Bickering Egyptian pilots have been blamed for this year’s most high profile shipping casualty:

You do not really maneuver in any canal. You just sail between the canal sides and adjust speed not to hit the ship ahead in the convoy. Why you need two canal pilots in the Suez canal is beyond me. One checks the starboard side and one the port, but don’t you need a third to look ahead?

in many cases you are just transporting them from one end to the other.
Nothing unusual about 2 pilots on board

Pilots bickering on the bridge is a big deal. Which one was more competent, and which one does the Master and helmsman listen to? Not a good situation on the bridge. Bank effect put that ship aground no matter how much rudder you use to stop it.

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There’s little question that it was bank effects that ultimately caused the EG to go aground. The question is why did they need to increase speed?

It looks like they didn’t adjust enough for leeway early on. In the video the ship can be seen getting set down on the bank but not enough adjustment for leeway used to regain track. Once they get too close they are trapped because they can’t pull away without swinging the stern in. The only option is to speed up to get away.

From about 1:00 on the video (7:10 local time) not sufficient adjustment for leeway till they wind up too close to the buoy here:

Looks like at that point on the video they might have had to kick the stern to stbd to avoid hitting the buoy.

Most easily seen watching the difference between HDG and COG vectors.

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Bank Ping Pong from the start.

Not paying sufficient attention to the position of the ship in the channel is very typical behavior of Suez canal pilots.

That’s been my experience anyway. I’ve got a photo somewhere of a canal pilot asleep in a chair.

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With regard to the dimensions of a ULCV relative to canal geometry it is fundamental to track and have the pivot point in the correct position at all times. Once you allow it to be displaced, the only way to retrieve it’s correct position is drive it out by throwing speed at it. At that point you create further problems via hydrodynamics. Track the pivot point correctly and in most cases you can get out of trouble.

Has nothing to do with this case, but am sure a few attorneys would love to share your photo while negotiating with SCA.

It would appear that the 2010 Egyptian High Court appeal ruling puts all Shipowners behind the eight ball irrespective of legal clout. I would suggest that many shipowners, managers, cargo shippers, P & I Clubs and Charterers are looking very closely at this situation.

SCA has a license to steal, regardless of culpability…

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Not any time did I imply incompetency yet I did indicate that there appeared to be an element of dysfunctionality. I have worked as a Senior Marine Check Pilot in a large group for in excess of 20 years and trust me, levels of competence are far from homogeneous.

Extract from Bloomberg Business Week.

“ A few miles into the Ever Given ’s transit, the ship began to veer alarmingly from port to starboard and back again. Its blocky shape may have been acting as a gigantic sail, buffeted by the wind. In response, according to evidence submitted in legal proceedings, the lead SCA pilot began barking instructions at the Indian helmsman. The pilot shouted to steer hard right, then hard left. The Ever Given ’s vast hull took so long to respond that by the time it began to move, he needed to correct course again. When the second pilot objected, the two argued. They may have exchanged insults in Arabic. (The SCA hasn’t released the pilots’ names and denies they were at fault for what followed.)

The lead pilot then gave a new order: “Full ahead.” That would take the Ever Given ’s speed to 13 knots, or 15 mph, significantly faster than the canal’s recommended speed limit of about 8 knots. The second pilot tried to cancel the order, and more angry words were exchanged. Kanthavel intervened, and the lead pilot responded by threatening to leave the vessel, according to the court evidence.

The increase in power should have provided the Ever Given with more stability in the face of the gale, but it also brought a new factor into play. Bernoulli’s principle, named for an 18th century Swiss mathematician, states that a fluid’s pressure goes down when its speed goes up. The hundreds of thousands of tons of canal water the ship was displacing had to squeeze through the narrow gap between its hull and the nearest shore. As the water rushed through, the pressure would have decreased, sucking the Ever Given closer to the bank. The faster it went, the greater the pull. “Speeding up to a certain point is effective, then it becomes countereffective,” Gillard said. “You won’t be steering a straight line no matter what you do.”

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The ship is to big for the canal. Period. That’s really the only take away here. Laying blame on the master and pilots allows industry and the SCA to continue business as usual with minimal safety margins and sooner or later another accident will happen.

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Question remains why the ship entered the canal and the convoy at 7 knots and then increased speed to >13 knots and turned starboard after a few minutes to run up on the eastern side. Bad weather? No, then you just slow down. Ship is still at anchor at the Bitter Lake. I cannot understand why the ship does not lift the anchor and proceeds under own power to Port Said north? You don’t need a pilot for it. Has the SCA removed the ship’s propeller?

Those who know nothing and know that they know nothing know more than
those who know nothing and do not know that they know nothing.

(adapted from Socrates )

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The ship physically fleeing detention and getting boarded and seized by the Egyptian authorities and going aground again in the chaos and blocking the canal would be a pretty good news cycle but not really a plan.

Everybody wants to be a gangster until it’s time to do gangster shit

Sadly, Socrates was never into digital media and it’s associated shortcomings. More of a man aligned with the written word.

He also said:
“ There is only one good, knowledge, and one evil, ignorance.”

You appear to be interested in accident reports and with the view that the primary investigation was undertaken by the SCA, I would be interested in your view on this incident given the available online information.

@Ausmariner
My citation of Socrates had nothing to do with your posts.
It was a reflection on Heiwa’s post, just above my post.

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I appreciate that and please don’t take my response as a slight. I would be genuinely interested to hear your viewpoint.

I agree. If you study the channel geometry for the area of grounding it is a little scary and was last reviewed in 2010.

Let us exclude all operational personnel, including Pilots, because I believe it is a systematic issue supported by Shipowners, Charterers and the SCA. No different to the “Costa Concordia “………the Master should have been prevented, via management dictates, from doing a close quarters sail past.

Just a few personal opinions if I may;

  1. The EG should have been prevented, by the SCA, from entering under those meteorological conditions.
  2. There should be strict wind limits placed on these ULCV’s
  3. There should be correctly enforced speed restrictions for ULCV’s to manage hydrodynamic incidents.
  4. There should be two escort tugs made fast aft capable of working indirect
  5. It would be logical to position ULCV’s at the absolute rear of the convoy

These primary decisions should not be left to operational onboard personnel to make. I believe that the Pilots and Captain were subjected to enormous commercial pressure and remain blameless in this instance.