Just making sure you guys saw this
Yes, 0624 JST, 0524 Singapore (+8)
FYI MPA Singapore are posting regular updates.
There is a radar on Horsburgh relaying into the VTS so they will have the full picture.
The light is at elevation of 31m, that puts the radar at a guess of +/- 40m
No Spin for the USNâŚ
It is also interesting, but probably not inportant, is that the collision occurred at the reporting point for Straitrep, the Singapore VTS
If there is dense traffic you are standing VHF in hand waiting to jump in as you cross the line.
AIS has enormously helped in this area.
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Just a question >>>
The McCain is not a stealth ship (âŚunlike the âStealth Alnic MCâ tanker⌠managed by the âStealth Maritime Corp.â of Greece !).
However, with her never vertical superstructures, her absence of âinboundâ corners to act as Radar reflectors and probably Radar waves absorbing surfaces, she is optimized to return a small Radar signature.
How does she appear on a shipâs Radar screen, compared to ânormalâ ships of similar dimensions?
Otherwise, how small a ship would she appear to be?
Just a quick Q: are USN warships on manual steering as a matter of routine? Would this include crossing a TSS?
UK merchant practice would be to adjust the auto-pilot except for large changes of direction.
AB DDG has aprox 1/50th the radar cross section of a âtypicalâ vessel her size
And yes, manually steered as a matter of routine.
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Do they have and use any means of making themselves more visible on radar, such as radar reflector(s)?
Could come in handy to let others detect and plot them in traffic congested areas.
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It seems like this might be good for tactical reasons as well, since the radar reflector could be stowed when they wanted to be sneaky.
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Even with heavy rain or sea clutter in use??
Latest from Straits Times:-
"Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore (MPA) said in response to queries from The Straits Times on Wednesday (Aug 23) âŚ"
Pretty much what was evident from Vesselfinder AIS vid. Article seems ambiguous on whether JSM was undetectable by AIS and RADAR.
I believe that the collision happened after the vessels had entered the TSS and Singapore VTS area.
It has been a while since I had to worry about reporting to VTS by myself, but as far as I can recall all vessels entering the VTS area were required to call and identify themselves with a full set of info, incl. even air draft.
Even when transiting from VTS East to VTS West reporting was required, but that may have changed now.
So my question is; does USN vessels follow such procedures, or are they exempt from even such requirements?
As I read that article, they are saying they did not see McCain on AiS (no surprise) nor on Radar, which is a bit of a surprise because (as mentioned above) there is a radar on Horsburgh lighthouse (at about 40m height) feeding the VTS (this is well within range of the collision area).
The collision was just 4.6 NM NNE of the Horsburgh Radar.
What youâre describing is a modern version of the âSailing Masterâ of the 17-18th C. British Navy. Officers were often (but not always) from fairly upper class backgrounds and SOME had little interest in learning the maritime arts except perhaps those of the fighting sailor. They were educated in navigation, ship handling under sail, etc. by their Lieutenants and their sailing master but many really werenât professional mariners although they had the Kingâs commission.
The Sailing Masters on the other hand, typically came up through the ranks of petty officers and merchant navy mates. They held the Kingâs warrant (warrant officers) and were almost entirely concerned ONLY with the navigation and pilotage of the ship. They ranked just behind the Lieutenants and ahead of the midshipmen and were addressed as âMrâŚâ Typically, the Sailing Master was responsible for the navigatorâs âdays workâ, position logs, etc⌠Decision making still resided entirely with the Captain, but wise Captains listened closely to their Sailing Masters in matters of navigation, pilotage, etcâŚ
By about the 1830âs, the position of Sailing Master had been replaced by ânavigating Lieutenantsâ, and eventually, all Lieutenants were expected to master navigating and piloting skills. But I agree that reviving the position of âSailing Masterâ might be one way to solve some of the Navyâs apparent problems!
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I could not say it better.
Not only am I aware of that but thatâs exactly what I modeled my suggestion after. (Weâve discussed the old sailing masters a few times already on here in the light of recent events.)
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STRAITREP is the VTS setup in the area
and Google - MPA STRAITREP
Itâs much the same as GIBREP, CALDOVREP and so on.
Applies, as usual, to anything >300GT etc, donât know about warship exemptionsâŚ
Wait, so there were two CDR Sanchezâs on the same ship? I imagine that would never get confusing everâŚ
This illustrates that the first reporting point for entering the easternmost Sector 9 of the STRAITREP Operational Area was not yet reached when the collision happened. And to be honest, I doubt that a report by the involved ships to the VTS would have helped anything in avoiding the accident.
Fortunately, the decisions on how to navigate vessels in VTS areas are still being made by navigators on board the ships, and not by people sitting behind radar screens ashoreâŚ
As has been mentioned before, the following factors give reasons to anticipate (conjecture) that it was an âOvertakingâ situation (Colreg #13), and that the John S. McCain was the overtaking ship:
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The ships were in the westbound TSS lane when the collision occurred
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The Alnic MC and the John S. McCain were both coming from the South China Sea, and were both bound for Singapore
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The AIS indicated that the Alnic MC was proceeding at slightly reduced speed at the time of the accident (9.4 knots). This is somewhat slower than in the initial part of the AIS capture (10.8 knots), and even more so than the max speed reported by Marinetraffic during her voyage from Korea to Singapore (12.3 knots)
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The John S. McCain has a maximum speed of more than 30 knots
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The Colreg #10 c) states that âA vessel shall, so far as practicable, avoid crossing traffic lanesâŚâ
Hence, I find it very little probable that this was a âCrossingâ situation (Colreg #15). If this was an âOvertakingâ situation, and if John S. McCain was the overtaking ship, Colreg #13 clearly states that it is her responsibility âto keep out of the way of the vessel being overtaken.â And furthermore, that: âAny subsequent alteration of the bearing between the two vessels shall not make the overtaking vessel a crossing vessel within the meaning of these Rules or relieve her of the duty of keeping clear of the overtaken vessel until she is finally past and clear.â
Iâve worked several times on a USNS Auxiliary that routinely operates with AIS in receive only mode for Operational Security reasons. We only transmit when weâre going into or leaving port, or at the Masterâs discretion.
One thing I have noticed is that foreign vessels are much less likely to either initiate or respond to collision avoidance calls on VHF 16 when youâre not transmitting on AIS. This isnât a problem with US-flag ships, they always come back on the first or second call. My personal theory is that its a language thing- its much easier to identify a shipâs name on AIS than it is to understand and act on âI am the white-hulled vessel off your port bow range 4.5 miles.â
Anyone else noticed a reluctance by foreign mates to make or respond to VHF calls when they donât know the other vesselâs name?
Yes, I have indeed noticed the same thing.
My theory is that the problem is that you native Americans speak English too good 
I think that there is a barrier to answer a call being transmitted in fluent American accent, by non-native English speakers, in particular those that understand that their command of the English language is very basic (although fully sufficient), and that they themselves will have to stammer with evident plain foreign accent.
I think that this barrier will become less significant, if you speak very slow and very clear English when calling foreign ships.
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