With regards to the flooding into the scuttle, there is the possiblity that not everything that is supposed to be closed is in fact left open. It happens.
Assuming not everything is buttoned up is there a path from the scuttle in #3 hold to the engine room? Is there a possiblity that sea water dumped on electrical controls of some kind in the E/R causing loss of power?
In the last day 10 hearing there are questions about certain ventilation openings and water tight closings of I thought to hear the no. 2 car deck. Ventilation is necessary because of the possible presence of gasoline fumes at such a car deck. The relevant questioning starts at 3:40:20 of the video. The audio quality is rather poor, a lot of echoing. This is probably due to the fact that the microphone was at the distant camera’s position. The video quality also leaves to be desired. Well, you cannot have it all…
[QUOTE=Jamesbrown;180123]I don’t know about ‘major’, but the CG exhibit shows final position data (see link). It would be nice if a time stamp was laid down, and lat/lon… I’m taking the end of the blue line as the end of AIS info, but there is no reason to take that as gospel lacking any specific statement accompanying (maybe LRIT data?). It would be nice to have times so we could see those two slight course adjustments and how long between–possibly trying to improve the ride, maybe tried slight correction and due to insufficient result tried again?
The subsequent positions such as SSAS point activation may represent (with analysis) the period of time between loss of prop (end of blue line or nearabouts) and drifting while engineers try to recover before throwing in the towel leading to the Master’s calls noting they ‘can’t get it started’. The calls happened before the SSAS activation, noting the Master was going to ‘hit the buttons’ (so accounting for drift from his last reported position to SSAS). Modelling this drift, with weather data should provide a rough timeline for period of prop loss to eventual sinking. The potential amount of that time is not a pleasant one to consider regardless of duration.
(I give up on trying to copy and paste an excerpt–so, see slide 19, of CG Exhibit 001 here:
http://www.uscgnews.com/go/doctype/4007/286370/?offset=10)[/QUOTE]
Wasn’t there a report of 60 kt winds somewhere? Less than 6 kt drift rate after loosing propulsion, I’d guesstimate 3-4 kts. The relationship between wind speed and drift rate is linear AFAIK.
The SW direction of drift matches the report of NE wind direction.
[QUOTE=Jamesbrown;180123]
The subsequent positions such as SSAS point activation may represent (with analysis) the period of time between loss of prop (end of blue line or nearabouts) and drifting while engineers try to recover before throwing in the towel leading to the Master’s calls noting they ‘can’t get it started’. The calls happened before the SSAS activation, noting the Master was going to ‘hit the buttons’ (so accounting for drift from his last reported position to SSAS). Modelling this drift, with weather data should provide a rough timeline for period of prop loss to eventual sinking. The potential amount of that time is not a pleasant one to consider regardless of duration. [/QUOTE]
Approx. last pos graphic
[QUOTE=Dutchie;180120]Was that an original design feature or added at a later date?[/QUOTE]
Original, on some photos you can see that the midship house extends out to the ends of this deck protrusion.
[QUOTE=fullbell;180128]Original, on some photos you can see that the midship house extends out to the ends of this deck protrusion.[/QUOTE]
That is obvious then. Any clue why they did this because as far as I know this is rather unusual. Squeeze in an extra row of containers, that is if they had also some free space on the deck for that?
[QUOTE=fullbell;180114]One unusual design feature of the EL FARO (and her sister ships) is that the upper-most cargo deck sticks out over the side of the hull. With the EL FARO’s design, the deck protruding over the side could act like a scoop, catching some of a large wave’s energy and adding to the rolling force in the opposite direction. I doubt that the possibility of this type of force is accounted for in their stability calculations.
[/QUOTE]
At sea there is an energy transfer into and out of the ship.
This can result in an imbalance between righting energy and exciting energy.
Righting energy is a property of the loading condition.
Exciting energy is a property of the wind and waves.
So evaluating stability on the basis of a motionless, flat water measure like GM Margin, [U]ignores the dynamics[/U] that are at play at sea.
There is software on the market that allows load planners ashore and mates onboard to gain a far more realistic knowledge of stability in forecast wind and wave conditions before departure.
Once at sea the loading condition cannot be effectively changed, you cannot move containers or trailers and changing ballast can introduce more free surfaces that effectively raise the center of gravity.
At sea the stability sensor gives the [U]actual remaining righting energy[/U], instantaneously and historically over the past hour.
Sensed stability trends give the mate/captain the critical data on which to base their corrective actions.
[QUOTE=Mat;180127]Approx. last pos graphic
[/QUOTE]I can see I have been miss-plotting the last position’ It is
at 7:56 am EDT on October 1, was 23.52°N, 74.02°W-
but I plotted it as degrees and minutes.
So after passing between San Salvador and Rum Cay the last position fall very close to a track direct to San Juan, passing just northeast of The Turks and Caicos. This track is consistent with the plan to pass 65 miles south of the center.
That small island just north of Crooked Island is Samana Cay.
This is 01/0800 position of Joaquin:
The system center is just at Samana Cay.
The position of Joaquin at 01/0800 hrs LT was about 23-06 N 73-45 W. Just off Samana Cay.
This is the forecast at 30/1100 hrs.
REPEAT…CENTER LOCATED NEAR 24.7N 72.6W AT 30/1500Z
AT 30/1200Z CENTER WAS LOCATED NEAR 24.8N 72.3W
FORECAST VALID 01/0000Z 24.3N 73.2W
MAX WIND 80 KT…GUSTS 100 KT.
64 KT… 30NE 30SE 20SW 20NW.
50 KT… 50NE 50SE 30SW 30NW.
34 KT…100NE 110SE 60SW 70NW.
FORECAST VALID 01/1200Z 24.1N 74.0W
MAX WIND 85 KT…GUSTS 105 KT.
64 KT… 40NE 40SE 30SW 30NW.
50 KT… 60NE 60SE 40SW 50NW.
34 KT…120NE 120SE 70SW 80NW.
The forecast is in error by about 60 miles.
Here is 30/1700 hrs LT, not much change, system is expected to be moving north. This forecast is consistent with plan to pass 65 miles south of the system.
REPEAT…CENTER LOCATED NEAR 24.3N 73.1W AT 30/2100Z
AT 30/1800Z CENTER WAS LOCATED NEAR 24.5N 72.9W
FORECAST VALID 01/0600Z 24.0N 73.8W
MAX WIND 85 KT…GUSTS 105 KT.
64 KT… 30NE 30SE 20SW 20NW.
50 KT… 60NE 60SE 40SW 60NW.
34 KT…120NE 120SE 80SW 80NW.
FORECAST VALID 01/1800Z 23.9N 74.5W
MAX WIND 90 KT…GUSTS 110 KT.
64 KT… 40NE 40SE 30SW 30NW.
50 KT… 70NE 70SE 40SW 50NW.
34 KT…130NE 130SE 80SW 100NW.
FORECAST VALID 02/0600Z 24.5N 75.0W
MAX WIND 95 KT…GUSTS 115 KT.
64 KT… 40NE 40SE 30SW 30NW.
50 KT… 70NE 70SE 50SW 50NW.
34 KT…150NE 150SE 90SW 120NW.
Here is 30/2300, here we see Lat 23.8 N and a forecast of 23.5N, 30 mile closer more or less than the previous forecast. The plan with the 65 miles from the center is no longer valid But this forecast comes in late at night.
ESTIMATED MINIMUM CENTRAL PRESSURE 951 MB
MAX SUSTAINED WINDS 100 KT WITH GUSTS TO 120 KT.
64 KT… 25NE 30SE 20SW 20NW.
50 KT… 40NE 60SE 30SW 40NW.
34 KT…100NE 120SE 80SW 80NW.
12 FT SEAS…210NE 160SE 120SW 180NW.
WINDS AND SEAS VARY GREATLY IN EACH QUADRANT. RADII IN NAUTICAL
MILES ARE THE LARGEST RADII EXPECTED ANYWHERE IN THAT QUADRANT.
REPEAT…CENTER LOCATED NEAR 23.8N 73.1W AT 01/0300Z
AT 01/0000Z CENTER WAS LOCATED NEAR 23.9N 73.0W
FORECAST VALID 01/1200Z 23.5N 73.8W
MAX WIND 110 KT…GUSTS 135 KT.
64 KT… 30NE 30SE 20SW 20NW.
50 KT… 60NE 60SE 40SW 60NW.
34 KT…120NE 120SE 80SW 80NW.
FORECAST VALID 02/0000Z 23.6N 74.5W
MAX WIND 120 KT…GUSTS 145 KT.
64 KT… 40NE 40SE 30SW 30NW.
50 KT… 70NE 70SE 40SW 50NW.
34 KT…130NE 130SE 80SW 100NW.
This update is for 01/0500 hrs local. This is the first forecast that gets the time the system turns north, just off Samana.
HURRICANE CENTER LOCATED NEAR 23.4N 73.7W AT 01/0900Z
POSITION ACCURATE WITHIN 25 NM
PRESENT MOVEMENT TOWARD THE WEST-SOUTHWEST OR 240 DEGREES AT 4 KT
ESTIMvATED MINIMUM CENTRAL PRESSURE 948 MB
MAX SUSTAINED WINDS 105 KT WITH GUSTS TO 130 KT.
64 KT… 25NE 30SE 20SW 20NW.
50 KT… 40NE 60SE 30SW 40NW.
34 KT…100NE 120SE 100SW 80NW.
12 FT SEAS…220NE 180SE 100SW 180NW.
WINDS AND SEAS VARY GREATLY IN EACH QUADRANT. RADII IN NAUTICAL
MILES ARE THE LARGEST RADII EXPECTED ANYWHERE IN THAT QUADRANT.
REPEAT…CENTER LOCATED NEAR 23.4N 73.7W AT 01/0900Z
AT 01/0600Z CENTER WAS LOCATED NEAR 23.5N 73.5W
FORECAST VALID 01/1800Z 23.1N 74.2W
MAX WIND 115 KT…GUSTS 140 KT.
64 KT… 35NE 40SE 20SW 20NW.
50 KT… 60NE 70SE 40SW 60NW.
34 KT…120NE 130SE 100SW 90NW.
FORECAST VALID 02/0600Z 23.4N 74.8W
MAX WIND 120 KT…GUSTS 145 KT.
64 KT… 40NE 40SE 30SW 30NW.
50 KT… 70NE 80SE 50SW 50NW.
34 KT…140NE 150SE 100SW 100NW.
It looks like none of the forecasts after 30/1700 were used to update or adjust the original plan to pass 65 miles south of the system.
[SUB][/SUB][QUOTE=Kennebec Captain;180138]
It looks like none of the forecasts after 30/1700 were used to update or adjust the original plan to pass 65 miles south of the system. [/QUOTE]
Which, without some kind of explanation, seems inexplicable.
[QUOTE=Mat;180139][SUB][/SUB]
Which, without some kind of explanation, seems inexplicable.[/QUOTE]
At this point we obviously don’t know the exact explanation and we may never know. Nobody could have possibly guessed the exact sequence of event that caused the crash of Air France 447but there were some suspicions that were on the right track. I think a list some of the factors that may have contributed could be made.
One set of factors would be the culture on board.
The crew probably was very good on that two port run but they would not have developed any skills dealing with unexpected complex problems that crew on a more a difficult run might.
Several reports that the captain was arrogant. He may have expected the crew to take a narrow view of their duties.
Crews on ships like that can get cliquish. The second mate ashore texting routing advice?
Another set of factors how the crew interpreted the weather information. On the JAX-SJU run the crew could have been very successful without a robust way of dealing with the weather. When the crew was asked how they got their weather the answer was that it came by email. I didn’t hear anything said about any other methods. A man with one watch is sure he knows what time it is, a man with three watches is not sure. Also the computer weather is convenient and fast but it can cause overconfidence in the accuracy and precision of the forecast.
Then the storm itself. Some characteristics of the storm, it’s track, the forecast, etc that made it difficult to understand.
A couple of things in the hearing that were of interest: the fact that the weather was not sent up to the bridge when the captain was sleeping. The anemometer wasn’t working.
I think that the timing of the voyage might be important. If the weather was looked at on the 28th it may have been dismissed as not an issue. The ship dropped off the pilot at about 2100, captain would have had a long day, messages to send. May or may not have had a quick look at Joaquin. Next morning it would have been past the optimum time to decide to use the Old Bahama Channel. The significant changes in the weather system the night of 30/01 would have been missed if the ship was set up to make weather routing decisions during the day by the captain only.
About the storm itself, I remember thinking at the time when Joaquin started heading down to the Bahamas, even before I heard about the El Faro incident, that the early models forecast tracks when it was just TD11, which were broadcast on TV weather bulletins and ALL had it heading off NW and N, proved to be so misleading for two reasons: 1) they set up the mindset that it will go north, even if not quite yet, and that can be a hard notion to throw out when it is subsequently proved false (especially if you’re a Captain hoping to take your vessel SE); and 2) that error in direction early on caused the initial predictions about intensification to be greatly underestimated, because N/NW meant cooler waters, whereas SW/W meant warmer waters and more energy. In fact the SST’s were exceptionally high near the Bahamas at that time, which did cause the rapid intensification as it closed on the islands.
However, I can’t find any plausible explanation as to why the NWS Advisories were so completely ignored. Even before the ship had reached the Bahamas, and long before it made that decisive course change in towards the Crooked Island Channel, Advisory 10 at 05:00 EDT WED SEP 30 had a Hurricane Warning for the Bahamas, and mentioned Rum Cay and San Salvador by name. I don’t know which would be worse - not having read the Advisory or ignoring the Advisory. But either way it suggests a break down in procedure or a flawed system on board.
[QUOTE=Kennebec Captain;180169]At this point we obviously don’t know the exact explanation and we may never know. Nobody could have possibly guessed the exact sequence of event that caused the crash of Air France 447but there were some suspicions that were on the right track. I think a list some of the factors that may have contributed could be made.
One set of factors would be the culture on board.
The crew probably was very good on that two port run but they would not have developed any skills dealing with unexpected complex problems that crew on a more a difficult run might.
Several reports that the captain was arrogant. He may have expected the crew to take a narrow view of their duties.
Crews on ships like that can get cliquish. The second mate ashore texting routing advice?
Another set of factors how the crew interpreted the weather information. On the JAX-SJU run the crew could have been very successful without a robust way of dealing with the weather. When the crew was asked how they got their weather the answer was that it came by email. I didn’t hear anything said about any other methods. A man with one watch is sure he knows what time it is, a man with three watches is not sure. Also the computer weather is convenient and fast but it can cause overconfidence in the accuracy and precision of the forecast.
Then the storm itself. Some characteristics of the storm, it’s track, the forecast, etc that made it difficult to understand.
A couple of things in the hearing that were of interest: the fact that the weather was not sent up to the bridge when the captain was sleeping. The anemometer wasn’t working.
I think that the timing of the voyage might be important. If the weather was looked at on the 28th it [B]may have been dismissed as not an issue[/B]. The ship dropped off the pilot at about 2100, captain would have had a long day, messages to send. May or may not have had a quick look at Joaquin. Next morning it would have been past the optimum time to decide to use the Old Bahama Channel. The significant changes in the weather system the night of 30/01 would have been missed if the ship was set up to make weather routing decisions during the day by the captain only.[/QUOTE]
I will generally defer to the numerous ship masters here regarding genuine “ship stuff.” I’m not one and never will be, and won’t pretend to have expertise I don’t possess. But I do make weather decisions for my little 'ol wire boat and oil barge, I’ve had to do it for those very same waters, and I’m having real heartburn with the idea that El Faro’s master was just too damned busy to carefully look at, follow, and adjust for both the weather that was forecasted and the weather that occurred. As I (and numerous others) have pointed out previously, there was a named storm ahead before they even left port with environmental conditions primed to strengthen it. So with all due respect to ship masters the world over: for fuck’s sake, busy as I’m sure he must have been, if Davidson couldn’t give priority to the weather with Joaquin already out in front of them then when the hell WOULD he (or any other ship master) be inclined or able to do so? Is this practice of cutting it close to storms a cultural thing widely practiced by ship drivers? I understand fully that ships have speed that tugs don’t. Does that serve mostly to embolden ship masters in potentially dangerous ways? Would a higher manning standard, reducing the captain’s work load, help in theory and in fact?
So maybe a scuttle or hatch failed, or was left open. Maybe the cargo lashings were insufficient and the cargo got loose before it should have. Maybe the stability margins were tighter than they should have been. Maybe there were deficiencies with the propulsion system. Maybe the ship was too old, or maybe it just wasn’t adequately maintained. Maybe it was all of these things combined. Maybe there are lots of other possibilities we don’t know about and never will. No accident investigation is ever 100% definitive. Try as we might, they always have their own deficiencies and blind spots, like every other human endeavor.
I’m not looking to blame anyone in particular, per se. I’m not interested in attacking the man’s personal or professional character. I didn’t know him. But it seems to me that in this case the forensics aren’t going to yield much in the way of things like materiel or equipment failure, and even if more of that comes to light it will be of very limited value. It seems to me that focusing on fully understanding the thought and decision-making process, both afloat AND ashore, that led to El Faro ultimately pulling up lame in front of Joaquin is where the buried treasure is.
Exactly what weather information did they use, and why? Why was that route chosen and adhered to despite the forecasts and unfolding events? How often did El Faro receive updated wx information? If it didn’t go to the bridge when the master was asleep, why? Did shoreside managers normally monitor the voyages of any of their vessels and the weather that affects them? If so, to what degree? Would higher-risk voyages get more (or any) scrutiny from ashore? Does it depend on the specific vessel and/or master? If not, why? Did the shoreside managers monitor that particular voyage? If so, were they simpatico with the routing? If so, why? If they weren’t, did they attempt to do anything about it? Or were they oblivious to the unfolding disaster until the first phone call from the master? What specific resources were available to the master before departure and while en route? Were/are masters always simply left completely to their own devices and choices, regardless of any other considerations, with no particular monitoring of any kind? If so, is that a good way of operating a ship, or any other kind of vessel? Yes, the last two questions are rhetorical.
We may never get entirely honest or accurate answers to those questions, but I think if merchant mariners are interested in avoiding personal involvement in some version of a repeat performance it’s where the focus needs to be. We’re all fallible. If that inevitable fallibility isn’t recognized and factored carefully into our decision-making processes in all parts of voyage planning and execution then it should come as no surprise when it happens the next time. And of course there will always be a “next time.” It’s just a matter of who, when and where.
Yes, hard to figure. I just speculating here more or less. But it not generally appreciated the added difficulty a ship will have when changes occur at night. Especially with an old school type captain. But the possiblity of error like that is why a larger margin is needed in the first place. I was surprised when I saw the 65 miles. Again the computer software doesn’t indicate postion or forecast errors or uncertainty, at least not what I use.
How many other ships have made the same mistake and the system behaved as forecast or moved off in a favorable directon, didn’t intensify etc? Or the ships just beat their way out of it?
I think it would be interesting to perform a Substitution Test. In evaluating the behavior and actions of the Captain, it would be beneficial to take one or more similarly qualified individuals, placed in similar circumstances to make their own evaluations and take their own actions for comparison. This process can identify system errors as opposed to individual ones. In some ways, the discussions of the Forum can be seen as a limited substitution test, but the best comparable analysis would be a data driven one where the individuals face the same situation with the same information available.
I would offer that such a data set exists. The USCG/NTSB could obtain and analyze a re-play of all LRIT/AIS/AMVER data for vessel traffic over the period in the area of interest for the duration preceding. I’ve mentioned before that, based on the SAR commander’s comments there was very few ships (1?) in the area by a wide margin. Let’s see what the data says. Clearly, there would be limits in the conclusions, since it would not be immediately obvious what destination each vessel has (though this can be obtained from AIS data). Possibly run a couple of data sets that compare the Joaquin situation to maybe one or two other similar events (possible hurricane formation in the same area, differing forecast tracks…) and maybe a control data set of no storms to get an idea of normal traffic in the area of interest.
Some family members are wondering why no former Tote employees such as mates, engineers have been called to testify. Only current employees.
[QUOTE=captjacksparrow;180181]I will generally defer to the numerous ship masters here regarding genuine “ship stuff.” I’m not one and never will be, and won’t pretend to have expertise I don’t possess. But I do make weather decisions for my little 'ol wire boat and oil barge, I’ve had to do it for those very same waters, and I’m having real heartburn with the idea that El Faro’s master was just too damned busy to carefully look at, follow, and adjust for both the weather that was forecasted and the weather that occurred. As I (and numerous others) have pointed out previously, there was a named storm ahead before they even left port with environmental conditions primed to strengthen it. So with all due respect to ship masters the world over: for fuck’s sake, busy as I’m sure he must have been, if Davidson couldn’t give priority to the weather with Joaquin already out in front of them then when the hell WOULD he (or any other ship master) be inclined or able to do so? Is this practice of cutting it close to storms a cultural thing widely practiced by ship drivers? I understand fully that ships have speed that tugs don’t. Does that serve mostly to embolden ship masters in potentially dangerous ways? Would a higher manning standard, reducing the captain’s work load, help in theory and in fact?
So maybe a scuttle or hatch failed, or was left open. Maybe the cargo lashings were insufficient and the cargo got loose before it should have. Maybe the stability margins were tighter than they should have been. Maybe there were deficiencies with the propulsion system. Maybe the ship was too old, or maybe it just wasn’t adequately maintained. Maybe it was all of these things combined. Maybe there are lots of other possibilities we don’t know about and never will. No accident investigation is ever 100% definitive. Try as we might, they always have their own deficiencies and blind spots, like every other human endeavor.
I’m not looking to blame anyone in particular, per se. I’m not interested in attacking the man’s personal or professional character. I didn’t know him. But it seems to me that in this case the forensics aren’t going to yield much in the way of things like materiel or equipment failure, and even if more of that comes to light it will be of very limited value. It seems to me that focusing on fully understanding the thought and decision-making process, both afloat AND ashore, that led to El Faro ultimately pulling up lame in front of Joaquin is where the buried treasure is.
Exactly what weather information did they use, and why? Why was that route chosen and adhered to despite the forecasts and unfolding events? How often did El Faro receive updated wx information? If it didn’t go to the bridge when the master was asleep, why? Did shoreside managers normally monitor the voyages of any of their vessels and the weather that affects them? If so, to what degree? Would higher-risk voyages get more (or any) scrutiny from ashore? Does it depend on the specific vessel and/or master? If not, why? Did the shoreside managers monitor that particular voyage? If so, were they simpatico with the routing? If so, why? If they weren’t, did they attempt to do anything about it? Or were they oblivious to the unfolding disaster until the first phone call from the master? What specific resources were available to the master before departure and while en route? Were/are masters always simply left completely to their own devices and choices, regardless of any other considerations, with no particular monitoring of any kind? If so, is that a good way of operating a ship, or any other kind of vessel? Yes, the last two questions are rhetorical.
We may never get entirely honest or accurate answers to those questions, but I think if merchant mariners are interested in avoiding personal involvement in some version of a repeat performance it’s where the focus needs to be. We’re all fallible. If that inevitable fallibility isn’t recognized and factored carefully into our decision-making processes in all parts of voyage planning and execution then it should come as no surprise when it happens the next time. And of course there will always be a “next time.” It’s just a matter of who, when and where.[/QUOTE]
I wouldn’t say that master’s are “too busy” to look at the weather. My argument here would be that it’s a mistake for the master to look at the weather until he is satisfied that it’s not an issue, or not an issue for the next 12 hrs when it will be routinely looked at again. Instead the ship has to have a process in place to evaluate the weather in a methodical way to avoid errors and it has to involve the bridge watch.
WIth regards to the practice of cutting it close; I believe that using the weather programs can led to this error. When ships were first equipped with radars it led to the so-called “radar assisted collisons”, the Stockholm and the Andrea Doria being the most famous case. The solution to that was now we all have to take the classes. I think the solution to this problem is companies should consider requiring weather routing when there is bad weather knocking about. Another possibility is to modify the software so it shows not just the track and the expected wind/seas but the forecast error as well.
I wrote about this back in 2011
One other point, you can’t avoid heavy weather if you don’t have or don’t pay attention to the forecast. Typically, shipboard the mates will simply rip what ever comes off the INMARSAT printer and, regardless of it’s relevancy, post it without reading it. I don’t allow that. On my ship I have a specific, written procedure that insures the correct weather forecast is read, understood and posted.
K.C.
I am only going to say this. Here is a graphic showing the position, windfield and forecast movement of Joachim at 2300 9/30 along with the estimated position of EL FARO at the same time. Since we do not know what Davidson’s course was intended to be after passing San Salvador, I plotted two possible courses. Going south through Crooked Islands Passage takes the vessel away from the center of circulation but does put winds and seas on the beam. Continuing on a SE track takes the ship ever closer to the center of circulation.
again, I reiterate that yes, EL FARO would not have gone down without the loss of propulsion but I think at least 50 masters with 30+ years at sea should be polled to be asked that at 2300 9/30 with this map, what would you have done? Heave to, proceed through Crooked Islands Passage or continue SE’ly. I am on record as saying owners be damned, I would heave to well to the west of San Salvador. All I see to the east of the island is HELL ON EARTH AND PERIL FOR MY SHIP!
.
[QUOTE=tengineer1;180185]Some family members are wondering why no former Tote employees such as mates, engineers have been called to testify. Only current employees.[/QUOTE]
I couldn’t attest to how far down the Crewlist or how far back, but past employees have been contacted by Legal Counsel for the owners. Would they ever testify I could not answer but previous employees in my opinion might not help the owner’s cause.
This is from one of my favorite books: Managing the Unexpected:
About the Cerro Grande Fire -
The ability to deal with a crisis situation is largely dependent on the structures that have been developed before the chaos arrives. The event can in some ways be considered as an abrupt and brutal audit: at a moment’s notice, everything that was left unprepared becomes a complex problem, and every weakness come rushing to the forefront.
BTW, why did Nimitz wait till after the typhoon to write his famous letter?
