You still have two anchor handling drums
While reading the testimony of the CE about how “something” caused the fuel to gel, I had to wonder how did the Generators keep running? There was never any report of them going dead boat so I guess this “mysterious” sludge had no effect on the Generator Engines.
I remember when they first started dieing the fuel red. We had a lot of problems with the Racor Filters plugging up after a very short time. I must of gone through 5-6 cases of filter every week. Not sure what changed but it slowly got better and we got back to having the Racors lasting a couple of weeks, which was normal for that boat.
The fuel has probably been tested every way possible but I doubt we will ever hear about the results unless they found something that they can blame all of this mess on.
[QUOTE=Tugs;111104]While reading the testimony of the CE about how “something” caused the fuel to gel, I had to wonder how did the Generators keep running? There was never any report of them going dead boat so I guess this “mysterious” sludge had no effect on the Generator Engines.[/QUOTE]
That question has already been raised here (by me) but it has been - surprise surprise - avoided by the CG hearing officers. Either no on in the CG knows that generators are driven by diesel engines that burn the same fuel as the mains or they have been paid to not ask.
This entire hearing seems to be a fraud and only exists in order to find a way to avoid pointing out that the players are not competent to operate in Alaska. Or just incompetent in virtually every aspect.
Maybe it is time to turn the investigation over to a professional body of maritime accident investigators like theNTSB, the MAIB or the Canadian TSB. This affair is making the CG look like fools and will only provide more anti drilling ammunition to the environmental extremists.
more from Thursday’s testimony
[B]Shell contractor’s role in checking tow setup under scrutiny[/B]
Published: May 30, 2013
By LISA DEMER
Near the end, after a number of broken tow connections and tow ship engine failures, after a mistakenly dropped anchor and scary rescues of crew, after five days in an escalating Gulf of Alaska storm, two boats finally had Shell’s unwieldy oil drilling rig, the Kulluk, under tow.
Jon Skoglund, skipper of the Kulluk’s Louisiana-built tow ship, the Aiviq, testified Thursday before a Coast Guard investigation panel about that fleeting control as well as problems with his vessel’s fuel, concerns about the voyage route, and other factors that may have contributed to the drilling rig’s Dec. 31 nighttime grounding south of Kodiak Island.
The Aiviq, whose crew resurrected all four failed engines at sea, and the Alert, a Crowley Marine Services tugboat sent to help, earlier that day drew up close to the drifting, unmanned Kulluk. They connected to broken tow lines in extreme conditions and at last were making way, Skoglund said.
So what changed? asked Cmdr. Joshua McTaggart, the Coast Guard’s lead investigator of the grounding.
“I’d have to go back and check my accuracy with the log, but I believe we were instructed to change course and that made a considerable difference in our headway,” Skoglund answered.
By then, a unified command team that included the Coast Guard, Royal Dutch Shell, and Aiviq owner Edison Chouest Offshore was giving orders from an emergency command center set up in the Anchorage Marriott Downtown. The boats and drilling rig had been headed to the closest safe refuge from the storm, but were instructed to go to “the vicinity of Kodiak” instead, Skoglund said. The Kulluk began pulling them back. The Aiviq’s tow line broke, then, as Alert was being pulled to shore, Coast Guard Capt. Paul Mehler ordered it to cut its line. The abandoned Kulluk hit the rocks.
A hearing that is part of the broader formal marine casualty investigation wrapped up Thursday afternoon after nine days of sworn testimony by more than a dozen witnesses, including Shell managers, assorted boat captains, a high-ranking Coast Guard officer and various other players in the complicated machinery running the Kulluk tow operation. Investigators canceled Friday’s testimony, which was going to feature a towing expert. Shell’s contractor in charge of the failed December tow, John Becker of Offshore Rig Movers International, was on the witness list but didn’t testify because of a family emergency.
McTaggart’s report on the investigation is due July 5 to Rear Adm. Thomas Ostebo, commander of the Coast Guard in Alaska. It must be approved by the Coast Guard commandant in Washington, D.C., before being released to the public, McTaggart said in wrapping up the hearing. He could recommend changes in safety procedures or equipment to prevent similar problems or propose further action against individuals licensed by the Coast Guard. But he won’t assign punishment, he said.
The Aiviq was custom built for Shell to tow the Kulluk alone and succeeded in moving it from Seattle north through a Chukchi Sea storm to the Beaufort Sea drilling site then south to Dutch Harbor.
When Skoglund took over command of the Aiviq in mid-December, he reviewed Shell’s plan to tow it from Dutch Harbor to the Seattle area for major off-season maintenance. He raised concerns about the near shore route and said he pushed for a more direct, southerly course in deeper water, the Great Circle route.
That route would have allowed a tow line up to two-thirds of a mile long, Skoglund said. A long line sinks deep into the sea, and the weight of the line helps absorb the force of rough weather. Plus, being further off shore gives a ship “sea room,” a distance that can prevent a grounding, he testified.
Becker agreed with him, Skoglund said, but they were overridden by Noble Drilling Corp.'s need to be near enough to shore for evacuation of hurt or ill crew members riding on the Kulluk.
On Dec. 22, the day after the Kulluk and the Aiviq left Dutch Harbor, Skoglund said he again pushed for a southern route but didn’t get permission to change course until Dec. 25 as he saw rough weather coming up on them.
Coast Guard investigator Keith Fawcett asked Skoglund about the ship’s fuel. The Aiviq loaded up with 440,000 gallons of diesel at the Delta Western fuel dock in Dutch Harbor, Skoglund said.
A biocide agent often is added to fuel to prevent algae and filter-clogging slime, Fawcett said. The Aiviq’s chief engineer testified earlier that slime damaged dozens of fuel injectors and caused the engine shutdowns but he didn’t know what caused the slime.
“Do you know if biocide was introduced into the fuel of the Aiviq at any point?” Fawcett asked.
“To my knowledge, we had never treated those fuel tanks with biocide,” Skoglund answered.
The Aiviq’s fuel is still undergoing testing, according to the Coast Guard.
Despite the troubles, the Aiviq was, and still is, capable of towing the Kulluk alone, Skoglund said. That arrangement eliminates the risk of two tow vessels crashing into each other or the rig, he said.
The tow setup included a 90-foot length of heavy surge chain, and the tow line was 31/2 inch-thick wire, which also is heavy. That gear serves as an underwater spring in rough water, he said.
Also on Thursday, the first hint of blame arose in the hearing.
Shell’s standards manager for offshore operations, Jonathan Wilson, testified by phone from London about how after the grounding, the damaged Kulluk was towed from Kiluida Bay back to Dutch Harbor by three vessels with heavy tow gear. The vessels between them had 300 metric tons of pulling power, compared to 200 tons for the Aiviq alone. A backup tugboat and an oil-spill response vessel added to the flotilla.
Shell lawyer Gregory Linsin asked Wilson his reaction to earlier sworn testimony by a Shell contractor, warranty surveyor Anthony Flynn of oil and gas consultant GL Noble Denton. The company was hired to verify the Aiviq-Kulluk tow setup.
Wilson testified that he was surprised when Flynn said his work wasn’t intended to check the adequacy of the setup against marine industry standards or engineering calculations but just was making sure the gear conformed with Shell’s tow plan.
Shell now is doing an internal review of its worldwide towing operations, Wilson said.
So I guess this circus is now over and will fold its tent and disappear without really determining a thing. The fuel is still being analyzed 5 months later and nobody can say a damned thing about what is in it. The master was not a master at all but a boat driver who let others make his decisions for him resulting in this grounding. Noble proved to be Noble. WHAT A JOKE!
I imagine the mains and gens both had racors, maybe 2020s? I am not positive, but maybe the mains and gens had different secondaries. Could be that the gens had a finer secondary, catching more of the slime or particulate that caused the problems.
Here’s my findings in five simple lines…pity I didn’t get to be on the inquiry panel!
- The route taken was wrong for the nature of the tow and the time of year which placed the tow on a perilous lee shore and forced the tug to cross a shallow bank necessitating the tow be shortened dangerously for the seastate encountered
- Using a single towing vessel introduced a major single point failure which obviously happened
- The tow was rigged with far too light of gear and omitted the surge chain. Kotter pins used in tow shackles was not standard Alaskan industry practice and likely fell out causing the pin to fall out of a critical shackle
- There was a major infusion of water into AIVIQ’s day service tanks from either vents which were continuously submerged by heavy seas or some other reason not disclosed such as human error mistakenly pumping water into the fuel oil (which is not outside the realm of reality but I can say no more)
- throughout the chain of responsibility at all levels there was a distinct lack of specific knowledge for towing across the Gulf of Alaska in the winter.
end of report
.
[QUOTE=gulf_engineer;111110]I imagine the mains and gens both had racors, maybe 2020s? I am not positive, but maybe the mains and gens had different secondaries. Could be that the gens had a finer secondary, catching more of the slime or particulate that caused the problems.[/QUOTE]
C280s I worked with had Racor 97812 for primaries. I had FO contamination once with IFO tar residue that did not show up in the samples. It ran me bat shit changing ring dams to try to stay ahead of the problem. The primary vacuum and secondary pressure drop was more pronounced than the C9 AUXs just from the volume circulated. Our crew stayed on top of the situation with many thousands worth of filters until they FINALLY cleaned the tanks. Others, I have heard did not fare as well. The Cat ECM and MMS alarm systems works very well when calibrated and tested on a regular basis.
[QUOTE=c.captain;111108]
So I guess this circus is now over and will fold its tent and disappear without really determining a thing. The fuel is still being analyzed 5 months later and nobody can say a damned thing about what is in it. ![/QUOTE]
It’s not very funny though. It took less time to analyze the cause of the shuttle Challenger loss and complete a presidential committee report with details that make this one look like an elementary school student meeting.
If anyone needs a strong argument to get the CG out of the regulatory oversight business, this debacle and coverup should be it. Greenpeace must be dancing in the halls over the ammunition this farce has provided them. It is the oil industry equivalent of the Bounty sailing but this time the CG is part of the scam instead of the hero for saving the victims of incompetence and stupidity. The CG is protecting its handlers and retirement employers.
There has been more than enough time for a dozen engineering labs to analyze the injectors and a hundred chemical labs to analyze every molecule of fuel. The truth is the CG and its industry handles don’t want to know, they don’t want the public to know. They are paid off to make sure no one who has the power and the voice to change the status quo. The public interest is not in their best interest.
Let’s have a congressional hearing to talk about the wisdom and ethics of the unholy alliance between the regulators and the regulated.
Wouldn’t the Aiviq’s fuel be running through a centrifuge before going to racors and primary fuel filters???
All new Chouest boats, as far as I know have at least one and the newest (within the last 4 years) have 2 Alfa Lavals. The FOPs do a pretty good job if you keep them clean, but they aren’t perfect. I know I’ve had some pretty heavy build up in my racor pots even with an FOP, especially when the tanks get all stirred up in heavy seas.
I talked to a tank cleaner and he mentioned that it took the tank cleaning crew that went up there, over 40 days to clean all the fuel tanks.
This biggest problem that I have with all of the talk about Bad Fuel is she was a brand new Vessel, so how dirty could her tanks be. I have worked on Vessels that had tanks so bad that I sat on the Deck Plates constantly cleaning the Duplex Strainer when we were in Twenty Foot Seas. I would clean on side then switch and clean the other side. Trust me it made for a very long trip. But the Aiviq was all but brand new. I wonder how many gallons of Fuel she had used up to the point of the grounding?
As for the Purifiers, if they were on line they should have had some warning that something was wrong with the fuel before the shit hit the fan.
[QUOTE=c.captain;111112]Here’s my findings in five simple lines
- The route taken was wrong for the nature of the tow and the time of year which placed the tow on a perilous lee shore and forced the tug to cross a shallow necessitating the tow be shortened dangerously for the seas encountered
- Using a single towing vessel introduced a major single point failure which happened
- The tow was rigged with far too light of gear and omitted the surge chain. Kotter pins used in tow shackles was not standard Alaskan industry practice and likely fell out
- There was a major infusion of water into AIVIQ’s day service tanks from either vents which were continuously submerged by heavy seas or some other reason not disclosed such as human error
- throughout the chain of responsibility there was a distinct lack of specific knowledge for towing in the Gulf of Alaska in the winter
end of report[/QUOTE]
I think you may be on the right tack with this but I am somewhat surprised at Shell’s ignorance. Did they not specify that the Aviq would be manned by people with experience towing in those waters? Who was the tow master that was capable of over ruling the master? How does that work? Not being familiar with towing maybe this is normal but it seems odd.
This engineer? Is he the same chief engineer for Chouest that didn’t know a by pass had been installed around the OWS on the Gould resulting in criminal penalties? If he is I can understand his testimony, if he isn’t the question is…where do they find these guys or are they cultivated? 
[QUOTE=c.captain;111112]Here’s my findings in five simple lines
- The route taken was wrong for the nature of the tow and the time of year which placed the tow on a perilous lee shore and forced the tug to cross a shallow necessitating the tow be shortened dangerously for the seas encountered
- Using a single towing vessel introduced a major single point failure which happened
- The tow was rigged with far too light of gear and omitted the surge chain. Kotter pins used in tow shackles was not standard Alaskan industry practice and likely fell out
- There was a major infusion of water into AIVIQ’s day service tanks from either vents which were continuously submerged by heavy seas or some other reason not disclosed such as human error
- throughout the chain of responsibility there was a distinct lack of specific knowledge for towing in the Gulf of Alaska in the winter
end of report[/QUOTE]
I think you overestimate the knowledge of the people sitting at the green table. I think there will be many more findings that will mean nothing, never be implemented because of indiustry squealing at cost, and a total lack of understanding of the gravity and potential daqmage of the situation at hand.
There will be much back slapping and congratulations and promotions throughout the USCG for the handling of the incident and when it happens again, the investigation team will know even less than this one. They will be lead around by the (the oil company) and the (contractors) and nobody except the Master will be found culpable.
I hope the master had license insurance…
Only one is a tow drum; two are anchor handling drums. You are right, that is three.
[QUOTE=BMCSRetired;111185]I think you overestimate the knowledge of the people sitting at the green table. I think there will be many more findings that will mean nothing, never be implemented because of indiustry squealing at cost, and a total lack of understanding of the gravity and potential daqmage of the situation at hand.
There will be much back slapping and congratulations and promotions throughout the USCG for the handling of the incident and when it happens again, the investigation team will know even less than this one. They will be lead around by the (the oil company) and the (contractors) and nobody except the Master will be found culpable.
I hope the master had license insurance…[/QUOTE]
Sadly you are probably right about the USCG’s role in all this. I heard a conversation recently about Carnival Cruise Lines debacles and someone said, “If they were under USCG regulation these things wouldn’t happen.” oh, really? The USCG doesn’t have the expertise or courage to oversee an oil drilling expedition or a US flagged towing operation in US waters and you believe they can oversee a 130,000t cruise ship with billions of dollars at play, ha !? There are still actually people who wonder why US mariners are not highly regarded in the world. My feeling is it is not because of the individual it is because those that license them and regulate the vessels appear to be as corrupt as any third world outfit.
[QUOTE=“anchorman;111190”]
Only one is a tow drum; two are anchor handling drums. You are right, that is three.[/QUOTE]
It seems like a design flaw that something that powerful doesn’t have the capability to tow with two wires. Crowley’s Invader class tugs are only 7,200 hp but have a dual wire drum…
That’t the difference between a towing vessel and an anchor vessel that can tow.
[QUOTE=anchorman;111215]That’t the difference between a towing vessel and an anchor vessel that can tow.[/QUOTE]
It seems like any vessel that is towing a large tow all alone out in the middle of nowhere, much less the Gulf of Alaska in the winter, ought to have a second tow wire in case the first one is lost.
And every towing vessel should have an Orville Hook and something to tow it with.
If the USCG wants to review and approve tow plans, methods and equipment to recover a lost tow should be an important part of the plan.
Question? On those Anchor Vessels with long stern decks how well do they handle those tows that tend to wander off to the side versus remaining straight behind the towing vessel.
The theory of regulatory capture, where interest groups with disproportionate amounts of power shape public policy, traces its roots back to the writings of Karl Marx.[1]
For public choice theorists, regulatory capture occurs because groups or individuals with a high-stakes interest in the outcome of policy or regulatory decisions can be expected to focus their resources and energies in attempting to gain the policy outcomes they prefer, while members of the public, each with only a tiny individual stake in the outcome, will ignore it altogether.[2] Regulatory capture refers to the actions by interest groups when this imbalance of focused resources devoted to a particular policy outcome is successful at “capturing” influence with the staff or commission members of the regulatory agency, so that the preferred policy outcomes of the special interest groups are implemented. For an example of this, see a statement by US Attorney General Richard Olney in the ICC section below.