Transocean's CEO admits DEEPWATER HORIZON drilling hands "should have done more"!

I have always believed that whatever BP’s role was that night with the well blowing out, that Transocean’s drilling hands on the rigfloor and in the DCR had every opportunity to see what was coming and had the ability to close in the well before it became too late. This testimony by TO’s CEO certainly does give BP a bit of weight to its claim that it was not in the position to actually secure the well and that it relied on TO’s people to have the knowledge and experience to do that before there was a disaster. Why are there not voice and data recorders for driller’s cabins and more importantly, why is there not a licensing scheme for supervisory drilling personnel? Of course though an OIM is licensed but should an asst. driller not be licensed like a third mate, a driller be considered a second, a toolpusher a chief mate and all have requisite experience and training just like mate’s and engineers? Would that have just possibly prevented DWH from ever becoming the disaster that it did?

[B]Transocean CEO: Deepwater Horizon Crew “Should Have Done More”[/B]

March 19, 2013
By Allen Johnson Jr. and Margaret Cronin Fisk

(Bloomberg) — Transocean Ltd. crew on the Deepwater Horizon “should have done more” to prevent the rig’s explosion in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010, Chief Executive Officer Steven Newman said at the trial over fault for the disaster.

Transocean’s failures led Newman to recommend the company pay $1.4 billion in civil and criminal penalties and plead guilty to a misdemeanor count of violating the Clean Water Act, he told U.S. District Judge Carl Barbier today in the nonjury trial in New Orleans.

Transocean owned the Deepwater Horizon rig that was drilling BP Plc’s Macondo well.

The company acknowledged that “our people should have done more,” Newman testified. Instead, he said, “They accepted the assessment of the BP well site leaders.”

Transocean lawyer Brad Brian asked Newman if he blamed the crew of the Deepwater Horizon for the accident that sank the rig. Nine of 11 crewmen who died were Transocean employees.

“Do I blame the crew?” Newman said. “I wish the crew would have done more. I’m not sure that is the same emotional context as ‘blame.’”

The blowout and explosion aboard the Deepwater Horizon spilled more than 4 million barrels of oil into the Gulf of Mexico. The accident sparked hundreds of lawsuits against London-based BP, Vernier, Switzerland-based Transocean, and Houston-based Halliburton Co., which provided cement services.

Disaster Liability

A nonjury trial over liability for the disaster began Feb. 25 before Barbier. The judge will determine responsibility for the disaster and whether one or more of the companies acted with willful or wanton misconduct or reckless indifference — the legal requirement for establishing gross negligence.

For BP, a finding of gross negligence would mean the company might be liable to the U.S. for as much as $17.6 billion in Clean Water Act fines, as well as unspecified punitive damages to claimants who weren’t part of the $8.5 billion settlement the company reached with most private party plaintiffs last year.

For Transocean and Halliburton, findings of gross negligence would mean the companies could be held liable for punitive damages for all plaintiffs.

Newman said Transocean and its employees have no financial incentives to cut corners or sacrifice safety for profits, an allegation leveled against BP and its contracting partners by plaintiff lawyers and government lawyers earlier in the trial, now in its fourth week.

“It’s a hazardous business,” Newman told Barbier. “Safety is one our core values and I think it’s fundamental to what we do.”

The case is In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon in the Gulf of Mexico on April 20, 2010, 10-md-02179, U.S. District Court, Eastern District of Louisiana (New Orleans).

Copyright 2013 Bloomberg.

Just because the CEO says he wished the crew “had done more” doesn’t mean much. The crew can’t tell you what happened because the driller didn’t make it out alive.

The licensing idea could be perfected by DNV, but is covered by IADC and IWCF well control. If you hold both certifications then you should be qualified to drill or supervise a well program.

[QUOTE=LandBoundBE;103266]The licensing idea could be perfected by DNV, but is covered by IADC and IWCF well control. If you hold both certifications then you should be qualified to drill or supervise a well program.[/QUOTE]

Not just take courses, but pass exams given by the BSEE and be issued a license just as a ship’s officer! This would certainly slow down the progression of the less that brightest bulbs from rapidly rising up the ranks of the Copenhagen bottle spitters.

[QUOTE=c.captain;103219]I have always believed that whatever BP’s role was that night with the well blowing out, that Transocean’s drilling hands on the rigfloor and in the DCR had every opportunity to see what was coming and had the ability to close in the well before it became too late. This testimony by TO’s CEO certainly does give BP a bit of weight to its claim that it was not in the position to actually secure the well and that it relied on TO’s people to have the knowledge and experience to do that before there was a disaster. Why are there not voice and data recorders for driller’s cabins and more importantly, why is there not a licensing scheme for supervisory drilling personnel? Of course though an OIM is licensed but should an asst. driller not be licensed like a third mate, a driller be considered a second, a toolpusher a chief mate and all have requisite experience and training just like mate’s and engineers? Would that have just possibly prevented DWH from ever becoming the disaster that it did?[/QUOTE]

There is no doubt those guys who were on the drill floor that night were qualified. Why they did not shut in the well will never be known though. Why TOI decided to go along with the BP Company man’s decision can only be guessed at. I would guess it was fear of losing their job. TOI clearly had maintenance neglect due to cost cutting and the desire to keep drilling to get the almighty dollar, this has been proven. Money rules in the oil business as everyone knows. When you combine BP and any of the major drillers you should not be surprised at anything.
Here’s an idea. Instead of requiring a license for the drillers and tool pushers why not require they have 12 months pay stashed away so that they can afford to say “Hell no”

I spoke to a TO guy on another rig, he said there was a BP guy standing behind every key guy telling him what to do, and clearly if you refused he rang for the chopper

The International Association of Drilling Contractors (IADC) requires you to pass a test before being deemed competent. Same for the International Well Control forum.

I don’t think that a licensing program comparable to a ship’s mate is the answer. It’s just what you are used to and what was pushed upon you.

I have worked with quite a few licensed 3rd mates, 2nd mates and 2 chief mates who I had no confidence in. Not only were they incompetent, they were arrogant and dangerous. (Not all were from KP)

Licensed captains and mates make mistakes that look like gross negligence every day, and then we get to discuss them here. Licenses don’t save the day. With that being said now the captain is 100% responsible for sealing the well and leaving if he sees fit. At least it is made clear to the rig hands and captains faced with a disaster in the future now know to close the rams and drive away.

We have a black box recording voice and information on the rig floor.

It definitely couldn’t hurt to have a more stringent qualification process. Also a license generally comes with accountability. Accountability tends to lead to better decision making. If ships officers could make it to the top as easily as drillers, the decisions they may or may not make would, IMO, reflect worse than they do now. I would agree C Capt. on this one, and I am sure we are going to start heading that direction eventually…

[QUOTE=powerabout;103287]I spoke to a TO guy on another rig, he said there was a BP guy standing behind every key guy telling him what to do, and clearly if you refused he rang for the chopper[/QUOTE]

Hmmmm, that gives a whole 'nother meaning to ones “stop work authority”

[QUOTE=powerabout;103287]I spoke to a TO guy on another rig, he said there was a BP guy standing behind every key guy telling him what to do, and clearly if you refused he rang for the chopper[/QUOTE]

but everybody is now dead and dead men can’t tell any tales but if there was a VDR, then that would certainly be admissible in a trial like this and would help to hang BP. Obviously, the DWH didn’t have such a recorder.

11 out of 126 didn’t make it. The survivors know the truth and it will come out.

It is unfortunate that people have to be hurt or killed to cause change in our industry. I think that the industry has made great strides and hopefully the accountants will not get in the way of safety and competency training.

It takes 7 plus ears to become a driller offshore, they are watched over by an assistant rig manager / toolpusher and at least 2 company representatives.

BP’s incident was the exception not the rule.

[QUOTE=powerabout;103287]I spoke to a TO guy on another rig, he said there was a BP guy standing behind every key guy telling him what to do, and clearly if you refused he rang for the chopper[/QUOTE]

That’s a big problem anywhere you have that kind of customer interface. The pressure to defer to the customer becomes excruciating. Nobody wants to be “that guy” who tells the customer, “no, we are stopping the job because we have a safety issue here.”

That mentality has killed a lot more folks than the DWH 11, and will kill more until everyone gets it in their heads that safety really does come first.