Latest Bourbon Rhode’s available AIS signal dated 1222 UTC Sep 26, tug moving at reduced speed in NW direction, probably trying to keep wind/sea on bow. The ship issued distress signal in the morning Sep 26 in Atlantic, in vicinity 15 35N 040 10W, some 970 nm due W of Cape Verde. The ship while en route from Las Palmas Canary islands, to Georgetown Guyana, was caught in the cyclone, suffering massive water ingress in ship’s compartments, 14 crew readying for evacuation.
There were reports that the ship sank just north of the eye of the hurricane and that agrees exactly with the hurricane’s path information of that date.
According to insiders’ information the Bourbon Rhode was drydocked recently, prior to her last voyage to South America, where she was to be working under charter. Something was done wrong or went wrong during repairs, the tug encountered trouble or troubles before she was caught in the hurricane. Master of tug is Croatian, Second Officer is Filipino, bosun is from South Africa, fitter is Russian, the rest are Ukrainians.
Yes I do appreciate the strength of Cyclones/Hurricanes/Typhoons, even though I have never been in the eye of one.
I also know that these types of offshore vessels are strongly built and designed to take a beating.
I agree with Dutchie that something must have gone wrong, whether operational, by getting that close to a forecasted hurricane, or with the vessel structure to allow water to enter into below deck compartments. (The first is quite obviously so)
If this could have been because of faulty repair work, design flaw, or failure to ensure watertight integrity by the crew may never be known.
Some 30+ years ago I was in a situation where wrong forecast and a chain of events lead to water entering the day tank and eventually flooding part of the hull of an Accommodation unit under tow. This caused a list and danger of capsizing.
But we managed to creep into safety thanks to a tug not much different from the Bourbon Rhode, with a skilled master that managed to keep us from drifting onto a lee shore.
According to an update on the website of Bourbon Offshore the body of the missing seafarer was located by one of the aircraft involved in the search and has been recovered by one of the five vessels that came to assist. The seafarer’s family was immediately notified and they requested that the identity not be disclosed.
What intrigues me is that the Owners donot provide any information about what happened. It suppose it is not too far sought to expect that the captain had been communicating with the office about their predicament. Before reaching the eye of the hurricane there probably was enough time for reporting and consulting by sat phone.
Also the three surviving crew members, like the two of the Stellar Daisy, could provide important information, but until now nothing was said.
Your comments “… communicating with the office about their predicament… reporting and consulting by satphone…” have me thinking more about El Faro than Stellar Daisy.
But as you say, the survivors will shine a light on the circumstances that led to Rhode being in the wrong place at the wrong time.
I sure hope for the captain that there was no DPA in the Bourbon office such as in case of the El Faro.
What I meant to say is that, as I remember it, the two survivors of the Stellar Daisy drama made a written report which was almost immediately shared with the international press agencies.
Not sure on the rules here (grandfather rites and all) but unless she has LRIT, her AIS will report her last known position -40 miles or so off Las Palmas.
I am not sure if the Bourbon Rhode had to use LRIT. The requirement is for passengers ships, cargo ships and all offshore rigs used for the purpose of drilling oil in the high seas. On the other hand I suppose that it is possible to register a vessel on a voluntary basis into the system. If she was participating in the system then the track is known. I am afraid we have to,sit and wait…
Bourbon Dolphin was under Norwegian flag and managed by Bourbon Norway in Fosnavaag. Most of the problems around that accident was handled by their Managing Director, Capt.Trond Myklebust. (Now CEO of Viking Supply) with little input from the mother company in France.
Pretty sure that LRIT applies at 300GT for tugs, same as yachts etc, etc.
SOLAS V/19.1 makes no distinction for tugs.
(can you guess who just had a SOLAS Safety Radio Cert Annual survey?)
As the weather worsens the vessel’s options get fewer and fewer, latent problems become more likely to manifest themselves and the crew’s ability to cope with problems is greatly reduced.
It’s not a simple matter of keeping the vessel in seas less than that which is sure to cause the vessel to capsize or flounder.
As to the idea that any particular vessel “should” be able to survive, the question is; how much are you willing to bet?
Did you read the NOU? I wish there was an English version I could post on here, because that’s a fucked up story on so many levels, while the public blame was concentrated on one bad decision. </OT>
So true. It’s one of those dynamic situations with a high dependence on initial conditions. In other words, we don’t really know what’s going to happen.
That right, once you’re in it it’s mostly just a matter of how things unfold. This idea that a highly skilled mariner is going to be able to pull a rabbit out of a hat in the middle of a typhoon is mostly bullshit.
Recall the Captain of the El Faro with his Alaska experience. I worked in Alaska many years, we used to make sure everything was dogged down, heavy weather expected or not. No real skills required to close and dog a scuttle, someone just has to do it.
As far as I can see they made a beeline from the two known positions to the spot where the ship sank. In the first position nearest the coast the course was 244° and the speed 9.7’. In the second position, almost a day later, the course was 247° and the speed about 2 miles less, 7.9’. It could be that the wind was already increasing.
The distance from the first position to the position where she sank is 1410 nm and the average speed 8.3’. The course is then 248°. By the looks of it they ran without any hesitation smack into Lorenzo. No signs of steering a safer course.
My guess is they just sailed into the system unawares.
Because they did not expect a TC in that area they were not monitoring the SAT-C. Unlike the El Faro they would not have access to the Weather Channel or the sat FM radio for weather information. However like the El Faro they did not understand the meaning of local weather signs.
That would have seemed implausible before the El Faro sailed into the eye wall of Joaquin but not now.
That is the only possible explanation. It was of course a freak hurricane in the sense that it started already with that force in such an easterly and northerly position but you should always be on the alert and closely follow the weather at all times.
