Echoes from groundings with low or very low UKC and other physical limitations .
Following recent discussions on hydrodynamic instability in confined waters, an important operational question remains: Why do experienced bridge teams sometimes lose control of a vessel — without recognizing it in real time?
As a pilot who served for 30 years on a confined channel this viewpoint seems unhelpful to me. My job was to monitor the ship constantly. If the helmsman began using large amounts of rudder to maintain course it would be immediately noticeable. I can’t think of an example of a situation where there is no control of the ship and no one realizes it. If the engine quits you can feel it right away. If steering is lost the helmsman notices it immediately. There are alarms for both of those situations.
I guess an comparison example might be when one is driving in freezing conditions and the car begins to traverse a long stretch of black ice. One could continue straight for a while without sensing the surface change but has technically lost the ability to brake or steer. The driver could conceivably be unaware until he/she tries to turn of slow down, but I can’t think of any similar situation with a ship.
The illustration that accompanies the article shows the container ship Ever Given aground in Suez. I can pretty much guarantee that the pilots and captain were fully aware that the ship was veering from bank to bank and was not likely to recover.
on DP
”are we moving” was always an issue now most software highlights the direction your going so its noticeable, crew trained to look for that.
And I would say that yours is a superb example of the equivalent situation. It is simply perfect. Thank you.
I am not sure whose idea it was to apply this pic in this article. Was it the intention of the author or the editor ? I can guess only. The author Smirnov seems to be quoted lately by The Maritime Executive Magazine . I think it is his 2nd or 3rd article with UKC issues and in general navigation in confined waters..
Editors often insert some inadequate pic but then add and frequently do not add a remark, that the pic is for illustrative purposes only.
Since You were so accurate in providing an example of comparable situation of a car on ice , could You pls apply your critical mind to the topic below as it has been noticed your comment is missing and I am pretty certain it will be very valuable.
It will be very much appreciated if You also could comment on this - expectation bias thing.
I am not sure i understand well this somewhat new phrase in this NTSB recent accident report.
Is it a kind of euphemism that justifies or softens/dilutes the fact, that a navigator despite clear old fashioned and tested warnings “ do not make decisions on scanty and unreliable information, do not rely on floating aids to navigation while fixing position , do not rely on single mode of position fixing if others are available “ , is not following this ancient rules of thumb expecting that all should be all right when the results of his actions disprove such optimism.
It is a nautical topic but since You have found parallels in car driving on ice then i am wondering if engineers can come up with similar situations in their field of experitise.
The intention of the comparison was to find an example of a situation where someone has lost control of an operation but isn’t aware that control has been lost. My conclusion was that I could not think of a nautical situation like that.
My only experience with shallow water effects has been with a pilot aboard. But I have driven on black ice without realizing it.
In Iowa or Nebraska, westbound to Seattle on the interstate. Speed limit was 75 and I was passing a tractor trailer truck when I got an uneasy feeling something was wrong. I started gradually slowing down, as did the truck I was passing. Then I saw cars on the eastbound lane spinning and going off the road. I recall thinking “that’s weird”.
Then I realized we were on black ice, I got slowed down as did the truck and the rest of the traffic around me.
I don’t know how long I drove without explicitly understanding what was happening. it was probably about 5 seconds or so.
I believe a ship pilot regularly conning large ships and coping with shallow waters effects would likewise have developed intuitions which likely keep them out of trouble.
Polanyi’s Paradox “We know more than we can tell.”
Polanyi’s paradox is mainly to explain the cognitive phenomenon that there exist many tasks which we, human beings, understand intuitively how to perform but cannot verbalize their rules or procedures.[2]
This “self-ignorance” is common to many human activities, from driving a car in traffic to face recognition.[3] As Polanyi argues, humans are relying on their tacit knowledge, which is difficult to adequately express by verbal means, when engaging these tasks…
Also applies to junior deck officers improving their ability read visual cues.
I would say in ship handling, when analysing why something went wrong or you did an unsatisfactory job, you can look back 10 or 15 minutes or 1 or 2 miles and recognise it started there.
A simple analogy is arriving at a berth too fast and slightly out of control is because you realise that 2 miles earlier you were too fast.
The proper definition of ship handling is “correcting your previous mistake”.
Also working as a pilot on different type and size vessels, hydrodynamic affects can effect ships differently and unexpectedly but that is a pilots job to deal with. A pilot can never say that they did everything correctly….but still demolished the jetty.
How about such statement :
The secret of excellent ship handling lies in the fact that you need not to use your extraordinary skills & excellence to achieve it or correct your previous mistakes.
Meaning :mastery in ship handling comes from a combination of proactive planning, situational awareness, and the refined intuition that only comes with experience . Staying/navigating always ahead of the ship.
Using your skill to anticipate forces like wind, current, ,momentum & other influencing factors so you never have to use “extraordinary” measures/skills to fix a mistake.
I think Admiral Ernest J. King summed it up best.
“The mark of a great shiphandler is never getting into situations that require great shiphandling.”
This is exactly what i was looking for as i saw it somewhere in the literature about ship handling . Unfortunately i forgot the Admiral name so search answers with your quote did not materialise. In another words i heard the bells tolling but could not find the church.
Thx .Need to save it for future use .
