SCBA Usage

We have 4 SCBAs, each one has two spare bottles - total of 12. Then we have 8 spares, total of 20. I’d say that’s the offical count. These are checked monthly and kept 100% filled.

There are also some for training, extra spares (Americans always like extra firefighting equipment) I’m not sure how many the mate has tucked away, est min 6 max 12.

Plus the compressor. Probably takes 15 minutes to fill a cylinder so not fast enough to keep up with a two man team but we could just barely keep one person on air indefinitely.

We have 6 SCBAs on board + 4 spare bottles. 2 of the SCBAs is dedicated to DG fire fighting + the extra equipment needed to do the job.

I do not know why we have so few spare bottles :confused:

But we do have a BA compressor on board and it is my job to fill up the bottles after training + weekly check of all the equipment.

One SCBA, one spare bottle.

It’s a tugboat with a fixed system, but I would love to have more spare bottles.

[QUOTE=freighterman;190443]But alas, no definite info from any mariners on the number of SCBAs and bottles aboard their boats. I didn’t know it was sensitive information. Right up there, I guess, with the Big Three of Don’t-Ask-A-Sailor: How much do you make? What flavor of porn is on your tablet? and, Is that really Aqua Velva in that bottle?[/QUOTE]
The # of SCBA and spare bottles required onboard is driven by CFR. The vessel’s Fire and Life Saving Plan should say how many SCBA you have on board, I used to spend a lot time updating F&LS Plans for my previous employer.
It depends on your vessel service and can vary depending on cargo being carried.

For instance Subchapter I boats call for:
[B]§96.35-10 Fireman’s outfit.[/B]

(a) Each fireman’s outfit must consist of one self-contained breathing apparatus, one lifeline with a belt or a suitable harness, one flashlight, one flame safety lamp, one rigid helmet, boots and gloves, protective clothing, and one fire ax. In lieu of the flame safety lamp, vessels may carry an oxygen depletion meter which is listed by a Coast Guard recognized independent laboratory as intrinsically safe.
(b) Every vessel shall carry at least two firemen’s outfits.

While Subchapter L boats call for:

[B]§132.365 Emergency outfits.[/B]

(a) Two emergency outfits, stored for use in widely separated, accessible locations, are required on all OSVs of at least 6,000 GT ITC (500 GRT if GT ITC is not assigned) that have cargo tanks that exceed 15 feet in depth, measured from the tank top to the lowest point at which cargo is carried.
(b) Each emergency outfit must have on board the following equipment:
(1) One pressure-demand, open-circuit, self-contained breathing apparatus, approved by the Mine Safety and Health Administration and by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health and having at a minimum a 30-minute air supply, a full facepiece, and a spare charge.

[QUOTE=JayNola;190458]The # of SCBA and spare bottles required onboard is driven by CFR. The vessel’s Fire and Life Saving Plan should say how many SCBA you have on board, I used to spend a lot time updating F&LS Plans for my previous employer.
It depends on your vessel service and can vary depending on cargo being carried…[/QUOTE]

With respect, the MININUM number of SCBAs and bottles are driven by CFRs. There is no law against putting more aboard. (I’m not saying you are arguing otherwise, I just wanted to make the fact clear for persons reading this post, without deep expertise with CFRs).
For example, I know of vessels legally classified as fishing vessels, that under CFRs have no legal obligation to carry fireman’s outfits, or any SCBAs. Yet these vessels carry 4 SCBAs and 24 bottles of air aboard, minimum; each member of a fire team has a complete set of personally-fitted fireman’s bunker gear issued to them on hire, which follows the person boat-to-boat, if they change postings within the company. In addition, each boat has two complete outfits of fireman’s bunker gear aboard, unassigned to anyone, just in case.
None of it required by CFR or union.

We have 6 SCBA’s with 6 spare bottles and a Bauer compressor to charge them.

[QUOTE=freighterman;190443]But alas, no definite info from any mariners on the number of SCBAs and bottles aboard their boats. I didn’t know it was sensitive information. Right up there, I guess, with the Big Three of Don’t-Ask-A-Sailor: How much do you make? What flavor of porn is on your tablet? and, Is that really Aqua Velva in that bottle?[/QUOTE]

I cannot say with certainty I know the exact amount of SCBA bottles we have on our drill ship. More importantly, I do know we have 4 SCBAs for the heli-deck teams with (2) spares per SCBA locally, two fire teams with 5 SCBAs per team with same amount of allocated spares locally; team leaders have UHF comms in their mask (FPS 7000 Drager). We probably have 25 or so additional spare bottles that are fully charged as back-up. Those are mostly steel bottles and not the composite style that we upgraded to some years back, it may be 30 - not sure. Of course, all are checked pre & post usage, and periodically. In addition, we have a dedicated masks and mini bottles for confined space entry with Y-connects and a 200 foot hose reel to a cascade trolley with surface pressure gages as well as local gauge for the entrants / rescue team.

Facial hair is monitored for anyone assigned to a SCBA. Anyone that may have the flu, sickness, or congestion type symptoms are temporarily excused from SCBA duties until signed off by the medic.

Both fire teams use air during every drill. They usually use 1/2 to 2/3 capacity.

In accordance with your D/O Fire Plan or the I/L one? Do you actually move stuff around when you swap service?

[QUOTE=freighterman;190420]On an inspected vessel, perhaps yes. But on an uninspected vessel, likely no.

As you know, uninspected U.S. vessels may have substantial amounts of combustibles in their make-up: plywood/ formica paneling and overheads, foam insulation, etc. Some people may take issue with the existence of these combustibles in their structure, but it is still a fact, and must be dealt with in planning for firefighting. Since SCBA usage is key to firefighting, SCBA training can be argued to more important on uninspected vessels than inspected vessels.

Once a fire starts on such a vessel—whether it be from a broken fuel line spraying fuel on a turbocharger in the engineroom, or an electrical short in wiring buried in foam insulation in a cargo hold, the fire very quickly becomes a Class-A fire traveling behind bulkheads and through overheads, unseen by firefighters, hidden first by the nature of the construction, and then by smoke, quickly moving upwards from lower decks to upper decks.

In fires aboard an uninspected vessel of this sort, I advocate using the fixed system FIRST, if provided at the original seat of the fire. The hope is to instantly knock down the fire before it moves to surrounding combustibles, and then upwards to higher decks. Others will disagree, and advocate using the fixed system as a last resort. I point to the P/V Galaxy fire of 2003 and rest my case. If the crew had never gone near the fire and simply set of the fixed system likely the fire would have been extinguished and no one would have died.

It takes time for even the best fire teams to assemble and make a plan of action. If the fire gets into the bulkheads and overheads (and I am confining my remarks to uninspected vessels of a particular sort), while the fire teams are assembling, they have let themselves in for a knockdown, long drawn-out mixture of direct attacks and indirect attacks with hose lines and extinguishers, while they tear out bulkheads and overheads, chasing down the fire. This has been the case with a number of fires in Alaskan waters. In most cases the fire wins.

The phenomenon of fires travelling within walls is not specific to ships. It occurs in shoreside structures also. The fire axes we have aboard ship may have a lot of theoretical purposes. Good marine firefighting schools teach you how to use them in a specific technique used by structural firefighters to quickly punch a hole in thick plywood bulkhead, so you can blast water in the space between it and the steel bulkhead to extinguish the actual seat of the fire.

On an uninspected vessels (which, I believe, make up the bulk of U.S. vessels) fixed systems are not commonly found outside of the engineroom, paint locker, and cargo holds. And sprinkler systems won’t reach a fire traveling within the bulkheads and overheads of the passageways and accomodations

All this points to the need for proper SCBA training and lots of bottles—or a realistic policy of abandoning ship early on. I know of one large tug company whose policy is to send their mariners to firefighting school; and yet they have a policy of not fighting a fire aboard the boat, but rather to abandon ship. Mixed message? Or pragmatism?

The system of rotating firefighters in the hot zone is a common one with structural firefighters, and should be adhered to, in my opinion, when it comes to a direct attack on a below-decks fire in the scenario I have described. The drawback of the technique is that it requires realistic training on an annual basis, with physically-fit personnel. The key is rotating the firefighters in and out of the hot zone on a rigid schedule (commonly 10 minutes). This gives a measure of safety to the firefighters, hopefully getting them topside before their low air alarms go off, and gives the fire commander (usually the chief mate) a degree of control over the crew, since he or she will have little control over the fire, at first. Then it’s a matter of SCBA training and a shitload of air bottles to put the fire out, more so than extinguishing agent.

The rotation technique takes time to learn—who’s doing the timing? how do you signal the firefighters their time is up? But it is a powerful technique whose foundation is proper SCBA usage. It prepares the crew for a prolonged battle. If you study actual cases of shipboard fires at sea you’ll learn that the crew often do everything right—to a point. Then the fire throws them a curveball and they panic and run. Poor training. Short-term mindset. Better to train crews to go into the event prepared for the long run. Or, alternatively, and rationally, confine them to indirect attacks. Or set off the fixed system early and often, and keep your distance.

Another key is for the captain, or company, to set guidelines as to when to stop firefighting and prepare to abandon ship. Rule of thumb in the scenario I have described: when the fire has spread to more than two decks, or if the fire seems to be cutting the crew off from the embarkation deck, it’s time to move towards the lifeboats/rafts. When the fire spreads to more than two decks it is usually too complex to fight. In such a case, even a veteran group of professional structural fire fighters would happily let the ship burn without a second thought, as long as no one was trapped below.

So how do I know all this? By working with structural firefighters for years in training seamen, and by studying the history of Alaskan marine firefighting. In particular you have to study the cases no one ever hears about, which are the successes. USCG and NTSB only document failure. Predictable but shortsighted. Many people know about the F/V Galaxy fire in 2003. 3 people died, in a textbook case of what not to do (and also an amazing story of heroism on the part of the captain and others). Yet few people remember the F/T Pacific Glacier in 2008, because it was a hands-down, epic Win. A textbook case of how to put out an intractable shipboard fire like the one described above. No one injured. Boat saved.

Without going through the whole story the fire started below decks and began spreading as described above. Most of the crew of about 106 souls were evacuated to other large fishing vessels that came to the 253’ LOA Pacific Glacier’s aid. Then the key crew, and trained crew members from the Good Samaritan vessels, prosecuted a direct attack through two smoke-filled decks, using 76 bottles of air, refilled from BA compressors aboard the Good Samaritan boats. They used the rotation technique, described above, among other things, hunting down fires as the flames raced through bulkhead and overheads. It took 12 HOURS of constant combat to extinguish the fire. The Pacific Glacier crews trained at the same firefighting school as the boats I work with, so I heard the details of the story from the captain and mate afterwards.

So, to sum up, in my opinion, if you are on an uninspected vessel with combustibles in her make-up have plenty of SCBAs, lots of bottles, and train on compressed air constantly. Or, equally valid, set off the fixed system early and realize your limitations.[/QUOTE]

Agree with all, but I would certainly add a capability that was not addressed in the above post, particularly for the type of vessels you mentioned with little or no fixed fire fighting capability.

http://www.statx.com/First_Responder.asp

A compartmental fire plan and decision tree is essential. Vessel operations at the time may put the using the fixed system lower in the pecking order.

It appears that the Statx device has class society approvals, but not USCG approval. Looking at it with a sea-lawyer’s eye it seems that, while the Statx won’t count towards the USCG-approved number of fire extinguishers aboard, you can still have it aboard. I don’t doubt it would be effective. The rub is this: if any litigation after a loss from fire occurred, the class society approval might or might not provide the defendant (shipowner/captain) adequate protection against a plaintiff’s (injured person/insurance company)assertion that the Stax wasn’t USCG-approved, and that this lack of a approval contributed somehow to the loss.

All that might just be lawsuit paranoia on my part. I hate to be the guy going down the sea-lawyer route, rather than the route of practicality, when to comes to safety devices, but we do live in That World. What do our other sea-lawyers say on the matter of non-USCG approved safety devices aboard ship, in excess of approved equipment?

As to fire plans: another subject dear to my heart. Big believer in decision trees. Trouble is getting officers (captains mostly) to use them. Increasingly in our firefighting training, when we train entire crews together, we plan the training so that referral to the fire plan by the captain is essential, in order to successfully complete the training scenario. Otherwise captains often ignore the firefighting plan(the decision tree) altogether, and fly by the seat of their pants.

[QUOTE=freighterman;190521]It appears that the Statx device has class society approvals, but not USCG approval. Looking at it with a sea-lawyer’s eye it seems that, while the Statx won’t count towards the USCG-approved number of fire extinguishers aboard, you can still have it aboard. I don’t doubt it would be effective. The rub is this: if any litigation after a loss from fire occurred, the class society approval might or might not provide the defendant (shipowner/captain) adequate protection against a plaintiff’s (injured person/insurance company)assertion that the Stax wasn’t USCG-approved, and that this lack of a approval contributed somehow to the loss.

All that might just be lawsuit paranoia on my part. I hate to be the guy going down the sea-lawyer route, rather than the route of practicality, when to comes to safety devices, but we do live in That World. What do our other sea-lawyers say on the matter of non-USCG approved safety devices aboard ship, in excess of approved equipment?

As to fire plans: another subject dear to my heart. Big believer in decision trees. Trouble is getting officers (captains mostly) to use them. Increasingly in our firefighting training, when we train entire crews together, we plan the training so that referral to the fire plan by the captain is essential, in order to successfully complete the training scenario. Otherwise captains often ignore the firefighting plan(the decision tree) altogether, and fly by the seat of their pants.[/QUOTE]

Your paranoia is not unfounded. I have had personal experience with an in-port shipboard fire- a big, destructive one, and the FIRST thing the company did was call the P&I Club and circle the legal wagons. They got their under-the-bus throwing arms warmed up, too, and used them. The other party (shipyard) lawyered up as well. Then the poo flinging began and it was hideous. People who had performed some heroic actions during the fire found themselves accused of all sorts of malfeasance, later unfounded, but nonetheless very distressing.

That all aside, this looks like a pretty nifty device to have in every damage control locker. Wake up, Coast Guard, and take a look at it.

We have and use fire plan for each compartment but I’m am not familar with the decison tree, is this something compartment specific or generic?

[QUOTE=Kennebec Captain;190537]We have and use fire plan for each compartment but I’m am not familiar with the decision tree, is this something compartment specific or generic?[/QUOTE]
Decision trees are borrowed from structural fire fighters. Our firefighting trainers (actual active-duty city firefighters) tell us they have binders of different sorts of plans for different sorts of fires, but when on-scene at a fire whatever rigid plan they’ve made up in advance often becomes irrelevant. It’s like the old military saying “No battle plan survives first contact with the enemy”. Another way they express it is “Don’t forget that the fire has a vote in things, too.” The fire often outsmarts their plan. in those cases firefighters use decision trees as the rough guide for survival, relying on their experience and tactical training to fill in the gaps.

The plans shown below are company specific, for uninspected vessels. The first plan shown below is for the chief mate to follow in actually combatting the fire. The second shown is for the captain to follow at the first report of fire. It helps prevent the captain from getting tunnel-vision during the emergency, or “flame fever”: everyone focusing on reacting to the fire, instead of asking themselves should they be fighting it in the first place.

QUOTE=Kennebec Captain;190537]We have and use fire plan for each compartment but I’m am not familiar with the decision tree, is this something compartment specific or generic?[/QUOTE]
Decision trees are borrowed from structural fire fighters. Our firefighting trainers (actual active-duty city firefighters) tell us they have binders of different sorts of plans for different sorts of fires, but when on-scene at a fire whatever rigid plan they’ve made up in advance often becomes irrelevant. It’s like the old military saying “No battle plan survives first contact with the enemy”. Another way they express it is “Don’t forget that the fire has a vote in things, too.” The fire often outsmarts their plan. in those cases firefighters use decision trees as the rough guide for survival, relying on their experience and tactical training to fill in the gaps.

The plans shown below are company specific, for uninspected vessels. The first plan shown below is for the chief mate to follow in actually combatting the fire. The second shown is for the captain to follow at the first report of fire. It helps prevent the captain from getting tunnel-vision during the emergency, or “flame fever”: everyone focusing on reacting to the fire, instead of asking themselves should they be fighting it in the first place.

QUOTE=Kennebec Captain;190537]We have and use fire plan for each compartment but I’m am not familiar with the decision tree, is this something compartment specific or generic?[/QUOTE]
Decision trees are borrowed from structural fire fighters. Our firefighting trainers (actual active-duty city firefighters) tell us they have binders of different sorts of plans for different sorts of fires, but when on-scene at a fire whatever rigid plan they’ve made up in advance often becomes irrelevant. It’s like the old military saying “No battle plan survives first contact with the enemy”. Another way they express it is “Don’t forget that the fire has a vote in things, too.” The fire often outsmarts their plan. in those cases firefighters use decision trees as the rough guide for survival, relying on their experience and tactical training to fill in the gaps.

The plans shown below are company specific, for uninspected vessels. The first plan shown below is for the chief mate to follow in actually combatting the fire. The second shown is for the captain to follow at the first report of fire. It helps prevent the captain from getting tunnel-vision during the emergency, or “flame fever”: everyone focusing on reacting to the fire, instead of asking themselves should they be fighting it in the first place.

[QUOTE=freighterman;190551]
Decision trees are borrowed from structural fire fighters. Our firefighting trainers (actual active-duty city firefighters) tell us they have binders of different sorts of plans for different sorts of fires, but when on-scene at a fire whatever rigid plan they’ve made up in advance often becomes irrelevant. It’s like the old military saying “No battle plan survives first contact with the enemy”. Another way they express it is “Don’t forget that the fire has a vote in things, too.” The fire often outsmarts their plan. in those cases firefighters use decision trees as the rough guide for survival, relying on their experience and tactical training to fill in the gaps.

The plans shown below are company specific, for uninspected vessels. The first plan shown below is for the chief mate to follow in actually combatting the fire. The second shown is for the captain to follow at the first report of fire. It helps prevent the captain from getting tunnel-vision during the emergency, or “flame fever”: everyone focusing on reacting to the fire, instead of asking themselves should they be fighting it in the first place.[/QUOTE]

Looks useful, we are using emergency checklists which are intended for the same purpose but maybe a little harder to follow then the tree.

I imagine this must be a hard sell to experienced captains but I think you’re on the right track.

I have a good quote somewhere about overconfidence, I can’t recall exactly but the gist is have confidence your own skills experience etc and have confidence in your crew but this is where the planning comes in; don’t underestimate what you’re up against.

The Alaska fishing community has the experience of the Pacific Glacier and Galaxy fires These fires have to some extent embedded themselves into the culture of the fishing community, particulay on the U.S. West Coast.

The way mariners on big container ships or RO/ROs think about fires did not arise in a vacuum. In the foreign-going U.S. flag fleet there have been major fires and other incidences that never made the headlines and information about them is not easily available to the general public.

Just as with the fishing community these stories, lessons learned etc have infiltrated themselves into the attitudes, policies and procedures in the deep-sea fleet.

[QUOTE=Kennebec Captain;190568]Looks useful, we are using emergency checklists which are intended for the same purpose but maybe a little harder to follow then the tree.

I imagine this must be a hard sell to experienced captains but I think you’re on the right track.

I have a good quote somewhere about overconfidence, I can’t recall exactly but the gist is have confidence your own skills experience etc and have confidence in your crew but this is where the planning comes in; don’t underestimate what you’re up against.[/QUOTE]

Most experienced Masters would realize that any decision tree, flow chart, or any other tool may not necessarily serve themselves as much as it would serve the rest of the crew if he ever became incapacitated during such emergencies. Without realizing that fact, maybe the experienced Master is not as experienced as he think he is.

Compartment fire plans are essential in knowing capabilities for an affected space (shut downs, cause and effect philosophy - for automated systems, shut downs, isolations, fire fighting systems, etc) which are finite in their nature. A decision tree will account for all of the operational variables. If you have a heli-deck, are there any inbound aircraft to redirect? Will the effect of dumping Co2 in the machinery spaces result in loss of propulsion resulting in a collision? Do we have a vessel on seen with FiFi capabilities?

A robust decision tree should account these changing variables based on vessel type and operations. Even as a SIRE & OVID auditor, I have not met one Master that can accomplish all of this in his head.

[QUOTE=anchorman;190590]Most experienced Masters would realize that any decision tree, flow chart, or any other tool may not necessarily serve themselves as much as it would serve the rest of the crew if he ever became incapacitated during such emergencies. Without realizing that fact, maybe the experienced Master is not as experienced as he think he is. [/QUOTE]

Very few mariners have experience fighting a major fire. Professional firefighters on the other generally have much more experience. If professional firefighters say tools like decision trees are useful then the use of tools similar may be worth considering.

Use of tools like this also matches what is know about human error. It’s not uncommon for very experienced competent people to make simple yet deadly errors. The Tenerife Airport Disaster is one example.

Does anyone have any hints on how to view the attached decision trees above? Clicking on them brings me to a page that says I am not logged in, etc. but I am logged in. Is it a bandwidth thing?

Err…never mind, brain fart problem.