Sadly you are probably right about the USCG’s role in all this. I heard a conversation recently about Carnival Cruise Lines debacles and someone said, “If they were under USCG regulation these things wouldn’t happen.” oh, really? The USCG doesn’t have the expertise or courage to oversee an oil drilling expedition or a US flagged towing operation in US waters and you believe they can oversee a 130,000t cruise ship with billions of dollars at play, ha !? There are still actually people who wonder why US mariners are not highly regarded in the world. My feeling is it is not because of the individual it is because those that license them and regulate the vessels appear to be as corrupt as any third world outfit.[/QUOTE]
Sadly, again, most of their practical knowledge is from reading and what is spoonfed to them. They refuse to call in people like Anchorman and others with hands-on experience to advise them on the questions to ask and places to look.
I lobbied for years both while serving and since retiring to no avail.
I love the people of that fine organization but cringe during situations like this. There is a core group that feel the same way that I do but they are normally ridiculed that a bunch of “boat trash” would have clue and therefore learn from us secretly do as not to be embarrassed or branded. They are also some of the best people i worked for in most casrs and i was given a LOT of leeway working gor them. This is unfortunate because those are the people pushed from the upper leadership, with a couple of notable exceptions and retire instead of playing the political game. Sad but true.
[QUOTE=DredgeBoyThrottleJocky;111227]The theory of regulatory capture, where interest groups with disproportionate amounts of power shape public policy, traces its roots back to the writings of Karl Marx.[1]
For public choice theorists, regulatory capture occurs because groups or individuals with a high-stakes interest in the outcome of policy or regulatory decisions can be expected to focus their resources and energies in attempting to gain the policy outcomes they prefer, while members of the public, each with only a tiny individual stake in the outcome, will ignore it altogether.[2] Regulatory capture refers to the actions by interest groups when this imbalance of focused resources devoted to a particular policy outcome is successful at “capturing” influence with the staff or commission members of the regulatory agency, so that the preferred policy outcomes of the special interest groups are implemented. For an example of this, see a statement by US Attorney General Richard Olney in the ICC section below.[/QUOTE]
Regulatory capture was also recognized by Nobel economist George Stigler a virulent anti-Marxist. He recognized that regulatory capture was an end result of concentrated power of too much influence/money. In other words…corruption.
Yeah, 70 years later… Or maybe I’m looking at this all wrong, coasties ordered the Crowley boat to drop the tow, against the masters wishes, FOUR MILES from the beach… Maybe it was more like “Well, we both sort of screwed up, so let’s just forget it ever happened…”. I guess that would be more like “Regulatory Culpability”.
Can anyone watch this video and say that Nanuk wasn’t ironed out at the video cut? @ 30 seconds or so.
Capt. Jon Skoglund, master of the tow ship Aiviq, testifies on Thursday, May 30, 2013 in Anchorage, Alaska, during the formal marine casualty hearing into Shell Oil’s conical drilling rig Kulluk grounding on Sitkalidak Island, Alaska on Dec. 31, 2012.
Near the end, after a number of broken tow connections and tow ship engine failures, after a mistakenly dropped anchor and scary rescues of crew, after five days in an escalating Gulf of Alaska storm, two boats finally had Shell’s unwieldy oil drilling rig, the Kulluk, under tow.
Jon Skoglund, skipper of the Kulluk’s Louisiana-built tow ship, the Aiviq, testified Thursday before a Coast Guard investigation panel about that fleeting control as well as problems with his vessel’s fuel, concerns about the voyage route, and other factors that may have contributed to the drilling rig’s Dec. 31 nighttime grounding south of Kodiak Island.
The Aiviq, whose crew resurrected all four failed engines at sea, and the Alert, a Crowley Marine Services tugboat sent to help, earlier that day drew up close to the drifting, unmanned Kulluk. They connected to broken tow lines in extreme conditions and at last were making way, Skoglund said.
So what changed? asked Cmdr. Joshua McTaggart, the Coast Guard’s lead investigator of the grounding.
“I’d have to go back and check my accuracy with the log, but I believe we were instructed to change course and that made a considerable difference in our headway,” Skoglund answered.
By then, a unified command team that included the Coast Guard, Royal Dutch Shell, and Aiviq owner Edison Chouest Offshore was giving orders from an emergency command center set up in the Anchorage Marriott Downtown. The boats and drilling rig had been headed to the closest safe refuge from the storm, but were instructed to go to “the vicinity of Kodiak” instead, Skoglund said. The Kulluk began pulling them back. The Aiviq’s tow line broke, then, as Alert was being pulled to shore, Coast Guard Capt. Paul Mehler ordered it to cut its line. The abandoned Kulluk hit the rocks.
A hearing that is part of the broader formal marine casualty investigation wrapped up Thursday afternoon after nine days of sworn testimony by more than a dozen witnesses, including Shell managers, assorted boat captains, a high-ranking Coast Guard officer and various other players in the complicated machinery running the Kulluk tow operation. Investigators canceled Friday’s testimony, which was going to feature a towing expert. Shell’s contractor in charge of the failed December tow, John Becker of Offshore Rig Movers International, was on the witness list but didn’t testify because of a family emergency.
McTaggart’s report on the investigation is due July 5 to Rear Adm. Thomas Ostebo, commander of the Coast Guard in Alaska. It must be approved by the Coast Guard commandant in Washington, D.C., before being released to the public, McTaggart said in wrapping up the hearing. He could recommend changes in safety procedures or equipment to prevent similar problems or propose further action against individuals licensed by the Coast Guard. But he won’t assign punishment, he said.
The Aiviq was custom built for Shell to tow the Kulluk alone and succeeded in moving it from Seattle north through a Chukchi Sea storm to the Beaufort Sea drilling site then south to Dutch Harbor.
When Skoglund took over command of the Aiviq in mid-December, he reviewed Shell’s plan to tow it from Dutch Harbor to the Seattle area for major off-season maintenance. He raised concerns about the near shore route and said he pushed for a more direct, southerly course in deeper water, the Great Circle route.
That route would have allowed a tow line up to two-thirds of a mile long, Skoglund said. A long line sinks deep into the sea, and the weight of the line helps absorb the force of rough weather. Plus, being further off shore gives a ship “sea room,” a distance that can prevent a grounding, he testified.
Becker agreed with him, Skoglund said, but they were overridden by Noble Drilling Corp.'s need to be near enough to shore for evacuation of hurt or ill crew members riding on the Kulluk.
On Dec. 22, the day after the Kulluk and the Aiviq left Dutch Harbor, Skoglund said he again pushed for a southern route but didn’t get permission to change course until Dec. 25 as he saw rough weather coming up on them.
Coast Guard investigator Keith Fawcett asked Skoglund about the ship’s fuel. The Aiviq loaded up with 440,000 gallons of diesel at the Delta Western fuel dock in Dutch Harbor, Skoglund said.
A biocide agent often is added to fuel to prevent algae and filter-clogging slime, Fawcett said. The Aiviq’s chief engineer testified earlier that slime damaged dozens of fuel injectors and caused the engine shutdowns but he didn’t know what caused the slime.
“Do you know if biocide was introduced into the fuel of the Aiviq at any point?” Fawcett asked.
“To my knowledge, we had never treated those fuel tanks with biocide,” Skoglund answered.
The Aiviq’s fuel is still undergoing testing, according to the Coast Guard.
Despite the troubles, the Aiviq was, and still is, capable of towing the Kulluk alone, Skoglund said. That arrangement eliminates the risk of two tow vessels crashing into each other or the rig, he said.
The tow setup included a 90-foot length of heavy surge chain, and the tow line was 31/2 inch-thick wire, which also is heavy. That gear serves as an underwater spring in rough water, he said.
Also on Thursday, the first hint of blame arose in the hearing.
Shell’s standards manager for offshore operations, Jonathan Wilson, testified by phone from London about how after the grounding, the damaged Kulluk was towed from Kiluida Bay back to Dutch Harbor by three vessels with heavy tow gear. The vessels between them had 300 metric tons of pulling power, compared to 200 tons for the Aiviq alone. A backup tugboat and an oil-spill response vessel added to the flotilla.
Shell lawyer Gregory Linsin asked Wilson his reaction to earlier sworn testimony by a Shell contractor, warranty surveyor Anthony Flynn of oil and gas consultant GL Noble Denton. The company was hired to verify the Aiviq-Kulluk tow setup.
Wilson testified that he was surprised when Flynn said his work wasn’t intended to check the adequacy of the setup against marine industry standards or engineering calculations but just was making sure the gear conformed with Shell’s tow plan.
Shell now is doing an internal review of its worldwide towing operations, Wilson said.
At least the captain isn’t as stoopid as his chief engineer!
[QUOTE=BMCSRetired;111228]Sadly, again, most of their practical knowledge is from reading and what is spoonfed to them. They refuse to call in people like Anchorman and others with hands-on experience to advise them on the questions to ask and places to look.
I lobbied for years both while serving and since retiring to no avail.
I love the people of that fine organization but cringe during situations like this. There is a core group that feel the same way that I do but they are normally ridiculed that a bunch of “boat trash” would have clue and therefore learn from us secretly do as not to be embarrassed or branded. They are also some of the best people i worked for in most casrs and i was given a LOT of leeway working gor them. This is unfortunate because those are the people pushed from the upper leadership, with a couple of notable exceptions and retire instead of playing the political game. Sad but true.[/QUOTE]
That is sad as the USCG used to be one of the most highly regarded government entities out there. I remember well when their primary mission was saving people and even property. I can remember when they used to tow yachts, which thankfully they don’t do any more. But where else is an organization that says “You have to go out but you don’t have to come back” ? That’s a balls bearing bunch. Sadly the emphasis now seems to be on “homeland security” which of course was always part of the mission but now seems to be at the front because that’s where the money is. Regulating vessels was really never their strong suit as they were reactive most of the time but now they have been co-opted by those at the top who are more worried about the next promotion or “keeping the options open” for after retirement work. There is a lot of money out there that is more than willing to help them with the next promotion or the next job option. There still exists a core group of true believers though, they aren’t big on self promotion, they just do a demanding job with sometimes not a lot to work with; I wish they got the recognition they deserve.
[QUOTE=Quimby;111291]In the years I was up there, fuel was never bad. It’s got to be good. Pretty far to go to the next fuel dock. Akutan? Pribilofs?[/QUOTE]
As I have said, there are likely 300 vessels in and around DH that have some that same fuel in their tanks. There is no way in hell that load was foul or boats would be having problems all over Alaska (supposedly that chief claims in his testimony he was hearing from other boats with problems with their fuel but I think that is pure BS!) It was water in AIVIQ’s service tanks that caused all the engines to die like they did in rapid succession. Why so much water got into the fuel is of course a whole other matter. Submerged vents or human error? Either would be ECO’s fault since they designed and built the vessel and manned her but ECO never ever is willing to admit any mistake! PERISH THE THOUGHT! THEY ARE THE BEST AT EVERYTHING OFFSHORE…JUST ASK THEM!
I say that the entire circus was 100% avoidable if Shell, Noble and ECO had an operating philosophy that allowed good qualified Alaska experienced vessel personnel to perform their jobs as professional mariners (vis. the master being allowed to go further offshore with KULLUK!)
Coasties Ordered the Alert to drop the tow Four Miles from the Beach. I’m just a lowly throttle jockey, but I’ll fight to the last freakin’ INCH before giving up, tack off, pray, but NEVER give up! Seeing the Nanuk spinning out with hard left rudder leads me to believe that “Does All” boats don’t. Anything past 10 or 15 degrees off center and your TAILHOOKED! Can’t find specs for Nanuk, but gotta be at least a couple thousand tons. So, if Alviq’s working her gear past the rating, out of step, towing short, and Nanuk gets tripped out, in irons because she’s not really a towboat, and adds a couple thousand ton load to Alviq’s gear at the exact wrong time, POP goes the Weasel…
He is correct they were running at 100% and the engines couldn’t take it from what I heard as well no break down just get a little too warm for the computers liking.
Yes I was on-scene. I cant share specifics but like I said earlier, it was determined that the safety of the crew was more important than taking the chance of something happening to the Alert AND the Kulluk. Anyone whos sailed near the coast of Kodiak will understand this when coupled with 25-30ft seas and 50-70kt winds that were pushing the rig directly towards Sitkalidak Isl.
Its not a very fun place to be in winter. I certainly didnt find it fun…
