You wonder what I would have done after I stopped the ship mid-channel in high winds. It is not a channel! It is a narrow canal. You slow down and stop and the highs winds will push you gently against one canal side. I thought it was SCA standard practice to slow down in sand storms, but I haven’t been there lately. Actually, I tell my ships to avoid any storms and, if you get caught by one, just slow down and take it easy, etc.
Doubt it. The ship broke suction and went like a raped ape.
It’s not workable as the margins for transit are thin on a good day. The Pilots did remarkably well for the hand they had been dealt, at least that’s how I see it. Had the master intervened it is beyond doubtful he would have escaped incident. 8000 TEU and above ships are simply a different animal and it gets worse the bigger you get.
They dealt the hand. The effects of a forward bridge and a large windage area aft should have been known by these senior pilots from taking large car carriers through the canal on windy days. One of the bickering pilots is on record arguing with the other that they should not have brought that ship through on that day because of the wind. That’s damning evidence. They can deny accountability and the fact that SCA has the audacity to demand a ransom is plain third world blackmail.
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A similar incident took place on 19 April 2019 with the grounding of M.V. APL Danube in the Suez Canal. The APL Danube was approaching the km 133 mark in the canal when the vessel suddenly sheered to starboard. In an attempt to correct the heading the helm was ordered hard over to port and speed was increased, the vessel however, as is customary with this phenomenon, continued to swing to starboard and ran aground. MSIU stated in their report, as an immediate safety factor, that “The vessel suffered loss of directional power due to bank effect, since she was in close proximity to the Eastern bank of the Suez Canal.”
The Marine Safety Investigation Report is good reading material and can be found here.
It is curious that a month earlier the same ship under the same master on 29 March 2019 also experienced a sheer to starboard while Northbound through the Suez Canal, just before passing Bur Fouad Peninsula, which was deduced to have been caused by bank effect. Not strange as we can see her hugging the shore and cutting corners.
The ship was towed from Suez to Sokhna, Egypt, after the grounding and breakdown in Suez Canal on Apr 20. Reportedly, ship’s steering was seriously damaged by the grounding. The ship is to be offloaded at Sokhna and after that, put under repairs. She was en route from Istanbul to Jeddah.
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No offense by any means, disagree 1883. The pilots did not do “Remarkedly well”.
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From what I have seen the Ever Given’s wheelhouse is pretty close to the pivot point when underway.
I do agree in storms to slow down in open water. Never remember slowing down in a narrow channel. Was balls to the wall upon entering said channel. The newer ATB units have ballast, we didn’t with about a 35 to 40 foot air draft while empty. Houston and other ports like that could be interesting if I slowed down. Was not my desire to “Rest on the bank” on purpose.
Handle one of these ships and get back to me. We can compare notes. While I haven’t had 18000 TEU yet, I do handle 14000 TEU ships.
When I say “they did remarkably well” I mean I’m surprised they made it as far as they did, and in fact that they were able to conduct any transit at all. I have maintained since the beginning on this thread that these ships are too big for the area afforded to them and in my opinion the transit should have never been conducted. The master should not have initiated transit and the SCA should have had a more comprehensive policy for ULCVs. Finding the master and pilots at fault is easy because once blame is affixed to them insurance pays (not sure if any one remembers that discussion on this board) and nothing, I mean nothing gets solved. Why? Because the real solutions are capital intensive (restrictions, widening and tugs)and culture change to the SCA and Industry’s risk management, which in its current state are far to lucrative to modify. The settlement means that both parties, the SCA and the Carriers are accepting this incident as an apparition and can’t wait to conduct business as usual. They are both saying, in effect, what’s the chances of this happening again?
At the end of the day it puts the shipboard guys in the bag and stacks the deck against even more in their disfavor. There is, not surprisingly, little advocacy for shipboard personnel, especially amongst our own.
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Well said. The procedures, berth design and size of tug assistance for very large and ultra large crude carriers was developed because of the cost of an accident and the resulting pollution. These vessels are operating without any clear guidelines. I’m glad to be retired and I don’t envy the pilots who have to deal with these behemoths.
Bickering between pilots usually does not end well. No wonder the master said “Shit”.
Fascinating report.
Smaller vessel. 300/48/14.8m
Poor establishment of MPX owing to cadet escort complaint. Apparently the SCA “rules” dictate that a responsible officer attend. Pity this does not apply to speed and towage requirements.
ECDIS route remain turned off by second canal Pilot. Pilot navigated using an EC overlaid X-band radar.
Benign conditions. 10 knots SOG.
No mention of PPU.
No escort tug.
The helmsman alerted the bridge team to the starboard sheer. Sheering to starboard with hard over port rudder applied.
Rudder and steering gear severely damaged and frozen.
Propeller severely damaged.
Turning gear damaged.
Crankshaft damaged.
Forward plating damage.
It just reinforces my belief that there is little SCA procedural control.
My time spent at numerous BRM courses, following the disaster at Tenerife and the introduction of CRM into the aviation industry, drove home to me that we needed to address the single person accident. To achieve this you require firm procedures formulated by the responsible parties. Power distance and cultural issues needed to be controlled. There needed to be accountability and consequences for those who routinely worked outside these dictates.
Will things change ? We will see in the fullness of time.
Quite frankly, as we say in Australia, my bullshit meter is in the red.
This is a bloody joke and highly unprofessional.
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The W. Alton Jones here seen near the Ismailia reporting station. I know that it is hopelessly old-fashioned and old school to sail in the middle of the Canal but then we didn’t know any better. It is a pity but no banking fun, cutting corners or sheering. Windage, what’s that? 
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I completely agree with you wrt BRM and so forth but none of that really applies in the Suez Canal. That accident report is consistent with my experience with SC pilots.
Once while awaiting transit at anchor off Port Suez I had a Suez Canal pilot board and get immediately get into an argument with an AB, in Arabic. The pilot threatened to call port control and cancel the transit. I managed to smooth things out and we transited without delay.
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Well said Dutchie.
My experience down the middle of the Suez was in 1978 as third mate aboard a 5 hatch Bank Line general cargo vessel with the princely loaded draft of 9 metres.
We had one antiquated radar, two VHFs and a radio direction finder.
The “Hazelbank”.
Thank you again for that excellent report. It makes a good book end to this discussion.
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They appear to be a law unto themselves with little SCA control allied with little accountability.
I pity any Master who, allegedly, is accountable for the numerous SCA shortcomings.
The SCA is going to want to avoid future incidents that result in multiple day canal blockages. That would require avoiding high-energy groundings, that is groundings of large displacement vessels at high-speed.
Groundings that can be resolved quickly will be tolerated to the same degree as the are now.
The Suez canal operates on its own logic, applying the lessons of other more typical marine operations just muddies the picture.
Evidently the SCA does not face strong incentives to avoid incidents like the grounding of the Danube. Made many transits and I don’t get the impression that the SC pilots are held accountable for their behavior. They certainly don’t act as if that’s the case.
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To be fair, SOLAS dictates this. Not the SCA.