Deepwater Horizon - Transocean Oil Rig Fire

Offshore
2641

[QUOTE=alcor;36237]There are deficiencies everywhere we examine what happened in this well. Everwhere you look. We need to open our eyes and see it all.
I am not defending BP. I’m trying to examine all the failings. I may get some wrong.
To move forward and get everyone back to work is no quick fix. We can’t have a repeat of this incident, and if it takes analysis which is unpalatable to many on this forum you can be sure it’ll be covered by the official investigation later on.
One thing is for sure, no-one’s been watching BP. And, that’s the role of the MMS. And if it hasn’t been their role up to now, then US control of offshore drilling has been seriously lacking.
I suppose MMS should join BP and TO for their share of the blame.
And what of Halliburton? My opinion, no blame whatsoever. Now I’m going to be accused of being a Halliburton spy.

And all who have been involved in HPHT wells will admit to hairy moments!! With all Operators.[/QUOTE]

It gets complicated, regulatory agencies can enforce known requirements, but industry doesn’t progress if they stifle innovation, so there is a good faith transition from API standards to the regulations to trying new methods that abide by existing regulations. Industry personnel are on the API committees that write the API standards, the government doesn’t write the API standards, if the gov’t was best at drilling the wells then they should be the ones drilling them. When the gov’t identifies a safe procedure they mandate those procedures. MMS mandated barriers in the casing design, BP presented an ambitious casing design that the MMS didn’t nix only on the pretext that BP would proceed fully cognizant of the requirement to provide those barriers. From what I know of the circumstances, in the spirit of the law BP didn’t act in good faith to ensure they had met those requirements. Because of this, several omitted procedures will probably become a matter of law.

More nuances: Did Halliburton think the cement job as pumped would be successful? If not, should they have pumped it? If they thought it was, should anyone who guesses wrong in any phase of a critical scenario be held accountable? If a cementer thinks there are questions about the integrity should they by law be allowed to force additional testing? How about all the other critical services? There will be a document produced hundreds of pages long addressing these things and more.

2642

BP’s latest oil-spill cleaning tool http://news.yahoo.com/s/ynews/20100611/ts_ynews/ynews_ts2556 Keep up the good work BP, we believe everything you say.

2643

[QUOTE=pumpjack hand;36245]It gets complicated, regulatory agencies can enforce known requirements, but industry doesn’t progress if they stifle innovation, so there is a good faith transition from API standards to the regulations to trying new methods that abide by existing regulations. Industry personnel are on the API committees that write the API standards, the government doesn’t write the API standards, if the gov’t was best at drilling the wells then they should be the ones drilling them. When the gov’t identifies a safe procedure they mandate those procedures. MMS mandated barriers in the casing design, BP presented an ambitious casing design that the MMS didn’t nix only on the pretext that BP would proceed fully cognizant of the requirement to provide those barriers. From what I know of the circumstances, in the spirit of the law BP didn’t act in good faith to ensure they had met those requirements. Because of this, several omitted procedures will probably become a matter of law.

More nuances: Did Halliburton think the cement job as pumped would be successful? If not, should they have pumped it? If they thought it was, should anyone who guesses wrong in any phase of a critical scenario be held accountable? If a cementer thinks there are questions about the integrity should they by law be allowed to force additional testing? How about all the other critical services? There will be a document produced hundreds of pages long addressing these things and more.[/QUOTE]

A couple of cementers carry out a cement job designed by Halliburton and approved by BP. The cementers on the rig simply pump the cement, and then TO displace it with the rig pumps. Whether they Bump the Plug or not, Halliburton have completed their side of the job. If we don’t place it where it’s supposed to go the onus is now on BP and TO. Why TO, you may ask? Because, they have a responsibility to look after their assets, the rig in this case.
Have we sealed the Reservoir? What were the return volumes from the well when spacer went through the Shoe? What were return volumes when the cement went through the shoe? Was the hole washed out?
MMS, should have defined the criteria for converting the well from exploration to Production. This should have included CBL and defined tests by Halliburton.
No doubt about it, BP have failed to intepret the tests correctly. Obviously, TO have failed too as they let the operation continue (after trying to exercise restraint).
But, the well is not yet lost. We still have mud in the well and a working BOP. As soon as volumes change in the well we have to take notice and respond. This is not possible if all mud is going back to the boat. The TO Toolpusher failed to come up with a good plan to maintain control of well volumes while displacing and backloading. Both are possible.
Of course, pressure control appears to have been completely ignored. The Driller should have known what the SPP should have been at all times while displacing. Many of you may disagree with this point, but if he had the figures he’d have understood that gas was in the well and he would have shut in. For this failure, I blame the Co Man and the TP for not ensuring this information was available. Of course, he should have been able to work it out himself. Static values for sure. Dynamic values as soon as you get going with a constant pump rate.

Regarding the cementer’s position in this, if he didn’t highlight any anomalies which occurred during the cement job then he can be implicated. If he did highlight issues and these were ignored then BP are in even more trouble.

Apportioning blame will be the job of Gov’t investigators, and you can be sure they’ll all look exclusively to BP as the lone scapegoat. Maybe, justifiably. Maybe, not!
I just want to highlight who may have been an accomplice. And, I realise no-one likes it.

Just heard Obama’s latest comments. Is he softening his attitude to BP? No nasty rhetoric?

2644

[QUOTE=Alf;36236]Are we all looking at the same charts here??
@ 20:00hrs the red SPP curve on the chart I have is just UNDER the 3rd black scale mark. ie just UNDER 1500psi.

Just what they did up until 20:00hrs is not clear. So you may want to keep that in mind.[/QUOTE]

http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20100512/BP-What.We.Know.pdf

2645

[QUOTE=Alf;36230]When I first saw your ideas pumpjack… I looked at the links above, and thought… hmmn, novel idea, but where would they get the subs from? I filed it into the good idea NOT PRACTICAL drawer and moved on.

Today, I briefly managed to see a live video ROV feed from Macondo and a light came on.

Some years ago, I was involved with a well where we had a really huge and humungous water flow after setting 20" casing. The ROV couldn’t see squat for a good 20metres around the wellhead in all 360 degree directions. ie zero visibility. The outcome was we finally gave up and abandoned the well as water started to erupt elsewhere on the seabed.

However, in trying to get to grips with this beast, we tried several “space cadet ideas” with the main aim of blasting the flow away from the wellhead so that we could get a visual look at the wellhead and problem we were dealing with and try to figure out a way forward.

One of the things we tried was this jet prop tool. Basically a ship’s thruster on the end of drillpipe. It belts out a tremendous wash/turbulence.

It won’t do anything to stop the oil leaking from Macondo… but it may help in breaking up surface slicks and subsurface plumes allowing them to degrade quicker.

Thanks for lodging an idea in my mind.

Time now to see if bp will actually still talk to me??

pics are attached for info[/QUOTE]

Thanks. Tell me more. Your idea could work if the idea is to help disperse the hydrocarbon for better natural remediation, right? So, there are at least two approaches I’m hearing, disperse or collect.

In 1981 the VP of General Dynamics (their Electric Boat is the division that builds nuclear subs) told congress that their design for a sub LNG tanker is “Technically feasible, economically viable, industrially beneficial, and environmentally sound.” Electric Boat historically builds subs only for the Navy, not the private sector, so in the national interest (this proposal had the backing of the Naval School of Underwater Warfare or Electric Boat wouldn’t have made the pitch to Congress) they were asking for a $2B subsidy to get the $16B project to build a fleet initiated.

Using decommissioned military subs retrofitted to be a free water knockout would be the cheapest idea, but building a sub specifically designed for such could be more efficient for the use. If they had built sub tankers thirty years ago, then retrofitting them now to be ocean cleaners would be practical.

But if the idea is to disperse rather than collect, a free water knock out concept wouldn’t work.

2646

[QUOTE=alcor;36237]There are deficiencies everywhere we examine what happened in this well. Everwhere you look. We need to open our eyes and see it all.
I am not defending BP. I’m trying to examine all the failings. I may get some wrong.
To move forward and get everyone back to work is no quick fix. We can’t have a repeat of this incident, and if it takes analysis which is unpalatable to many on this forum you can be sure it’ll be covered by the official investigation later on.
One thing is for sure, no-one’s been watching BP. And, that’s the role of the MMS. And if it hasn’t been their role up to now, then US control of offshore drilling has been seriously lacking.
I suppose MMS should join BP and TO for their share of the blame.
And what of Halliburton? My opinion, no blame whatsoever. Now I’m going to be accused of being a Halliburton spy.

And all who have been involved in HPHT wells will admit to hairy moments!! With all Operators.[/QUOTE]
I’m not trying to pick a fight with you. Goodness knows we’ve had enough pie throwing entertainment. But you have been very willing to blame everyone else but the most obvious guilty party in all of this. There should no doubt be an investigation that will take any & all to task & hopefully that will occur. The only ones who have the key evidnce are the same ones who refuse, evidently due to the incriminationg nature of the evidence, to disclose such evidence. We have all speculated about failed tests. The fact is we don’t know if by API standards there were ever any failed tests or successful tests for that matter achieved.
We have to speculate becuase the only people who do know besides the company reps are dead. The company reps have taken the 5th & that leaves us having to depend on BP not to tamper with the evidence. Based upon their behavior since 4/20/10, I give that about a zero percent chance of happening. What we do KNOW is that there was a very suspect casing design made for this job. A design which did not call for the proper cement barriers to be pumped to assure that the well would function properly to achieve sustainable well control conditions. We know the cement job which was ordered & then pumped was evidently not sufficient to hold a proper bond to the casing & shale wall ensuring sustainable well control conditions.
The truth of what occured on the rig floor that day may never be known. We know there was some type of malfunction to the ESD & EDS systems on board the rig. What is not known is the causation of this/ these malfunctions. The only thing we do know is the company which stood to gain the most from tampering with what evidence there is, is in total control of the location. We don’t even know if there is a single represntative from the federal government on the location or if they have been on location for any substantial amount of time. Given all of the unknowns, the only real substantiated evidence which points to the root cause of this disaster is engineering & instructions given out & carried out by BP.
We can blame the rig operator & they may/ might/ could be culpable. We don’t know. We can blame the vendor who pumped the design job even though they questioned the recipe for said job. We can blame the government for allowing something to happen which could very well have been above their level of thinking to stop. We can blame the president, democracy, & for that matter the free market system of capitalism for allowing the freedom of businesses to operate with a level of trust that they will want to do the right thing for their own survival, if for no other reason. The fact is there is now & has been only one party in all this that has total control from the inception of this occurance until today. If anyone can’t see those obvious facts then they are just looking to flame out on everyone beside the most guilty party.
Now a crime has been comitted. The question is was it through overly aggresive, ambitious, naive design ? Or was it because of premeditated dispicable acts of a criminal or terroristic nature? Before I am quickly dismissed by intelligent others on this board I will ask about Tylenol, Anthrax, & Fort Hood. Who would have ever thought 20 guys would ever fly commercial jets into the World Trade Center & the Pentagon? Did we blame our government or the airline industry for the acts of a few ?
Based upon where we are now & what got us here, I think it is certainly reasonable that BP be grounded permanently or until they can prove that persons in their organization that are responsible for the design & implimentation of this well acted willfully against the better discretion of their standard practices, safety policies, industry standards, & rules & regulations of the government of the United States.

2647

It is most vital that it be made known, the person or persons who made alterations to the original well plan to convert it from an exploration well to a production well. Who made the decision to do this ? When was this decision made ? Who Ok’ed it ? Names of persons along with their experience within the industry, who approved the revised well plan and when were persons on the rig given confirmation to implement such changes. The timeline of these events and decisions, are worth close scrutiny. The qualifications and experience of the companyman that BP saw fit to place in charge of operations on the rig, and the person he rotates stints with must also be checked out along with reasons why the person or persons who made the decision to hire and put him in charge. A closer look should also be made at the credentials of other candidates who may have applied for this position but were not selected. It now appears that the rest of the oil majors will be distancing themselves from BP’s due to non compliance.

2648

Doug Suttles response to Rear Admiral James Watson for building additional capacity and redundancy for the containment of oil. Dated June 13, 2010.

2649

[QUOTE=alcor;36249]A couple of cementers carry out a cement job designed by Halliburton and approved by BP. The cementers on the rig simply pump the cement, and then TO displace it with the rig pumps. Whether they Bump the Plug or not, Halliburton have completed their side of the job. If we don’t place it where it’s supposed to go the onus is now on BP and TO. Why TO, you may ask? Because, they have a responsibility to look after their assets, the rig in this case.
Have we sealed the Reservoir? What were the return volumes from the well when spacer went through the Shoe? What were return volumes when the cement went through the shoe? Was the hole washed out?
MMS, should have defined the criteria for converting the well from exploration to Production. This should have included CBL and defined tests by Halliburton.
No doubt about it, BP have failed to intepret the tests correctly. Obviously, TO have failed too as they let the operation continue (after trying to exercise restraint).
But, the well is not yet lost. We still have mud in the well and a working BOP. As soon as volumes change in the well we have to take notice and respond. This is not possible if all mud is going back to the boat. The TO Toolpusher failed to come up with a good plan to maintain control of well volumes while displacing and backloading. Both are possible.
Of course, pressure control appears to have been completely ignored. The Driller should have known what the SPP should have been at all times while displacing. Many of you may disagree with this point, but if he had the figures he’d have understood that gas was in the well and he would have shut in. For this failure, I blame the Co Man and the TP for not ensuring this information was available. Of course, he should have been able to work it out himself. Static values for sure. Dynamic values as soon as you get going with a constant pump rate.

Regarding the cementer’s position in this, if he didn’t highlight any anomalies which occurred during the cement job then he can be implicated. If he did highlight issues and these were ignored then BP are in even more trouble.

Apportioning blame will be the job of Gov’t investigators, and you can be sure they’ll all look exclusively to BP as the lone scapegoat. Maybe, justifiably. Maybe, not!
I just want to highlight who may have been an accomplice. And, I realise no-one likes it.

Just heard Obama’s latest comments. Is he softening his attitude to BP? No nasty rhetoric?[/QUOTE]

This is how it’s going to go down: BP didn’t pump the design Halliburton recommended. The Halliburton attorney got right to his points and only had a couple of questions, one stated that Halliburton recommended 21 centralizers, and he asked how many were used? The answer was six. And what was the WOC?

Re: the kick, What I’m wondering is if gas is disguised more or less in synthetic mud than in OBM which we know is more than WBM?

2650

Apologies for taking a half day to find them… I think Alf found them for himself, but if others are interested here are the links. Sure would be interested in everyone’s observations. You Tube vid is dated May 28,2019 at 9:15 am for time line reference.

I think this is the post content that Company Man was referring to:

Morning Mr. CM1. Your comments on this video from this morning around 8:15 am central appreciated. http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AadjMspXMAA It was another time that looked like things broke loose… but they didn’t in video afterwards once the turbidity cleared. Interesting part starts around 1:10 in the video.
Also this one:

I found a gent with a blog that has many screen shots and video captures of this mornings “eruption” at around 8:10 AM Central timehttp://pasaudela.blogspot.com/2010/05/for-record-to-be-updated.html
There are some alternate descriptions there. When I had the pleasure of talking with CompanyMan1, and he asked what I saw, I said: “It was like Hercules threw a giant handful of #57 limestone through the water.” Some of the pix in the above link, fit that description pretty well.
Here is one of the stills:
[ATTACH=CONFIG]973[/ATTACH]

Edited to put the current URL for the blog reference, as the original reference went to the home page, updated for archived location.

2651

[QUOTE=company man 1;36252]I’m not trying to pick a fight with you. Goodness knows we’ve had enough pie throwing entertainment. But you have been very willing to blame everyone else but the most obvious guilty party in all of this. There should no doubt be an investigation that will take any & all to task & hopefully that will occur. The only ones who have the key evidnce are the same ones who refuse, evidently due to the incriminationg nature of the evidence, to disclose such evidence. We have all speculated about failed tests. The fact is we don’t know if by API standards there were ever any failed tests or successful tests for that matter achieved.
We have to speculate becuase the only people who do know besides the company reps are dead. The company reps have taken the 5th & that leaves us having to depend on BP not to tamper with the evidence. Based upon their behavior since 4/20/10, I give that about a zero percent chance of happening. What we do KNOW is that there was a very suspect casing design made for this job. A design which did not call for the proper cement barriers to be pumped to assure that the well would function properly to achieve sustainable well control conditions. We know the cement job which was ordered & then pumped was evidently not sufficient to hold a proper bond to the casing & shale wall ensuring sustainable well control conditions.
The truth of what occured on the rig floor that day may never be known. We know there was some type of malfunction to the ESD & EDS systems on board the rig. What is not known is the causation of this/ these malfunctions. The only thing we do know is the company which stood to gain the most from tampering with what evidence there is, is in total control of the location. We don’t even know if there is a single represntative from the federal government on the location or if they have been on location for any substantial amount of time. Given all of the unknowns, the only real substantiated evidence which points to the root cause of this disaster is engineering & instructions given out & carried out by BP.
We can blame the rig operator & they may/ might/ could be culpable. We don’t know. We can blame the vendor who pumped the design job even though they questioned the recipe for said job. We can blame the government for allowing something to happen which could very well have been above their level of thinking to stop. We can blame the president, democracy, & for that matter the free market system of capitalism for allowing the freedom of businesses to operate with a level of trust that they will want to do the right thing for their own survival, if for no other reason. The fact is there is now & has been only one party in all this that has total control from the inception of this occurance until today. If anyone can’t see those obvious facts then they are just looking to flame out on everyone beside the most guilty party.
Now a crime has been comitted. The question is was it through overly aggresive, ambitious, naive design ? Or was it because of premeditated dispicable acts of a criminal or terroristic nature? Before I am quickly dismissed by intelligent others on this board I will ask about Tylenol, Anthrax, & Fort Hood. Who would have ever thought 20 guys would ever fly commercial jets into the World Trade Center & the Pentagon? Did we blame our government or the airline industry for the acts of a few ?
Based upon where we are now & what got us here, I think it is certainly reasonable that BP be grounded permanently or until they can prove that persons in their organization that are responsible for the design & implimentation of this well acted willfully against the better discretion of their standard practices, safety policies, industry standards, & rules & regulations of the government of the United States.[/QUOTE]

More dramatic prose at a time when we need objectivity. I’m trying to see what and who failed. I’m interested in getting people back to work, but we must learn lessons from this disaster. To suggest that only BP operates with shortcuts is profoundly short of the truth.
And, BP has about 40,000 employees in the US. 45% of BP is made up of its US prescence. Are you suggesting that we make all of these employees redundant?

Do you deny that TO could have stopped this blowout if they had been observant enough?
What responsibilities do the drilling contractors have when it comes to well control?
Is volume control an issue? Apparently not, because BP suggested that operations had the all clear to go ahead, despite arguments on the rig between BP and TO regarding displacement.
If TO were worried about displacement why didn’t they take action to ensure the well was displaced with volume and pressure control.
Perhaps, you feel that this was BP’s responsibility as well. Do you?
Assuming you agree that TO were at fault for not observing pressure and volume trends, how much of the blame would you apportion to TO overall?
How much oil spill would there be if TO had closed the rams with SW at the BOP after partial displacement?
And the ignition source, is that down to BP?
The contractor has many obligations when drilling a well. I work for one and I know my responsibilities. I stand up when the fault is mine, even though it might be easier to blame others.

There’s no doubt about the fact that BP will answer for their own deficiencies (the list is endless). But, we’ll find out in time where BP’s specific failures are. The facts will come out. All we can do is speculate with the little facts known.

2652

"@ 20:00hrs the red SPP curve on the chart I have is just UNDER the 3rd black scale mark. ie just UNDER 1500psi."
No argument there but scroll down to 21:30 when pumping stopped for the last time. I see 1250 psi not 1450 psi. My point is that at 21:30 they had ‘reasonably’ been ignoring gain for 1 1/2 hours.
It appears to me that what could have saved the day would have been an accurate measurement of the bbls in vs bbls off loaded delta. Maybe that is what Alcor refers to as volume control? Hard to tell without explanation. Jimmy Harrell testified (as did one other gentleman) that there was no way to pump directly overboard while displacing. Telling me that the lawyers are interested in this.
Regarding Donald Vidrine, they’ll have him under oath soon enough. I’ll withhold judgment about him until I hear what he has to say. I sold him some tools 1981-82. I promise you he is no idiot.

2653

Does the oil and gas industry focus specifically on ‘Human Factors’ in the way they work? From reading forums about this accident I get the feeling that additional investment in that area is in order. Boeing has a quick overview of Human Factors that explains what I mean.

Human error has been documented as a primary contributor to more than 70 percent of commercial airplane hull-loss accidents. While typically associated with flight operations, human error has also recently become a major concern in maintenance practices and air traffic management. Boeing human factors professionals work with engineers, pilots, and mechanics to apply the latest knowledge about the interface between human performance and commercial airplanes to help operators improve safety and efficiency in their daily operations.
The term “human factors” has grown increasingly popular as the commercial aviation industry has realized that human error, rather than mechanical failure, underlies most aviation accidents and incidents. If interpreted narrowly, human factors is often considered synonymous with crew resource management (CRM) or maintenance resource management (MRM). However, it is much broader in both its knowledge base and scope. Human factors involves gathering information about human abilities, limitations, and other characteristics and applying it to tools, machines, systems, tasks, jobs, and environments to produce safe, comfortable, and effective human use. In aviation, human factors is dedicated to better understanding how humans can most safely and efficiently be integrated with the technology. That understanding is then translated into design, training, policies, or procedures to help humans perform better.
Despite rapid gains in technology, humans are ultimately responsible for ensuring the success and safety of the aviation industry. They must continue to be knowledgeable, flexible, dedicated, and efficient while exercising good judgment. Meanwhile, the industry continues to make major investments in training, equipment, and systems that have long-term implications. Because technology continues to evolve faster than the ability to predict how humans will interact with it, the industry can no longer depend as much on experience and intuition to guide decisions related to human performance. Instead, a sound scientific basis is necessary for assessing human performance implications in design, training, and procedures, just as developing a new wing requires sound aerodynamic engineering.

2654

[QUOTE=Bob S;36264]"@ 20:00hrs the red SPP curve on the chart I have is just UNDER the 3rd black scale mark. ie just UNDER 1500psi."
No argument there but scroll down to 21:30 when pumping stopped for the last time. I see 1250 psi not 1450 psi. My point is that at 21:30 they had ‘reasonably’ been ignoring gain for 1 1/2 hours.
It appears to me that what could have saved the day would have been an accurate measurement of the bbls in vs bbls off loaded delta. Maybe that is what Alcor refers to as volume control? Hard to tell without explanation. Jimmy Harrell testified (as did one other gentleman) that there was no way to pump directly overboard while displacing. Telling me that the lawyers are interested in this.
Regarding Donald Vidrine, they’ll have him under oath soon enough. I’ll withhold judgment about him until I hear what he has to say. I sold him some tools 1981-82. I promise you he is no idiot.[/QUOTE]

I’m not sure if I read you correctly. Did you say they had ‘reasonably’ been ignoring gain for 1 1/2 hrs? What part of ignoring volumes is considered reasonable? None. Are we wearing blinkers?
Here are the logger’s charts:
http://energycommerce.house.gov/Press_111/20100512/Halliburton-Last.Two.Hours.Chart.pdf

At 2002 hrs, I suggest they bled off SPP. Why?
From 2020 hrs to 2035 hrs, we see the return flow indicator increasing from 900 gpm to 1100 gpm despite the fact that the pump rate is 900 gpm.
This is a good enough reason to stop pumps and close in the well.
They don’t stop pumping.
At 2034 hrs, they decide to monitor return volume, while continueing to pump at the same rate.
From 2034 to 2052 hrs, we see a 12 barrel gain.
Again, we have an opportunity to close the BOP.
At 2052 hrs, the pump rate is reduced, but the gain continues.
From 2100 to 2108 hrs, SPP is increasing. It’s supposed to reduce as we displace the heavy mud from the hole. This is another opportunity to react.
The gain continues right up until 2108 hrs. Total gain at this point is 28 barrels over 30 mins of pumping.
Still no reaction. I’m wondering if the drill crew were convinced the gain was coming from within their own pits. Did the logger advise the DF of the unfolding events?
At 2108 hrs, the pumps are shut off. But, SPP rises by 200 psi over the next 6 mins.
At 2114 hrs, they start pumping again at 400 gpm. Pressure rises over the next 6 mins by 200 psi. It should be dropping.
At 2118 hrs, pumps are stopped and restarted at 2120 hrs. There appears to be a great deal of uncertainty.
From 2120 to 2130 compare Riser flow with volume pumped and refer flow to earlier pumped volumes. Something is radically wrong. The signs are all here.
Note that from 2120 onwards we have no indication of return flow, but we do have Riser flow. Does this mean that the Diverter has been activated at 2120 hrs?
Pumps are shut off at 2130 hrs.
From 2130 to 2150 hrs, SPP goes up and down, possibly someone bleeding off?? We also see a further 10 Bbls increase in the pits over this 20 min period. The TT also rises. Is the Diverter leaking?
At 2149 hrs, the horrific moment arrives, and the logger’s report ends.

May the drill crew rest in peace.
There is never a time to be complacent about well volumes. Those of you who practice this should understand that anything is possible.
Our crews use trip sheets for every Rih and Pooh, even after cement jobs which have been tested. And we perform flow checks, even though it’s obvious that all is well.
You just never know what’s going to bite you. Look what happened to this poor crew.

All the warning signs were there. TO will have to answer many awkward questions…which no-one really want to make. We choose others to blame.
This scenario would happen on every well that takes a kick if we ignore the signs. Every single well. Why doesn’t it happen more often? Because, we close the BOP before it’s too late.

I’d like to know why the Co Man and TP weren’t on the DF interpreting data. After all, they had a serious spat earlier in the day, didn’t they?

Do you have a comment CM1?

2655

Yes. With the laser brilliant clarity afforded by hindsight we can all agree that there was a great deal of uncertainty before 21:30. However, after 21:30 with the variables associated with pumping removed and gain continuing, and presumably with plenty of time left to shut it in, that still did not happen. Cynthia’s post regarding human factors points to an interesting area. This is the same kind of puzzlement we had surrounding the reasons why Kennedy Jr. flew his plane upside into the ocean.

2656

[QUOTE=Bob S;36270]Yes. With the laser brilliant clarity afforded by hindsight we can all agree that there was a great deal of uncertainty before 21:30. However, after 21:30 with the variables associated with pumping removed and gain continuing, and presumably with plenty of time left to shut it in, that still did not happen. Cynthia’s post regarding human factors points to an interesting area. This is the same kind of puzzlement we had surrounding the reasons why Kennedy Jr. flew his plane upside into the ocean.[/QUOTE]

Hindsight is too late. This data is in front of the driller and in the TP and Co Man’s offices. There should have been at least 4 senior personnel on the rig watching the displacement. And the driller and logger are not in that four. This is the most serious lapse in volume control that I’ve seen. Weigh this up against the fact that the TP didn’t want to displace and I feel that he and the Co Man have had a total disregard for the personnel on this vessel.

There were many other things wrong with this well that BP will answer for. But, there are 2 people on the rig to answer for this failure to shut in the well, the Co Man and the TP.

2657

[QUOTE=alcor;36262]More dramatic prose at a time when we need objectivity. I’m trying to see what and who failed. I’m interested in getting people back to work, but we must learn lessons from this disaster. To suggest that only BP operates with shortcuts is profoundly short of the truth.
And, BP has about 40,000 employees in the US. 45% of BP is made up of its US prescence. Are you suggesting that we make all of these employees redundant?

Do you deny that TO could have stopped this blowout if they had been observant enough?
What responsibilities do the drilling contractors have when it comes to well control?
Is volume control an issue? Apparently not, because BP suggested that operations had the all clear to go ahead, despite arguments on the rig between BP and TO regarding displacement.
If TO were worried about displacement why didn’t they take action to ensure the well was displaced with volume and pressure control.
Perhaps, you feel that this was BP’s responsibility as well. Do you?
Assuming you agree that TO were at fault for not observing pressure and volume trends, how much of the blame would you apportion to TO overall?
How much oil spill would there be if TO had closed the rams with SW at the BOP after partial displacement?
And the ignition source, is that down to BP?
The contractor has many obligations when drilling a well. I work for one and I know my responsibilities. I stand up when the fault is mine, even though it might be easier to blame others.

There’s no doubt about the fact that BP will answer for their own deficiencies (the list is endless). But, we’ll find out in time where BP’s specific failures are. The facts will come out. All we can do is speculate with the little facts known.[/QUOTE]
About the same amount you apportioned to BP for possibly rupturing the stupid rupture discs in the 16" casing while pumping the top job you claim the government & media forced them to do.

2658

I’m extremely reluctant to post this article here but do so because it purports to establish an information trail for a question I had posted earlier. And that was the comments from Senator Bill Nelson regarding oil seeping from the sea floor. I had asked where he was getting this information from. The credibility of the article goes down for me because of discussion of the nuclear bomb and Matt Simmons.

The only information I’m considering in this article is that quoted below. If anyone has any information that can prove or dis-prove Sagalevich’s report, please post it. Such as the Mir 1 or Mir 2 either being in the GoM or not being there. I would assume they would have to launch it from a surface ship in close approximation to the well. And word would quickly get out if a Russian ship was on scene. Personally, I’m getting tired of reading uncorroborated reports of oil from the Macondo well coming from the sea floor. We need a Mythbusters team on this.

According to Sagalevich’s report, the oil leaking into the Gulf of Mexico is not just coming from the 22 inch well bore site being shown on American television, but from at least 18 other sites on the “fractured seafloor” with the largest being nearly 11 kilometers (7 miles) from where the Deepwater Horizon sank and is spewing into these precious waters an estimated 2 million gallons of oil a day.

Interesting to note in this report is Sagalevich stating that he and the other Russian scientists were required by the United States to sign documents forbidding them to report their findings to either the American public or media, and which they had to do in order to legally operate in US territorial waters.

However, Sagalevich says that he and the other scientists gave nearly hourly updates to both US government and BP officials about what they were seeing on the sea floor, including the US Senator from their State of Florida Bill Nelson who after one such briefing stated to the MSNBC news service “Andrea we’re looking into something new right now, that there’s reports of oil that’s seeping up from the seabed… which would indicate, if that’s true, that the well casing itself is actually pierced… underneath the seabed. So, you know, the problems could be just enormous with what we’re facing.”

2659

[QUOTE=Bob S;36270]Yes. With the laser brilliant clarity afforded by hindsight we can all agree that there was a great deal of uncertainty before 21:30. However, after 21:30 with the variables associated with pumping removed and gain continuing, and presumably with plenty of time left to shut it in, that still did not happen. Cynthia’s post regarding human factors points to an interesting area. This is the same kind of puzzlement we had surrounding the reasons why Kennedy Jr. flew his plane upside into the ocean.[/QUOTE]
We don’t know that they didn’t shut in. In fact looking at the pictures & seing fire coming out of the gas buster line at the top of the derrick & seeing fire coming out of the flare line tells me they did shut in. We don’t know how hard the kick was & where it was by the time they realized it. If it was 40 BBls. down there then it was 200 times that large by the time it got to surface. You guys keep bringing up pilot error when the engines were rigged to explode.

2660

The TP WAS on the floor. He is now deceased. The Sr. TP has already testified. Maybe you are thinking about the OIM. He is the one who had the discussion with the Co Man in the pre-tour meeting. The OIM has testified. The Co Man was Donald Vidrine. He is supposed to testify soon. Hindsight is what you, I, and everyone else on this site is engaging in. Maybe my grasp of the king’s English is lacking but these facts seem to be pretty basic and central to the discussion.