Have you seen pictures of the bulbous of Sola TS after discharging. If so, any link??
She just departed from Tilbury after discharging. She is now bound for Gdansk. (For repairs??)
The bulb is under water (in the picture), you may remember the Amercian destroyers that made contact with a bulbā¦ and the destruction they causedā¦ Guess we will have to wait till they have the wreck out of the water to see the damageā¦
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The Sola TS is the one with the bulbous bow. We may see the bulbous before they manage to get the frigate above water.
Looking at the simulation, I cannot even believe that Helga Ingstadās bridge was manned by a navigating officer (of any caliber) during the minutes before the collision. Whoever it was, clearly shows a stunning lack of understanding of the āActions to Avoid Collisionā in the simplest of traffic situations like this head-on-situation. It seems as though the person on the bridge never heard of the Rule 14 of ROR. The obvious action of altering his course to starboard would have kept his ship clear of tanker Sola, and this action would have also avoided him getting into another head-on-situation with other oncoming traffic.
The only imaginable reason he kept his course until the ship collided head-on could be that the guy on Helga Ingstadās bridge was just standing watch while the OOW needed a long break, and the OOW decided to take it on a straight course. This is, of course, speculation. But I canāt think of another explanation, at least based on the simulation. I have navigated very large merchant ships at least fifty or sixty times through fjords of Norway and I do not remember a single instance where navigation became stressful or, a close-quarters situation developed due to excessive cross-traffic or any other reason. The fjords are deep and thereās plenty of sea-room for very large ships to manoeuver to pass the traffic at a safe distance.
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I find it far more likely that they simply didnāt see him. From a purely visual standpoint, thatās quite easy to understand; big can boats look weird when you approach them fast and close in the dark. Whatās not so easy to understand is how the tankerās presence was lost to a bridge crew of five, armed with a sensing array capable of reading your darkest secrets.
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With the bright lights from the Sture Terminal and other shore facilities it MAY be possible to miss even a big tanker with only navigation lights showing.
I did so once in the Singapore Strait, (before VTS)
But I was alone on the bridge of a very slow moving drillship. A big Maersk tanker had to take evasive action to avoid collision. As he passed us he came on the VHF with the well chosen words; āYou F*king ocean farmersā. (Imagine heavy Danish accent here) I did not reply.
But with 5 persons on the bridge and an array of instrument, like you so colourfully describe, it should not be possible in my opinion.
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The only exception would be the Oslofjord on a summers day, with numerous WAFIs and people racing around in too fast boats with too much to drink and too little understanding of danger.
On the west coast the only cross traffic would normally be ferries and they are well trained in evasive actions to avoid large cruise ships etc.
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It appears that things are getting together for how they intend to get the HI onto the barge:
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I agree, the tanker not only has to be seen but the visual has to be matched up with radar etc. And it doesnāt matter if there are 5 people or 50 on the bridge, in the end the situation has to understood by a single person and that person has to take the correct action.
Just as an example a possibility that comes to mind is the tanker was detected and it was matched up with the side lights of the tug. Not saying thatās what happened, just an example of what can happen at night in traffic.
This is especially true when fatigue is a factor.
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Latest is that US Navy exchange officer on board, will be interesting to see roll played in accident
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Both crane ships can lift together 7300 tons. The Helga Ingstadās weight is 5290 tons. Apart from that she is fully filled with sea water and that in total will outweigh, I think, the lifting capacity of the two crane ships. But I suppose they will have a plan for that.
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@Klaveness
āI find it far more likely that they simply didnāt see him. From a purely visual standpoint, thatās quite easy to understand; big can boats look weird when you approach them fast and close in the dark. Whatās not so easy to understand is how the tankerās presence was lost to a bridge crew of five, armed with a sensing array capable of reading your darkest secrets.ā
Indeed that is a possibility. But the voice communication (as I understood it) between the VTS and Sola T & VTS and Helga Ingstad casts a doubt on the possibility that Helga Ingstadās bridge team wasnāt aware of the oncoming tanker under tug escort. The Sola Tās pilot, a Norwegian, the VTS and Helga Ingstad all three communicated in the same language (their own) leaving very little chance for a miscommunication. What was even more alarming about Helga Ingstadās conduct was the fact that the oncoming tanker was under tug escort. That fact alone should strike as a possible composite target on Helga Ingstadās radar to pass at even safer distance than a vessel in an ordinary head-on situation. A composite target on the radar throws up some interesting possibilities, all of which would require that you give a wider berth to the operation underway between the two vessels. The tug could be assisting the tanker via a line attached between them. Any naval officer would reflexively consider the impact of his bow-wave or propeller-wash of his powerful engines on the operation between a tug and the vessel being assisted. Every officer I have known would give a āpossibleā composite target a wider berth so as not to disturb their operation. This is something that comes naturally to a trained navigator. Regrettably for Norwegian Navy, the person on Helga Ingstadās bridge did not show any of the traits of an experienced navigator. A very unfortunate accident involving the loss of an allied naval ship. The only silver lining to this sordid incident was the fact that there was no human casualty.
The recording of the VTSās communication showed that they warned the Helga Ingstad a couple of times that they were on a collision course but got no response. Blind and deaf at the same time.
Determining if a risk of collision is developing by only observing the navigation lights of an incoming vessel is a guess. It only gives the aspect of the other vessel.
Rule 7; Risk of Collision
Assumptions shall not be made on the basis of Ā«scantyĀ» information
In determining if risk of collision exists the following considerations shall be among those taken into account:
- such risk shall be deemed to exist if the Ā«compass bearingĀ» of an approaching vessel does not appreciably change,
- such risk may sometimes exist even when an appreciable bearing change is evident, particularly when approaching a Ā«very large vessel or a tow or when approaching a vessel at close rangeĀ».
If you can avoid a collision in dense fog, you can certainly evade in perfect visibility. And escaping such a situation in fine visibility, outfitted with the state if the art electronic navigation equipment, was to my humble opinion, the easiest thing to achieve, navigation lights on or off or bothā¦
I have a question; how these VHF conversations sound to you? 
2:21 ā Sola TS: Turn starboard, if youāre coming.
0:13ā¦
2:34 ā KNM Helge Ingstad: I turn a few degrees starboard weāll pass ehā¦
0:04ā¦
2:38 ā KNM Helge Ingstad: ā¦pass on starboard.
Water in the hull doesnāt add to the weight before it gets above surface.
Some will be draining out through the damaged parts as she is raised. (As long as there are communication to the sea, that is)
Since thay are loading her on a semi-submersible barge, the cranes only need to lift her until her hull draft allows her to be brought over deck (+ cribbing and UKC) The last bit of lifting is done by deballasting the barge.
Boabarge 33 capacities:
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This conversation alone demonstrates lack of navigation skills. What type of response is āpass on stbdā? Without clarifying āport to port,ā I donāt know what the bridge was contemplating at this point. Did they state āpass on starboardā thinking they would turn to starboard and the someone on the bridge misinterpreted that as pass starboard to starboard and gave the helmsman the wrong orders?
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If you lift an underwater weight you have to use 75% more power to lift that weight. For a load of 2000 kg that amounts to 3500 kg. This is because you also have to lift the added weight of the displaced water.
Yes they did use Norwegian, which shut out the other vessels in the vicinity without a Norwegian speaking officer on watch. (There were several)
It should be compulsory for ALL VTS to use clear English and SMCP for communication with ALL vessels, even if they know that the pilot on board is a Norwegian (maybe even a neighbour and school friend from Fedje).
The Maritime industry is international and no longer local. The Aviation industry is using English only, even for communication between the flight deck and the cabin staff on domestic flights.
All Norwegians Deck Officers have to know English, even if they are only working on the coast as it is compulsory per IMO and MNA requirements.
PS> I wrote the same in a Norwegian maritime forum, but it somehow disappeared (??)
PPS> The same should apply to using slang and local phrases in an American maritime setting. Not everybody understand āmeet you on two bellsā etc.
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On a Head-on situation, how on earth can you expect to pass or meet or clear another vessel Stbd to Stbd by turning own vessel to Stbd ?
KNM Helge Ingstad ā I turn my elm a few degrees Starboard (which meant the head to Port) and weāll pass on your starboard side, expecting you to do the same, as by turning my elm to Port weāll land on the nearest block ! 
2:14 ā Sola TS: Take starboard now!
2:17 ā KNM Helge Ingstad: Than we go to the nearest blocks ! (shore, reef) .
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That is dynamic load from heave and roll of the vessel the crane is installed on and applies in an offshore operation.
No fast acceleration is expected (or wanted) in this case. The rule of thumb here is; āif you can see it move, itās too fastā.
I was involved with a lift of 9800 m.t. where we had to do the lifting in a sheltered fjord not too far from where this operation is to be conducted. This was because dynamic load offshore COULD have exceeded the crane capacity, even with a semi-submersible crane vessel and in summer season. (There were a couple more factors involved)