig when it exploded in the Gulf on April 20, testified Thursday that the rig had only used the nitrified cement on shallower casings. Harrell said he’d been warned that nitrogen from the cement could get in the well hole and cause problems.
The well plan had changed several times before the incident, in which natural gas and oil got into the well and shot up the marine riser to the rig, igniting in huge fireballs.
[B]Final testimony of Chris Pleasant, Transocean, subsea supervisor:[/B]
Senior Chief Petty Officer Mike O’Berry / U.S. Coast Guard ChristopherPleasant, a subsea supervisor with Transocean, testifies at the Deepwater Horizon joint investigation hearing Friday. Contrary to prior testimony from other rig leaders and BP’s drilling engineerthat tests gave no reason for concern and conditions were safe for the Deepwater Horizon to displace heavy drilling mud the evening of April20, the rig’s subsea supervisor testified Friday that workers were confused by some test results that showed possible leaks in the well.
Chris Pleasant, the man in charge of the blowout preventer and other well systems on the sea floor, said he was part of lengthy discussions about fluid losses during a negative pressure test about four hours before the accident.
In a negative pressure test, the well head is shut off using annular valves in the massive blowout preventer device on the sea floor, and workers measure whether pressure causes any mud to come up to the rig from the marine riser that runs down to the well.
Pleasant said when he began his shift that day, he went to the drill floor and found a tool-pusher, one of the main drilling crew, discussing results of the negative pressure test with Robert Kaluza, BP’s top official on the rig. He said the tool-pusher, Wyman Wheeler, was concerned that barrels of mud had leaked out during the pressure test. The workers disagreed about where the mud had been lost.
Pleasant said Kaluza, who invoked his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination this week to avoid testifying, was the one who insisted that the test results weren’t satisfactory.
“Bob Kaluza said that according to APD (the rig’s permit to drill), we didn’t achieve the results,” Pleasant said.
Similarly, Christopher Haire, a cementer for Halliburton, said drillers were “unsatisfied” with the negative test, which returned 15barrels of mud, rather than the ideal of no mud released.
And yet, the top drilling official on the rig, Offshore Installation Manager Jimmy Harrell, and BP’s well designer on shore, Mark Hafle, testified previously that they believed the pressure tests were successful and no cause for concern.
Kaluza and the other BP man on the rig, Donald Vidrine, ended up deciding to alter some valve pressures and do a second negative test that showed no mud returns and that Pleasant agreed appeared to be a successful test.
[B]Earlier testimony of Chris Pleasant, Transocean, subsea supervisor:[/B]
Moments after explosions rang out and set the Deepwater Horizon on fire April 20, the man in charge of the blowout preventer that’s supposed to close the well on the sea floor said he asked the captain to hit an emergency disconnect system.
“Calm down! We’re not EDS’ing,” Capt. Curt Kuchta told subsea engineer Chris Pleasant, according to Pleasant’s testimony Friday before a Marine Board panel investigating the incident.
But about 30 seconds later, with total chaos on the rig, Pleasant decided on his own to hit the emergency button, which would trigger the blowout preventer’s shear rams to close the well and unhitch the rig. It didn’t work.
“It went through the sequence at the panel, but it (the signal to disconnect) never left the panel. I had no hydraulics,” Pleasant recalled.
He said it was about four or five minutes later when Kuchta decided it was time to get the rig off the well.
"The captain asks Daun Winslow (a visiting Transocean official), ‘Do we EDS?’ The captain comes over and tells me to EDS, not knowing I already hit the button."
Pleasant said he had the authority to activate the emergency disconnect.
“I am the authority,” he said. “It’s my equipment.”
[B]Testimony of Mark Hafle, BP drilling engineer:[/B]
Petty Officer 2nd Class Thomas M. Blue / U.S. Coast Guard Mark Hafle, with BP, testifies at the Deepwater Horizon joint investigation hearing into the incident in Kenner on Friday. A BP engineer who helped design the Gulf oil well that exploded April 20wouldn’t admit that his handiwork led to the disaster, despite brow-beatings from a lawyer and a member of the federal investigative panel.
Mark Hafle, the BP drilling engineer who wrote plans for well casings and cement seals on the Deepwater Horizon’s well, testified that the well had lost thousands of barrels of mud at the bottom. But he said models run onshore showed alterations to the cement program would resolve the issues, and when asked if a cement failure allowed the well to “flow” gas and oil, he wouldn’t capitulate.
Hafle said he made several changes to casing designs in the last few days before the well blew, including the addition of the two casing liners that weren’t part of the original well design because of problems where the earthen sides of the well were “ballooning.” He also worked with Halliburton engineers to design a plan for sealing the well casings with cement.
John McCarroll from Minerals Management Service, a member of a six-person investigative panel holding hearings in Kenner, couldn’t hold back his opinion that cement failures allowed the well to flow as he questioned Hafle.
“Don’t you think for that size casing, you set up your Halliburton cementer for failure, especially when you had a loss return zone (where drilling mud was seeping into the earth) below the hole?” McCarroll pointedly asked.
“I believe it’s a sound engineering practice,” said Hafle, who said the internal investigation would have to be completed before anyone knows what went wrong.
“Personally, I would not want to try to attempt that,” McCarroll added.
Ned Kohnke, a lawyer for Transocean, the owner of the Deepwater Horizon rig, also asked Hafle pointed questions, especially about BP’s decision not to run a key cement integrity test called a cement bondlog. Kohnke told Hafle that The Times-Picayune had reported that BP sent a team of testers home before performing that test, but Hafle said he wasn’t aware of that.
Hafle gave what appeared to be conflicting testimony about the cement bond log, considered by engineers to be the “gold standard” of testing cement jobs. Initially, when asked why no cement bond log was conducted, Hafle said it was because “we had not gotten that far in the well plan when the incident (blowout) occurred.” But later on, he said there was no plan to conduct the test and the crew was about to close off the well with a final plug, which would close of the well to cement bond log tests.
Kohnke asked Hafle what could have gone wrong if it wasn’t BP’s cement design, but Hafle said he wouldn’t speculate.
“I don’t believe you’ll ever find out how the hydrocarbons got in the well bore,” he said.
© 2010 NOLA.com. All rights reserved. http://blog.nola.com/2010_gulf_oil_spill/print.html?entry=/2010/05/oil_spill_hearings_transocean.html

[B]Hearings: BP representative overruled drillers, insisted on displacing mud with seawater[/B]
[I]This is an update from the [B]joint U.S. Coast Guard and Minerals Management Service hearings[/B] in Kenner Wednesday into the [B]explosion and fire aboard the Deepwater Horizon oil rig[/B] on April 20, which killed 11 workers and created the [B]Gulf of Mexico oil spill[/B] currently fouling Louisiana’s coast.[/I]
Chris Granger / The Times-Picayune Members of the investigation team, from left to right, Lt. Robert Butts, Ross Wheatley, and Capt. Hung Nguyen, listen to testimony from Capt. Carl Smith at the Radisson Hotel in Kenner on Wednesday.
The chief mechanic on the Deepwater Horizon testified Wednesday that he was at a planning meeting 11 hours before the rig exploded at which the BP company man overruled drillers from rig owner Transocean and insisted on displacing protective drilling mud from the riser that connected the rig to the oil well.
“I recall a skirmish between the company man, the OIM (offshore installation manager), the tool-pusher and the driller,” said Doug Brown, one of 115 rig workers who survived the April 20 disaster. "The driller was outlining what would be taking place, whereupon the company man stood up and said, ‘No, we’ll be having some changes to that.’ It had to do with displacing the riser for later on. The OIM, tool-pusher and driller disagreed with that, but the company man said, ‘Well, this is how it’s gonna be,’ and the tool-pusher, driller and OIM reluctantly agreed."
Before Brown came to the witness stand at the hearings in Kenner, a ship captain with 15 years of drilling experience told the joint investigative panel that he doesn’t know why a rig would displace the protective column of heavy mud with light seawater before closing off a well.
“That’s something you learn at well-control school,” said Capt. Carl Smith, a former Coast Guard captain serving as an expert witness for the panel. "If you’re circulating fluid, you need to monitor how much is going in and how much is coming out. If you get more fluid out than in, it’s an indicator that something’s going on."
Smith testified that there is an inherent conflict on any drilling rig between the company that’s leasing the rig and oilfield and the drilling operators. He said the “company man” represents a firm that leases the rig and often pays $500,000 a day to drill for the oil, so is concerned about speed and cost. The crew, meanwhile, is generally more concerned about safety and controlling the well, he said.
“That’s a natural point of conflict that I’ve seen,” Smith said. "Some (company men) have become outright adversaries, but they’re the people paying the bills. They control helicopters, the boats, what’s going on and off the rig. But I have to say, most of them are safety conscious."
© 2010 NOLA.com. All rights reserved. http://blog.nola.com/2010_gulf_oil_spill/print.html?entry=/2010/05/hearings_bp_representative_ove.html

[B]Hearings: Transocean official denies BP pressured them to complete work quickly[/B]
Published: Thursday, May 27, 2010, 9:34 AM Updated: Thursday, May 27, 2010, 10:15 AM
[B]David Hammer, The Times-Picayune [/B]

[I]This is an update from the [B]joint hearings[/B] by the U.S. Coast Guard and Minerals Management Service held in Kenner Thursday into the explosion and fire aboard the [B]Deepwater Horizon oil rig[/B] on April 20, which killed 11 workers and created the Gulf of Mexico [B]oil spill[/B] currently fouling Louisiana’s coast.[/I]
Transocean’s top drilling official on the Deepwater Horizon said he was wrapped up with hosting top BP officials in the hours before his rig blew up April 20, but he denied Thursday that his crew was under any pressure from BP to complete its work more quickly.
Under tough questioning by Jason Mathews of the federal Minerals Management Service, the rig’s offshore installation manager, Jimmy Harrell, said the cost of delays at the oilfield 50 miles off the Louisiana coast was not compromising safety on the rig.
“So there was no pressure at all about being about $20 million behind?” Mathews asked, referring to documents showing the Deepwater Horizon had been scheduled to start work at another oilfield 43 days earlier.
“I’m sure at times people want to get it done and want to meet timelines,” said Harrell in his Mississippi drawl. "But never to jeopardize safety."
BP had sent some high-level personnel to the rig the day of the accident, led by Pat O’Brien, the corporate vice president for drilling, to congratulate the rig’s crew for seven years without a lost-time incident and to discuss the completion of work at the exploratory well. Harrell said he spent a lot of time the day of the accident meeting with the company representatives and giving tours.
Mathews and another panel member, Russ Wheatley of the Coast Guard, wanted to know if the executives were there to put pressure on the crew, which had been forced to drill a bypass well in March, to speed up.
“It’s part of the job,” Harrell said. "No pressure concerns whatsoever."
Harrell, who said he was taking a shower when explosions set the rig on fire, said he directed the subsea engineer, Chris Pleasant, to activate the emergency disconnect system, which would have separated the rig from its drilling riser and the spewing well so the vessel could at least get away. Harrell said he saw Pleasant press the activation switch, but it didn’t work.
He also said that as he stumbled from his quarters to the bridge, he saw the control panel that’s used to activate the blowout preventer, a four-story stack of valves and pistons at the bottom of the sea that acts as a final fail-safe to shut off the well. He said it “wasn’t normal,” that yellow lights indicating certain functions were “blocked” or in a neutral position, were more prevalent than usual.
Attempts to activate the blowout preventer also failed.
© 2010 NOLA.com. All rights reserved. http://blog.nola.com/2010_gulf_oil_spill/print.html?entry=/2010/05/hearings_transocean_official_d.html
A prominent Houston attorney with a long record of winning settlements from oil companies says he has new evidence suggesting that the Deepwater Horizon’s top managers knew of problems with the rig before it exploded last month, causing the worst oil spill in US history. Tony Buzbee, a lawyer representing 15 rig workers and dozens of shrimpers, seafood restaurants, and dock workers, says he has obtained a three-page signed statement from a crew member on the boat that rescued the burning rig’s workers. The sailor, who Buzbee refuses to name for fear of costing him his job, was on the ship’s bridge when Deepwater Horizon installation manager Jimmy Harrell, a top employee of rig owner Transocean, was speaking with someone in Houston via satellite phone. Buzbee told [I]Mother Jones[/I] that, according to this witness account, Harrell was screaming, "Are you fucking happy? Are you fucking happy? The rig’s on fire! I told you this was gonna happen."
Whoever was on the other end of the line was apparently trying to calm Harrell down. “I am fucking calm,” he went on, according to Buzbee. "You realize the rig is burning?"
At that point, the boat’s captain asked Harrell to leave the bridge. It wasn’t clear whether Harrell had been talking to Transocean, BP, or someone else.
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2010/06/the-rigs-on-fire-i-told-you-this-was-gonna-happen/57775/

<more>

[B]Hearings: Transocean official untroubled about various red-flag issues[/B]
Published: Thursday, May 27, 2010, 11:06 AM Updated: Thursday, May 27, 2010, 3:31 PM
[I]This is an update from the [B]joint hearings[/B] by the U.S. Coast Guard and Minerals Management Service held in Kenner Thursday into the explosion and fire aboard the [B]Deepwater Horizon oil rig[/B] on April 20, which killed 11 workers and created the Gulf of Mexico [B]oil spill[/B] currently fouling Louisiana’s coast.[/I]
[B]Final testimony from Jimmy Harrell of Transocean:[/B]
Harrell, Transocean offshore installation manager on the Deepwater Horizon oil rig, testifies during a joint hearing held by the Coast Guard and the Interior Department’s Minerals Management Service in Kenner, La., Thursday. The hearing was held to investigate last month’s explosion of the Deepwater Horizon, which has caused a massive oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico.
Throughout his testimony, Harrell expressed little concern about issues that panelists and lawyers for the various companies suggested could have raised red flags.
For example, Harrell said the reason he was suddenly handed a BP plan that didn’t include the key negative pressure test was that BP was constantly changing the well plan. He said the company had added additional casings, the various size pipes that line the well, and he said the one that didn’t include the pressure test had not been approved by federal regulators.
The rig’s senior tool pusher, Miles Ezell, told Harrell once they were safe on the rescue ship that the rig had lost control of the well at 9:45 p.m., about eight minutes before the explosion. Harrell said the driller or tool pusher is authorized to activate the blowout preventer in case of lost well control. He said Ezell got word the well was being shut in, although it’s now clear the blowout preventer didn’t work.
Harrell said that when he’d started his stint on the rig a few weeks before the incident, there was a “tick” on the blowout preventer’s test ram when it was in the open position. But he said he wasn’t worried about it and felt the blowout preventer was functioning well before the incident.
Next to the blowout preventer, the only other emergency action the rig can take is to unhitch from the well equipment and sail away. But when the disaster struck, that system failed to work, too, Harrell testified.
“It appeared they had been taken out from the explosion,” he said.
[B]Previous testimony of Jimmy Harrell:[/B]
Members of the investigative board also asked Harrell questions that followed up on Wednesday’s testimony by [B]Douglas Brown[/B], the rig’s chief mechanic. Brown had said Harrell got into a “skirmish” with BP’s company man at a meeting the morning of the incident. Harrell said he actually expressed concern to BP company man Robert Kaluza that a new drilling plan did not include a key test at a morning meeting April 19, the day before the accident.
Harrell said Kaluza’s plan did not include a “negative test” to measure pressure in the well, and Harrell said he made sure the test was done before he would agree to displace mud from the riser with lighter seawater. He said he was successful at getting BP to authorize the test and, in fact, the test was performed twice. Harrell said the other BP company man, Don Vidrine, wanted to do the second negative test.
Harrell said he was happy with the results of the two negative tests, which, ideally, would have shown no drilling mud being returned to the rig. But he acknowledged that the first negative test returned 23 barrels of mud and the second test returned 15 barrels. According to previous testimony, a total of 51 barrels of cement slurry was used to seal the well casing.
Federal regulations require drilling rigs to perform a definitive test of the integrity of a well’s cement – called a cement bond log – if there are concerns with the results of negative and positive pressure tests. Harrell said BP had a team from Schlumberger at the ready to perform a cement bond log, but Harrell said he was happy with the results of the negative test.
A Schlumberger official told The Times-Picayune last week that the team of testers was sent home at 11 a.m. the morning of the accident without ever conducting the cement bond log.
Robert Kaluza declined to testify Thursday, invoking his Fifth Amendment right against self incrimination.
Harrell testified that BP decided not to do a so-called bottoms-up test, which takes a sample of the drilling mud from the deepest part of the well to measure pressures and temperatures there. An attorney for Halliburton, the cementing contractor on the rig, asked Harrell if he was aware that Halliburton had “recommended running substantially more mud than BP decided to run,” but Harrell said he was not aware of that and wasn’t concerned about the lack of a bottoms-up test.
Douglas Brown also testified Wednesday that he’d heard Harrell leave the morning meeting and say in frustration, “Well, I guess that’s what we have those pinchers for.” Harrell said he may have said that and would have been referring to the possibility that they would have to employ the last-ditch shear rams on the blowout preventer to shut off the well in an emergency. He said the reason he would have said that was to prepare his crew for the possibility that the cement, a relatively new kind of nitrogen-infused cement from Halliburton, could cause problems.
Harrell said the Deepwater Horizon had used the nitrified cement to seal well casings at shallow depths, but never on the full length of a well as deep as this one. He said he’d heard of other rigs where nitrogen from the cement got into the riser and caused problems. The nitrified cement is supposed to bond faster and prevent the slurry from channeling into the surrounding rock formation.
[B]Jimmy Harrell’s opening testimony:[/B]
Transocean’s top drilling official on the Deepwater Horizon said he was wrapped up with hosting top BP officials in the hours before his rig blew up April 20, but he denied Thursday that his crew was under any pressure from BP to complete its work more quickly.
Under tough questioning by Jason Mathews of the federal Minerals Management Service, the rig’s offshore installation manager, Jimmy Harrell, said the cost of delays at the oilfield 50 miles off the Louisiana coast was not compromising safety on the rig.
“So there was no pressure at all about being about $20 million behind?” Mathews asked, referring to documents showing the Deepwater Horizon had been scheduled to start work at another oilfield 43 days earlier.
“I’m sure at times people want to get it done and want to meet timelines,” said Harrell in his Mississippi drawl. "But never to jeopardize safety."
BP had sent some high-level personnel to the rig the day of the accident, led by Pat O’Brien, the corporate vice president for drilling, to congratulate the rig’s crew for seven years without a lost-time incident and to discuss the completion of work at the exploratory well. Harrell said he spent a lot of time the day of the accident meeting with the company representatives and giving tours.
Mathews and another panel member, Russ Wheatley of the Coast Guard, wanted to know if the executives were there to put pressure on the crew, which had been forced to drill a bypass well in March, to speed up.
“It’s part of the job,” Harrell said. "No pressure concerns whatsoever."
Harrell, who said he was taking a shower when explosions set the rig on fire, said he directed the subsea engineer, Chris Pleasant, to activate the emergency disconnect system, which would have separated the rig from its drilling riser and the spewing well so the vessel could at least get away. Harrell said he saw Pleasant press the activation switch, but it didn’t work.
He also said that as he stumbled from his quarters to the bridge, he saw the control panel that’s used to activate the blowout preventer, a four-story stack of valves and pistons at the bottom of the sea that acts as a final fail-safe to shut off the well. He said it “wasn’t normal,” that yellow lights indicating certain functions were “blocked” or in a neutral position, were more prevalent than usual.
Attempts to activate the blowout preventer also failed.
© 2010 NOLA.com. All rights reserved. http://blog.nola.com/2010_gulf_oil_spill/print.html?entry=/2010/05/hearings_transocean_official_u.html

[QUOTE=company man 1;37383]Wow! That was a lot of reading. I hate to do this because TO is partly to share in this responsibility also. But the two most important things I took away from the article were that BP had TO change part of its defense mechanism to a test mechanism to save time & money & they clearly stated that at least half of the shear ram piston functioned fully. It sounds as if they did not even check the other half. Would they not want to know if the other half also functioned fully? That was very vague & open ended. There have to be changes made in MMS enforcement ability as well as culture. They must have redundant shear rams as part of a BOP system also.[/QUOTE]
Since the single point of failure (associated with a catostrophic event, see earlier link to the 2001 examination), was identified as a shuttle valve in the blind shear mechanism, you would think they would have checked both halves…?

Waves to Alcor who I don’t think should have been banned even if I don’t always agree with him.
Admins-- don’t ban [I]me[/I] for this plz plz plz- his private IM is shut down too so…

Sorry, I just couldn’t let this pass. Really? They trust the Captain of the DWH with the ship and all the souls, but not a knife? (Since I also was a rigger way back when, I could not imagine doing my job without my trusty Gerber 440 Stainless Steel sheathed dagger I had re-cut with a serrated edge. Considered it a piece of life saving equiment…)

(Captain) “Kuchta said he watched his crew board lifeboats and helped eight people get on a life raft, which is released to the sea 75 feet below. When that life raft left, he had to manually crank the raft release back to the deck. Rather than do that, he decided to jump.
“I don’t want to do that again,” he said.
After he landed in the water, he said he had to swim to a small craft and get a knife so he could cut the life raft that had lowered without him free from the burning rig. He didn’t have a knife on him because of a company policy against knives on board the rig, he said.” http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/05/hearings_rig_captain_recounts.html

I watched the whole CGMMS hearing again this weekend. Out of curiosity, Hafle at one point states that (I’m paraphrasing) [I]no other company in the GOM runs cbls on this kind of job[/I]. I find that to be a dramatic statement. Is that true? From my reading of documents about cementing in this kind of well, it is recommended to use them, especially when shorting on centralizers and running nitrogen foamed cement on the final production casing string, and with losses in the zone. Yet, he states that no other companies do it in the GOM either. If this is so, is it a best practice, or, a fallacy of common practice?

He says one other thing that catches my attention, and I’ll paraphrase; He doesn’t agree that cementing needs or is supposed to isolate the production zone, or to prevent the flow hydrocarbons into the system, before moving off, apparently because he has one other barrier to rely on, (and because a completions crew can come back in and fix it.) Isn’t that an egregious error to make with redundant barriers? Isn’t the idea to have multiple [I]fully functioning[/I] barriers?

[QUOTE=Cynthia;37395]I watched the whole CGMMS hearing again this weekend. Out of curiosity, Hafle at one point states that (I’m paraphrasing) [I]no other company in the GOM runs cbls on this kind of job[/I]. I find that to be a dramatic statement. Is that true? From my reading of documents about cementing in this kind of well, it is recommended to use them, especially when shorting on centralizers and running nitrogen foamed cement on the final production casing string, and with losses in the zone. Yet, he states that no other companies do it in the GOM either. If this is so, is it a best practice, or, a fallacy of common practice?

He says one other thing that catches my attention, and I’ll paraphrase; He doesn’t agree that cementing needs or is supposed to isolate the production zone, or to prevent the flow hydrocarbons into the system, before moving off, apparently because he has one other barrier to rely on, (and because a completions crew can come back in and fix it.) Isn’t that an egregious error to make with redundant barriers? Isn’t the idea to have multiple [I]fully functioning[/I] barriers? [/QUOTE]
Who is Hafle again?

[QUOTE=Cynthia;37395]I watched the whole CGMMS hearing again this weekend. Out of curiosity, Hafle at one point states that (I’m paraphrasing) [I]no other company in the GOM runs cbls on this kind of job[/I]. I find that to be a dramatic statement. Is that true? From my reading of documents about cementing in this kind of well, it is recommended to use them, especially when shorting on centralizers and running nitrogen foamed cement on the final production casing string, and with losses in the zone. Yet, he states that no other companies do it in the GOM either. If this is so, is it a best practice, or, a fallacy of common practice?

He says one other thing that catches my attention, and I’ll paraphrase; He doesn’t agree that cementing needs or is supposed to isolate the production zone, or to prevent the flow hydrocarbons into the system, before moving off, apparently because he has one other barrier to rely on, (and because a completions crew can come back in and fix it.) Isn’t that an egregious error to make with redundant barriers? Isn’t the idea to have multiple [I]fully functioning[/I] barriers? [/QUOTE]
I know who Hafle is now. That just sums up the stupidity followed by denial. It sounds like 5-10 in Angola could teach this guy some responsibility & remorse. It sure doesn’t sound like he had any at the hearing.

thanks so much[QUOTE=KASOL;37377]Many rigs have realtime cameras that can be viewed onshore. Since 2005 have had access to all rig cameras from operations rooms onshore on projects I have worked. You can switch cameras onshore but you are not allowed to “move cameras” from onshore.

Read: http://www.csg.no/pdf/30_08_07_Statoil.pdf

Most major oil companies have this today.

With this technology we are one team on it is not “rig vs beach”.

Normal way of working:

  1. Drilling guidelines developed onshore
  2. Rig "Drillers work instruction written offshore by DSV and Drilling Engineer based on drilling guideline.
  3. Meeting held with rig contractor(TP) and all involved service contractor( DD, mud, cement, ROV etc) to finalize drillers work instruction offshore.
  4. Drillers work instrucution sendt onshore for review by onshore Drilling Superintendent and engineers as well as Rig Manager and service provider coordinators.
  5. Meeting held, often video meeting, with beach/rig. Reviewing and agreeing on final procedure/drillers work instruction.

Then beach and rig agree an the way forward.
Example of camera from “Blow out”: It happens qucikly!

//youtu.be/sYTO_0_0ReQ
[/QUOTE]

LOL i don t know how i did it, but i did ,do it,didnt i?

Kasol, Now i wanna work on an oil rig,can I?,Best I stick to nursing, tho, 'cause I think I would be hanging from a Teather after one of those blowouts,and CMI would be yellin “mannnn overboard”!!

Been out for a while thought I’d bring back my call for Thad Allen to resign.

Why you ask?

Because of the continued use of the dispersants among other things.

Something everyone should know about Corexit:
http://activepatriot.org/index.php?topic=28.msg249;topicseen#new

Yes, Corexit is toxic. Yes, Nalco (who makes it) is located in the Illinois 13th District. And, Yes, that is Obama’s old Congressional District. Oh, and Yes, Warren Buffet is it’s second largest share holder.

Some people are getting very rich off of using a chemical which will harm Americans and may have the potential to spread a disaster in the Gulf into American Farm Lands. I call this as no less than treasonous.

The Coast Guard’s Mission:

The U.S. Coast Guard’s mission is to protect the public, the environment, and U.S. economic interests — in the nation’s ports and waterways, along the coast, on international waters, or in any maritime region as required to support national security.

Source: http://www.uscg.mil/civilian/wa_mission.asp

Thad Allen has betrayed the mission of the Coast Guard and should never be allowed to wear the uniform again.

Damn the media, government and every individual putting money above Country. “Country First” is not a damn campaign slogan to me. I have lived it.

[QUOTE=OldHondoHand;37394]Sorry, I just couldn’t let this pass. Really? They trust the Captain of the DWH with the ship and all the souls, but not a knife? (Since I also was a rigger way back when, I could not imagine doing my job without my trusty Gerber 440 Stainless Steel sheathed dagger I had re-cut with a serrated edge. Considered it a piece of life saving equiment…)

(Captain) “Kuchta said he watched his crew board lifeboats and helped eight people get on a life raft, which is released to the sea 75 feet below. When that life raft left, he had to manually crank the raft release back to the deck. Rather than do that, he decided to jump.
“I don’t want to do that again,” he said.
After he landed in the water, he said he had to swim to a small craft and get a knife so he could cut the life raft that had lowered without him free from the burning rig. He didn’t have a knife on him because of a company policy against knives on board the rig, he said.” http://www.nola.com/news/gulf-oil-spill/index.ssf/2010/05/hearings_rig_captain_recounts.html[/QUOTE]

Typical 2 dimensional safety management offshore. Knives have been against policy since 2001, if I remember? Same with BP, XOM, TO, BHP,Shell on rigs.

Dispersit is the other option for a dispersant, but is much more expensive, COrexit is veryyyy acidic, with a PH of 6.2=KASOL;37377]Many rigs have realtime cameras that can be viewed onshore. Since 2005 have had access to all rig cameras from operations rooms onshore on projects I have worked. You can switch cameras onshore but you are not allowed to “move cameras” from onshore.

Read: http://www.csg.no/pdf/30_08_07_Statoil.pdf

Most major oil companies have this today.

With this technology we are one team on it is not “rig vs beach”.

Normal way of working:

  1. Drilling guidelines developed onshore
  2. Rig "Drillers work instruction written offshore by DSV and Drilling Engineer based on drilling guideline.
  3. Meeting held with rig contractor(TP) and all involved service contractor( DD, mud, cement, ROV etc) to finalize drillers work instruction offshore.
  4. Drillers work instrucution sendt onshore for review by onshore Drilling Superintendent and engineers as well as Rig Manager and service provider coordinators.
  5. Meeting held, often video meeting, with beach/rig. Reviewing and agreeing on final procedure/drillers work instruction.

Then beach and rig agree an the way forward.
Example of camera from “Blow out”: It happens qucikly!

//youtu.be/sYTO_0_0ReQ
[/QUOTE]

[QUOTE=ActivePatriot;37402]Been out for a while thought I’d bring back my call for Thad Allen to resign.

Why you ask?

Because of the continued use of the dispersants among other things.

Something everyone should know about Corexit:
http://activepatriot.org/index.php?topic=28.msg249;topicseen#new

Yes, Corexit is toxic. Yes, Nalco (who makes it) is located in the Illinois 13th District. And, Yes, that is Obama’s old Congressional District. Oh, and Yes, Warren Buffet is it’s second largest share holder.

Some people are getting very rich off of using a chemical which will harm Americans and may have the potential to spread a disaster in the Gulf into American Farm Lands. I call this as no less than treasonous.

The Coast Guard’s Mission:

Source: http://www.uscg.mil/civilian/wa_mission.asp

Thad Allen has betrayed the mission of the Coast Guard and should never be allowed to wear the uniform again.

Damn the media, government and every individual putting money above Country. “Country First” is not a damn campaign slogan to me. I have lived it.[/QUOTE]

Larry King is hosting Disaster in the gulf now

Just so no one looses sight of this conflict of testimony. (There is a nugget here, me thinks…)

[I][U]Jimmy Harrell[/U]’[/I]s (Transocean’s top drilling official on the Deepwater Horizon) opening testimony:
Mathews and another panel member, Russ Wheatley of the Coast Guard, wanted to know if the executives were there to put pressure on the crew, which had been forced to drill a bypass well in March, to speed up. “It’s part of the job,” Harrell said. “[B]No pressure concerns whatsoever[/B].” (Perhaps a better question would have been were you receiving pressure from shore …)

Tony Buzbee, a lawyer representing 15 rig workers …says he has obtained a three-page signed statement from a crew member on the boat that rescued the burning rig’s workers. The sailor… was on the ship’s bridge when Deepwater Horizon installation manager [U][I]Jimmy Harrell[/I][/U], a top employee of rig owner Transocean, was speaking with someone in Houston via satellite phone. Buzbee told Mother Jones that, according to this witness account, Harrell was screaming, “[B]Are you [/B]f_cking [B]happy[/B]? [B]Are you[/B] f_cking [B]happy[/B]? [B]The rig’s on fire! I told you this was gonna happen[/B].”

Sat phone records are an easy subpoena… one day we will know. Thanks HondoHand for your diligent posting.

On another note, NY Times on line article was very well written. http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/21/us/21blowout.html?ref=global-home

Had results of the Cobalt 60 radiography of the BOP. Said on one side the shear ram extended and “locked” with the safety wedge that holds the ram in the closed position. Other side of the shear ram either didn’t move or couldn’t move. Cause unknown. They doubled the hydraulic design pressure on the ram, and still no effect.

The fumes from corexic is prob. like mixing bleach with comet. One should wear a “respirator” ,a mask we use in the hospital when caring for T.B. pt’s. or other infectious air born pathogens. Its a very lite mask similar to the common hospt masks we ve seen on tv