It could have been worse. If the article was in Nynorsk the hilarious parts would probably outweigh the informative. (If you could understand the original that is)
Correction!!! The original IS in Nynorsk.
âClawingâ is a very good translation of the Norwegian âkloreâ and a lot more descriptive than Googleâs âmunchingâ.
BTW; The State Pilot in question is from Northern Norway and they are known for their colourful language.
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People designing machinery and systems always think they are smarter than the operators.
People operating and maintaining the machinery always think they are smarter than the designers.
Men that have done both, are smarter than all of them.
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Well, that was a bit of a let down considering all the early speculation. Spoiler alert:
- ďˇ The lubricating oil sump tanks of all the diesel generators were maintained at 28%â40% capacity. MANâs recommendation was to maintain them at 68%â75% capacity.
- ďˇ The diesel generators shut down as a result of the loss of lubricating oil suction due to low sump tank levels, combined with pitching and rolling.
- ďˇ All three operational diesel generators shut down within 19 minutes of each other, causing blackout and loss of propulsion.
What isnât made clear is why the sumps were only 28%-40%. Who told them to do that?
Yeah agree with those points. Some details and better time line but they surely have more details on actions taken in engine room than this. Although we hear they did add oil. Complete blackout at 1358, add oil, DG 2 started and on line at 1422.
However, did you see thisâŚbetween 0500 and 0904 there were 18 oil level alarms all cleared when acknowledged. We are talking elsewhere on these forums about the ability to read weak signals and awareness. My goodness, how do you not take corrective action of some kind in that scenario? Thatâs not a weak signal thatâs a blaring klaxon!
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Ah, that oil alarm is always kinda screwy. Prolly a bad sender or a loose wire somewhereâŚ
Weâll chase it when the weather calms down.
I donât suppose it occurred to the Engineer on watch to actually look at the oil pressure gauges to check whether the oil pressure was actually fluctuating as the ship rolled and pitched?
These conclusions are rather staggering, it is all so amateurish.
Literally.
The first part of the enquiry done and dusted and they are moving right along to see what they can hang on the master.
That made me wonder how long it takes to transfer oil to the sump. They had nearly 20 minutes from persistent low level alarm to shutdown on DG1.
Oh I see. So youâve been having low oil level and volume alarms all night, the thingâs screaming at you that itâs not getting oil, and you donât know why it stopped? Did you need the factory technician to tell you?
This would be incredibly amusing if it wasnât for how very close they got to creating the worst maritime disaster in Norwegian history. The full report is going to make an interesting read.
As chief engineer on a large pax vessel I do not find this amusing at all, not one bit. This event highlights many of the things weâre up against - workloads, automation that needs to be understood, degradation of engineering knowledge because of the way we do things now, etc. All subjects for their own thread.
As you know a blackout on a D/E vessel is a very serious thing. At the MV Viking Sky blackout when the bridge called the E/R I believe the important thing they wanted to know was not so much what caused it but when can you get propulsion back? Iâm sure the engineering staff knew what caused the problem but were not able to give a good timeline for propulsion to be restored (âNo sweat mate all back online in a minuteâ).
I posted in the previous thread that it seems reasonable to acknowledge a few âlow L/O levelâ alarms when youâre in a real seaway because operators know that engine oil sloshes around yet expect the engine installation to be able to handle the conditions it was designed for - the working environment they are going to be in (rough). But as KPChief has pointed out, 19 acknowledged alarms previous should have triggered some introspection (situation awareness) so Iâm going to walk back that comment a bit if I may. Also of course the L/O levels allegedly not within the manufacturerâs specifications.
When the first generator (DG 4) indicated a low L/O pressure problem and said it was going to go offline then it seems that should have been âall hands on deckâ and call the bridge to âaskâ to come to a more comfortable weather course.
My main point still stands, which is that once propulsion is lost then the vessel is at the mercy of the seas, which is not where one wants to be. The L/O pump suction problems only become much worse (see the MV Faro rpt).
âThe worst maritime disaster in Norwegian Historyâ - I donât know Norwegian maritime history but this was as close to a significant marine disaster as Iâve seen in a while. Kudos to getting through it without anyone getting hurt.
I am curious about the âlow low L/O level alarmâ. Is this different and more critical than a âlow L/O level alarmâ or is it a typo? Details, details. which we may hear about in the final report - or notâŚ
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Yeah whatever. From my engineering point of view the handling of the situation by the upper deck crowd looks to be ok.
Usually youâve got at least two low lube oil alarms. Low level should be the first to go off and it gives you a headâs up, hey, youâre getting low on oil. My experience in heavy seas is that itâs not unusual to get an occasional low level alarm, though I usually add oil after the first one otherwise it turns into a nuisance. The low low level is set lower than the low level and should go off after the low level. In essence, you should have two alarms going off at that point (low + low low). Any low low (or high high) alarm should be an instant attention getter. If low level is âHey, you should do somethingâ, low low is âHey you NEED to do somethingâ
Yes thatâs my understanding/experience with a low, low level alarm, I just wasnât clear that this is actually what they meant in the report. I agree, if you get a low L/O pressure indication on an engine and then a low, low sump level alarm on a different engine it is time to get the f**k out of your chair and do something. Now Iâm not accusing anyone of not doing the right thing in this instance, just agreeing with you on the alarms.
Yes, all this.
It seems likely that there is more to this story.In every incident itâs almost always the case there is a mismatch between what is actully happening and what the cew (or person in charge) believes is happening.
The earlier reports were that the oil levels were on the low side but within specs, seemed to indicate a technical issue.
Yes, I did not mean to start blaming anyone, really just to point out that whomever was making decisions did not think that the engines could lose L/O suction in rough weather. This seems to me to be a reasonable initial assumption for the operators to take as it is a new modern vessel and a good marine engine manufacturer.
Yet maintaining the engine L/O levels at 30-40% when the manufacturer recommends them in the 70% range doesnât make sense so more information is required about this. If MAN recommends the L/O level to be above 68% I would expect the low L/O level alarm to be set well above 40%.
This was the initial preliminary report:
For the present, our conclusion is that the engine failure was directly caused by low oil pressure. The level of lubricating oil in the tanks was within set limits, however relatively low, when the vessel started to cross Hustadvika. The tanks were provided with level alarms, however these had not been triggered at this time. The heavy seas in Hustadvika probably caused movements in the tanks so large that the supply to the lubricating oil pumps stopped. This triggered an alarm indicating a low level of lubrication oil, which in turn shortly thereafter caused an automatic shutdown of the engines.
This was presumably after some investigation so itâs a mystery why the conclusion has changed so much.