It seems the best way to avoid this type of incidents is (1) slow down, (2) to keep an eye out in all directions, (3) avoid heavy weather areas all together, (4) double up the watch on the bridge, (5) avoid series of strange waves, etc, etc.
There is a curious phenomenon of rogue wave triplets or Three Sisters present in fiber optics which can be viewed as the analogous dark counterpart of the “three-sister” hydrodynamics rogue wave formations that are reputed also to occur in the Great Lakes of Northern America as shown by the sinking of the ore carrier ss Edmund Fitzgerald in those waters.
https://www.osapublishing.org/oe/fulltext.cfm?uri=oe-22-22-27632&id=303577
We are reminded of that there is a similar three-rogue-wave phenomenon in the Great Lakes known as the “three sisters” , wherein the first wave will hit the ship and before its water drains away the second wave strikes, followed by the third wave. This sequential impact adds together suddenly overloading the deck with tons of water. These types of waves are now believed responsible for the sinking of the SS Edmund Fitzgerald on Lake Superior in 1975. Our vector dark triplets shown here can be thought of as the dark counterparts of these three-sister rogue waves. For this reason, we vividly term them the “dark three sisters”.
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Do rouge waves need to be invoked here? The seas were described 6 meters with a long swell. This is the type of situation where an occasional big set would be expected.
I don’t know why that would not show up on the analysis. Maybe too infrequent to up the average.
According to that German report the wave that struck the MSC Zoe was 10 meters. In a sea of 6 meter SWH approx 1 wave out of 1000 will be 11.2 meters.
Lashing bridges reach 5th tier on ULCV .Pls google some pic. of loaded ships to verify.
wires are not used - lashing rods are used .
Various sources explaining phenomenon of parametric rolling , list as a precondition for it to occur the wave length , which must be about the same or very similar to LOA . Wind waves seem to be a lot shorter. Wonder why all participants are so focused on the ship dynamics and complicate issues. One may have a very robust ship but when actual box distribution is different then per stow plan and it very often happens then loadicator results are false. Have never seen a stow plan weight wise , that would reflect the Container Securing Manual weight distribution - NEVER. Even when carrying mpties only as a mix of 20 & 40. Never was calculated draft same as actual draft and it may be up to 2000 or abt more cargo then declared . VGM ( verified gros mass) as per solas 2016 is a pure nonsense as nobody is verifying shippers declaration although it seems easy to do with weigh stations/bridges. Final EDI fed to loadicator reflects the port figures not the crew tally as crew can not handle due to the speed of loading with 7+ gantries and 30+ moves per hour. What is given in Container securing manual is valid only if weigh and distribution of boxes is PER CSM AND whitin the specified range of GM ( say 0,8 > 2.2) . If not then only loadicator lashing module can tell the master/chiefof if if stack-weights , lashing forces, racking forces are OK ( in the green) . 99% is also in the green and one can not cancel boxes when all is green as serious questions will be asked. Summarising , there are so many things , that can be wrong including loadicator results , then no wonder things are breaking like dominoes. What about cargo securing inside container ( coils, steel plates ) ??? stuffed in Burkina Faso or inland China, it can get loose , damage the box , the box collapsed and the lovely stow is gone. Found one comment on gCaptiain FB - the commentator has written a small book what can go wrong with the cargo and still all will be in the GREEN. I see in many forums all are concerned what is wrong with the ship construction, lashing systems , weather and what the crew screwed up but it looks , that from shore stuffing depot to ships rail all was PERFECT- packed and stuffed by UNLICENCED personel to be road-worthy, rail-worthy but surely not SEAWORTHY , Makes me wonder why human error is solely attributable to those wretched souls on board who do not have any control of what happens. Sorry to bother but seems to me You have a very cool and analytical head and do not shy from research. Cheers
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With regards to the lashing arrangement…I was referring to the One Apus. Yes, other ships, if well designed, will have lashing bridges higher up. Even those can have containers 4 or 5 stacked higher than the lashing can reach.
Not that it matters but I spent the better part of my career aboard container ships.
I suspect that in this case the crew was not at fault. Obviously something had to have gone wrong but given that NYK was operating the vessel I’d bet that the routing was by the book.
I did come across an interesting tidbit with regards to container weights and stow. Evidently on these ULCS there is a conflict between lowering GM by stowing heavy containers higher up and reducing forces caused by high acceleration by stowing the heavy ones lower.
The crew just assists and sails the ship from A to B and ensures the cargo is secured aboard in transit. More advanced items like stability incl. roll period, reducing forces due to accelerations in storms are for the officers to handle. After departure the C/M decides the course and off they go. I doubt that anyone aboard worry about lowering the roll period any time. I always recommend to avoid bad weather and to slow down if in doubt.
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Should be obvious what is meant by the term ‘crew’ from the context.
This is wrong.
I edited my post, meant to say lower the GM.
My first introduction to parametric rolling was on a feeder container vessel. With very fine entry and stern designed to wring the last knot out of the engine she was unfortunately the same length as the prevailing swell. When in the wrong conditions for the vessel the movement was violent with extreme acceleration as the righting moment changed. Because the stacks were not that high we never lost a box.
It should be noted that due attention was paid to maintaining a manageable GM but the motion experienced was not unlike a very stiff vessel one minute and tender the next.
How would you name someone who repeats nonsense even though the truth is known?
From post #86, December 8:
The only reason to leave the oceanic great circle to Long Beach could have been the weather.
They made the course change early!
With the original GC-course, at the longitude of the incident (172.5°E), their latitude would have been 47.6°N, near the apex of the GC.
The incident was at 33.25°N, i.e. 860 miles south of the originally planned course.
At their position, wind and wind seas were probably manageable, the northerly swell with isolated monsters obviously not.
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Maybe a much better decision would have been to continue on the great circle to Long Beach but to slow down to avoid the heavy weather? You would then also save plenty fuel. Only the new ETA would be a couple of days later, but you have a good excuse - heavy weather. Maybe the ‘optimal’ speed for many container lines is say only 10 knots (slow speeding = reduced fuel consumption) and if you get delayed you could speed up. If a cargo owner needs a fast ship, he should pay extra for it.
The One Apus would have had aboard some sophisticated routing software linked by satellite to both professional ship routers and to company ship operations.
All this chief mate setting the course and the like is uninformed nonsense.
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Consider the source.
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All we have now is a screenshot from MarineTraffic, to ‘read’ where they changed course:
- at about the latitude of the JP-port of Sendai = 38°N
- at about the longitude of the easternmost point of the northern JP-island Hokkaido = 146°E
From there, the course to Long Beach was:
- by Great Circle, initially 59.4°, distance 4450 NM
- by loxodrome, permanent 93.1°, distance 4670 NM
- a difference of 220 NM, or 5%
- the real stable course, after the change, seems to have been about 100°
The final decision to make this change was indeed by the captain.
For know, we completely ignore, whether the captain’s decision came out of bridge observations, out of their weather routing, or out of a company ‘proposal’.
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That’s always going to be the case.
Sometimes the recommend route is in error. The captain can email and ask for a correction to have the route adjusted or just ignore the recommendation. I’ve called a couple of times when the routers missed how quickly a low was deepening.
My point is routing is not done in some half-assed manner. The captain has access to some excellent tools and weather expertise is an email away.
How the captain chooses to use those tools is another matter.
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Marine claims consultancy WK Webster, which is involved in the ONE Apus case, has warned that the total cargo insurance claims could top $200m. Beyond the 1,816 containers that fell overboard in the storm there is an enormous volume of badly damaged boxes on deck.
Images from WK Webster’s drone footage taken over the magenta-hulled ship last week have now been analysed. Out of the 22 bays on deck, only six appear to have survived intact. With 20 rows per bay and with stack heights of six to eight tiers, this would equate to approximately 2,250 containers potentially impacted, mainly forty foot boxes, thus equating to around 4,500 teu.
A post was merged into an existing topic: Off-topic from One Apus Thread
ms ONE Apus drone footage.