[QUOTE=alcor;36151]MMS, must have approved the design.
We often drill wildcat wells worldwide expecting to allow for a certain amount of over-pressurized zones. When we meet a monster, we have to decide straight away how to control it. After eventually weighing up the mud and bringing the well under control further decisions are required as to the suitability of our well design. It may be that in a worst case scenario, we get full reservoir pressure at the WH. Our original design may not have anticipated such pressures. This may have been the dilemma facing BP when they initially hit the payzone!!!
At this point, the design is weaker than required. And yet, it is no different to all the exploration wells conducted around the world…which we have been permitted to drill. So, who is the authority in the US to say whether we carry on with the well? Is BP the authority? Surely, Gov’t agencies call the shots on what’s considered safe.
I suggest that BP applied for change of use from exploration to production, and a Gov’t authority approved it.
Regarding, the well design, I’ve worked on wells where we’ve discovered our casing design won’t meet the criteria required in the case of a well full of gas.
I have no idea what pressure was seen in the Macondo well WH prior to the blowout. We have seen the SPP reach 6000 psi on the logger’s charts. Other than that, I have no idea. All I’m suggesting is that it is quite possible that the Rupture disk may have remained intact. I’m also suggesting that no-one saw bullheading as an option immediately after the blowout. They opted for oil ‘capture’, knowing the probability of worsening the situation with regard to more flow to be a strong one.
When it was decided to give Bullheading a try one of two things happened: they either ruptured the disk or they pumped through an already ruptured disk at 1000 ft below the WH. As I said earlier, I feel it is quite possible that the top Kill may have exacerbated the situation by increasing the flow from other areas.
The great thing about this forum is that all possibilities are explored. This is a valid possibility.
Regarding the other issue, all I can say is that I would reccommend the crew shutting down when safety became an issue. The TP has to take the required action to stop proceedings when the Co Man fails to do so.
And, when a kind of agreement to continue was established, the crews should have been briefed on the possibilities that the well would flow. When the SW displacement took place as far as the BOP, failure to identify an anomaly in the SPP sealed the fate of the unfortunate crew. The well could still have been saved at this point. How we all wish someone was monitoring the displacement and interpreting the data.[/QUOTE]
This is a good post which makes some very good points. I disagree with the bullheading because of caution. I saw the trucks bringing new hose to the dock for this job 3 days before it was pumped. That tells me they were stalling for time & trying the first thing they could come up with. The truth is they didn’t have a clue of how to deal with this runaway train.
Once again, you give the MMS too much credit. On the one hand you want to say it was the rig/ Co. men’s fault for not stopping operations. On the other hand it is the government’s fault for wanting an operation to take place which would cause even more damage than was done. No where in the plan is it the design engineers, department heads, regional managers, vice presidents, or COO/CEOs scope of knowledge or influence to determine what is going to happen to a well they are calling all the shots on & paying to have drilled/completed? You are going to have a very hard time selling that considering they have had all of the control since & have been dishonest about everything they have done or seen. Now they are blaming the rupture on a malfunctioning rupture disc. I would say the disc worked very well.
If they were honest about rolling the dice because they were in a no win situation, people could respect that. If they didn’t want to try top kill because they knew they had rupture discs set in the intermediate casing that could rupture & cause the situation to get worse. People could buy into that, event though there would be a myriad of questions about why anyone would put a rupture disc in casing that would certainly cause a well to flow out of control if BHP ever migrated up the casing annuli. In fact I now believe the disc was ruptured all along even before the top kill was attempted. The BHP coming up to the well head was certainly high enough to blow one if not all of them. I, ridiculed someone who posted such on here, but now I have to apologize because they may very well have known exactly what they were talking about.
One thing is for sure, this isn’t going to get any better before it gets a whole lot worse, & I wouldn’t be caught holding any confederate money better known as BP stock by this time tomorrow evening.