[QUOTE=Frarig;37262]Thanks for that, Alvis. At least now I know where they put the test rams! Doesn’t change my thinking much, though.[/QUOTE]
What is your thinking on this? You have advanced background that uniquely qualifies you to be an expert on the BOPs. Do you think BP is being honest in their assessments ? Do you think BP was even competent to perform the post blowout prcedures without TO being present ? Do you think BP is capable of making post blowout alterations that could lend to their credibility at the expense of TO?
[QUOTE=alcor;37258]That’s amazing! A fucker who wants to abuse me now asks for my thoughts.
You should have come up with the answer long ago.
Firstly, the initial pumping sequence took place to displace 14 ppg mud with SW as far as the BOP. The Annular was then closed.
What was the SPP reading? 1480 psi.
What should it have read? 1000 psi.
Is this a good enough time to stop pumping?
Close Annulars. Close Rams. Shear the pipe. Bullhead everything back into the formation. Just keep pumping like fuck. If both Seal Assy and Plugs are gone then just pump and pray that the flow goes both annulus and hole. Who knows you might seat the Plug again and flow may then go down the Annulus.
One things for sure, there’s a rig still floating in this scenario. The leak to the GOM may come later if the WH/Casing is compromised.
And, who carried out the inflow tests? Was it Halliburton? Did the TO OIM doubt the tests?
Then why the fuck did he allow the fucking displacement to take place. He is 100% in charge, not BP.
You want to know what I’d do in this scenario. I’d tell BP to go fuck themselves. We’re not displacing without proper tests. And, I’ve never heard of attempting to Bump the Plug 9 times (who the fuck called that one?).
My opinion is that the well could have been saved.
As to your opinion, I couldn’t give a fuck for it.[/QUOTE]
Meh.
Apparently somebody got their wittew feewings hurt. Do you “want your life back” too? Please tell it to the fishing and tourism industries in the GOM that are losing everything they own because bp’s shit ass practices and incompetence (and other culpable parties) have, like, [I]destroyed the entire ecosystem of the Gulf of Mexico[/I]. Maybe you can have them shed a tear for you over how poorly you have been treated when all you’ve tried to do is minimize bp’s involvement in this clusterfuck.
BTW, they did “pump like fuck”. They called it Top Kill. How well did that work out?
You keep on saying (from your lofty position) that “the well could have been saved.” Yeah? Well when? Before they even began to complete it with bp’s shitty design, that’s my answer. Your answer has been whatever minimizes bp’s culpability. Is there a wonder you get dumped on?
As for me, I could care less who gets strung up, nearly everyone involved is culpable to more or less degree. Kill them all, let God sort them out.
As for your not giving a fuck about my opinion, why am I not surprised? The only opinion you seem impressed with is your own; another trait you share with bp? As for me, I really don’t care about your overall opinion either, but I do enjoy your contortions as you flit from one line of bp ass-covering to the next.
Y’know, at first I thought you were English, or maybe Norwegian, but now I think you are Dutch. I’ve worked with Dutch people extensively the last few years and it’s true: you can tell the Dutch, but you can’t tell them much.
[QUOTE=company man 1;37261]I appreciate your reply. What needs to be done now is vetting by an independent source. If I am correct, most of these allegations were made by BP. Right now BP’s word isn’t worth a warm buket of spit. I would not put it past them to lie about any of this. I also would not put it past them not to even know how to perform the procedures to properly work these devices without the direct assistance of TO. Do you have any independent studies that can confirm this. I for one definitley think Pumping Jack’s claim of nitrified foam cement having a neutral effect at best & being downright dangerous at worst, especially considering all the other shortcuts & changes made to the well design should be added to this list. The resposible party/ parties are problematic. I would have to give HallCO. some share of the responsibilty for letting BP make them pump this batch of hog slop in these conditions. It also gave BP ammo to fingerpoint at them. Show of hands please?[/QUOTE]
Some relevant expert witness testimony about this well from the Senate Hearings: (apologies for not providing the link to where this is published, but it is intact and verbatim from the government website I downloaded it from.)
[CENTER]Statement of Elmer P. Danenberger III
Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
May 11, 2010[/CENTER]
My name is Elmer Danenberger. In January, I retired after a 38 year career with the Department of the Interior’s offshore oil and gas regulatory program. During my career, I served as a staff engineer in the Gulf of Mexico regional office, Chief of the Technical Advisory Section at the headquarters office of the U.S. Geological Survey, District Supervisor for Minerals Management Service (MMS) field offices in Hyannis, Massachusetts and Santa Maria, California, and Chief of the Engineering and Operations Division at MMS Headquarters. For the past five years, I served as Chief, Offshore Regulatory Programs, with responsibilities for safety and pollution-prevention research, accident investigations, regulations and standards, and inspection and enforcement programs.
Since retirement, I have closely followed the investigation of the Montara blowout in the Timor Sea northwest of Australia and the ongoing Deepwater Horizon (DWH) blowout in the Macondo field in the Gulf of Mexico. My comments to the Australian Commission of Inquiry may be viewed at http://www.montarainquiry.gov.au/submissions.html
In this statement, I will briefly comment on the history of deepwater drilling, the compliance and performance record with an emphasis on blowout data, and regulatory issues that have emerged since the Macondo well blew out three weeks ago. I will then suggest technical and regulatory improvements for your consideration.
Before I begin, I want to extend my sincere condolences to the families and friends of the eleven men who lost their lives on the Deepwater Horizon. Offshore workers are vital to our economy and energy security; yet their important contributions to society often go unnoticed. The best way to honor the victims of this tragedy is through our commitment to prevent future accidents. Everyone I have spoken to, in the US and around the world, is eager to assist in any way possible.
I also want to express my disappointment in certain media comments directed at my former MMS colleagues. These comments have not only been ill-informed and unsubstantiated, but malicious. Without hesitation, I can tell you that MMS regulatory personnel - inspectors, engineers, scientists, and others – are 100% committed to their safety and pollution prevention mission. MMS inspectors are themselves exposed to risks every day when they fly offshore and inspect facilities. MMS personnel have repeatedly made personal sacrifices to support the regulatory mission. After Ivan, Katrina, Rita, Gustav, and Ike, MMS employees worked to restore oil and gas production essential to our economy, even when their personal lives had been disrupted by the onshore impacts of these hurricanes. These personnel work under strict ethics standards, and despite a few isolated and highly publicized incidents that occurred more than four years ago, conduct themselves with the highest degree of professionalism. While a critical review of the entire offshore regulatory regime is necessary and appropriate, unsubstantiated accusations and personal attacks are not.
[CENTER]History, Compliance, and Blowout Record
[/CENTER]
Deepwater drilling is not new. In 1965, the drillship CUSS I ushered in the deepwater era by drilling a well in 632’ of water offshore California. In 1979, the Discoverer Seven Seas drilled an exploratory well in 4876’ of water off Newfoundland. This was the first of many wells to be drilled in water depths similar to or greater than those at the Macondo site. In the early 1980s, the Discoverer Seven Seas drilled a series of deepwater wells in the Mid-Atlantic including a record-setting well in 6952’ in 1984. The current water depth record is 10139’ - more than twice the depth of the water at the blowout location. In the Gulf of Mexico alone, 2500 wells were drilled in water depths greater than 1000’ between 1992 and 2006. Recently, approximately 30 rigs have been operating in greater than 1000’ of water, about half of which are working in depths of 5000’ or more.
Deepwater rigs are typically staffed with experienced and capable personnel, and their compliance records tend to be very good. I reviewed civil penalties summaries for the past 5 years (2006 to present) on the MMS website. Not a single case appeared to be related to deepwater drilling operations. According to recent news reports, the DWH had achieved a milestone of 7 years of accident-free operations
I have written several papers on blowout occurrence rates and causes. The most recent paper, co-authored with David Izon and Melinda Mayes, reviews the blowout record during the 15-year period from 1992-2006. I have attached a link to that paper and a summary of the pertinent findings. According to these data, well control performance for deepwater drilling was significantly better than for shallow water operations. There were no fatalities or major spills associated with deepwater drilling blowouts during the 15-year study period.
[CENTER]Regulatory Issues Raised Since the Blowout[/CENTER]
I will briefly comment on some regulatory issues that have been raised by the media since the Macondo blow out began on April 20. The extent to which these issues are relevant to the blowout has yet to be determined.
[U]Acoustic Backup Systems for Seafloor Blowout Preventers[/U]: At this time, there is no evidence that such systems would have made a difference in this incident. Attempts to close BOPs were reportedly made prior to the DWH evacuation. The BOP should have also been signaled when the rig lost power and when the riser disconnected. It is unlikely that additional signals sent acoustically to the stack would have prevented the blowout.
MMS requires a backup system for all seafloor BOPs, and disconnect sequencing that ensures that a well is secured before the marine riser is detached from the well bore. http://www.gomr.mms.gov/homepg/regulate/regs/ntls/2009NTLs/09-g11.pdf
The DWH backup was a remotely operated vehicle (ROV) which successfully stabbed into the BOP stack and attempted to actuate ram closure after the well blew out. Problems with the rams or other BOP components apparently prevented a full, effective closure. The press has reported that cost was a factor in the MMS decision not to require acoustic backups. I never heard cost mentioned in any discussions about these systems. Concerns were raised that ambient noise from a flowing well would render the ROV systems ineffective, that seafloor topography might affect their reliability and performance, and that there was a risk of unintended actuations. The internal consensus was that ROVs were the more reliable option. Further research on this topic is suggested.
[U]Shear Ram Reliability[/U]: Shear rams are intended to cut through pipe that might be in the BOP stack when the well has to be secured in an emergency situation. Heavier, high strength drill pipe is more difficult to shear, and thus a complete seal of the well bore is not always achieved. Also, increased hydrostatic pressure at greater water depths and higher well pressure increase the force required to completely shear the pipe. In 2003, MMS revised its regulations (250.416(e)) to require the submittal of information demonstrating that shear rams on the proposed BOP stack can cut the drill pipe in the hole under maximum anticipated surface pressure. However, shear rams may not be able to cut tool joints and certain other equipment that is run through the BOP. Since this is an industry-wide issue, I suggest that an international standard or guidance document be developed for minimizing the risk of shearing failures. Standardized shearing tests should be required for each BOP model, and test data should be publicly available.
http://www.mms.gov/tarprojects/463/%28463%29%20West%20Engineering%20Final%20Report.pdf
[U]Reduced BOP Testing Frequency[/U]: MMS reduced the required BOP pressure testing frequency to once every 14 days (from once every 7 days) after an internal review and a contract research study (http://www.mms.gov/tarprojects/253/AA.PDF)
indicated that there would be no increase in the risk of BOP failure. To the best of my knowledge, no company or international regulator requires more frequent testing.
[U]Cementing[/U]: Cement is used to secure the steel casing installed in the well bore, and prevent the migration of gas or fluids in the annulus surrounding the casing. As indicated in the attached summary of blowout data, 18 of 39 blowouts during the 15-year period from 1992-2006 involved cementing operations. An industry standard should be developed to address cementing problems, how they can be prevented, and the actions that should be taken when they do occur. In light of the findings from the Montara blowout (Australia) and related concerns elsewhere, there is significant international interest in such a standard. The advisability of using external casing packers, in addition to cement, to seal certain annuli should also be considered.
[U]Research – Deepwater and Well Control[/U]: The MMS Technology Assessment and Research (TAR) program has been a leader in deepwater operations (http://www.mms.gov/tarprojectcategories/deepwate.htm) and drilling research (http://www.mms.gov/tarprojectcategories/drilling.htm), and funded a pioneering deepwater well control research center at Louisiana State University. MMS also participates in the International Committee on Regulatory Authority Research and Development (ICRARD), a consortium that addresses offshore safety issues. Many operators and contractors conduct related research. An organized process for reviewing the findings and recommendations of industry and government safety research and proposing follow-up studies is suggested.
[U]Research – Spill Response[/U]: The TAR program has conducted oil spill response research (http://www.mms.gov/taroilspills/) for more than 30 years and currently operates the Ohmsett spill response research center in New Jersey (http://ohmsett.com/). Most boom and skimmer and skimmer performance data have been collected at Ohmsett. Some of the first in situ burn tests were conducted at the facility. Remote sensing tests and data on dispersant performance have also been collected at Ohmsett. The TAR program funded one of the first studies on seafloor containment and collection systems. The Coast Guard, NOAA, the states of Alaska and California, Norway, and Canada have been important oil spill research partners. The oil spill research community is rather small, and the communication among researchers has been quite good. Consistency is critical, and we need to make sure that industry and governmental research efforts are sustained.
[CENTER]Path Forward[/CENTER]
In the aftermath of the DWH tragedy, we need to consolidate our efforts and ensure that all pertinent issues are addressed in a complete and timely manner. I recommend that a single, independent commission be established to recommend operational and regulatory changes to the President and Congress. The Commission should be comprised of technology, operations, and regulatory policy experts from the public and private sectors, and should draw on, not duplicate, the detailed technical investigation that the MMS and Coast Guard have just initiated. The following are policy and technical recommendations that I believe such a Commission should consider:
- Streamline the OCS regulatory regime to minimize the potential for gaps, overlap, and confusion. Because of the complexity of the OCS regime, regulatory and industry personnel spend too much time resolving and coordinating administrative and procedural matters. This time would be better spent focusing on mission critical safety issues. A single agency should be responsible and accountable for safety and pollution prevention at offshore facilities, and should draw on the expertise of other agencies and organizations as necessary to achieve performance objectives.
- Establish an independent authority to investigate offshore accidents, make recommendations, and assess trends. Such an authority was first recommended by Dr. Don Kash, then a professor at the University of Oklahoma, in 1973 following a series of major offshore accidents.
- Either expand the role and jurisdiction of the Coast Guard’s National Offshore Safety Advisory Committee, or establish a new expert advisory board to review technological advances and performance data, and make recommendations regarding new research, standards, and procedures. This board should also organize an annual public forum for presenting government and industry research and safety performance updates.
- Establish a public or private system for collecting and assessing failure data for blowout prevention equipment. Establish standardized manufacturer testing programs for certain BOP components (e.g. shear rams). The resulting data should be publicly released. Existing quality assurance program for surface and subsurface safety valves (producing wells) should also be reviewed.
- Conduct a thorough review of BOP performance considerations including redundancy, independent functioning, shearing capability (for pipe or other obstructions), backup actuation options, and riser disconnect and drive-off sequencing (intentional and unintentional).
- Expand existing well control training programs or develop new programs to cover well integrity issues. This training should include a review of major historical accidents to remind personnel what can happen and why.
- Develop standards that address best practices for cementing operations with decision/fault trees that describe safeguards, problems, and appropriate responses. Consideration should be given to other options, such as external packers, for redundant annular protection above oil and gas reservoirs.
- Establish special procedures that will facilitate the prompt publication of safety rules. The Federal review and publication process for rules is enormously complex, time consuming, and frustrating. Too many resources must be dedicated to getting rules through the system, and technological advances and new findings cannot be readily addressed.
- Require that all OCS operators have comprehensive safety and environmental management programs. Compliance with prescriptive rules and standards is only part of the safety equation. Companies must actively manage their activities to minimize safety and environmental risks. These management programs should also explain how the company will participate in the standards development and research activities needed to make everyone safer.
- Recognize the importance of international cooperation on offshore safety and pollution prevention issues. The offshore industry is international in scope, as are the operational and regulatory challenges. Effective international communication reduces risks and burdens. The International Regulators’ Forum (http://www.irfoffshoresafety.com/ ) is a model for informal cooperation, but more could be done.
Thank you for the opportunity to participate in this hearing. I’ll be happy to respond to any questions.
[CENTER][B]Attachment[/B]
OCS Drilling Blowouts – 1992 to 2006
Elmer Danenberger, David Izon, and Melinda Mayes[/CENTER]
CENTER
[/CENTER]
Highlights:
- During the study period, blowouts occurred at a rate of one for every 387 wells drilled, compared with a rate of one blowout for every 246 wells during the period covered in my previous blowout study (1971-91).
- 2493 wells were drilled over the study period in water depths greater than 1000.’ There were five minor blowouts yielding a rate of 499 wells per incident. This is better than the rate of 387 wells per incident for all water depths.
- The severity of blowouts, as measured by their duration and consequences, decreased significantly compared with the previous study period (1971–1991). Only one fatality and two injuries resulted from drilling blowouts during the 1992-2006 period compared with 25 fatalities and 61 injuries during the previous period. The fatality was on a jackup rig; a crew member was found missing after the rig was evacuated because of well control incident.
- The seven fires and explosions associated with the 1992-2006 blowouts occurred either on jackups or platform rigs, not deepwater floating rigs.
- Blowouts during the 1992-2006 period resulted in the spillage of 341 bbls of oil/condensate and 982 bbls of synthetic-based mud. Most of the spillage resulted from an unintended riser disconnect, that caused a release of mud and allowed the well to flow briefly. The blowout preventers were shut-in by a remotely operated vehicle. Procedures were changed to automatically close blowout preventers when the riser is disconnected.
- Over-pressured shallow gas influxes persisted as a major contributing factor to blowouts. These incidents have minimal environmental risk, but significant safety risk.
- While the number of blowouts declined, the percentage of blowouts associated with cementing operations increased significantly. Cementing problems were a contributing factor in 18 of the 39 incidents.
- Half of the blowouts lasted less than 24 hours. The longest lasted 11 days. Over 50% of the blowouts were controlled by pumping mud or cement or by actuating mechanical well control equipment. 36% of the wells ceased flowing because sediments bridged or sealed the well. 13 of the wells ceased flowing when trapped gas or shallow gas pockets were depleted. Although relief wells were initiated in two of the blowouts, both wells were controlled by other means prior to completion of the relief well.
- Of the 34 blowouts involving mobile drilling units, 28 were bottom-founded jackups. Only 6 involved floating rigs, all semisubmersibles.
[QUOTE=company man 1;37266]What is your thinking on this? You have advanced background that uniquely qualifies you to be an expert on the BOPs. Do you think BP is being honest in their assessments ? Do you think BP was even competent to perform the post blowout prcedures without TO being present ? Do you think BP is capable of making post blowout alterations that could lend to their credibility at the expense of TO?[/QUOTE]
CM1, I trust you’ll understand if I refrain from speculation on the honesty, competency or capability of BP or any of the other parties involved. This time around, I’ll just comment on what I know from experience and on what others have shown to be true beyond any reasonable doubt.
To me it’s an obvious, proven fact that BP’s decisions regarding well construction and well abandonment were the root cause of this disaster. Beyond that, I’ll do my best to speculate in private and wait for the details to come out.
[QUOTE=alcor;37263]He’ll hang alongside the BP incompetents…who all come from the US.[/QUOTE]
That’s the spirit, never let blame extend across the pond! Proudly wear that company underwear!
Of course, I’m confused. Which is operational: everything will come out in the investigation, or only specific Americans are at fault?
Pray sir, since you claim to know, won’t you please tell us from your exalted position, who exactly is culpable? Tony desperatly wants his life back, can’t you help him?
[QUOTE=Frarig;37255]CM1, I’ll do as you suggest. But I’m not sure what value I can add to the discussion at this point – I’ve got more questions than answers and am feeling as frustrated as everyone else by the lack of hard information available. I can’t even find an accurate diagram of the DWH’s BOP stack configuration at the time of the incident. Also, due to my job I’m naturally defensive of BOPs and the guys who maintain them, and I’m sure that clouds my judgement sometimes.
Having said that, one thing I think I can give some information on with a reasonable degree of accuracy is the impact, or otherwise, of the incorrectly routed lines from the ROV hot-stab panel. IMHO, there is no possible way that any incorrect plumbing from the ROV panel to the rams could have contributed to the incident. It may have caused some delay after the fact, while the ROV’s tried to figure out why they were getting no response from the function they were trying to operate, but knowing what we know now it seems highly unlikely that the delay would have had any impact on the situation.
For those who are interested in the nuts and bolts, each ram can be supplied with hydraulic fluid from at least two sources (Blue pod and Yellow pod) through a shuttle valve mounted directly on the side of the ram. In addition, some rams are fed from the ROV panel via another shuttle, and (in the UK, Norway, Brazil etc) the shear rams have yet another feed-path, from the acoustic pod, via another shuttle. So you can end up with quite a xmas-tree of shuttle valves on the side of your shears to accommodate all possible supplies. Your main ‘normal’ B & Y supplies come from the pods and are therefore dependent on the whole system working correctly (rig panels, Mux cables, Subsea Electronic Modules, SPM valves etc). The acoustic system is dependent on a signal being sent and received through 5000’ of water and I don’t know any SSE’s that enjoy testing this particular system because there are many variables that can interrupt successful transmission of the signal. The ROV intervention system is nowhere near as complicated – you stab in, open a valve and pump like hell into the ram. No electrickery involved.
So, if the lines from the ram shuttle valves were lined up to the wrong stab, it would make no difference at all to normal operation of the BOP unless fluid was leaking through the shuttle valve/s and the ROV panel isolation valve. There has been no suggestion that this was the case.
After the incident, if the lines were wrong, the ROV’s would have been trying to operate one ram whilst actually operating another until they figured out what was happening. Would this have made any difference at that stage of the game? I don’t think so.
What does concern me, regardless of effect, is the mere fact that the lines were lined up incorrectly in the first place and that the problem wasn’t discovered prior to running the BOP. This, along with the 5 minute (instead of 10 min) HP tests that were mentioned earlier, gives me pause for thought. Were these isolated and individually harmless anomalies, or were they symptomatic of a more wide-spread lack of proper maintenance and testing procedures? I hope and pray they were not.
I’ve read a lot of excellent and informative comment on this thread, changed my mind a few times, had several near-strokes when things drifted from the technical aspects, but I think I still stand by what I said in my first post: the guys on board (for whatever reasons) had almost no time to react when the shit hit the fan. Whether that means that they closed the shears on a tool-joint or whether casing was in the BOP, nobody knows at this point. The only other possible explanations I can see for the BOP failure are a) the pressure encountered was greater than a 15K stack could handle, or b) the BOP stack was in such a state of disrepair that it was not fit for purpose.
I don’t, can’t, don’t want to believe it was ‘b’. I don’t know enough about the down-hole environment to say if ‘a’ was even possible. I do 100% believe that if BP hadn’t cut corners and ignored obvious and repeated warning signs then 11 guys would still be alive, the GoM wouldn’t be full of oil and I wouldn’t be posting on page 130+ of this post.
I’ll be joining a TO rig in a couple of days, with a 15K Cameron TL stack and a crew of highly experienced SSE’s. Hopefully I’ll be able to pick their brains and come up with some more information for you all.[/QUOTE]
Frarig,
A note relating to the change of use of the BOPs:
BP asked TO for the conversion. Would this have to approved by MMS?
BP would pay for this conversion.
Who did TO engage with to perform the conversion?
Should TO have gone through Cameron in order to maintain the BOPs as per operational requirement?
My understanding is that Operators suggest what they want and Contractors deliver. Who they seek to deliver the requirement is covered by the Operator financially.
Complete tests are performed at surface prior to running the BOP. Why were the anomalies not found prior to requirement. And, were the functional problems known to TO and BP?
What were the known functional problems? Was BP informed, and did they carry on with the well regardless?
This may help with the ongoing enquiries.
[QUOTE=Frarig;37255] I can’t even find an accurate diagram of the DWH’s BOP stack configuration at the time of the incident. [/QUOTE]
You may already know of this DWH BOP Quality Assurance Report. It is from 2001 however. It has hydraulic system schematics of the BOP on pages 56 thru 63 I believe.
http://markimoore.com/bp-media/docs/TRO-Deepwater.Horizon.BOP.Assurance.Analysis.March.2001.pdf
[QUOTE=CPTdrillersails;37270]That’s the spirit, never let blame extend across the pond! Proudly wear that company underwear!
Of course, I’m confused. Which is operational: everything will come out in the investigation, or only specific Americans are at fault?
Pray sir, since you claim to know, won’t you please tell us from your exalted position, who exactly is culpable? Tony desperatly wants his life back, can’t you help him?[/QUOTE]
He’ll lose his job, of course. He’ll probably do much more yachting. He’ll enjoy his retirement I’d imagine. He’ll get a handsome pay-off for all his loyal years. Who knows, he may invite Obama to dinner some time.
But he wasn’t the dim wit who made the catologue of errors that CM1 is providing. No Sir. That’ll be your esteemed brothers from BP, TO and MMS, making the most holy fuck up decisions the oil industry has ever known. And you guys love advertising it! And it’s on your doorstep. Be careful about how eloquently you present this ‘impartial report’ to whoever may be interested.
Just remember, to the whole fucking offshore world outside good 'ol USA, you guys did this all on your own. An All American Tragedy.
As to my opinion of you, you are less than a cockcroach, I stamp you out!!!
[QUOTE=bigmoose;37272]You may already know of this DWH BOP Quality Assurance Report. It is from 2001 however. It has hydraulic system schematics of the BOP on pages 56 thru 63 I believe.
Bigmoose thanks for the link. The reason I wanted a recent configuration diagram was to see where they had installed the new (to me!) test rams. This document shows the lay-out I’m used to, with Lower Pipe Rams in place as per usual. Having read the Hydril document Alvis linked to, I now understand the purpose and therefore the location of the test rams. Still can’t quite figure out why an effective 33.3% reduction in non-shear sealing capability is regarded as acceptable though.
[QUOTE=CPTdrillersails;37267]Meh.
Apparently somebody got their wittew feewings hurt. Do you “want your life back” too? Please tell it to the fishing and tourism industries in the GOM that are losing everything they own because bp’s shit ass practices and incompetence (and other culpable parties) have, like, [I]destroyed the entire ecosystem of the Gulf of Mexico[/I]. Maybe you can have them shed a tear for you over how poorly you have been treated when all you’ve tried to do is minimize bp’s involvement in this clusterfuck.
BTW, they did “pump like fuck”. They called it Top Kill. How well did that work out?
You keep on saying (from your lofty position) that “the well could have been saved.” Yeah? Well when? Before they even began to complete it with bp’s shitty design, that’s my answer. Your answer has been whatever minimizes bp’s culpability. Is there a wonder you get dumped on?
As for me, I could care less who gets strung up, nearly everyone involved is culpable to more or less degree. Kill them all, let God sort them out.
As for your not giving a fuck about my opinion, why am I not surprised? The only opinion you seem impressed with is your own; another trait you share with bp? As for me, I really don’t care about your overall opinion either, but I do enjoy your contortions as you flit from one line of bp ass-covering to the next.
Y’know, at first I thought you were English, or maybe Norwegian, but now I think you are Dutch. I’ve worked with Dutch people extensively the last few years and it’s true: you can tell the Dutch, but you can’t tell them much.[/QUOTE]
Dick for brains,
I can assure you that every exploration well that’s drilled may come to a point where there’s a sudden realisation that we don’t have the WH and casing design to control the well if the annulus becomes full of gas. That’s why we need competent crews in place to react immediately to pressure increases and volume gains.
I recall when your rigs arrived in the North Sea, and we had to replace all the TPs. Why? Some couldn’t even write their names never mind add and subtract. They all failed BOP school and had to take off home to work locally where their ‘skill’ was better understood. These are facts. I suggest you still have that industry in place, and it doesn’t matter what BP do to try and change ‘culture’ the good old boy network can’t be broken. Get that on your list of deficiencies.
Prick.
[QUOTE=alcor;37273]He’ll lose his job, of course. He’ll probably do much more yachting. He’ll enjoy his retirement I’d imagine. He’ll get a handsome pay-off for all his loyal years. Who knows, he may invite Obama to dinner some time.
But he wasn’t the dim wit who made the catologue of errors that CM1 is providing. No Sir. That’ll be your esteemed brothers from BP, TO and MMS, making the most holy fuck up decisions the oil industry has ever known. And you guys love advertising it! And it’s on your doorstep. Be careful about how eloquently you present this ‘impartial report’ to whoever may be interested.
Just remember, to the whole fucking offshore world outside good 'ol USA, you guys did this all on your own. An All American Tragedy.
As to my opinion of you, you are less than a cockcroach, I stamp you out!!![/QUOTE]
When is a “Chief” not a chief? Alcor’s answer, when he’s not American! Nope, nobody has any responsibility in a multi-national company, except Americans. No matter what. The CEO is barely even responsible for anything, unless he is American. Anyway, your concern for the gulf is touching, as are your priorities.
All of this is just one more example for why you are pathetic. And what is even more pathetic is that you (supposedly) have some technical expertise in this arena, and yet the only information you will share is what covers corporate bp ass.
Anyway, regarding your opinion of me. I welcome your hatred.
[QUOTE=alcor;37275]Dick for brains,
I can assure you that every exploration well that’s drilled may come to a point where there’s a sudden realisation that we don’t have the WH and casing design to control the well if the annulus becomes full of gas. That’s why we need competent crews in place to react immediately to pressure increases and volume gains.
I recall when your rigs arrived in the North Sea, and we had to replace all the TPs. Why? Some couldn’t even write their names never mind add and subtract. They all failed BOP school and had to take off home to work locally where their ‘skill’ was better understood. These are facts. I suggest you still have that industry in place, and it doesn’t matter what BP do to try and change ‘culture’ the good old boy network can’t be broken. Get that on your list of deficiencies.
Prick.[/QUOTE]
Your ad hominems are important to me. Please continue to shower me with your ad hominems. After all, when you ain’t got nothing else left…
You see, your problem is that while most people here are not trying to defend the indefensible (i.e. bp’s obviously flawed well design), you are.
Oh! Forgot to say that you can feel free to visit Delft and educate me next September, I’ll be helping teach a course at Deltares (GeoDelft). Sorry, I can’t get you a discount, it will set you back about 1,250 euro…
[QUOTE=company man 1;37261]I appreciate your reply. What needs to be done now is vetting by an independent source. If I am correct, most of these allegations were made by BP. Right now BP’s word isn’t worth a warm buket of spit. I would not put it past them to lie about any of this. I also would not put it past them not to even know how to perform the procedures to properly work these devices without the direct assistance of TO. Do you have any independent studies that can confirm this. I for one definitley think Pumping Jack’s claim of nitrified foam cement having a neutral effect at best & being downright dangerous at worst, especially considering all the other shortcuts & changes made to the well design should be added to this list. The resposible party/ parties are problematic. I would have to give HallCO. some share of the responsibilty for letting BP make them pump this batch of hog slop in these conditions. It also gave BP ammo to fingerpoint at them. Show of hands please?[/QUOTE]
Indeeed, you have set me straight on this. Namely, only investigation will/might show how far BP can distract their own acts by blaming BOP matters on TO. Awesome how “clever strokes” can blur accountability. I naively had TO altering the BOP system only by agreement with BP, the leaseholder. …may deliberately not be so.
Makes me feel born yesterday and just got off the boat [a little].
Want to learn about cementing? Found this reference on another board. 77 great slides on cementing. Has the design equations for the selection of centralizers. This may help some of us with understanding.
http://www.scribd.com/doc/29550076/Cementing
Explains:
[ul]
[li]Well cement grades, compressive and tensile strength[/li][li]Additives to lighten, additives to densify, flow additives, accelerators and retardants to cure[/li][li]Cementing equipment, use of float shoe, float collar, spacers, plugs… explains bumping the plug[/li][li]Describes absolute minimum volume of mud to circulate before cementing[/li][li]Explains plug, laminar and turbulent flow of cement and spacer; shows preferred regime(s)[/li][/ul]
Final slide: Do not hold pressure on the casing after the plug has bumped unless the float equipment does not hold.
Alcor said they bumped the plug 9 times?? Does this imply the float collar/float shoe was not holding?
[QUOTE=CPTdrillersails;37277]Your ad hominems are important to me. Please continue to shower me with your ad hominems. After all, when you ain’t got nothing else left…
You see, your problem is that while most people here are not trying to defend the indefensible (i.e. bp’s obviously flawed well design), you are.[/QUOTE]
Asshole,
You will continue to operate in the same way if it’s not highlighted that standards in the GOM are less than the rest of the world. Don’t blame BP for that. Blame your culture. You are probably a prime example of the deficiency in your industry. BP made the biggest fuck up buying American trash compannies like AMOCO and ARCO. They were trash. They’re only realising what kind of trash now.
Bottom line in your case is this: you fucking insulted me with your irresponsible commentary. And I’m prepared to revisit that tenfold.
[QUOTE=alcor;37271]Frarig,
A note relating to the change of use of the BOPs:
BP asked TO for the conversion. Would this have to approved by MMS?
BP would pay for this conversion.
Who did TO engage with to perform the conversion?
Should TO have gone through Cameron in order to maintain the BOPs as per operational requirement?
My understanding is that Operators suggest what they want and Contractors deliver. Who they seek to deliver the requirement is covered by the Operator financially.
Complete tests are performed at surface prior to running the BOP. Why were the anomalies not found prior to requirement. And, were the functional problems known to TO and BP?
What were the known functional problems? Was BP informed, and did they carry on with the well regardless?
This may help with the ongoing enquiries.[/QUOTE]
Alcor, this is kind of what I meant when I said I have more questions than answers. I’ll do my best to respond, with appropriate caveats:
-
I’ve never worked with a SSTV and I haven’t worked in the GoM since the late 90’s, before SSTV’s were in use, so I don’t know for a fact if there would have to be MMS approval for their use. I’m guessing here (and will try to confirm within a few days), but I’d imagine that Hydril and Cameron will have designed these things for their respective BOPs and then received some kind of blanket ‘fit-for-purpose’ approval from the relevant authorities. In other words, fitting a SSTV might be no more of a big deal than fitting a new fail-safe valve or any other kind of pre-approved component. I will try to confirm this.
-
Yes, as you know, Transocean would need to provide whatever systems BP required for the well if they wanted the contract. BP would probably pay for it one way or another, but I believe it would be TO engineers who liaised with Cameron (in this case) to either supply a new or a modified double that could accept the SSTV. Since they were operating in the GoM, this would have been done directly with Houston. In other regions, Brazil or UK say, most BOP repair/modification work would be carried out by a local Cameron workshop, operating to the same standards as Cameron USA. We hope…
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Interesting question. I know that Stena carries a full-time Cameron hand on at least some of their rigs, working as a fully integrated part of the SS department. It’s a difference in maintenance philosophies between the two companies for sure. In my experience, the big nuts and bolts of the stack don’t usually present problems that the rig guys can’t handle, nor does routine maintenance and repair. For more esoteric problems, eg. in the pods and the control systems, TO will call on Cameron or Hydril as required. So I guess TO has decided that it’s more cost-effective to call the experts when they need them rather than to have an expert on board full-time who spends half his time cleaning the workshop…right or wrong, I don’t know.
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I don’t know why the alleged problems weren’t discovered prior to deploying the BOP. You will know yourself that stacks are tested top to bottom several times before they get wet, and that the tests should be witnessed and signed off by the company rep. It worries me, as I alluded to in my earlier post, that several things (wrong piping on the ROV panel, dead battery in one of the pods, loose fitting on the shear-ram supply) somehow weren’t found before they ran it. That’s not to say that any one of those factors caused the BOP ‘failure’, but it does indicate that there may have been issues with maintenance and I don’t want to believe that. I want to believe even less that these faults were found during between-wells maintenance or testing and were either not reported or were ignored higher up the chain.
Again, there’s too much we don’t know. I’ve told you what I can, and if I can get any more information in the next couple of weeks I will post it here. Right now, I’ve got 5 hours to sleep before I catch a boat, so I’m off to the sack.
[QUOTE=Frarig;37282]Alcor, this is kind of what I meant when I said I have more questions than answers. I’ll do my best to respond, with appropriate caveats:
-
I’ve never worked with a SSTV and I haven’t worked in the GoM since the late 90’s, before SSTV’s were in use, so I don’t know for a fact if there would have to be MMS approval for their use. I’m guessing here (and will try to confirm within a few days), but I’d imagine that Hydril and Cameron will have designed these things for their respective BOPs and then received some kind of blanket ‘fit-for-purpose’ approval from the relevant authorities. In other words, fitting a SSTV might be no more of a big deal than fitting a new fail-safe valve or any other kind of pre-approved component. I will try to confirm this.
-
Yes, as you know, Transocean would need to provide whatever systems BP required for the well if they wanted the contract. BP would probably pay for it one way or another, but I believe it would be TO engineers who liaised with Cameron (in this case) to either supply a new or a modified double that could accept the SSTV. Since they were operating in the GoM, this would have been done directly with Houston. In other regions, Brazil or UK say, most BOP repair/modification work would be carried out by a local Cameron workshop, operating to the same standards as Cameron USA. We hope…
-
Interesting question. I know that Stena carries a full-time Cameron hand on at least some of their rigs, working as a fully integrated part of the SS department. It’s a difference in maintenance philosophies between the two companies for sure. In my experience, the big nuts and bolts of the stack don’t usually present problems that the rig guys can’t handle, nor does routine maintenance and repair. For more esoteric problems, eg. in the pods and the control systems, TO will call on Cameron or Hydril as required. So I guess TO has decided that it’s more cost-effective to call the experts when they need them rather than to have an expert on board full-time who spends half his time cleaning the workshop…right or wrong, I don’t know.
-
I don’t know why the alleged problems weren’t discovered prior to deploying the BOP. You will know yourself that stacks are tested top to bottom several times before they get wet, and that the tests should be witnessed and signed off by the company rep. It worries me, as I alluded to in my earlier post, that several things (wrong piping on the ROV panel, dead battery in one of the pods, loose fitting on the shear-ram supply) somehow weren’t found before they ran it. That’s not to say that any one of those factors caused the BOP ‘failure’, but it does indicate that there may have been issues with maintenance and I don’t want to believe that. I want to believe even less that these faults were found during between-wells maintenance or testing and were either not reported or were ignored higher up the chain.
Again, there’s too much we don’t know. I’ve told you what I can, and if I can get any more information in the next couple of weeks I will post it here. Right now, I’ve got 5 hours to sleep before I catch a boat, so I’m off to the sack.[/QUOTE]
Much appreciated, have a good trip.
[QUOTE=peakoilerrrr;37278]Indeeed, you have set me straight on this. Namely, only investigation will/might show how far BP can distract their own acts by blaming BOP matters on TO. Awesome how “clever strokes” can blur accountability. I naively had TO altering the BOP system only by agreement with BP, the leaseholder. …may deliberately not be so.
Makes me feel born yesterday and just got off the boat [a little].[/QUOTE]
How about trying the neutral position where everything is out in the open and all can be blamed.
CM1’s credibility will diminish rapidly in a court of law if he directs you to only find culpabilitity in one place. Look everywhere, my friend. It’s a disease which needs to ousted. Or, shall you just look for CM1’s way of finding sole blame with BP.
This type of ‘closed’ campaigning will never allow you to reach the deficiencies in your industry. Address them first.
CM1,
Where did you drag that idiot up from? Your whole game is up. You couldn’t attempt to take this to a law court based on what the previous respondent has stated. Sounds to me like your Templar quiet moment has backfired somewhat.
How about being open and straight?
[QUOTE=OldHondoHand;37250]English only spoken at the table, Bond Guy. <jk> Thanks for your valued info on this but could ya could you please translate that into layman’s English for us non-high-finances dudes?
p.s…since you run in that world, care to comment on the rumors that Goldman Sachs shorted BP in the days just before the blowout?[/QUOTE]
I haven’t heard anything to substantiate those rumors, and at this point I would guess they are just that. The short interest in BP leading up to the spill was below the average over the last year and it ticked up significantly, though still below average for the last 12 months following the news. I don’t have access to a fine enough time increment of data to see if the short interest jumped significantly before news became public. I would be willing to bet the SEC has taken a look for any out of the ordinary moves in the short interest and options market and if we haven’t heard anything by now its unlikely there was anything out of the ordinary helping. Unless it was decided to keep it quiet for the time being or until after the well situation was resolved.
A try at more simplified English.
Equity is the residual value of a company’s assets after its liabilities are covered. The simple example is you buy a house with a loan, the house is the asset, the loan is the liability, any money leftover from then selling the house and paying off the loan is your equity value. In the case of BP the assets are producing wells, wells that have not been put into production and mineral rights on land that isn’t being drilled which may or may not have confirmed discoveries. Before the blow out the market cap/equity of BP was in the $140B-$150B range and BP had about $23B in debt meaning the total value the market was placing on its assets was ~$160B-$180B. Bond guys often talk in a variety of ratios and asset coverage is one of them, asset coverage is simple Assets/Debt, which tells you how easily the company could cover its liabilities if it could sell its assets at a fair market value tomorrow. The reason the equity has fallen is primarily the growing liability from the blow out, the best way to think of it is every barrel that spews out of that well is like a small bond being issued by BP, because for each barrel they now have an obligation to pay an EPA clean water fine, fisherman Bob for lost income, clean up costs, etc. Some of this will be paid fairly soon through the escrow fund, a lot of it will take a long time to wind its way through the courts. Once it has made it through the courts any judgment will have an interest component, making it all the more like a bond. So what you have is:
Equity value (~$100B Currently) = The Asset value (~$170B) - Debt ($23B) - Blow Out Costs (~$50B according to the market). If the Blow Out Costs Keep going up Equity keeps going down.
The moves talked about only alter the right side so equity remains unchanged:
Equity Value of $100B (unchanged) = Assets $210B ($170B - $10B in sold assets + $10B in cash proceeds from the asset sales + $40B in cash proceeds from bond issuance and bank loans) - Debt $63B ($23B + $40B of bonds and bank loans) - Blow Out Costs $50B(unchanged)
BP will not be able to issue the bonds with out spreading the issuance out over time $3B-$5B at a time over the next 2 years. The bond market has a lot of buy and hold investors (meaning they won’t sell their current investments to make a large investment in new issue unless the new bonds are very attractive), it is relatively illiquid so its hard to sell a lot of bonds quickly to take a large stake in a new bond issue and bond investors usually desire more diversity so they are less likely to take concentrated positions. The only way it could bring most of the intended bond issuance to market all at the same time is if it was willing to pay coupons at a really high rate (over 10%) which would get more investors interested or willing to sell other positions.
Bonds are priced based on an interest rate spread to treasuries, so if General Mills issued a new 5 year bond at a 100 basis point spread, what non-bond people would call 1%, to the 5 year treasury if the treasury rate was 2% that would make the coupon on the bond 3%. Right now if BP brought a bond it would likely come at a credit spread similar to a distressed BBB- (lowest rating for an investment grade bond) or BB+ (highest rating for a high yield bonds) rated credit which would be 400-500 basis points or 4%-5% over the same maturity treasury. Right now the 5Y treasury is yielding 2.07%, meaning if BP issued a 5 year bond at those spread the bonds would have a coupon rate of 6.07% to 7.07%. However, this is still relatively cheap debt historically, because treasury rates are at historic lows. For example BP issued a now matured 3 year bond in 2000 with a coupon of 7.375%, however 3 year treasury rates were 6.33% at the time meaning the credit spread was about 104 basis points or 1.04%. So despite being in a slightly distressed situation BP would more than likely be able to bring 5 year debt at a lower coupon than it did when it was rated AA+ 10 years ago.
Hopefully that is a little more in English for the non-finance people.