This week’s DeepDraft essay started after I saw an SSS-bow vessel off Japan and began reading more about the design. That led me to the CITY OF ROTTERDAM collision and the MAIB investigation.
MAIB already established the operational chain- pilot error, late intervention by the Master, and insufficiently robust challenges from PRIMULA SEAWAYS and Humber VTS.
The narrower question I examined is whether unconventional bridge geometry should require a specific human-factors or simulator assessment before approval. If the design can distort visual orientation, are procedures, centreline markers and stricter watchkeeping sufficient controls?
Interested in hearing from anyone who has operated ships with unusual bridge fronts or off-axis working positions.
In the normal situation of ship control while looking forward, a navigator is using vision for action, effectively an extension of how we move around ourselves (visually guided locomotion). This is an egocentric frame of reference. The nature of the task (a visual transit, estimating time to collision etc.) is bound to an egocentric frame of reference.
Gibson’s term “optical flow” is not used but that’s “how we move around ourselves” as well as conn ships.
