Deepwater Horizon - Transocean Oil Rig Fire

[QUOTE=alvis;36274]http://beforeitsnews.com/story/76/057/Scientists_Warn_Gulf_Of_Mexico_Sea_Floor_Fractured_Beyond_Repair.html

I’m extremely reluctant to post this article here but do so because it purports to establish an information trail for a question I had posted earlier. And that was the comments from Senator Bill Nelson regarding oil seeping from the sea floor. I had asked where he was getting this information from. The credibility of the article goes down for me because of discussion of the nuclear bomb and Matt Simmons.

The only information I’m considering in this article is that quoted below. If anyone has any information that can prove or dis-prove Sagalevich’s report, please post it. Such as the Mir 1 or Mir 2 either being in the GoM or not being there. I would assume they would have to launch it from a surface ship in close approximation to the well. And word would quickly get out if a Russian ship was on scene. Personally, I’m getting tired of reading uncorroborated reports of oil from the Macondo well coming from the sea floor. We need a Mythbusters team on this.[/QUOTE]
Alvis, somebody posted a link to the viking poseidon ROV from Saturday night a couple of pages ago. That video should settle the issue for you. They knew & disclosed to WSJ last weel that the well was flowing outside of the casings.

[QUOTE=company man 1;36275]We don’t know that they didn’t shut in. In fact looking at the pictures & seing fire coming out of the gas buster line at the top of the derrick & seeing fire coming out of the flare line tells me they did shut in. We don’t know how hard the kick was & where it was by the time they realized it. If it was 40 BBls. down there then it was 200 times that large by the time it got to surface. You guys keep bringing up pilot error when the engines were rigged to explode.[/QUOTE]

20:00 hrs was a good enough time to shut in. All the evidence was there. Pressure showed 400+ psi more than they should have had. And this at a time when the Annular was closed.
I hate this examination as much as anyone else.

So all us driller wannabe’s can follow along with the developing discussion on SPP… could a man in the know confirm or clarify the following:

Is SPP = Stand Pipe Pressure ? = Pressure in the stand pipe or pressure exiting the mud pumps ? Is this the mud pressure in the Drill String (DS) up at the Top Drive ?

… and to clarify the positions of key personnel (in sort of layman’s/land based terms):
Company Man = BP Manager in Charge of Operations when Rig Connected to Well head
OIM = Company Affiliation Transocean? Offshore Installation Manager in charge of the rig when connected to well head?
Toolpusher = Transocean Manager in Charge of Drilling Operations
Driller = Transocean man with hands on the controls

[QUOTE=alcor;36269]I’m not sure if I read you correctly. Did you say they had ‘reasonably’ been ignoring gain for 1 1/2 hrs? What part of ignoring volumes is considered reasonable? None. Are we wearing blinkers?
Here are the logger’s charts:
http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20100512/Halliburton-Last.Two.Hours.Chart.pdf

At 2002 hrs, I suggest they bled off SPP. Why?
From 2020 hrs to 2035 hrs, we see the return flow indicator increasing from 900 gpm to 1100 gpm despite the fact that the pump rate is 900 gpm.
This is a good enough reason to stop pumps and close in the well.
They don’t stop pumping.
At 2034 hrs, they decide to monitor return volume, while continueing to pump at the same rate.
From 2034 to 2052 hrs, we see a 12 barrel gain.
Again, we have an opportunity to close the BOP.
At 2052 hrs, the pump rate is reduced, but the gain continues.
From 2100 to 2108 hrs, SPP is increasing. It’s supposed to reduce as we displace the heavy mud from the hole. This is another opportunity to react.
The gain continues right up until 2108 hrs. Total gain at this point is 28 barrels over 30 mins of pumping.
Still no reaction. I’m wondering if the drill crew were convinced the gain was coming from within their own pits. Did the logger advise the DF of the unfolding events?
At 2108 hrs, the pumps are shut off. But, SPP rises by 200 psi over the next 6 mins.
At 2114 hrs, they start pumping again at 400 gpm. Pressure rises over the next 6 mins by 200 psi. It should be dropping.
At 2118 hrs, pumps are stopped and restarted at 2120 hrs. There appears to be a great deal of uncertainty.
From 2120 to 2130 compare Riser flow with volume pumped and refer flow to earlier pumped volumes. Something is radically wrong. The signs are all here.
Note that from 2120 onwards we have no indication of return flow, but we do have Riser flow. Does this mean that the Diverter has been activated at 2120 hrs?
Pumps are shut off at 2130 hrs.
From 2130 to 2150 hrs, SPP goes up and down, possibly someone bleeding off?? We also see a further 10 Bbls increase in the pits over this 20 min period. The TT also rises. Is the Diverter leaking?
At 2149 hrs, the horrific moment arrives, and the logger’s report ends.

May the drill crew rest in peace.
There is never a time to be complacent about well volumes. Those of you who practice this should understand that anything is possible.
Our crews use trip sheets for every Rih and Pooh, even after cement jobs which have been tested. And we perform flow checks, even though it’s obvious that all is well.
You just never know what’s going to bite you. Look what happened to this poor crew.

All the warning signs were there. TO will have to answer many awkward questions…which no-one really want to make. We choose others to blame.
This scenario would happen on every well that takes a kick if we ignore the signs. Every single well. Why doesn’t it happen more often? Because, we close the BOP before it’s too late.

I’d like to know why the Co Man and TP weren’t on the DF interpreting data. After all, they had a serious spat earlier in the day, didn’t they?

Do you have a comment CM1?[/QUOTE]
I do have a comment. BP is already guilty as hell. Show us the evidence from your e-well data for the whole afternoon, so we canput this issue to rest intead of speculating who did what. What do you have to hide that can’t be discovered at this point?

[QUOTE=bigmoose;36279]So all us driller wannabe’s can follow along with the developing discussion on SPP… could a man in the know confirm or clarify the following:

Is SPP = Stand Pipe Pressure ? = Pressure in the stand pipe or pressure exiting the mud pumps ? Is this the mud pressure in the Drill String (DS) up at the Top Drive ?[/QUOTE] That would be correct Bigmoose & it is a very telling indicator if you are on bottom circulating. The only problem is they weren’t on bottom where the BOP would have a fighting chance to save their lives. They were at 8330’ & by the time they recognized an indication there was a gas bubble already in the riser big enough to blow a stream of water & mud 21" wide clean through the derrick. That is one thing my buddies have failed to add to their expert analysis. The bottom joint wasn’t at 18,000’ it was at 8330’ & the kick didn’t circulate up the hole 18’000’., It circulated from 5000’. Not once have they mentioned this in their critical analysis.
Edit: I guess it’s pretty easy to second guess someone when you haven’t had to wear their shoes & until we see all the data unedited, WE JUST DON’T KNOW!

[QUOTE=company man 1;36280]I do have a comment. BP is already guilty as hell. Show us the evidence from your e-well data for the whole afternoon, so we canput this issue to rest intead of speculating who did what. What do you have to hide that can’t be discovered at this point?[/QUOTE]

We have all been provided with the last 2 hours. We don’t have the other data.
Let’s assume the tests show BP to have interpreted the positive and negative tests incorrectly. They got it wrong.
Should the drill crew assume that all is well because BP says the tests were fine? No, never. I would expect you to believe the same.
What is the role of the Contractor? To maintain volume and pressure control at all times.
Do you have a different understanding of the role of drilling contractors? What do you expect of them when you go to bed? Do you want volume control? Yes, or no?
When we ignore volume control who is at fault?

[QUOTE=company man 1;36281]That would be correct Bigmoose & it is a very telling indicator if you are on bottom circulating. The only problem is they weren’t on bottom where the BOP would have a fighting chance to save their lives. They were at 8330’ & by the time they recognized an indication there was a gas bubble already in the riser big enough to blow a stream of water & mud 21" wide clean through the derrick. That is one thing my buddies have failed to add to their expert analysis. The bottom joint wasn’t at 18,000’ it was at 8330’ & the kick didn’t circulate up the hole 18’000’., It circulated from 5000’. Not once have they mentioned this in their critical analysis.
Edit: I guess it’s pretty easy to second guess someone when you haven’t had to wear their shoes & until we see all the data unedited, WE JUST DON’T KNOW![/QUOTE]

My personal opinion is that the gas came from the Seal Assy at 5000 ft. There was sufficient time to close the BOP. It also means that gas would have come up the Riser but the Diverter would have controlled it. The Riser would most likely have collapsed. But the well would be secure with a closed BOP. Then, we’d have had a very serious well control problem. But, no lives would have been lost. The casing may not have held and we’d end up with external losses of gas and oil. But we’d still have the opportunity to re-enter the well, strip to bottom, and kill it.
And the DWH would not be at the bottom of the sea.
And BP would then have much to answer. TO would have done their job.

[QUOTE=alcor;36283]We have all been provided with the last 2 hours. We don’t have the other data.
Let’s assume the tests show BP to have interpreted the positive and negative tests incorrectly. They got it wrong.
Should the drill crew assume that all is well because BP says the tests were fine? No, never. I would expect you to believe the same.
What is the role of the Contractor? To maintain volume and pressure control at all times.
Do you have a different understanding of the role of drilling contractors? What do you expect of them when you go to bed? Do you want volume control? Yes, or no?
When we ignore volume control who is at fault?[/QUOTE]
Let’s not assume anything about any tests anymore. We don’t know what kind of tests were performed at who’s discretion. I agree with you totally that not having volume control was a major screw up by everybody involved. That’s what happens when you give up safety for speed. As far as influx goes though, until we get some better kind of understanding whether the leak started slowly & ramped up as they went or there was a massive blow out of the casing due to differential force we cannot say for sure there were any real telling indicators they could have used had they had them. Believe me. I understand your point & I have questioned myself. I just can’t see that many guys with that much experience making the kinds of complete blunders we have all refered to. We do all have to understand that this did not come from the bottom when indicated, but rather right from under the stack where there would have been precious little time if any to react with the real ability to stop this before major damage was done.
Edit: I think we may be starting to sing on the same sheet of music.

[QUOTE=company man 1;36280]I do have a comment. BP is already guilty as hell. Show us the evidence from your e-well data for the whole afternoon, so we canput this issue to rest intead of speculating who did what. What do you have to hide that can’t be discovered at this point?[/QUOTE]

I’m wondering what you have to hide by not allowing your mind to open up to what has occurred. I can only tell you how professional drilling contractors understand their role in these circumstances. There is no time for nerves. Stop the pumps and close the BOP. No-one’s going to get on your case for reacting to an unexplained gain.
Have you read the drilling contractor’s report? It is obsessive about volume control:

http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20100512/TRO-Daily.Drilling.Report.04.20.2010.pdf

What’s interesting is that all this information came out more than 5 weeks ago. The media don’t understand it. They rely on experts in the industry. Some of the expertise being presented is sadly one-sided.

[QUOTE=bigmoose;36279]So all us driller wannabe’s can follow along with the developing discussion on SPP… could a man in the know confirm or clarify the following:

Is SPP = Stand Pipe Pressure ? = Pressure in the stand pipe or pressure exiting the mud pumps ? Is this the mud pressure in the Drill String (DS) up at the Top Drive ?

… and to clarify the positions of key personnel (in sort of layman’s/land based terms):
Company Man = BP Manager in Charge of Operations when Rig Connected to Well head
OIM = Company Affiliation Transocean? Offshore Installation Manager in charge of the rig when connected to well head?
Toolpusher = Transocean Manager in Charge of Drilling Operations
Driller = Transocean man with hands on the controls[/QUOTE]

It is the pressure being read on the standpipe. It will be about 50 psi les than what you see on your mud pump guage.
The pressure you read on your mud pumps is the collective pressure required to move mud through the standpipe, the drill pipe and the Annulus. It represents all the pressure losses to get mud moving at a certain pump rate.

Alcor, to go to the next level of understanding, do you mind if I parse your response with some questions?

My personal opinion is that the gas came from the Seal Assy at 5000 ft. There was sufficient time to close the BOP. It also means that gas would have come up the Riser but the Diverter would have controlled it.
Seal at 5000’ = The production casing hang off seal near the mudline for the production casing? Or the burst disk in the 16" casing connector at 9560’?
Gas up the riser, if I understand the idea of supercritical gas in Oil Based Mud, it stays in solution until around 900 psi which is around 2000 feet of water column. Once the gas comes out of solution, it is a “runaway” to the surface, which unloads the column; so if the BOP is not closed you have a blowout.

The Riser would most likely have collapsed. But the well would be secure with a closed BOP.
Riser collapse = rupture? or implosion, crinckled inwards?
Secured with BOP. lower pipe rams closed around the drill string AND shear rams actuated for the Drill String? Would this be the controlled, hang off the drill string on the pipe rams then shear event?

Then, we’d have had a very serious well control problem. But, no lives would have been lost. The casing may not have held and we’d end up with external losses of gas and oil. But we’d still have the opportunity to re-enter the well, strip to bottom, and kill it.
If the drill string is hung off and sheared, how do you safe a well at shut in pressure, with a hung off and sheared drill string to reenter? Bullhead the closed in well with kill mud from the top? … but the riser couldn’t take that pressure. Use choke/kill lines to introduce it? Kill the well through choke/kill lines then open BOP and fish the DP?

And the DWH would not be at the bottom of the sea.
And BP would then have much to answer. TO would have done their job.
Got it!

[QUOTE=bigmoose;36289]Alcor, to go to the next level of understanding, do you mind if I parse your response with some questions?

Seal at 5000’ = The production casing hang off seal near the mudline for the production casing? Or the burst disk in the 16" casing connector at 9560’?
Gas up the riser, if I understand the idea of supercritical gas in Oil Based Mud, it stays in solution until around 900 psi which is around 2000 feet of water column. Once the gas comes out of solution, it is a “runaway” to the surface, which unloads the column; so if the BOP is not closed you have a blowout.

Riser collapse = rupture? or implosion, crinckled inwards?
Secured with BOP. lower pipe rams closed around the drill string AND shear rams actuated for the Drill String? Would this be the controlled, hang off the drill string on the pipe rams then shear event?

If the drill string is hung off and sheared, how do you safe a well at shut in pressure, with a hung off and sheared drill string to reenter? Bullhead the closed in well with kill mud from the top? … but the riser couldn’t take that pressure. Use choke/kill lines to introduce it? Kill the well through choke/kill lines then open BOP and fish the DP?

Got it![/QUOTE]

I’ll address each point:

  1. A Seal Assy is set between the 16" casing and the 9 7/8" Hanger. It is then pressure tested both positive and negative tests. It is unknown if these tests were successful. The Burst disk is inserted as a weak point in the casing string to ensure that production temperatures relieve the pressure on the Annulus of the 16" Casing if a barite plug forms on the Annulus side of the 16" Casing. Outer casing swells and contracts according to the production pressures when flowing or shut in.

  2. It is almost certain that the Riser collapsed due to Sea Water Hydrostatic pressure when gas entered the Riser. Implosion.

  3. If the drill string is hung off and sheared, we have the option to remove the LMRP (Lower Marine Riser Package), and install a BOP on top of the existing BOP for extra safety. We could then retrieve the hung off string and run back in the hole to bottom and kill the well.

4.Bullheading wouldn’t work as we’ve discovered due to the leak developed at the Glass plug.

5.We need to kill the well from the source.

All’s quiet on the western front!

At 21:50 hrs, on the logger’s report, we see both Hookload and WOB increase.
Any comment?

http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20100512/Halliburton-Last.Two.Hours.Chart.pdf

Here’s the statement from the committee Chairman:

According to James Dupree, the BP Senior Vice President for the Gulf of Mexico, the well did not pass this test. Mr. Dupree told Committee staff on Monday that the test result was “not satisfactory” and “inconclusive.” Significant pressure discrepancies were recorded.
As a result, another negative pressure test was conducted. This is described in the fourth bullet: “During this test, 1,400 psi was observed on the drill pipe while 0 psi was observed on the kill and the choke lines.”
According to Mr. Dupree, this is also an unsatisfactory test result. The kill and choke lines run from the drill rig 5,000 feet to the blowout preventer at the sea floor. The drill pipe runs from the drill rig through the blowout preventer deep into the well. In the test, the pressures measured at any point from the drill rig to the blowout preventer should be the same in all three lines. But what the test showed was that pressures in the drill pipe were significantly higher. Mr. Dupree explained that the results could signal that an influx of gas was causing pressure to mount inside the wellbore.

http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20100512/Waxman.Opening.oi.05.12.2010.pdf

Live AIS tracking of the response vessels on scene (some of the smaller boats don’t use AIS… so coverage isn’t 100%).

I’m told that this is the exact information the command center has access to.

http://bit.ly/bSsc8Z

Also… with the document searches… you can use google’s “allinurl” tag to get all the documents in a web-subdirector. So if you wanted all the energy commitee’s DHW filings you can do this search:

allinurl:http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20100512/

[QUOTE=company man 1;36277]Alvis, somebody posted a link to the viking poseidon ROV from Saturday night a couple of pages ago. That video should settle the issue for you. They knew & disclosed to WSJ last weel that the well was flowing outside of the casings.[/QUOTE]

That’s not enough oil for me to believe what I’ve been reading. There has been mention of full flows streaming from the sea floor.

And I still don’t believe it.

Is this at all important? Doesn’t this prove, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that the rig hands were the cause of all of this?

http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20100614/ap_on_bi_ge/us_gulf_oil_spill_washington

By MATTHEW DALY, Associated Press Writer Matthew Daly, Associated Press Writer – 1 hr 21 mins ago
WASHINGTON – BP took measures to cut costs in the weeks before the catastrophic blowout in the Gulf of Mexico as it dealt with one problem after another, prompting a BP engineer to describe the doomed rig as a “nightmare well,” according to internal documents released Monday.

The comment by BP engineer Brian Morel came in an e-mail April 14, six days before the Deepwater Horizon rig explosion that killed 11 people and has sent tens of millions of gallons of oil into the Gulf in the nation’s worst environmental disaster.

The e-mail was among dozens of internal documents released by the House Energy and Commerce Committee, which is investigating the explosion and its aftermath.
In a letter to BP CEO Tony Hayward, Reps. Henry Waxman, D-Calif., and Bart Stupak, D-Mich., noted at least five questionable decisions BP made in the days leading up to the explosion.
“The common feature of these five decisions is that they posed a trade-off between cost and well safety,” said Waxman and Stupak. Waxman chairs the energy panel while Stupak heads a subcommittee on oversight and investigations.

“Time after time, it appears that BP made decisions that increased the risk of a blowout to save the company time or expense,” the lawmakers wrote in the 14-page letter to Tony Hayward.
“If this is what happened, BP’s carelessness and complacency have inflicted a heavy toll on the Gulf, its inhabitants, and the workers on the rig.”

The letter, supplemented by 61 footnotes and dozens of documents, outlines a series of questions Hayward can expect when he comes before Stupak’s subcommittee on Thursday.

The hearing will be Hayward’s first appearance before a congressional committee since the explosion and sinking of the BP-operated Deepwater Horizon rig. BP America President Lamar McKay and other officials represented the company at earlier hearings.

The letter by Waxman and Stupak focuses on details such as the design of the well, saying that the company apparently chose a riskier option among two possibilities to provide a barrier to the flow of gas in space surrounding steel tubes in the well.

Despite warnings from its own engineers, “BP chose the more risky casing option, apparently because the liner option would have cost $7 to $10 million more and taken longer,” Waxman and Stupak said.

In the brief e-mail, Morel said the company is likely to make last-minute changes in the well.

“We could be running it in 2-3 days, so need a relative quick response. Sorry for the late notice, this has been nightmare well which has everyone all over the place,” Morel wrote.
BP apparently rejected advice of a subcontractor, Halliburton Inc., in preparing for a cementing job to close up the well. BP rejected Halliburton’s recommendation to use 21 “centralizers” to make sure the casing ran down the center of the well bore. Instead, BP used six centralizers.

In an e-mail on April 16, a BP official involved in the decision explained: “It will take 10 hours to install them. I do not like this.” Later that day, another official recognized the risks of proceeding with insufficient centralizers but commented: "who cares, it’s done, end of story, will probably be fine."

A spokesman for BP could not immediately reached for comment.

[QUOTE=alcor;36295]Here’s the statement from the committee Chairman:

According to James Dupree, the BP Senior Vice President for the Gulf of Mexico, the well did not pass this test. Mr. Dupree told Committee staff on Monday that the test result was “not satisfactory” and “inconclusive.” Significant pressure discrepancies were recorded.
As a result, another negative pressure test was conducted. This is described in the fourth bullet: “During this test, 1,400 psi was observed on the drill pipe while 0 psi was observed on the kill and the choke lines.”
According to Mr. Dupree, this is also an unsatisfactory test result. The kill and choke lines run from the drill rig 5,000 feet to the blowout preventer at the sea floor. The drill pipe runs from the drill rig through the blowout preventer deep into the well. In the test, the pressures measured at any point from the drill rig to the blowout preventer should be the same in all three lines. But what the test showed was that pressures in the drill pipe were significantly higher. Mr. Dupree explained that the results could signal that an influx of gas was causing pressure to mount inside the wellbore.

http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20100512/Waxman.Opening.oi.05.12.2010.pdf[/QUOTE]
It seems this testimony was rebutted the next day by the BP attorneys. Did Mr. Dupree offer any EVIDENCE to back this up? I cannot comment much on your previous post because I can’t open the link. I can assume the hookload would increase due to the gas emtying out the riser with force. I noticed he said they tested the cement after 16.5 hours. From the evidence I have seen they tested the cement at 1100 hours that morning 10.5 hours after bumping the plug. Any comments on this?
BTW if I’m going to be quizzed by you, I would appreciate it if you would answer me this. Assuming the rig did get pressure tests that Mr. Dupree claims were shown to be bad, How was BP Houston going to handle the next phase of work? Because that rig sure wasn’t going anywhere for a while.
Another thing. On your synopsis of stabbing another BOP on top of the first if the well blows out of the outter casing. I would think that it would have looked like the video Kasol provided the other day. I don’t think anyone would have been going over that well for a while.

Thanks for working me through this a step at a time Alcor!

[QUOTE=alcor;36291]I’ll address each point:

  1. If the drill string is hung off and sheared, we have the option to remove the LMRP (Lower Marine Riser Package), and install a BOP on top of the existing BOP for extra safety. We could then retrieve the hung off string and run back in the hole to bottom and kill the well.[/QUOTE]

I think I need more hand holding on this one. Let’s assume the 16 inch casing held, and there was no ejection of the production casing into the original BOP. And then assume the crew could do a controlled EDS. They hung off the lower pipe rams with the DP, and sheared the DP (One string, and one string only.) Closed up everything on the BOP above that successfully. Now let’s assume that the shut in pressure is something like 9,500 psi at the BOP.

OK, now we add a second BOP on the first per your procedure and have the 9,500 psi on that one also. Connect another LMRP (yes/no?) to the second BOP with it’s two annulars and our riser up to the drill ship.

Aren’t we in the same boat? How do we enter into this 9,500 psi environment, now at the upper/new BOP? Do I still need to drill the intercept wells? If so, then I understand. If not, I need a little more time at “Well Control School” to understand how this intervention is implemented.

Thanks for your courtesy working me through these scenarios. Know it is appreciated!