Deepwater Horizon - Transocean Oil Rig Fire

[QUOTE=alcor;36151]MMS, must have approved the design.
We often drill wildcat wells worldwide expecting to allow for a certain amount of over-pressurized zones. When we meet a monster, we have to decide straight away how to control it. After eventually weighing up the mud and bringing the well under control further decisions are required as to the suitability of our well design. It may be that in a worst case scenario, we get full reservoir pressure at the WH. Our original design may not have anticipated such pressures. This may have been the dilemma facing BP when they initially hit the payzone!!!

At this point, the design is weaker than required. And yet, it is no different to all the exploration wells conducted around the world…which we have been permitted to drill. So, who is the authority in the US to say whether we carry on with the well? Is BP the authority? Surely, Gov’t agencies call the shots on what’s considered safe.

I suggest that BP applied for change of use from exploration to production, and a Gov’t authority approved it.
Regarding, the well design, I’ve worked on wells where we’ve discovered our casing design won’t meet the criteria required in the case of a well full of gas.

I have no idea what pressure was seen in the Macondo well WH prior to the blowout. We have seen the SPP reach 6000 psi on the logger’s charts. Other than that, I have no idea. All I’m suggesting is that it is quite possible that the Rupture disk may have remained intact. I’m also suggesting that no-one saw bullheading as an option immediately after the blowout. They opted for oil ‘capture’, knowing the probability of worsening the situation with regard to more flow to be a strong one.
When it was decided to give Bullheading a try one of two things happened: they either ruptured the disk or they pumped through an already ruptured disk at 1000 ft below the WH. As I said earlier, I feel it is quite possible that the top Kill may have exacerbated the situation by increasing the flow from other areas.
The great thing about this forum is that all possibilities are explored. This is a valid possibility.

Regarding the other issue, all I can say is that I would reccommend the crew shutting down when safety became an issue. The TP has to take the required action to stop proceedings when the Co Man fails to do so.
And, when a kind of agreement to continue was established, the crews should have been briefed on the possibilities that the well would flow. When the SW displacement took place as far as the BOP, failure to identify an anomaly in the SPP sealed the fate of the unfortunate crew. The well could still have been saved at this point. How we all wish someone was monitoring the displacement and interpreting the data.[/QUOTE]
This is a good post which makes some very good points. I disagree with the bullheading because of caution. I saw the trucks bringing new hose to the dock for this job 3 days before it was pumped. That tells me they were stalling for time & trying the first thing they could come up with. The truth is they didn’t have a clue of how to deal with this runaway train.
Once again, you give the MMS too much credit. On the one hand you want to say it was the rig/ Co. men’s fault for not stopping operations. On the other hand it is the government’s fault for wanting an operation to take place which would cause even more damage than was done. No where in the plan is it the design engineers, department heads, regional managers, vice presidents, or COO/CEOs scope of knowledge or influence to determine what is going to happen to a well they are calling all the shots on & paying to have drilled/completed? You are going to have a very hard time selling that considering they have had all of the control since & have been dishonest about everything they have done or seen. Now they are blaming the rupture on a malfunctioning rupture disc. I would say the disc worked very well.
If they were honest about rolling the dice because they were in a no win situation, people could respect that. If they didn’t want to try top kill because they knew they had rupture discs set in the intermediate casing that could rupture & cause the situation to get worse. People could buy into that, event though there would be a myriad of questions about why anyone would put a rupture disc in casing that would certainly cause a well to flow out of control if BHP ever migrated up the casing annuli. In fact I now believe the disc was ruptured all along even before the top kill was attempted. The BHP coming up to the well head was certainly high enough to blow one if not all of them. I, ridiculed someone who posted such on here, but now I have to apologize because they may very well have known exactly what they were talking about.
One thing is for sure, this isn’t going to get any better before it gets a whole lot worse, & I wouldn’t be caught holding any confederate money better known as BP stock by this time tomorrow evening.

[QUOTE=Bob S;36160]Alcor said " failure to identify an anomaly in the SPP sealed the fate of the unfortunate crew"
It is not possible to tell which ‘anomaly’ or artifact on the strip chart you are referring to. Can you please identify that anomaly by time on the log? Are you referring to the SPP spike that began at 21:47?

IMO ‘failure to identify’ began at 21:30 when rig pumps were dead OFF and pit gain Continued. My belief is that they had earlier Noted AND Discounted pit gain as being Unimportant during an off-loading operation. This was a correct and reasonable judgment that I’m sure they had made many times before.
For an hour and a half, starting at 20:00, while displacing and off-loading, they Reasonably ignored pit gain. But then with rig pumps OFF at 21:30 (and pit gain Still Increasing!) they failed to make the Mental Shift required to place pit gain Back at the top of the Importance tree/list. They simply remained in ‘pit gain Not Important’ mode. A perfectly human nature kind of compartmentalization activity.
I have seen No log Evidence nor heard any testimony nor seen any time line to suggest that this is Not what happened. And further it would be almost impossible to believe that 5 or more bright, dedicated, and tremendously experienced men could simply Miss something like this. They correctly discounted pit gain while off-loading and did not reacquire it as crucially important when pumps stopped. They Did Not Miss the pit gain (which they certainly knew was one of the first signs of a blow out in progress). They discounted it.[/QUOTE]

There is no such thing as a secure well without volume control. And this includes displacement, particularly so when we have discovered the TP’s worries concerning removing weighted mud from the well. But, I repeat, we must always have volume control. If someone has suggested on your rig that it’s ok to ignore volumes and displace to SW I suggest you send him to the nearest mental institution.

Would you reduce BHP by a margin of 2460 psi without any volume control? Even when someone tells you the tests were ok, that is, the positive and negative tests were considered ok. We must always have volume control.

There is nothing more crucial than volume control when backloading to a boat. It only requires two pits to be assigned as ‘returns’ pits, one to fill up while the other is being backloaded. Add the return pit to the Active system and remove the backload pit.

The displacement to SW was performed down the string and up as far as the top of the BOP. Then the BOP was closed. 14 ppg mud was being displaced.
When the mud pumps were shut down the SPP read 1450 psi. The pressure should have been 1000 psi. The well was shut in at this point and if someone had recognised the anomaly the well could have been saved.
We’ve had 100’s of wells which have depended on the BOPs as a second line of defence. We are often called upon to shut them in the case of a kick. The circumstances weren’t that different at this time when the well was shut in. And the drill crew checked for pressure on both the C&K lines. Both guages read zero. If they had 14 ppg mud in the K&C lines they would read zero on the guage. If they had SW they would have read approx 400 psi. It may be that they weren’t lined up correctly. One thing is certain, this was an opportunity to save the well.
Where was the night Co Man? Where was the TP who had alerted everyone to the potential dangers? It’s alright blaming someone else for deciding upon a course of action as the TP did, but you better not go to bed until all is well and the well has been displaced…and your mind can rest. Where was the day Co Man?
These are important questions. We shy away from them because of our respect for those who perished. We spend all our time damning BP for an incident which could well have been prevented by TO employees.
We never know what’s proved or unproved in a well. BP Co MAn interprets the test data following the cement job and later on the Seal Assy with inconclusive results. And arguements take place on the rig as to the validity of the tests.
Volume control right up to removal of the BOP/Riser. And Pressure control.

[QUOTE=watchful I;36153]http://www.youtube.com/v/b2RxIQP0IBU&color1=0xb1b1b1&color2=0xd0d0d0&hl
[B]
I don’t know if anyone has posted this yet, but it appears this video SHOWS oil coming from the sea floor.
Please chime in and tell us what you think!!!
If someone could embed this video for the rest of us, I still can’t seem to get how it’s done ???[/B][/QUOTE]

//youtu.be/b2RxIQP0IBU

Thanks for bringing this to my attention watchful I.

//youtu.be/O1jDJ1ARPJQ

At 32 seconds I show an image in this video of what appears to be gas being expelled during the various top kill efforts … before and after. Many particles floated about. The story has been in what they have not shown us. Seeing is believing. I want to believe as we share the watchtower.

[QUOTE=company man 1;36161]This is a good post which makes some very good points. I disagree with the bullheading because of caution. I saw the trucks bringing new hose to the dock for this job 3 days before it was pumped. That tells me they were stalling for time & trying the first thing they could come up with. The truth is they didn’t have a clue of how to deal with this runaway train.
Once again, you give the MMS too much credit. On the one hand you want to say it was the rig/ Co. men’s fault for not stopping operations. On the other hand it is the government’s fault for wanting an operation to take place which would cause even more damage than was done. No where in the plan is it the design engineers, department heads, regional managers, vice presidents, or COO/CEOs scope of knowledge or influence to determine what is going to happen to a well they are calling all the shots on & paying to have drilled/completed? You are going to have a very hard time selling that considering they have had all of the control since & have been dishonest about everything they have done or seen. Now they are blaming the rupture on a malfunctioning rupture disc. I would say the disc worked very well.
If they were honest about rolling the dice because they were in a no win situation, people could respect that. If they didn’t want to try top kill because they knew they had rupture discs set in the intermediate casing that could rupture & cause the situation to get worse. People could buy into that, event though there would be a myriad of questions about why anyone would put a rupture disc in casing that would certainly cause a well to flow out of control if BHP ever migrated up the casing annuli. In fact I now believe the disc was ruptured all along even before the top kill was attempted. The BHP coming up to the well head was certainly high enough to blow one if not all of them. I, ridiculed someone who posted such on here, but now I have to apologize because they may very well have known exactly what they were talking about.
One thing is for sure, this isn’t going to get any better before it gets a whole lot worse, & I wouldn’t be caught holding any confederate money better known as BP stock by this time tomorrow evening.[/QUOTE]

What went wrong?
Cement job.
Positive and negative test data misinterpreted and misunderstood.
No CBL.
No second barrier (plug).
Displacement to BOP with SW with a DP string at 8300 ft (no-one able to recognise pressure on standpipe indicated gas in the well)
No Volume control.
No pressure control.

All the screw-ups that the cement job and misinterpretation of data related to the negative/positive tests still required the Drill crew to be on guard.

When I go to bed on the Rig I’m hoping that the next crew who relieve me are competent at reading the signs in the well. It has been unacceptable to mention these points up to now.

CM 1,
Have you noticed how often you are thanked for your posts? You must be doing one hell of a job illuminating the world.
I’m afraid I don’t get as many thanks because I’m not prepared to be sensationalist.
The truth is the relief well has always been the only solution. Top Hat would have been fine if there wasn’t so much gas. All the other tampering with the well has been provoked by sensationalist politicians and a media out to crucify BP.
The media and Obama prefer to scold BP than show consideration for those who lost their lives. They appear to be forgotten.

[QUOTE=alcor;36177]What went wrong?
Cement job.
Positive and negative test data misinterpreted and misunderstood.
No CBL.
No second barrier (plug).
Displacement to BOP with SW with a DP string at 8300 ft (no-one able to recognise pressure on standpipe indicated gas in the well)
No Volume control.
No pressure control.

All the screw-ups that the cement job and misinterpretation of data related to the negative/positive tests still required the Drill crew to be on guard.

When I go to bed on the Rig I’m hoping that the next crew who relieve me are competent at reading the signs in the well. It has been unacceptable to mention these points up to now.[/QUOTE]
Add to this an F?><ed up casing design, totally screwed up cement job that the client ordered, & a screwy set of instructions for the day’s work from the Houston office & you’re getting warmer.

[QUOTE=alcor;36181]CM 1,
Have you noticed how often you are thanked for your posts? You must be doing one hell of a job illuminating the world.
I’m afraid I don’t get as many thanks because I’m not prepared to be sensationalist.
The truth is the relief well has always been the only solution. Top Hat would have been fine if there wasn’t so much gas. All the other tampering with the well has been provoked by sensationalist politicians and a media out to crucify BP.
The media and Obama prefer to scold BP than show consideration for those who lost their lives. They appear to be forgotten.[/QUOTE]

Maybe I’m thanked because I have been trying to get to the bottom of this thing & have been as honest & forthright as I can. I have openly admitted when I was proven wrong & challenged others thoughts with as much respect as I can while holding firmly to the belief that the guilty & only the guilty should pay.
Edit: How is the only solution a relief well when the well is flowing outside of the casing?
ONCE AGAIN, THE ONLY SOLUTION IS PREVENTION! It would do everyone good to remember this.
Edit: How is holding BP accountabls for causing the deaths of just eleven people when they put 115 others in the water on 4/20/10 not showing consideration for the dead? The eleven certainly have been forgotten along with the other 115 by BP according to THEIR testimony & the testimony of surviving family members.

[QUOTE=company man 1;36182]Add to this an F?><ed up casing design, totally screwed up cement job that the client ordered, & a screwy set of instructions for the day’s work from the Houston office & you’re getting warmer.[/QUOTE]

On my rig it doesn’t matter who screwed up what. We can still control this well if we have volume/pressure control and a functioning BOP.

[QUOTE=company man 1;36184]Maybe I’m thanked because I have been trying to get to the bottom of this thing & have been as honest & forthright as I can. I have openly admitted when I was proven wrong & challenged others thoughts with as much respect as I can while holding firmly to the belief that the guilty & only the guilty shoud pay.[/QUOTE]

I am drilling crew. Nothing is dead in the well until we displace successfully, and that is the way we have to behave. We are there to intercept others’ mistakes. That’s my philosophy.

[QUOTE=KASOL;36145]For those interested: http://www.ptil.no/getfile.php/z%20Konvertert/Health%2C%20safety%20and%20environment/Supervision/Dokumenter/snaendeligrapporteng_v04_low.pdf
This is the NPD report from the Snorre incident in 2004 where the TLP platform nearly got blown up. I hope the investigation of the DH incidents is as detalied as this. I use this report often. If i feel we are doing something that may be in conflict with the rules I read this report again. I also recommend all foreign engineers to read it when they plan wells here in Norway. It is not “pretty” reading. It also shows how it could happen and that a lot of barriers failed as well as poor management involvment.[/QUOTE]

Thanks. Have you ever drilled in the Troll field? If so, can you post info on any well control issues you may have learned or tell me where I can go to find that info?

Add to this an F?><ed up casing design, totally screwed up cement job that the client ordered, & a screwy set of instructions for the day’s work from the Houston office & you’re getting warmer.

Absolutely correct. This was a flawed design but BP’s public relations people and the oil lobbyists in general are trying to pass this off as something that happened because it was uncharted territory, like a trip to Mars or something. I’ve heard deepwater drilling equated with going to the moon on news reports. Bullshit, the engineering principles of Archimedes, Bernoulli and Pascal still apply, we’re on the planet earth for God’s sake we know how things work here. It’s a matter of pressure, volume, force and a little basic material science. Drilling a hole in the bottom of the ocean is NOT rocket science, we’ve been doing this for years quite successfully and we learned from shallow to deepwater what was acceptable and what was not.
This was negligence, plain and simple. The fact that there was no containment contingency plan just shows the audacity of the oil company, in this case BP, though it could have been any of them.

[QUOTE=alcor;36177]All the screw-ups that the cement job and misinterpretation of data related to the negative/positive tests still required the Drill crew to be on guard.

When I go to bed on the Rig I’m hoping that the next crew who relieve me are competent at reading the signs in the well. It has been unacceptable to mention these points up to now.[/QUOTE]

Actually it has been mentioned since day one on this thread if you go back & look. Several folks who had worked with the guys on the drill floor that night expressed their disbelief that people of their training & caliber would have missed the indications. I don’t think anyone is disputing that there were some mistakes made by many of the people involved, including the drill crew possibly. The point we are trying to make is that those mistakes were made after the drill crew was placed in a no-win situation by the people who designed the well plan & were running the show.

I appreciate the way that, when each of your attempts to steer the blame & focus away from BP is shot down, you make a series of resonable posts to lull us into a sense of security prior to slowly going further & further in each new post towards the next attempt at pointing the finger elsewhere. First it was the BOP (Cameron or TO), then Don Virdine and now it was all the drill crew’s fault. Thanks for playing, I look forward to seeing who gets blamed next.

Oh. . . . . just read your next post & it would appear that those who lost their lives are not forgotten by you. You remember them well enough to now try to lay all the blame at their feet since they are not here to defend themselves & it would appear that you mistakenly believe the people here will stand by without taking you to task for it.

As CM1 stated earlier “please don’t do that” we are not buying what you are selling.

Thank you Alcor for arguing my points. btw, “When the mud pumps were shut down the SPP read 1450 psi.” This is why I asked you for the time on the strip log because it was 1250 psi when pumping stopped not 1450. Best to doc your assertions. and do all a favor and reign in the finger wagging.

Great Reading Kasol. Looks like the work ethic of the Norwegions , surpasses that of BP. Also, I am very impressed with your work responsibilities, the extremeley dangerous enviroment you work under. I really appreciate the risk you all take. We americans are so spoiled. Thanks to you all.

[QUOTE=Corky;36190]Actually it has been mentioned since day one on this thread if you go back & look. Several folks who had worked with the guys on the drill floor that night expressed their disbelief that people of their training & caliber would have missed the indications. I don’t think anyone is disputing that there were some mistakes made by many of the people involved, including the drill crew possibly. The point we are trying to make is that those mistakes were made after the drill crew was placed in a no-win situation by the people who designed the well plan & were running the show.

I appreciate the way that, when each of your attempts to steer the blame & focus away from BP is shot down, you make a series of resonable posts to lull us into a sense of security prior to slowly going further & further in each new post towards the next attempt at pointing the finger elsewhere. First it was the BOP (Cameron or TO), then Don Virdine and now it was all the drill crew’s fault. Thanks for playing, I look forward to seeing who gets blamed next.

Oh. . . . . just read your next post & it would appear that those who lost their lives are not forgotten by you. You remember them well enough to now try to lay all the blame at their feet since they are not here to defend themselves & it would appear that you mistakenly believe the people here will stand by without taking you to task for it.

As CM1 stated earlier “please don’t do that” we are not buying what you are selling.[/QUOTE]

Alcor,
You say you are drilling crew. What is your job?
Tengineer

[QUOTE=alcor;36181]CM 1,
Have you noticed how often you are thanked for your posts? You must be doing one hell of a job illuminating the world.
I’m afraid I don’t get as many thanks because I’m not prepared to be sensationalist.
The truth is the relief well has always been the only solution. Top Hat would have been fine if there wasn’t so much gas. All the other tampering with the well has been provoked by sensationalist politicians and a media out to crucify BP.
The media and Obama prefer to scold BP than show consideration for those who lost their lives. They appear to be forgotten.[/QUOTE]

I thank you Alcor when you address the issues technically, I don’t like wasting my time with pie throwing, by anyone. You’ve made some good technical points, but keep in mind politically that the GoM operators have been given incentives to drill for the last 15 years, the government doesn’t know how to write the new rule book even though you say they should. The SPE 10/2009 paper I read today about technical challenges in the GoM written by five Petrobras engineers said nobody knows, but we make educated guesses. So at this point maybe the MMS is kinda like what the BP Sr Drllg Eng said about a CBL, they can tell you when it’s good, but not necessarily when it’s bad. In that spirit, BP should have been a lot more conservative re: design, implementation, and testing the long string, but they decided to roll the dice and they lost. That was then, from now on the MMS will be a lot more heavy handed, like you are used to in the North Sea.

edited: It’s understandable you have a soft spot for BP.

Hey BP, time to hurry now. 'Cane season is here… Hurricane Season that is.

TROPICAL PREDICTION CENTER MIAMI FL
ATLANTIC BETWEEN 07N TO 31N W OF 35W INCLUDING CARIBBEAN SEA AND
GULF OF MEXICO
SYNOPSIS VALID 0000 UTC MON JUN 14.
24 HOUR FORECAST VALID 0000 UTC TUE JUN 15.
48 HOUR FORECAST VALID 0000 UTC WED JUN 16.
.WARNINGS.
.NONE.
.SYNOPSIS AND FORECAST.
.ATLC BROAD LOW PRES MEAN CENTER 08N38W 1010 MB. FROM 08N TO 12N
E OF 40W NE WINDS 20 KT. SEAS LESS THAN 8 FT.
.24 HOUR FORECAST LOW PRES…POSSIBLE TROPICAL CYCLONE…11N42W
1011 MB. WITHIN 180 NM NE SEMICIRCLE OF CENTER WINDS 20 TO 25
KT. SEAS TO 8 FT. ELSEWHERE FROM 11N TO 17N E OF 42W NE TO E
WINDS 20 KT. SEAS LESS THAN 8 FT.
.48 HOUR FORECAST LOW PRES…POSSIBLE TROPICAL CYCLONE…13N47W
1011 MB. WITHIN 180 NM NE SEMICIRCLE OF CENTER WINDS 20 TO 25
KT. SEAS 8 FT. ELSEWHERE FROM 13N TO 20N BETWEEN 35W AND 47W
NE TO E WINDS 20 KT. SEAS TO 8 FT.

[QUOTE=tengineer;36069] I don’t blame BP for this. Geez, if you can write BS like this and have it approved by the regulatory officials why not? BP did what BP does, they drilled a hole in the ground and got some oil, that’s how they make a living. That there were glaring flaws in both the design of the well and the contingency planning should there be a spill is not BP’s fault, hell they and every other company operating in US waters have been getting by with this for years. [/QUOTE] Really? Every other company? I’m sure almost everyone takes a few liberties with the regulators. We all bend the rules, maybe we drive 65 in a 55 zone. That doesn’t mean we all do 100 in a 55.

There is a big difference between bending a few rules, and systematically pushing every rule almost to the breaking point (which is what some people accuse BP of doing).

[QUOTE=alcor;36132] The only way to truly combat this well is through the relief well.[/QUOTE] Is there a [I]credible[/I] worst case where that does not work? BP say they expect to complete a relief well in August. Even if casing or cement or shoes or seals or whatever have failed below the sea bed, the relief well fixes things 10,000 feet further down … right?

[QUOTE=OneEyedMan;36208]Is there a [I]credible[/I] worst case where that does not work? BP say they expect to complete a relief well in August. Even if casing or cement or shoes or seals or whatever have failed below the sea bed, the relief well fixes things 10,000 feet further down … right?[/QUOTE]
Unfortunately, that is not necessarily true. In fact it may not work at all. That is why transparency & honesty are always the best policy. In this case the best policy certainly has not been practiced & because of this by the time they get on depth if they can’t kill this well due to too much flow, then the people whom I have been accused of crucifying, may actually be crucified literally. With the lies & deception practiced by BP from the beginning one has to wonder if this well wasn’t known by them to be flowing outside of the casing from the outset of the blowout. That would make all of what we have witnessed just one big charade. I have a suspicsion someone as laid back & wise as Alf may have suspected this for a while now.
ALf, I have to ask you this in front of all the other posters & readers. You should be one of the most if not the most respected poster on this sight. I want your opinion from what you have seen & read. Do you think it is a pretty good possibility that this whole thing has been a sick joke of a cover up or do you think these guys have been up front & sincere ?