Now, all facts should be known.
Hopefully, we will be informed one day by the flag state Panama or by the owner’s state Japan.
It is interesting, that they seemed to have had difficulties to stay in the canal’s center for some 30 minutes before the grounding… which could have happened before.
With every new bit of info we will come nearer to the truth… the time for speculations is gone.
Agreed and once again, no offence intended with my reply.
Having worked at Suez and Port Said and watched many times the ships in, entering and leaving the canal at slow speed, 7-9 knots, the ships hardly produce a big wave and water is hardly pushed up or sucked away at the canal sides. Sand storms may develop quickly, so you see nothing, and then only solution is to slow down, stop and allow your ship to be pushed against the canal side. In the EG case the ship increased speed 50% after entering the canal and, after another a few minutes, turned starboard into the eastern canal side and rammed it. With two SCA pilots on the bridge! ROTFL.
Long gap between that and the current situation.
Last I heard the official word from the SCA is that it’s all the captain’s fault and the pilots are strictly advisers etc.
And therein lies the fundamental problem……the SCA.
In the meantime, as a workaround, one captain I knew used to give the helmsman a “corrected” course via hand signals to stay in the channel . Pilots never knew the difference.
Well this is no surprise to anyone that has transited the Suez Canal
The settlement with the SCA ensures that none of your suggestions, no matter how prudent, will never come to fruition.
Not a good idea, in fact a terrible idea. When I catch guys doing that or independently working the thruster I make sure to question and confirm the behavior so it is recorded on the VDR. That way if there’s an incident, it’s established that the crew and master were willful ignoring or running counter to the pilots advice and leaving the pilot out of the informational loop.
Your better off communicating your misgivings with the pilot, that way it is on the VDR. There is more support for any number of actions, be they aggressive, or not further up the road.
No doubt, although, perhaps this is the beginning of a new global legal challenge towards the archaic and inward looking 2010 appeal ruling of the Egyptian High Constitutional Court.
There is no way that in this day and age a shipowner or associates, inclusive of insurance providers, will allow so much capital equipment and cargo to traverse the canal with the potential for such an outrageous compensation claim.
If two Pilots flying an A380 approach an airport with firm crosswind limits and conditions are outside limits then they do not land and divert. No choice. End of story.
The SCA published their 2015 367 page “Rules of Navigation” which are very prescriptive regarding transit speeds and allocation of escort tugs. These are not guidelines but rules.
If I was a high end Shipowner, with the view that the Pilot is my employee, then I would be suggesting that I train and employ my own Pilots which would encapsulate and control accountability.
My Port Authority set very strict operational parameters inclusive of speed profiles, wind limits, swell limits, swinging distances and towage usage. All of this was recorded on AIS, ship’s VDR and CCTV. I was in serious trouble if I had an incident and was working outside these limits. In my tenure, I witnessed four Pilots who were terminated for this very reason.
The west just need to invade and take the canal back
Not claiming that it’s best practice, saying it’s the sort of thing that happens in that part of the world.
As far as the “what if there’s an incident” question there was in fact an incident. The ship went aground, blocked the canal for days and is even now still anchored in Great Bitter Lake.
In my view the captain should use his best judgement to avoid incidents based on an assessment of the situation, YMMV.
The canal does strictly enforce the speed limit but it’s based on the transit time between signal stations.
The SCA does allow ships to speed up in case of high winds, for that reason the car ships typically go first in the convoys (behind the military ships).
Interesting analysis wrt to wind here:
About 45 kt wind gusts.
I don’t recall ever seeing much more than 20 or 25 kts of wind at either Port Suez or Port Said.
The average hourly wind speed in Port Said experiences mild seasonal variation over the course of the year.
The windier part of the year lasts for 5.3 months , from November 27 to May 4 , with average wind speeds of more than 10.1 miles per hour . The windiest day of the year is February 7 , with an average hourly wind speed of 11.1 miles per hour .
The calmer time of year lasts for 6.8 months , from May 4 to November 27 . The calmest day of the year is August 16 , with an average hourly wind speed of 9.0 miles per hour .
I cannot understand why you speed up in a canal when the wind increases. Isn’t it better to slow down?
Never actually driven something that floats, have you?
I always slow down in storms.
I don’t suppose that the audio from the VDR will ever be made public including a translation of the conversation between the two pilots who should be censured for not using English.
The issue here is situation awareness. We can see the vessel’s track and speed but our knowledge of the human factor is incomplete. The ship was being manoeuvred to masters orders and pilot’s advice but it is unlikely that the Indian master understood Arabic and if he did he would have been getting conflicting advice.
It is unfortunate that any inquiry will be conducted by incompetent and corrupt officials.
Just stop. Move on. You don’t have any idea what you’re blabbering on about.
