A TS or a hurricane is definitively not a dot on the map and not only you should account for wind and wave fields as KC states but also for the uncertainty of the track evolution. This is where the NHC forecast is very useful.
As early of Tuesday midday, there was a forecast for bad weather (TS) across the road.
By tuesday evening the door was virtually shut with a hurricane watch.
On wednesday morning, everything is red.
I like a lot the Tropical Storm Force Wind Speed Probabilities forecast model. By Tuesday 8PM, there was a forecasted >90% chance to hit TS force winds in the area.
http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/archive/2015/graphics/al11/loop_PROB34.shtml
The warnings were there with plenty of time to do something about it. Why but Why…?
When the El Faro and Yunque passed the cost using the Hole in the Wall would have been about 9 hours or so plus the extra cost of using the Old Bahama Channel.
This would have been the forecast in effect at the time of the passing 30/2000 UTC hrs or 30/1600 hrs LT.
HURRICANE CENTER LOCATED NEAR 24.7N 72.6W AT 30/1500Z
POSITION ACCURATE WITHIN 25 NM
PRESENT MOVEMENT TOWARD THE SOUTHWEST OR 230 DEGREES AT 5 KT
ESTIMATED MINIMUM CENTRAL PRESSURE 971 MB
EYE DIAMETER 50 NM
MAX SUSTAINED WINDS 70 KT WITH GUSTS TO 85 KT.
64 KT… 30NE 30SE 20SW 20NW.
50 KT… 40NE 50SE 30SW 30NW.
34 KT…100NE 110SE 60SW 60NW.
12 FT SEAS…160NE 100SE 90SW 130NW.
WINDS AND SEAS VARY GREATLY IN EACH QUADRANT. RADII IN NAUTICAL
MILES ARE THE LARGEST RADII EXPECTED ANYWHERE IN THAT QUADRANT.
REPEAT…CENTER LOCATED NEAR 24.7N 72.6W AT 30/1500Z
AT 30/1200Z CENTER WAS LOCATED NEAR 24.8N 72.3W
FORECAST VALID 01/0000Z 24.3N 73.2W
MAX WIND 80 KT…GUSTS 100 KT.
64 KT… 30NE 30SE 20SW 20NW.
50 KT… 50NE 50SE 30SW 30NW.
34 KT…100NE 110SE 60SW 70NW.
FORECAST VALID 01/1200Z 24.1N 74.0W
MAX WIND 85 KT…GUSTS 105 KT.
64 KT… 40NE 40SE 30SW 30NW.
50 KT… 60NE 60SE 40SW 50NW.
34 KT…120NE 120SE 70SW 80NW.
FORECAST VALID 02/0000Z 24.4N 74.4W
MAX WIND 90 KT…GUSTS 110 KT.
64 KT… 40NE 40SE 30SW 30NW.
50 KT… 70NE 70SE 40SW 50NW.
34 KT…130NE 130SE 80SW 100NW.
This would have been the 01/0800 local time forecast.
FORECAST VALID 01/1200Z 24.1N 74.0W
MAX WIND 85 KT…GUSTS 105 KT.
64 KT… 40NE 40SE 30SW 30NW.
50 KT… 60NE 60SE 40SW 50NW.
34 KT…120NE 120SE 70SW 80NW.
I didn’t spend a lot of time on this so I may have made an error but that shows the El Faro passing south about 36 miles of the 01/1200Z (01/0800 LT) forecast position. That’s just outside the 64 kt wind field.
Almost doesn’t need to be said but unless I missing something that’s a really bad plan.
[QUOTE=Kennebec Captain;180394]Almost doesn’t need to be said but unless I missing something that’s a really bad plan.[/QUOTE]
really sad to realize how it was the master who failed his own ship and her people so hideously…almost HEINOUS in its lack of exercising reasonable care to protect the EL FARO. VERY VERY SAD TO CONTEMPLATE! All Davison had to do was say, “we have gone far enough and will stop here until this passes”…“we will arrive late, but alive” WHY ON EARTH DID HE PROCEED PAST RUM CAY AND SAN SALVADOR?
^^^ agreed. As master you have to know when to say to management “this is what I’m doing and why I’m doing it”. It’s in the SOM that the master has the right and is expected to when safety is on the line. With other people’s lives depending on your decisions then it’s time to walk the walk and let the chips fall where they may.
[QUOTE=c.captain;180395]really sad to realize how it was the master who failed his own ship and her people so hideously…almost HEINOUS in its lack of exercising reasonable care to protect the EL FARO. VERY VERY SAD TO CONTEMPLATE! All Davison had to do was say, “we have gone far enough and will stop here until this passes”…“we will arrive late, but alive” WHY ON EARTH DID HE PROCEED PAST RUM CAY AND SAN SALVADOR?[/QUOTE]
Well, I don’t like idea of second guessing events that happen late in the game, could have been any number of things that might have gotten them crossthreaded, late at night,they may have been concerned that the route west was going to be cut off, wind/seas not favorable, who knows. It’s possible that there was a path with lower seas on the routing software. But it looks to me that the entire San Salvador I / Rum Cay was cut off by (forecasted) 50 kt winds as early as the evening the night before when the Hole in the Wall was a low cost/low risk option. It’s one thing to have a good plan that goes bad but it’s another to start with a bad plan to begin with.
Either way it doesn’t really matter. We’ll have to see what the hearing come up with but it’s looking like this is not just a matter of insufficient margin.
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[/urtingcl][url=https://flic.kr/p/EPPz6e]image](https://flic.kr/p/EPPz6e) by kennebeccaptain, on Flickr[/IMG]
The line at the top connecting 01/0000 Z F thru 02/0000 Z F is NHC forecast track as of 30/1500 hrs Z, the time the El Faro passed the El Yunque.
The line with the waypoint “Rum Cay” is the assumed El Faro track-line. The 01/0800 ef is about the 0800Z (0400 LT) position.
The line with 01/0300 Z P is the actual track of Joaquin with the positions in Z time.
The line with the red and green dots is 50 miles for scale.
Four more families have accepted Tote’s $500,000 settlement offer, brining the total to 14 families settling so far. 19 more families to go.
The forecast, issued 30/1500 UTC turns out to be not very accurate but the plan was too close to Joaquin by any standard. At 30/1500 UTC the ship had plenty of time at sea to evaluate the situation regardless of whatever confusion early forecasts caused.
The ship also would have been able to use the Hole in the Wall with little lost time so it wasn’t a gradual erosion of margins. It’s just a bad plan.
Also it appears that for some reason the ship was not able to monitor or didn’t respond to the divergence of positions of Joaquin from the forecast during the night. It should be routine that a ship’s bridge crew is able to track nearby tropical systems in relationship to the vessel’s track regardless of schedule or workload. It’s even more critical for this high-risk track.
On this chart the bold blue line is the track of Joaquin. The lighter lines are the forecasts. From top to bottom 30/1500, 30/2100, and 01/0300. The lines with points marked EF is the assumed track of the El Faro. No line for scale as the Lat lines are 30 miles apart.
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](https://flic.kr/p/EEZo69)image by kennebeccaptain, on Flickr[/IMG]
so basically at approximately the same time that EL FARO passes San Salvador that a new forecast is transmitted showing Joachim’s predicted path making a major shift towards the south and towards the ship’s track yet they continue to proceed? Did Davidson leave the decision to the 000-0400 third mate to make?
[QUOTE=c.captain;180432]so basically at approximately the same time that EL FARO passes San Salvador that a new forecast is transmitted showing Joachim’s predicted path making a major shift towards the south and towards the ship’s track yet they continue to proceed? Did Davidson leave the decision to the 000-0400 third mate to make?[/QUOTE]
At 30/1100 local (30/1500Z) they had about a forecast 50 mile CPA. At 01/1700 local (01/2100 Z) they had maybe a 45 mile CPA because even though the track had shifted the forecast was for the system to slow way down. Instead the Joaquin shifted further south and speed up. At 01/2300 local (01/0300 Z) they had essentially nothing, 20 miles maybe and the system actual crossed ahead of them.
As far as what happened it’s anyone’s guess. There are several steps between sending out a forecast, receiving it, reading and comprehending it and someone finally acting appropriately on the information. Something in that chain evidently failed.
One possibility is that they were using the weather software and were focused on forecast wave height. That’s what I watch when I am routing near mid-latitude storms.
Bottom line however is just not enough room. It was a bad plan to begin with, no margin for error. Staying out of the 34 kt wind field is not bad advice.
[QUOTE=c.captain;180432]so basically at approximately the same time that EL FARO passes San Salvador that a new forecast is transmitted showing Joachim’s predicted path making a major shift towards the south and towards the ship’s track yet they continue to proceed? Did Davidson leave the decision to the 000-0400 third mate to make?[/QUOTE]
Yes, at 0130 local there was a forecast showing that Joaquin was in front of them and was forecast to be very close to the track. Don’t know who was on watch.
The El Yunque was down to 9 kts when she passed Joaquin. It would have been in head winds in the SW sector. Not sure if it was on the regular SJU-JAX track.
This is from the Wall Stree Journal.
The ships appeared to pass each other the afternoon of Sept. 30, according to Genscape Vesseltracker, about 16 hours before El Faro sent its final communication, a distress signal indicating it had lost propulsion and was taking on water. Their captains swapped data and notes on weather and ocean conditions as they passed by, according to TOTE Maritime Puerto Rico, the owner of both ships.
The content of those communications is a “key part” of interviews federal investigators conducted with the captain of the SS El Yunque and TOTE executives, Ms. Dinh-Zarr, said in an interview Thursday.
Investigators want to know whether the conversation between the captains influenced the decision to keep El Faro on course, sailing into the heart of Hurricane Joaquin, she said.
