U.S.C.G. El Faro Hearings in Jacksonville

[QUOTE=Kennebec Captain;180203]
If the captain checked the weather on the 28th he might have seen something like this (the first google hit on TS-11 Joaquin)

If he had seen that he might have been satisfied that he understood the situation and the TS-11 was not a threat. Instead a rule based error-trapping process should be used. For example there could be a requirement that (for example) any tropical cyclone in the Atlantic be tracked on a chart and updated at 6 hour intervals.[/QUOTE]

I think everybody interested in this case should click on the link above and watch what was being broadcast as weather on the TV on the 28th. Does the weather presenter not feel any culpability when he later learns that 33 seamen have been lost at sea in the hurricane which reached & devastated the Bahamas? His tone is hard to take. He seems so sure of himself. He was so confidently assuring us that the system would move north, and was all about rain, even when it was actually still moving West, and hadn’t turned north at all.

The initial models were ALL widely wrong in their direction forecasts (see Fig. below). It reminds me of Hurricane Tomas in the Caribbean which developed overnight and caught everyone by surprise because a Tropical Depression had defied the models and exploded while the Windward Islands slept.

I think no model tracks would be more helpful than faulty model tracks, because faulty model tracks are hard to overcome, once the misinformation is disseminated. There should be a warning attached to models purporting to show the forecast direction of a developing Tropical Depression: [B]“THIS STORM IS IN THE DEVELOPMENTAL PHASE AND ANY COMPUTER MODEL IS TO BE TREATED WITH THE UTMOST CAUTION. PLEASE BE GUIDED ACCORDINGLY. FOLLOW THE SYSTEM’S PRESENT MOVEMENT AS BEING THE SAFEST INDICATOR OF FUTURE DIRECTION.”
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[QUOTE=Mat;180221]I think everybody interested in this case should click on the link above and watch what was being broadcast as weather on the TV on the 28th. Does the weather presenter not feel any culpability when he later learns that 33 seamen have been lost at sea in the hurricane which reached & devastated the Bahamas? His tone is hard to take. He seems so sure of himself. He was so confidently assuring us that the system would move north, and was all about rain, even when it was actually still moving West, and hadn’t turned north at all.

The initial models were ALL widely wrong in their direction forecasts (see Fig. below). It reminds me of Hurricane Tomas in the Caribbean which developed overnight and caught everyone by surprise because a Tropical Depression had defied the models and exploded while the Windward Islands slept.

I think no model tracks would be more helpful than faulty model tracks, because faulty model tracks are hard to overcome, once the misinformation is disseminated. There should be a warning attached to models purporting to show the forecast direction of a developing Tropical Depression: [B]“THIS STORM IS IN THE DEVELOPMENTAL PHASE AND ANY COMPUTER MODEL IS TO BE TREATED WITH THE UTMOST CAUTION. PLEASE BE GUIDED ACCORDINGLY. FOLLOW THE SYSTEM’S PRESENT MOVEMENT AS BEING THE SAFEST INDICATOR OF FUTURE DIRECTION.”[/B][/QUOTE]

I think the advisory discussion msgs were frank enough about the uncertainties. And it should be remembered that NOAA and TV presenters don’t focus on more than the impact potential for land areas. The storm was an odd one, and as can be seen in NHC’s report, also involved a period of strengthening over some waters that had higher temps than previously recorded for the time of year.

http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL112015_Joaquin.pdf

The subject of crewing wheelhouses is a fascinating study in human dynamics. Some say there are too few mates aboard, and therefore they are overworked, so the solution is more mates. Some say the mates are not paying attention to the big picture because the watch changes over so frequently the fast-changing nature of a storm goes unrecognized: in other words, there are too many mates.

 Some say the chief mate should stand a watch, presumably because the other mates have lesser experience and may not spot a developing, dangerous situation. Some will argue the chief mate should stay out of the wheelhouse and keep an eye on the fabric of the ship—watertight closures, stability—because the OOWs have to concentrate on navigation, collision avoidance and weather; two different aspects of the total question of ship safety.

Some will say additional mates would allow the captain more time to rest so as to analyze situations with a clear head. Some will say that the captain should be divorced from all duties except 24/7 analysis of the ship’s situation. In other words, be up in the wheelhouse nearly every watch to see what the Hell the situation really is.

  As I write this I am involved, in a small way, with an incident where a boat (262’ LOA) ran into heavy seas last night, burying the bow and breaking a wheelhouse window. Wheelhouse and accommodations flooded. No one injured. Steering thought lost, though problem was really a breaker tripping on RAI system. All hands on deck, and excitement and chain-falls in the Steering Room for a few minutes, while rolling in 20’ to 30’ seas. Most wheelhouse electronics toast. Enough operational for boat to divert and arrive safely today in a SE Alaskan shipyard under her own power. She will be towed back to Seattle.

 The captain had been skirting bad weather for days, on the 1800-mile run back from Dutch Harbor to Seattle, watching weather mainly via AWT’s weather routing software “Bon Voyage”. Anchoring out in a port of refuge as necessary, continuing on as the weather moderated. Typical drill for PNW tenders and tugs. The first part of the day in question the weather had dropped to near flat calm. But weather came up in a hurry in its usual/unexpected GOA way, despite all forecast and satellite data. By late afternoon winds were 50-70 knots. Sea 20-25’ with occasional 30 footers. As I say, typical GOA winter weather. 

6 and 6 watch schedule. Captain and mate rotating. Regardless of the watch schedule the captain was in wheelhouse all afternoon with the mate. They manned the throttle and helm [I]themselves[/I], making sure the bow wasn’t burying itself, speeding up and slowing down as the big ones passed. Even with all that care the above-mentioned damage occurred. 

My points follow. I present them only as talking points, not conclusions. You can make those yourself:

1)You can have as many mates as you want rotating. At some point the captain as to be in the wheelhouse for ungodly hours taking the reins in his/her own hands. In that sense the concept of work hours is debatable.

  1. The captain in question has over 30 years of dealing with weather of this sort. In his personal annals this incident will be minor and nearly forgettable. He’s seen worse. Because he has spent a lifetime of operating in an area where bad weather is the norm he has a sixth-sense about it, and avoided greater damage to the boat. [B]Experience with bad weather is everything[/B]. If the area you normally operate in usually has good weather you are at a disadvantage.

  2. Satellite weather forecasting software is invaluable. I am dumbfounded that El Faro did not have AWT software. A vessel of that size likely spends more in paper towels each month than the cost of a subscription. Why does a situation like this occur? I can tell you in the PNW captains are fixated on bad weather. It is the norm for them, so they assume the worst and plan accordingly. Other mariners in other oceans? Weather forecasting has revolutionized our operations in the GOA in just a few short years, saving us money in schedule-keeping and loss of damage to ship and cargo, for a trivial amount of outlay. Can’t imagine operating without it now. BUT HERE’S THE RUB: IT IS NOT OMNISCIENT. Man proposes, Nature Disposes. Man may make rules for Weather but Weather doesn’t have to read the memo. To begin a sentence with something like “A storm shouldn’t—“ betrays less experience with storms than others have.

4)The captain in the above-mentioned incident has done everything right. Early and constant weather tracking coupled with a lifetime experience has brought his ship home under her own power, with no one hurt and no cargo damaged. it. No drama. But even then, the incident still happened. [B]Moral: You can do everything right , with the reins in the captain’s hands, and still be in the wrong place at the wrong time. Imagine how much worse it is when the storm is a magnitude stronger and the ship loses propulsion in its path.
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5) I must admit professional exasperation with those of my peers who say , as a [B]blanket[/B] statement, that ships should not operate near storms. Taking that as a [B]categorical[/B] statement commerce would grind to a halt in the GOA and in other high latitudes.Proposed regulatory prescriptions to deal with heavy weather avoidance would have to be so carefully parsed and shot with caveats as to be useless—or destructive of commerce in and of themselves. Better to keep it simple and follow basic tenets of good seamanship: stay out of the path of a hurricane if you don’t need to be there.

  1. Comparisons to airline operations are as instructional as they are fraught with difficulties. An airplane is aloft for mere hours, making work-hour management easy to deal with. Crew tired? Get another crew tomorrow. Ships are at sea for weeks. Different thing altogether. Planes travel fast enough to fly around weather systems. Some ships on some runs can do this. Others can’t and must be ready to deal with heavy weather. Planes deal with high winds. Ships deal with high winds AND heavy water. The destructiveness of an element that weighs 8 lbs per cubic foot coming at you at several miles an hour in unlimited quantities is something a plane does not need to contend with. Not to disparage airplane pilots. They have their own particular set of dangers.

[QUOTE=Mat;180221]
I think no model tracks would be more helpful than faulty model tracks, because faulty model tracks are hard to overcome, once the misinformation is disseminated. There should be a warning attached to models purporting to show the forecast direction of a developing Tropical Depression: [B]“THIS STORM IS IN THE DEVELOPMENTAL PHASE AND ANY COMPUTER MODEL IS TO BE TREATED WITH THE UTMOST CAUTION. PLEASE BE GUIDED ACCORDINGLY. FOLLOW THE SYSTEM’S PRESENT MOVEMENT AS BEING THE SAFEST INDICATOR OF FUTURE DIRECTION.”
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I guess you’ve never seen this warning (from the NHC page about their graphic products and how to read them):

"NHC tropical cyclone forecast tracks can be in error. This forecast uncertainty is conveyed by the track forecast “cone”, the solid white and stippled white areas in the graphic. The solid white area depicts the track forecast uncertainty for days 1-3 of the forecast, while the stippled area depicts the uncertainty on days 4-5. Historical data indicate that the entire 5-day path of the center of the tropical cyclone will remain within the cone about 60-70% of the time. To form the cone, a set of imaginary circles are placed along the forecast track at the 12, 24, 36, 48, 72, 96, and 120 h positions, where the size of each circle is set so that it encloses 67% of the previous five years official forecast errors. The cone is then formed by smoothly connecting the area swept out by the set of circles.

It is also important to realize that a tropical cyclone is not a point. Their effects can span many hundreds of miles from the center. The area experiencing hurricane force (one-minute average wind speeds of at least 74 mph) and tropical storm force (one-minute average wind speeds of 39-73 mph) winds can extend well beyond the white areas shown enclosing the most likely track area of the center. The distribution of hurricane and tropical storm force winds in this tropical cyclone can be seen in the Cumulative Wind History Graphic described below. "

http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/aboutnhcgraphics.shtml?text

I believe they attach a similarly worded warning to most of their advisories.

[QUOTE=Jamesbrown;180223]I think the advisory discussion msgs were frank enough about the uncertainties. And it should be remembered that NOAA and TV presenters don’t focus on more than the impact potential for land areas. The storm was an odd one, and as can be seen in NHC’s report, also involved a period of strengthening over some waters that had higher temps than previously recorded for the time of year.

http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL112015_Joaquin.pdf[/QUOTE]

NOAA produces a variety of marine weather products. I don’t know why you’d suggest otherwise.

http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/abouttafbprod.shtml?text

I think weather data is only as useful as the end user deems. If the Captain wasn’t following up with the latest weather data, then that’s nobody’s fault but his.

[QUOTE=catherder;180227]NOAA produces a variety of marine weather products. I don’t know why you’d suggest otherwise.

http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/abouttafbprod.shtml?text

I think weather data is only as useful as the end user deems. If the Captain wasn’t following up with the latest weather data then that’s nobody’s fault but his.[/QUOTE]

I was specifically talking about hurricane impact forecasting priorities.

[QUOTE=freighterman;180224]As I write this I am involved, in a small way, with an incident where a boat (262’ LOA) ran into heavy seas last night, burying the bow and breaking a wheelhouse window. Wheelhouse and accommodations flooded. No one injured. Steering thought lost, though problem was really a breaker tripping on RAI system. All hands on deck, and excitement and chain-falls in the Steering Room for a few minutes, while rolling in 20’ to 30’ seas. Most wheelhouse electronics toast. Enough operational for boat to divert and arrive safely today in a SE Alaskan shipyard under her own power. She will be towed back to Seattle.[/QUOTE]

Been watching the NWS Pt Reyes wx maps and must say this winter has been very nasty indeed. Able to give us anything more on the vessel diabled? Freighter or processor? Owned by a guy who has a very large processing company in Ballard and keeps his fleet in Tacoma?

Coastal Progress is at the shipyard in Ketch. Would not seem a scheduled stop and she’s right size.

[QUOTE=Jamesbrown;180228]I was specifically talking about hurricane impact forecasting priorities.[/QUOTE]

Of course the priority is to land impacts. It’s assumed that a ship can get out of the way.

But the info is there for the using.

[QUOTE=Jamesbrown;180223] The storm was an odd one, and as can be seen in NHC’s report, also involved a period of strengthening over some waters that had higher temps than previously recorded for the time of year.

http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL112015_Joaquin.pdf[/QUOTE]

Useful report. I particularly liked the admission at the bottom of page 8: "The genesis of Joaquin was poorly forecast. " !

[QUOTE=catherder;180227]NOAA produces a variety of marine weather products. I don’t know why you’d suggest otherwise.

http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/abouttafbprod.shtml?text

I think weather data is only as useful as the end user deems. If the Captain wasn’t following up with the latest weather data, then that’s nobody’s fault but his.[/QUOTE]

Is the question of fault even remotely in dispute here? I can’t understand how it could possibly be an issue?

[QUOTE=Kennebec Captain;180237]Is the question of fault even remotely in dispute here? I can’t understand how it could possibly be an issue?[/QUOTE]

Not from my end. I thought there might have been some fault finding with the weather forecasting, hence my comment.

[QUOTE=catherder;180235]Of course the priority is to land impacts. It’s assumed that a ship can get out of the way.

But the info is there for the using.[/QUOTE]

Didn’t say it wasn’t.

That was a different thread.

[QUOTE=Kennebec Captain;177725]According to the National Hurricane Center the “Cone of Uncertainty” used on forecast graphics is not based on calculations of uncertainty of that particular system but instead:

The cone represents the probable track of the center of a tropical cyclone, and is formed by enclosing the area swept out by a set of circles (not shown) along the forecast track (at 12, 24, 36 hours, etc). The size of each circle is set so that two-thirds of historical official forecast errors over a 5-year sample fall within the circle. The circle radii defining the cones in 2015 for the Atlantic and eastern North Pacific basins are given in the table below.

Cliff Mass weather blog has a post about the cone here:[B]Time to Replace the National Hurricane Center’s Forecast Cone[/B]

From that post:

[SIZE=4]

Uncertainty in hurricanes tracks vary by storm, location, date, forecast situation and forecast period. One size does not fit all. And we now have much more sophisticated capabilities that can produce relevant forecast track uncertainty that shows a very different structure than the simple cone method.
To put it another way, the cone approach is out-of-date and should be dropped for next hurricane season.

[/SIZE]
[SIZE=4]

[/SIZE]
Bottom line here is the uncertainty in the forecast can not be determined using NHC “cone of uncertainty”

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[QUOTE=Dutchie;180129]That is obvious then. Any clue why they did this because as far as I know this is rather unusual. Squeeze in an extra row of containers, that is if they had also some free space on the deck for that?[/QUOTE]

I think the original design was 100% ro ro, no stacked containers on the uppermost deck. With the deck extended out past the hull, they could fit additional trailers on that deck.

[QUOTE=freighterman;180224]The subject of crewing wheelhouses is a fascinating study in human dynamics. Some say there are too few mates aboard, and therefore they are overworked, so the solution is more mates. Some say the mates are not paying attention to the big picture because the watch changes over so frequently the fast-changing nature of a storm goes unrecognized: in other words, there are too many mates.

 Some say the chief mate should stand a watch, presumably because the other mates have lesser experience and may not spot a developing, dangerous situation. Some will argue the chief mate should stay out of the wheelhouse and keep an eye on the fabric of the ship—watertight closures, stability—because the OOWs have to concentrate on navigation, collision avoidance and weather; two different aspects of the total question of ship safety.

Some will say additional mates would allow the captain more time to rest so as to analyze situations with a clear head. Some will say that the captain should be divorced from all duties except 24/7 analysis of the ship’s situation. In other words, be up in the wheelhouse nearly every watch to see what the Hell the situation really is.[/QUOTE]

With three mates and a 4 on 8 off schedule workload becomes an issue from working cargo, misc port ops and transiting in and out of port. Workload at sea is almost never an issue. It’s nice if all the mates understand the big picture but it’s not really required. Typically the C/M knows what’s going on, the second mate sometimes does sometimes not, the third mate generally doesn’t have the experience to much more than the minimum.

During the day the captain can keep an eye out from the office or visits to the bridge. At night orders can be written so that if the situation develops in a way that is different than expected the captain gets called. Not much expertise is required to stand a watch, that why third mates can do it.

In the rare times more expertise is needed for long periods in the bridge at sea the watches can be doubled up the C/M with the 2/M and the captain with the third mate on 6/6.

What I want to know is why the 2nd Mate’s Email was not brought up as it was most likely the last message from The El Faro before the shit hit the fan. To me this sets the beginning of the Time Line on what ever the hell happened!

If I had been on this Board, I would have wanted to know exactly when that message was sent.

[QUOTE=fullbell;180114]One unusual design feature of the EL FARO (and her sister ships) is that the upper-most cargo deck sticks out over the side of the hull. With the EL FARO’s design, the deck protruding over the side could act like a scoop, catching some of a large wave’s energy and adding to the rolling force in the opposite direction. I doubt that the possibility of this type of force is accounted for in their stability calculations.

[/QUOTE]

I’m not sure if this has been looked at in prior posts/threads, but I’m curious as to whether, or not, the navigation bridge would have separated if it didn’t have that protruding deck.

Aside from the fact that the ship was dead in the water in the middle of a hurricane, could she have sank fast because the navigational bridge separated from the ship because of the increased moment caused by the protruding deck?

[QUOTE=freighterman;180224]Some say there are too few mates aboard, and therefore they are overworked, so the solution is more mates.[/QUOTE]

That’s exactly right.

[QUOTE=freighterman;180224]Some say the mates are not paying attention to the big picture because the watch changes over so frequently the fast-changing nature of a storm goes unrecognized: in other words, there are too many mates.[/QUOTE]

You’re the only person I’ve ever heard make this claim. I seriously doubt anyone not working in the office would EVER say there are too many mates. If they change watch too often then alter the watch schedules, don’t reduce manning.

[QUOTE=freighterman;180224]Some say the chief mate should stand a watch, presumably because the other mates have lesser experience and may not spot a developing, dangerous situation.[/QUOTE]

The Chief Mate shouldn’t stand a watch, he should be available to be called if the OOW needs an expert opinion. Night orders and mates with half a lick of sense take care of avoiding dangerous situations. Besides, the Chief Mate can’t stand watch 24 hours a day so the others have to take over at some point. If your fears were true no ship would ever successfully complete a voyage.

[QUOTE=freighterman;180224]Some will say additional mates would allow the captain more time to rest so as to analyze situations with a clear head. Some will say that the captain should be divorced from all duties except 24/7 analysis of the ship’s situation. In other words, be up in the wheelhouse nearly every watch to see what the Hell the situation really is.[/QUOTE]

Those are the same thing.

[QUOTE=Tugs;180245]What I want to know is why the 2nd Mate’s Email was not brought up as it was most likely the last message from The El Faro before the shit hit the fan. To me this sets the beginning of the Time Line on what ever the hell happened!

If I had been on this Board, I would have wanted to know exactly when that message was sent.[/QUOTE]

I believe that the first hearing was to lay the gourndwork, the actual final voyage will be the focus of a future hearing. I agree that the email could be important.