Two Firefighters Die in Cargo Ship Fire at Port in Newark

The fire was contained in an area of the 11th and 12 floors of the vessel, which has a Halon fire suppression system.

The city’s firefighters are trained to battle blazes on cruise ships and other vessels that contain living quarters but not ones that carry vehicles, according to Jackson.

“This was definitely a unique fire for us,” the fire chief told reporters.

One of the issues encountered by firefighters was their two-and-a-half-inch fire hose lines weren’t compatible with the European-made ship’s one-inch connections, according to the source.

The Newark firefighters were instead forced to use the fire hoses on the boat, which output less water and pressure than the firefighters were used to, according to the source.

At 10:25 p.m. ET the firefighters called a “Mayday” after two firefighters were trapped inside the ship followed by a second “Mayday” call 15 minutes later, city officials said.

Acabou was found by his cousin, who is also a firefighter, at 12:45 a.m. ET and transported to a hospital where he later died, according to officials. Brooks, Jr was found at 2:25 a.m. by a FDNY firefighter and also taken to the hospital where he died, according to officials.

I hope that this is just the result of low-quality journalism. However, when I consider the two- to four-hour time needed to evacuate a distressed firefighter, I’m unsure if it’s solely due to uninformed and sensationalist journalists.

In any case, Grande Costa D’Avorio is a relatively new ship, and it’s unlikely to be equipped with fixed fire-fighting installations containing Halon. However, it surely had other modern fixed fire suppression systems that failed for some reason.

I don’t understand the problem of incompatibility between the ship’s main FiFi system and the equipment of the Newark FD firefighters. While a similar situation occurred during the firefighting operation on USS Bonhomme Richard, we are talking here about a commercial vessel equipped according to international standards and port rescue services.

I don’t know how the relevant FD in Newark is trained, but worldwide we have at least several different FiFi system couplings. Port firefighters should be prepared for any situation, and their training should not be limited only to scenarios on passenger ships or accommodation areas. Complaining about the European-made ship and the type/size of its fire hoses is at least strange.

As usual, we will have to wait for the official report because relying on unreliable information can lead to false conclusions. The discussion about ISC or inerting fuel tanks in transported cars is rather pointless. First, we need to find out what happened and why, and then we can think about what we can do to prevent it in the future, economically of course

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I have always been of the opinion that each deck be equipped with a basic sprinkler system that could be charged with water from outside the compartment would be useful in these circumstances. The system would contain no water and the sprinkler heads would be without the heat sensitive capsules. With the use of an international shore connection water could be directed at the seat of the fire.
At new build the cost would be of pipe work and sprinkler heads only with a minimum of valves. Because of standardisation with the widespread use of the same fittings in buildings the cost would be inconsequential with the price of the ship.

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I agree and have long thought the same. When I was involved in ships being built in Korea several cargo holds were designated for carriage of hazardous cargo. Those hatch covers had a sprinkler arrangement that could be supplied via a hose connection on the side of the hatch cover.

Perhaps it’s time for the Port Authority of NY/NJ to develop and maintain a dedicated elite Marine Firefighting Unit the way New York City has.

They can do it with their pseudo-unlimited budget.

Shouldn’t one of the largest port facilities in the country have at least a fire house on site? If they already do, please feel free to educate me.

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The hose sizes I’ve seen aboard ships are 65mm and 40mm or 2-1/2 in. and 1-1/2 in. In this case it may have been 25mm but I’ve never seen that size aboard ship.

The remarks about the hose sizes might have been misconstrued, the intended meaning may have been that the volume and pressure of one-inch hoses that the crew laid out were not comparable (as opposed to compatible) to the 2-1/2 inch hoses that firefighters were accustomed to.

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Agree. Fire hose sizes on ships are standard, regardless of type, flag or where built. (Maybe except US??) Unfortunately the FDs in world’s ports are not standardized, hence the need to carry one or more ISC on ships.

The M/V GRANDE COSTA D’AVORIO is Italian owned and flagged, built in Croatia and classed by RINA:

The purpose of the International Shore Coupling is to keep a standby hose attachment to get a connection from shore (or from other ships) for shipboard firefighting, in case there is a total failure of onboard fire pumps

While using International Shore Connection, the seawater is supplied by external source connected to the ship’s fire main via the ISC.
This international shore connection flange is generally kept at a convenient and accessible location (Near the gang way, or in the Fire locker etc.) and the position marked on the Fire Safety Plan of a ship so that in case of an emergency it is readily available and used.

PS> Fire hoses of various sizes with different types of nozzles MAY be distributed around the ship. Position depends on the type of compartment and likely fire source, but they will all be of a standard size as marked on the Fire Safety Plan.

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True that. I’m wondering just how much training these firemen had in shipboard fires. You can get the “routine, standard” training but shipboard fires are a whole nuther world.

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That is true in most ports and why having shoreside firefighters helping to kill a shipboard fire is sometime more of a danger than help.
They tend to think they are the “experts” and in charge, so they don’t need any advice.
In many cases they lack any understanding of how a vessel functions, especially stability and the fact that water doesn’t just drain away, like in a building onshore.

With the large battery banks that are becoming common on ships, this will likely be even more critical. Special training is needed for both shipboard and shoreside firefighters.

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The reporting was the the two firefighters who tragically died were trapped in the car decks.

That may have been because they didn’t expect the way the vehicles are stowed. Typically there’s not enough space between cars for a person to travel fore and aft except for a couple paths.

That stowage is also one reason that a direct attack may not be used or is not considered effective inside full car decks.

I have 3 SUNY Maritime classmates in the marine unit of the NYFD.

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I think the Newark fire department use Storz couplings on their fire hoses, many ships have Storz couplings but some don’t.

I don’t know what kind of couplings they had on this ship, but even if they had Storz the couplings would be too small for the bigger fire department fire hoses.

Italians have a different coupling called an UNI.

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Interesting thread and while reading it I was reminded about the fire of M/V Auto Banner in Korea. I find it difficult to believe , there are stiil folks who believe , that putting more fire fighting equipment o/b and extra training will make this types of ships safer while seeing, that even alongside with the assistance of shore FF teams and tons of equipment it is extremely difficult to handle fire on PTCC and roro ships in general. Commented once on that accident as follows:

quote:
2018 May 24 0700 UTC:

In the morning May 24 official statement said, that the fire on board of car carrier AUTO BANNER was

extinguished after 67 hours of large-scale firefighting, involving hundreds of firefighters and dozens of engines, tugs and SAR ships, and helicopters. Of 2440 cars on board, some 1500 said to be burned down, together with 5000 tyres. As of now, it is believed, that overheated engine of one of the cars located

somewhere in the middle of cargo deck 11, was the cause of the fire. Investigation is under way, it will take not less than a month to determine the cause of the fire.

=========================

teams of 8 people each said to be on board, engaged in firefighting.

================================

Fire is considered to be major, some 40 engines, helicopters

and tugs, 150 firefighters in total, are engaged in firefighting,

================================

Just …wait a minute. Lets crack some figures.

67 hours large scale fire fighting ??/!!!

hundreds of firefighters!!!

dozens of engines!!!

tugs, SAR ships , choppers!!!

teams of 8 people each!!!

cutting ships side to get access!!!

all that professionals, trained and battle hardened crack fire troops with superb equipment and shore side support , all this army was fighting day and night alongside wharf for 67 hrs to extinguish the fire of some 2440 cars out of which abt 1500 burned completely including 5000 tyres!!!

AND YET SOMEBODY -still thought , that 20-22 crew members who after Eurasia Dream fire had!!! to be EXPERIENCED with number of certificates of profficiencies larger then Encyclopedia Britanica had pages, that such crew could fight the fire on board the vessel classed /equipped surely in line with with SOLAS Chapter II -2 Construction fire detection - Fire protection and fire extinction.

And yet there are STILL some, who think, that adding extra equipment - tons of it ( fire engines and no choppers excluded) will make ships safer and more fire proof.

Deam on dreamers.

End quote.

Very good article here - Rick Spilman is reliable.

NJ.com reports that according to city officials, a fire brigade from Port Authority of New York and New Jersey was already at Port Newark trying to extinguish the blaze on the Grande Costa d’Avori when Newark firefighters arrived at the scene late Wednesday night, they said at a press conference on Thursday.

From the same article minimum required hose size by SOLAS is 38 mm (1-1/2 inch) so likely no 1-inch hose.

Its interesting to hear about the lack of proper connections between Standard and Metric connections and threadings, one would think the Normandie fire in '42 would have made that fairly standard across most maritime-assigned fire department apparatus.

PAPD operates several dedicated and high-spec fire apparatus on the bridges and tunnels connecting NYC and NY to NJ, but for all the time I worked in Port Elizabeth/Bayonne and Howland Hook I never saw anything other than a glorified pickup truck respond to shipboard or container fires. Thats not saying said pickup couldn’t transport a multitude of vessel-specific tools and pipe connections along with a handful of experienced personnel, but when you look at what kind of hardware PAPD has stationed not 10 miles away its pretty astounding there aren’t dedicated units and personnel at the port itself. Hopefully, this may change that posture.

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I don’t understand why a fire department would expect to lug their own hoses onto a ship? Christ even on my US built (Korean designer) ship, we had Nakajima fittings at the fire stations until we started changing them out for American thread. No hope for any fire department to connect to that.

And the ISC is only meant for charging the ships firemain. It’s useless at the scene.

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image

source : FSS Code (International Code for fire safety systems.

Above is Solas requirement >
21.7.1 Ships of 500 gross tonnage and upwards shall be provided with at least one international shore connection complying with the Fire Safety Systems Code.

Try not to have it while visiting US ports and USCG will burry you during inspection.

Solas on fire hoses:

2.3 Fire hoses and nozzles
2.3.1 Ceneral specifications
2.3.-|…-l Fire hoses shall be of non-perishable material approved by the Administration and shall be sufficient in length to project a jet of water to any of the spaces in which they may be required to be used.
Each hose shall be provided with a nozzle and the necessary couplings. Hoses specified in this chapter as “fire hoses”
shall, together with any necessary fittings and tools, be kept ready for use in conspicuous positions near the water service hydrants or connections. Additionally, in interior locations in passenger ships carrying more than 36 passengers, fire hoses shall be connected to the hydrants at all times. Fire hoses shall have a length of at
least 10 m, but not more than:
.1 l5 m in machinery spaces;
.2 20 m in other spaces and open decks; and
3 25 m for open decks on ships with a maximum breadth in excess of 30 m.

2.3.2 Number and DIAMETER of fire hoses

2’.3’2’1 ships shall be provided with fire hoses, the number and diameter of which shall be to the satisfaction of the ADMINISTRATION = Flag State ( which delegates the duty to determine what eq/fitting are appropriate to R.O. or at least consults with Class)

Below pic is from Legislation .Gov.uk

have never seen portable fire hoses other then 64 mm dia and only once 45 mm which were installed inside accomodation.

Firefighting regardless of where it is taking place depends on the speed of response and the correct use of equipment. In my experience a fire in the end bay of a car was quickly extinguished by a portable fire extinguisher. As I posted previously I experienced an engine room fire on a Ro-Ro at sea where the fire was extinguished solely by ship’s crew, with the rider that we were all of the same nationality holding certificates issued by a first world nation.
I have had no experience of fighting a fire caused by the overheating of a Lithium battery as fitted in an EV. We carried new and used batteries in two different compartments, both of which could be fully flooded. We also had portable fire extinguishers for lithium fires, that thankfully we never had to use.
I am of the opinion that a basic sprinkler system would be effective in shipboard fires on car carriers.

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In responding to the fire on the Angelina Lauro - a major issue was the coordination - or lack there of - from all the different responders. We spent most of night one laying a foam blanket in the engine spaces, only to have local firefighters break it the following morning - re-ignighting the spaces.

From the DOT investigation: ( attached)

  1. Starting with the morning of second day a more systematic attack of the fire was formulated. Under the direction of Fire Chief ( retracted) and Commander Moritz from the GALLATIN, St. Thomas firemen and volunteers from the Navy and Coast Guard Cutter GALLATIN began to isolate fires onboard. Eventually, the fire teams were able to reboard the vessel. The GALLATIN crew provided the bulk of the man power and, working around the clock, they succeeded in bringing the fire under control.

  2. The question of organization and agency relations was frequently posed during the investigation. Fire Chief (retracted ) stated that he was in overall charge of any firefighting responsibility on the island. He believed that the Coast Guard was responsible for coordinating, under his direction, any Coast Guard assistance. Commander WEBB stated his responsibility was for the general safety of the port and since he was not designated on-Scene Commander by the Section Commander, he assumed the duties of liaison and advisor in addition to his predesignated duties as On-Scene Coordinator. Under this designation, Commander Webb saw his objective as containing the fire onboard without allowing the vessel’s fuel tanks to burst from the fire’s heat and without allowing the vessel to capsize from the application of too much water in the wrong place. He also had two problems to consider regarding the potential for pollution if the tanks exploded, or if the vessel rolled over. Commander MORITZ considered the GALLATIN’s duty as On-Scene Commander to be overall in charge of the firefighting effort including the shoreside fireman provided they were a “party to that kind of agreement.” However, he conceded “I’m not sure, I wasn’t sure then and I’m not sure now where the line of authority with the Virgin Island Fire Department and up was.” As the interplay of relations proceeded, Commander MORITZ characterized the activity as a “joint but separate effort” relying discreetly on tactfully presented requests. He knew of no incidents where mutually agreed upon actions were not carried out to their most effective end. His objective was to extinguishment of the blaze.

And so a recommendation was made -
10. That consideration be given to the following:
a. That the cognizant COTP develop for his area of jurisdiction in coordination with local fire and safety officials, a contingency plan for fire of disasters occurring on vessel’s pier side or at anchor including a designation and understanding of who is in charge.

I wonder if their has been changes made along the lines of the above recomendation.

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DNV-GL-Fires-on-Ro-Ro-Decks-2016.pdf (maritimesafetyinnovationlab.org)

Car carrier fires and the associated risks with Electric Vehicle transportation (ukpandi.com)

Layout 1 (britanniapandi.com)

Electric Vehicles and Maritime Transportation - Fire Hazards
Identified (gcaptain.com)

Car carriers featured in Alianz report
The problems with bigger ships | AGCS (allianz.com)

Pointless to offer other links as above indicates the industry knows very well what is the problem. But i am not sure that pointing fingers at allegedly “untrained” crews looking for scapegoats is the sollution .

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